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SYNOPSIS
Leading analysts in the field of foreign policy in a 
parliamentary democracy have long argued that Parliament can 
have no significant impact on foreign policy.
This thesis, through case studies of one part of the 
parliamentary system - the Foreign Affairs Committees - argues 
the contrary view that legislatures have actually exerted 
important influence on external policies, albeit in exceptional 
cases.
The thesis further seeks to derive some empirically valid 
generalisations concerning the circumstances and conditions 
under which the possibilities for such influence are greatest. 
In deriving these generalisations I have undertaken case 
studies of three parliamentary systems with significantly 
different traditions - the Australian, Canadian and V7est 
German - in order to determine the extent to which key 
variables are system bound or whether and to what degree they 
are valid beyond national boundaries.
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INTRODUCTION
Parliament's participation in the area of foreign policy 
has remained a source of conflict and confusion since 
de Tocqueville's suggestion that the natures of democracy and 
foreign policy are not easily reconciled.^ While parliamentary 
Committee influence on foreign policy decisions has to be seen 
in this wider context,I have not tried to discuss this complex 
issue in terms of political philosophy. However, an attempt 
has been made to describe an important aspect of the 
relationship between Parliament and foreign policy. Even here 
I have confined myself to a discussion of the influence of 
parliamentary Committees on foreign policy decisions. It is 
true, of course, that while Parliament's actions embrace those 
of its Committees,its overall activities span a wider range. 
These non-Committee activities, such as 'question time', debates 
on foreign policy issues and individual influence on the 
Government's foreign policy exercised by non-Committee members, 
consequently will not be extensively discussed. In any case, 
as will be demonstrated, nearly all parliamentary foreign 
policy activities norroaüy almost inevitably involve Committee 
members. Moreover, while it is acknowledged that there can be 
parliamentary influences outside of the Committees/ it is argued 
that the Committee's activity represents one of the most 
important forces. This, of course, does not imply that 
Parliament has any automatic significance in formulating 
Government policy.
Once the parliamentary influences on a Government's foreign 
policy have been delineated, the means whereby such influence 
can be exerted should next be examined.
One tactic which conceivably influences the Government's 
foreign policy decisions is that of public accusation. Its aim
De Tocqueville, of course, was referring to the American 
presidential system but the point is equally, if not more valid 
for a parliamentary system.
2is to discredit the Government within and particularly outside 
Parliament. The effect of this tactic is mainly to unite 
Government supporters, polarise public opinion and, more 
importantly, divide further Government and Opposition supporters 
rather than directly influence foreign policy decisions. From 
this stage onwards there no longer exist supporters and 
opponents of a particular issue but only supporters and 
opponents of the Government. Because of the divisive effect I 
call this 'divisive politics'. Aspects of divisive influence 
have been described by both Government and Opposition Committee 
members in terms of, for example, 'Opposition blackmail, vote 
hunting or ideological hoo-haa'. This characterises the 
overwhelmingly emotional nature of divisive influence.
An alternative way to influence Government decisions I 
shall call 'integrative politics'. This strategy intends to 
persuade and convince the executive rather than directly oppose 
it. It is often necessary to pursue this in a non-public, 
quasi-confidential manner. While the motives of seeking to 
influence a decision may vary, the aim is to change a planned 
course of action without subjecting the Government to 
embarrassing criticism. Another aim of 'integrative politics' 
is to require the executive to defend its planned actions 
rationally, to respond unemotionally to sincere and serious 
arguments and to supply further information. The effect of 
'integrative politics' is to open up channels of communication 
with the executive and to create a cooperative atmosphere and 
a notion of mutual respect among backbenchers of different 
persuasion as well as between Committee members and the 
executive. Aspects of integrated politics have been described 
by interested parliamentarians in the following manner: 'We
put the country first', or, more ironically 'Those Committee- 
statesmen ...'. Other parliamentary comments include: 'It's
normal to want influence, but one has to be able to keep one's 
mouth shut', or 'We know how to handle the executive, but we 
need even more information'. And an Opposition member, 
reflecting the tension between integrative and divisive politics,
3complained: 'The External Affairs Committee members have now
gained some prestige and influence, but what about our party's 
interest?'
So far I have not clearly stated what I understand by 
'influence'. While this term is to some extent self-evident 
I have not quantified the amount and extent of it. I intend to 
deal with some areas of influence lying between total or final 
control and any sort of impact, however small. I believe that 
parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committees, although hardly 
infallible, provide inputs into the foreign policy decision­
making process, which on balance result in improved decisions. 
This belief illustrates some of my normative values or 
prejudices which have led to the selection of this topic.
These normative values also help to explain what I regard as 
the difference between influence and control. Here I am not 
referring to control in its absolute sense but rather to a 
series of checks and balances. In this context being in favour 
of more control represents a desire to increase the limits on 
the free reign of power by the executive. This type of control 
has been defined by Gordon Reid as a
periodic check on the executive government ... a 
periodic oversight, or the maintenance of a 
parliamentary audit - taking the analogy to call for 
random checks by parliamentarians. The purpose of 
control in these terms is to engender an attitude of 
responsiveness and accountability to the public3 of 
prudence3 rectitude and circumspection in official 
affairs - from the highest employee to the lowest.2
Consequently Reid's description of control can be seen to be 
influence on a higher moral plain. XdaaÜr&trc Elements of 
democratic purity appear to be overlaid on influence, and 
despite the apparent conflict with political reality, the moral 
qualities of control deserve consideration. While the 
considerable influence of these views in the selection of the
G.S. Reid, 'Parliament and the Bureaucracy' in John Wilkes 
(Ed.), Who Runs Australia?, Sydney, 1972, pp.3-4.
4topic must be acknowledged it was also recognised that an 
analysis of foreign policy decision-making was first required.
Reid himself acknowledges the immense difficulties in
carrying out what he suggests and proposes that 'if the
legislative function is wTeak ... the ability of the Houses to
3control the bureaucracy is also weak ...*.
Be that as it may in the area of domestic policy, in 
the area of foreign policy there can be no doubt that the 
legislative function is most severely limited. While 
constitutions in most parliamentary democracies have bestowed 
upon national Parliaments the power to make laws with respect 
to foreign affairs, defence and external trade in practice the 
legislators have, in Peter R. Baehr's words, found it 'hard to 
exercise their controlling function because of the following 
factors:
- secrecy on account of vital matters, concerning 
national interests;
- the resulting lack of sufficient information;
- limited applicability of legislative and budgetary 
powers to foreign policy'.^
For different reasons and sometimes with regret, more often
with satisfaction and most frequently with disinterest or
indifference many contributors to this field have come to the
conclusion that Parliament's role in formulating foreign policy
5is not a substantial one.
This verdict has been presented in such a convincing and 
comprehensive manner that, at least in the field of foreign
3 Ibid., p.5.
4 Peter R. Baehr, 'Parliamentary Control over Foreign Policy in 
the Netherlands' in Government and Opposition, Vol. 9, No. 2, 
1974, p.169.
5 See for example, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Entscheidungen 
(BVerfGE), 1, 351/369/1952; J.D.B. Miller, 'The Role of the 
Australian Parliament in Foreign Policy' in Parliamentarian, 
Vol. 50, January 1969, pp.1-6; Peter Lyon, 'Canada, the United 
States and Vietnam: A Comment' in Journal of Commonwealth
Political Studies, Vol. 6, 1968, p.151.
5policy, very little consideration has been given to possible 
changes. However in the nineteen sixties H. Kopf, West Germany’s 
Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, was one of 
the few who stated flatly that foreign affairs was a 'combined 
power', shared jointly between Parliament and Government.^ His 
statement was ignored and dismissed by theoreticians and 
constitutional lawyers as wishful thinking.
Nevertheless Kopf and his Committee sought and occasionally 
found 'power via the backdoor', despite former rulings of the 
highest court, thus establishing precedents for parliamentary 
influence in foreign affairs. This sort of parliamentary power 
'via the backdoor' appears to have added a new dimension to the 
relationship of Parliament and foreign policy.
This is in seeming contradiction to the views of 
J.D.B. Miller describing the Australian Committee influence:
The role of the Australian Parliament in foreign 
policy is the same as that of any other Parliament 
working to the rules of responsible government. It 
cannot make foreign policy; this is the task of the 
executive.7
While Miller's statement does not preclude parliamentary 
influence over foreign policy, he goes on to list specific 
functions which in practice add up to extremely limited 
influence indeed:
[Parliament can be] ... a sounding board, from which 
the Government and Opposition can project their views 
on what should be done, and partly that of a self- 
educating device whereby Members, whether previously 
specializing in foreign affairs or not, can enlarge 
their knowledge by service on the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, by trips abroad, and by participation in 
the rough-and-tumble of parliamentary discussion. It 
is not a substantial role. But, short of an adoption 
of the system of separation of powers, I do not see 
how it could be.8
H. Kopf, 'Das Parlament und die auswaertige Politik' in 
Aussenpolitik, May 1971, pp.307 and 312.
7 J.D.B. Miller, op,cit.f p.6.
8 Ibid.
6J.D.B. Miller's description of the existing Australian 
situation in this area appears to have a broad base of 
empirical support, but exceptions exist where the Committee role 
did have significant substance. Furthermore, H. Kopfs 
experience suggests, even without adopting a system of 
separation of powers, the possibility of securing parliamentary 
Committee influence in the field of foreign policy. Indeed, I 
shall argue it is not the principle of the division of powers 
that is the decisive factor which determines whether Parliament 
(or its Committee) exercises influence on foreign policy 
decisions. I believe it depends more on the capability and 
keenness of one side in pursuing influence and of the other in 
opposing this.
Having already distinguished two types of politics, namely 
divisive and integrative, the nature of the two 'sides' 
mentioned above should be outlined. Political theorists have 
considered this problem in terms of a conflict between 
executive and legislature and/or between Government and 
Opposition.
Most academics nowadays consider that the former (executive 
versus legislature) has become outmoded and that the latter is 
more appropriate in describing the political realities of the 
present system. Hardly anyone today believes that Parliament 
as such opposes the Government: Party loyalties within the
governing group will normally prevent it from strong and public 
criticism of the Government, let alone force a change of action 
upon the executive, especially in the field of foreign policy. 
Very rarely will a Government backbencher feel he can accept 
the odium of a traitor; he might however try to achieve a 
compromise in the party room with various degrees of success.
Public and severe criticism of the Government's decisions 
or intentions has become the domain of the parliamentary 
Opposition. This Opposition is not only expected to articulate 
justifiable criticisms, but may also indulge itself in political 
hyperbole. This self-assigned role, often supported by 
political theoreticians, appears to require what has previously 
been described as divisive politics.
7While in general the relationship between the Government 
and its backbenchers can best be described in terms of 
integrative politics, and that between Government and Opposition 
in terms of divisive politics, the relationship between the 
Governments foreign policy decision-maker and the parliamentary 
Foreign Affairs Committee is more subtle and requires a more 
complex description. It first appears necessary to elucidate 
the composition of the Committee and the executive grouping with 
which the Committee has to deal.
The Chairman of a Foreign Affairs Committee normally 
belongs to the Government party or parties; in Germany he can 
also be a member of the Opposition. Chairmen of the Committee 
are usually members with a specially keen interest in foreign 
affairs and include an ex-foreign affairs minister and MPs who 
looked to the Chairmanship of the Committee in terms of a 
lifetime career.
Members of the Committee often include future Cabinet
members and sometimes Prime Ministers or Chancellors. Even in
Australia H. Turner has pointed to the large number of9ex-Committee members achieving ministerial positions. Most 
members of the Committee are also members of their party's and 
their parliamentary party's foreign affairs committees.
On the other side the executive grouping dealing with the 
Committee normally consists of the Foreign Affairs and Defence 
Ministers, sometimes the Prime Minister or Cabinet, in Canada 
and Germany the respective Parliamentary Secretaries of State, 
the head of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Departments, other 
top bureaucrats and occasionally other lower-ranking officers 
from these Departments.
Introducing the composition of the parliamentary Committee 
and the executive grouping as above does not necessarily 
delineate the nature and dividing line between opposing factions. 
A description of the nature of the workings of a parliamentary
H. Turner, 'The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Australian 
Parliament' in Australian Outlook, Vol. 20, April 1966, p.23.
8Foreign Affairs Committee cannot always be given in terms of 
Parliament versus executive, Opposition versus Government or 
even parliamentary Committee versus parts of the executive. 
While elements of these theoretical confrontations will always 
be present, I will suggest that influential Committee operation 
demands abandonment of any rigid structure of confrontation, in 
favour of ad hoc alliances across party and bureaucratic lines. 
I call these loose alliances 'fluid coalitions' since in 
practice they represent the contending factions in any foreign 
policy decision. While these fluid coalitions may be composed 
of exactly the above theoretical groupings (Government versus 
Opposition etc.), very often they transcend party interest and 
departmental or other loyalties. A formation of such coalition 
is only possible when interest in and concern for a specific 
foreign policy issue overrides the prescribed positions or 
conversely where it does not threaten those positions. It is, 
of course, very difficult for an Opposition Committee member 
to abandon the idea that one of his main roles should be to 
expose the Government's faults and for Government Committee 
members to criticise their Government. It is also very hard 
for a Foreign Affairs or Defence Minister to concede changes 
and it needs an outstanding bureaucrat to admit that good 
judgement can occasionally also be found outside his 
department. From this it appears clear that integrative 
politics is the only means by which fluid coalitions can 
operate. As we shall see in the case studies there is no 
reason to believe that power politics has been naively 
abandoned, merely that the means by which power is exercised 
have been changed. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe 
that parliamentarians in general and Opposition members in 
particular cannot achieve their objectives because the 
representatives of the executive are more familiar with the 
system and the use of integrative politics.
Political 'realists', especially in Australia, will 
nevertheless argue that the above set-up is strongly influenced 
by idealism or elitism, by wishful thinking or even ideology. 
Normativists who show a great concern over parliamentary
9influence in terms of parliamentary control will argue that 
the means by which I suggest control shall be exercised run 
contrary to the aims and purposes of control itself. Of course, 
classical forms of divisive politics can contribute to control. 
Thus Opposition attacks on a particularly vulnerable matter can 
cause the Government embarrassment and force a change in policy 
or administration. However, I shall argue that apart from 
exceptional cases, in dealing with matters of foreign policy 
substance over the long run the parliamentary Committee will 
be most able to secure responsiveness to its initiatives from 
the executive by means of integrative politics.
While conceding that a system of integrated politics 
cannot guarantee parliamentary control in the above sense, it 
represents a step forward in its achievement and most 
definitely does not exclude it. What it does often exclude, 
however, is direct accountability to the public. Nonetheless, 
public accountability is only one step removed since it occurs 
through the public's representatives in Parliament. While 
some people may regard this as having removed the decisive 
element in control, I pose the question, what are the 
alternatives?
While I have indicated my sympathy for increasing 
parliamentary control or influence on foreign policy decision­
making this is not one of the main topics of my thesis. The 
views of J.D.B. Miller and the rulings of the highest German 
Constitutional Court are typical of all those who either 
maintain that there should not be or that there cannot be any 
considerable parliamentary influence or control on the 
formulation of a Government's foreign policy under a 
parliamentary system. An investigation into the practical 
possibilities of parliamentary Committee influence could 
therefore create the framework for a serious discussion upon 
pros and cons of parliamentary control in the field of foreign 
policy. So far such a debate has not eventuated because the 
existence of parliamentary influence has not been demonstrated. 
Such a demonstration would remove the problem of desirability 
of Committee influence from the problem of its possible and 
effective implementation.
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For this reason I have concentrated on the following 
question:
- Are there or have there been Foreign Affairs 
Committees which exert or exerted an influence, 
whether large or small, on foreign policy decisions 
under a parliamentary system?
Furthermore a cautious attempt has been made to formulate 
tentative propositions dealing with the following questions:
- If influence exists, what circumstances contributed 
towards its effective achievement?
- Was this influence unique to specific situations or 
are recurring patterns observable?
- To the extent that patterns exist, are they limited 
to single political cultures or do they operate in 
all parliamentary democracies under analysis?
For these purposes I have selected several case studies from 
West Germany, Canada and Australia. I chose these countries 
because of what I believed to be their differing experiences 
with influence exercised by parliamentary Foreign Affairs 
Committees. From previous research I felt justified in 
assuming that West Germany exemplified a relatively high 
degree of Committee influence; Australia is generally 
considered as having a singularly weak parliamentary Foreign 
Affairs Committee. I expected Canada to occupy an 
intermediate position, because although operating under the 
Westminster system the Canadian parliamentary Committees are 
relatively well developed.
Despite the fact that there are similarities between the 
three countries'^ I have chosen these parliamentary systems 
because of their differences. There are differences in 
political culture and political tradition; their constitutions 
and standing orders of Parliament are also greatly different.
Basically, West Germany, Canada and Australia have two- 
party systems; in each case smaller parties exist which often 
have an important impact on the forming of a Government. All 
three countries are federations. All three states have been 
confronted with the problem of parliamentary influence in 
foreign policy decisions only after World War II.
11
While it is acknowledged that all these factors can have and 
have had some bearing on foreign policy decisions and perhaps 
on the workings of the Committees I have concentrated my 
analysis on the political behaviour of the Committee members and 
members of the executive grouping.
Generalisations from such an analysis promise to have some 
broader validity if based on a diversity of case studies 
selected from such different national systems.
Since the main aim of the thesis is to establish whether 
parliamentary Committee influence in the field of foreign policy 
is in practice possible or not it is necessary to examine case 
studies which are likely to yield a positive result.
Consequently no attempt has been made to present a balanced 
comparison of the case studies from different countries. 
Naturally, because of West Germany's suspected, inclination to 
allow some degree of parliamentary Committee influence on 
foreign policy decisions a preponderance of case studies have 
been selected from this country.
While I have selected, at least in the case of West 
Germany and Canada, some of the most important foreign policy 
decisions in these states I cannot claim that these case 
studies are representative of the Committees' general importance 
in the foreign policy decision-making process. Even if these 
case studies indicate that considerable Committee influence in 
the field of foreign policy is possible I am not going to argue 
that in Canada or even in West Germany the Committee always 
represents a major foreign policy decision-maker. What can be 
argued, however, in this eventuality, is that the Committee is 
sometimes a potentially important force in the foreign policy 
decision-making process, and while I do not believe that the 
Committee is or always should become involved in all decisions,
I do believe that its potential influence can contribute to 
fulfil the function of parliamentary control.
In the event that parliamentary Committee influence or. 
foreign policy decisions can as a practical possibility be
12
established I shall attempt to formulate propositions which can 
be thought of as the necessary but not sufficient conditions 
for this influence to be exercised.
The reason for the different proportion of case studies 
selected from Australia, Canada and West Germany has already 
been given. The amount of attention allotted to each of the 
case studies however also requires some explanation. There are 
several reasons. The amount of material available was a major 
factor. Within this limitation the degree of detail devoted to 
the individual studies was partly determined by what was 
regarded as necessary to illustrate the importance or otherwise 
of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee in the decision­
making process. Furthermore, previous contributions to a 
specific subject have affected the extent of its consideration. 
Finally, in some cases I regarded a detailed historical 
description of extremely important foreign policy events, which 
had not yet come under close investigation, as having a value 
sui generis.
A brief introduction to the selected case studies can now 
be presented. Following the advice of German parliamentarians 
I examined three of the most important instances of 
parliamentary influence in the history of the Federal Republic.
Chapter One examines the Jaksch-Report, which can be seen 
as the forerunner in the early 1960s of the West German 
Ostpolitik in the seventies. This report has only recently 
been discovered by academics. It is hard to imagine the degree 
of co-operation between the various participants during the 
discussions which led to the Jaksch-Report, since ironically, 
at the present time there is a considerable divergence in the 
views of the different parties on exactly this topic. Even in 
the sixties, however, everything was not plain sailing and the 
chapter analysis shows an integrative approach developed 
gradually over time.
-MeIn the eyes of many German parliamentarians/ influence of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee on the so-called Franco-German 
Friendship Treaty stands out as an example of Parliament's
13
capacity to affect foreign policy decisions. The second 
chapter examines this assertion. The outcome of this analysis 
assumes a high degree of significance since this treaty touched 
upon foreign policy problems of the greatest importance for 
West Germany.
The third chapter, an analysis of a treaty between France 
and West Germany about the Mundat Forest, deals with a conflict 
between Parliament and Government or, more accurately, between 
the political elite and the majority of the backbenchers of all 
parties. The motives of those MPs who effectively blocked 
ratification of that treaty were widely different, and for some 
readers this case will not be more than, perhaps, an amusing 
anecdote to West Germany's history. Like the first case, 
however, the Mundat Forest Treaty supports the thesis in that 
a formal legislative function will render it easier for 
Parliament to exert influence on a Government decision. In 
other words when it is formally necessary for Parliament to 
give its consent the Committee members need not rely solely on 
integrative politics.
The selection of a case study dealing with the influence 
of the Joint Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee on the 
formulation of Australia's foreign policy was particularly 
difficult. On the one hand there was no clear-cut case in 
which considerable influence could be easily identified. On 
the other hand^ however^ there were a few cases where the 
Committee was not as unimportant as a reading of Miller's 
article would suggest. While by international standards the 
Committee's influence on Australia's foreign policy decision­
making must be regarded as low, it appears that nearly all 
Committee reports had a certain effect on Australia's foreign 
policy. Even Australian parliamentarians when asked could not 
agree in which case the Committee's influence was strongest.
In Chapter Four I have chosen an analysis of the Committee's 
Aid Report, because this report had been completed and its 
effects were already evident, whereas the other alternatives 
such as the Omega issue or the Russian threat in the Indian 
Ocean were issues that were unresolved. This analysis deals
14
not only with the manner in which a Committee in Australia 
attempts to exert influence but it also throws some light on 
the reaction of the Department of Foreign Affairs to an issue 
which impinges on a particular departmental interest.
Difficulties arose also with the analysis of the most 
suitable case study in Canada. These difficulties, however, 
did not refer to the selection of the case study. Here there 
were no alternatives. ’Canada's 1969 decision to remain in NATO 
under certain conditions has therefore been chosen for 
analysis in Chapter Five. This is probably the most important 
foreign policy decision in the history of post-war Canada. It 
was part of the only comprehensive review of the nation's 
foreign policy. The foreign Affairs Committee of the Lower 
House was explicitly invited by the Government to participate 
in this review, and although this is still a matter of dispute 
some analysts argue that the Committee exerted a significant 
influence on this case. Not the influence as such but the 
determination of the degree of influence produced the above- 
mentioned difficulties. A multiplicity of competing factors 
were involved in this decision and nowhere else was their 
entanglement o€—the compet-irng faeter^ e so complicated.
After analysis of these five case studies which have been 
selected principally to establish the possibility of 
parliamentary Committee influence on the foreign policy 
decision-making process, it became clear that further case 
studies were required in order to elucidate some general 
principles involved in such influence.
To this end I have selected three further case studies, 
one from Canada and two from West Germany. These three cases 
also provided a test of some of the underlying assumptions 
which have characterised the presentation of the earlier case 
studies. The question is whether it was a valid approach to 
assume that an analysis of the political behaviour of foreign 
policy actors in three different parliamentary systems would 
supply sufficient data and insights, not only to establish the 
possibility of Committee influence but also to formulate some 
general principles. Alternatively, does the difficulty of
14 a
A note on sources and methodology is now in order.
The unusual feature of this thesis is its heavy reliance 
on interviews. This was made necessary by the nature of 
the inquiry, i.e., the behaviour of politicians in situa­
tions where written documentation was frequently unavai­
lable .
In the German case, procedures of strict confidenti­
ality of Committee documents made recourse to interviews 
the only possible way to provide a detailed reconstruction 
of events. In the Canadian and Australian cases, while 
such strict confidentiality did not always exist, neverthe­
less there were frequently gaps in the written documenta­
tion which could only be filled by interviews. In the 
Australian case, moreover, I was able to gain access to some 
documents which could not be cited; therefore it was neces­
sary to confirm the information by use of interviews.
Naturally, rules of evidence are necessary for evalua­
ting and using such material. At the outset it must be 
stated clearly that every interview source must be taken for 
what it is: the statements of politicians who are not above 
consciously or unconsciously distorting reality to enhance 
their own roles and positions. In addition, quite apart from 
the question of motives, the human memory is fallible and 
human errors are inevitable. Accepting these limitations, 
however, I have applied the following rules in order to en­
sure, as far as possible, the accuracy of the statements 
used in this thesis.
First, no statement has been used when clearly conflic­
ting evidence is available from the sources, whether these 
sources be written or additional interviews. 10a) Second, 
a systematic effort was made to crosscheck data provided in 
interviews by pursuing the same points in interviews with 
other politicians as well as by reference to available writ­
ten documentation. Third, a consistent effort was made to 
ascertain that each specific piece of factual information 
was consistent with the Jarger political context.
More narrowly, I have generally identified my informants 
but in some cases this was not possible because the indivi­
dual concerned required anonymity. In these cases the reader 
can only accept the descriptions of the individuals concerned 
at face value and rest assured that the same rules of evidence 
have been applied as in those cases where the interviewees 
are identified by name.
Finally I can only again stress the need for circumspec­
tion in evaluating information drawn from interview sources 
given the inherent problem which also arises concerning 
written documents. The fact that the information is oral 
rather than written may create specific methodological problen 
but it does not make the evidence cited necessarily more sus­
pect than that from documentary sources provided rigorous 
standards are applied.
10a) Of course, certain dubious statements have been inclu­
ded in the thesis to indicate the perspectives of the indi­
viduals concerned. But these have been clearly indentified 
as personal opinions and contrary evidence has been cited.
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transferring across national boundaries a specific nation's 
historic experience, political culture, international 
environment or constitutional framework render invalid any 
general conclusions?
The way in which a normally powerless Canadian Senate 
Foreign Affairs Committee 'persuaded' the Government to change 
its attitudes towards sugar rebates to the West Indies (Chapter 
Six), a case study of one of West Germany's first attempts to 
integrate itself into Western Europe (Chapter Seven) and an 
analysis of the parliamentary treatment of Willy Brandt's 
Ostpolitik (Chapter Eight) have been selected to assist in the 
assessment of the relevance of these points.
The aim here has never been to provide a definitive answer 
to such fundamental questions. Rather, an attempt has been 
made merely to outline the means by which Committee influence 
has been effective in the selected cases. However, as a 
consequence some conditions have been tentatively proposed 
under which Committee influence on foreign policy decisions may 
re-occur in future. (Ccfo'hnU&d l^o)
Although this work should not be regarded as defining a 
general rigid principle, the establishment of the existence of 
Committee influence, the partial identification of the mechanism 
involved in its effective use and the proposal of conditions 
required for its future occurrence should be seen in the light 
of a stimulus for further detailed research.
CHAPTER ONE
THE ORIGINS OF OSTPOLITIK: THE JAKSCH-REPORT
This chapter analyses the emergence of the so-called 
Jaksch-Report which provided the basis for German Ostpolitik 
for more than a decade. As already mentioned this case 
encompasses examples of both divisive and integrative influence 
as it covers a transitional period in the strategies of the 
social democratic opposition. Initially, as analysed at greater 
length in Chapter Six, the Opposition adopted confrontational 
tactics whose fundamental aim was to appeal to the German public 
over the head of the Federal Government. In 1960 the Opposition 
publicly embraced a new approach aimed primarily at the 
parliamentary parties and particularly the Adenauer Government. 
In practice, however, this approach has been tested in the area 
of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee since the late 
1950s.
A major, if at the time unrecognised, turning point in this 
transition process occurred in late 1957 with the Oppositions 
demand for the diplomatic recognition of Poland. As in previous 
years the SPD's intention was to rally public support against 
the Government's pro-Western foreign policy which implied in the 
eyes of the Opposition the permanent division of Germany. Also 
as in previous years the Government's reaction was to refer the 
matter to the Foreign Affairs Committee with the expectation 
that it would be buried there. Contrary to this expectation, 
over the next four years during the process of Committee 
consideration of the issue the Opposition reoriented its 
strategy to one of direct influence on the Government.
The crucial issue examined in this case study is the proper 
diplomatic posture of the Federal Republic towards the East 
European communist nations. In 1957-58 when the Committee 
initially became involved German policy towards the East was 
marked by considerable rigidity. The most prominent feature of 
this rigidity was the so-called Hallstein-Doctrine which 
prohibited diplomatic links with any country recognising East
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Germany except for the Soviet Union. A small but significant 
change in this policy occurred shortly after the adoption of the 
Jaksch-Report when, in 1961, Bonn sent a senior diplomat to 
Poland for trade talks.
As the following analysis will argue the Jaksch-Report
played a crucial role in facilitating the new, albeit tentative
posture towards the East. The significance of the report was
recognised by MPs of all parties, several of whom mentioned in
interviews that they regarded it as the most important work done
by the Committee up to that time. This report formed the
theoretical basis for the joint eastern policy of the Government
and Opposition during the 1960s up to the forming of the
SPD/FDP coalition in 1969.^ In the mid-sixties Foreign Minister
Schröder regarded the report as a parliamentary instruction and
t-hejustification for establishment of trade commissions in East 
2Europe. The report marked the first time that the Bundestag, 
which acted unanimously, "looked towards the East" and, in the 
words of former Committee Chairman and CDU-MP H. Kopf, that West 
German politicians "talked no more of enslaved nations but of3communist governed states".
The evolution in attitudes towards the East as reflected 
in the Jaksch-Report and the decision to send ambassadorial 
rank personnel to Warsaw was paralleled by changes in the 
attitudes of the SPD-Opposition. For most of the 1950s the SPD 
argued against a firm military alliance with the Western powers 
on the grounds that it froze the- division of Europe into two 
camps and therefore prevented the re-unification of the German
See Chapter Eight for post-1969 developments.
2 Interview with the former CDU-MP and Chairman of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee, H. Kopf, Bonn,2july 1973 (hereafter cited 
as 'Interview Kopf); interview with the former CDU-MP and 
Chairman of the CDU/CSU Working Group on Foreign Affairs,
E. Majonica, Bonn,6July 1973 (hereafter cited as 'Interview 
Majonica').
Interview Kopf.3
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state. The SPD had also attempted to use this position for 
electoral advantage against the Government but the results had 
not been auspicious. To the contrary, in the 1957 Federal 
elections when the Government utilised the Hungarian revolt to 
call into question the SPD line the CDU/CSU won for the first 
and still only time an absolute majority. In the late 1950s 
SPD-strategists, recognising this fact, began to shift the 
party's foreign policy stance in a more pro-Western direction, 
a shift which culminated in the party's 1961 public endorsement 
of NATO.
A number of political forces which played critical roles 
in the unfolding of West Germany's new Eastern policy must be 
enumerated. For most of the 1950s the strongest opposition to 
any flexibility to the east came from the organizations of 
Germans who had been expelled from the former German territories 
taken over by the Eastern bloc countries. The expellees did not 
form one monolithic grouping; although there was an expellee 
political party, the BHE, the expellees also organised 
themselves within all major political parties. Despite the 
generally rigid position of the expellees in the 1950s their 
diverse organisational connections were also reflected in a 
variety of viewpoints, some of which were sensitive to the 
changing climate of the beginnings of detente. Nevertheless 
from the perspective of leading politicians of both major 
parties the expellees were a group whose position had to be 
modified if any changes in Eastern policy were to be 
politically feasible.
Another crucial factor was the division within the ruling 
CDU/CSU itself. Germany's foremost maker of foreign policy, 
Chancellor Adenauer, adopted as usual a pragmatic stance. Eager 
to maintain the expanded parliamentary majority of 1957 
Adenauer's public stance was one of firm support for State 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, i.e. the permanent departmental 
head, W. Hallstein. The Chancellor, however, was mindful of 
new developments - particularly those emanating from 
Washington - and he therefore allowed Foreign Minister von 
Brentano to explore new initiatives towards the East.
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There were also latent divisions within the SPD as a 
result of the party's developing foreign policy reorientation. 
Some left-wing SPD parliamentarians were suspicious of any 
steps to embrace the Western alliance. Nevertheless this was 
a distinct minority view within the party and one of the former 
leaders of the left, Party Vice-Chairman Herbert Wehner, became 
one of the strongest proponents of a new Eastern policy.
Finally an introduction to role and composition of the 
parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee is in order. Under the 
Standing Orders of Parliament the Committee was empowered to 
discuss all matters referred to it by Parliament and to 
recommend appropriate action to the Government. More 
importantly, the Committee's consideration of all treaties was 
required before they could be dealt with by the Bundestag. In 
practice the activities of the Committee were extremely wide- 
ranging given the breadth of the terms of parliamentary 
referral. The actual status of the Committee was reflected in 
its membership which included leading politicians of both 
parties, such as the SPD-Chairman and Vice-Chairman and CDU/CSU 
party whips. This status was further reflected in the behaviour 
of leading Foreign Ministry personnel who always kept close 
tabs on Committee proceedings. Thus by the late 1950s the 
Committee consisted of key politicians who were sensitive to 
maintaining and expanding the importance of that body.
EVENTS PRECEDING THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE'S INQUIRY
Three developments preceding the Committee deliberations 
which eventuated in the Jaksch-Report must be elaborated.
First, the 1956 attack by Foreign Minister von Brentano 
on the expellees' influence over Eastern policy is a case 
illustrating the role of the group as a perceived impediment to 
policy adjustments.
The Reasons for the Strained Relationship Between the Foreign 
Minister and the MPs of the 1 Expellees1
As early as 1956, Heinrich von Brentano had assessed the 
situation in foreign policy and had come to similar conclusions 
as the majority of the SPD. Immediately after the failure of
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the Hungarian revolt a strictly confidential meeting was held
39)by the Foreign Affairs Committee. Here, in the face of both 
the strong resistance of his own Secretary of State, Hallstein, 
and the MPs representing the expellees, the Minister had 
outlined the attitude the Federal Government would have 
subscribed to if the Hungarian Nagy Government had remained in 
power. Dr von Brentano had expressed the opinion to the 
Committee that, even if Hungary had maintained diplomatic 
relations with Ulbricht, the Nagy Government would have had to 
be supported and recognised by West Germany. On this occasion 
he asked the Committee to take up again and discuss the problem 
of diplomatic relations with the Eastern Bloc States. Probably 
Poland would succeed in breaking away from Moscow. In this 
event, recognition should not be delayed.
However, convinced of the necessity to improve relations 
between West Germany and Poland, the Foreign Minister also said 
that he would need the "backing of all parties" if there should 
be a diplomatic exchange between West Germany and Poland. This 
would only be possible, he maintained, if the "touchy business 
of the Oder-Neisse border" could be dealt with to the 
satisfaction of all concerned. The Department of Foreign 
Affairs would prepare an analysis of the general problems of a 
new Ostpolitik and present this study to the parliamentary 
Committee in due course. /
The Foreign Minister's frankness not only indicated that 
a turning point in German foreign policy was envisaged, it also 
presented an explosive matter in the field of domestic policy: 
it was a barely disguised challenge to the expellees' MPs. At 
least the expellees' MPs did not regard von Brentano's foreign 
policy as anything else but an attempt to convince the majority 
in all parties about the necessity of a supra-partisan and 
flexible Ostpolitik. This would inevitably bring about a 
drastic curtailment of the power basis and influence of the 
expellees' organisations and their representatives in Parliament. 
If all parties, Government and Opposition together, would agree 
on a flexible Eastern policy, the expellees would not be able to 
play the parties off against each other on a problem which was 
of vital concern for them.) W  <$££ holt V  jp ^  Y\ots %l)
3 b) ib'l
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However, von Brentano's attempt failed. Three weeks after 
his daring appearance in the Foreign Affairs Committee, after 
the Hungarian revolt had failed totally and the Soviet Union 
had completely reinstated its influence in Eastern Europe, 
decisive parts of the Brentano statement were leaked to the 
Spiegel and published on 5 December 1956. The Spiegel was able 
to supplement its report with the statement that after a change 
in the international situation the "group of refusers in the 
Foreign Ministry, led by the Chancellor's governor in this 
department", Secretary of State Professor Hallstein, had won 
the battle at present.^
There are two possible interpretations abeu£ which side 
could have informed the Spiegel about the confidential 
Committee meeting and for what motive. One possibility is that 
supporters of a flexible Eastern policy, particularly members 
of the Opposition, leaked this material to the press either out 
of frustration about the retention of the 'old' Eastern policy 
or, for party tactical reasons, to deepen the conflict within 
the CDU. The other likely possibility is that expellees' MPs 
committed this indiscretion on purpose to isolate von Brentano 
from his parliamentary party.
Whichever interpretation one might prefer, it is certain 
that from this time onwards the expellees' MPs within the 
CDU/CSU held a suspicion for the CDU Foreign Minister which 
could only be surpassed by that harboured by the right-wing 
CSU-MP von und zu Guttenberg. The bitterness of the expellees 
was so strong that - five years later - expellees' MPs of the 
CDU urged Wenzel Jaksch to include a paragraph in his preface 
to the Jaksch-Report which could be regarded as a direct reply 
to von Brentano's speech before the Foreign Affairs Committee 
in 1956:
4 Der Spiegel, 5 December 1956.
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Anyone, who regarded the 'Polish October' of 1956 
as the beginning of Poland's breaking away from the 
Eastern Bloc, might have had the impression that 
the way towards German reunification had to lead 
via Warsaw. Such considerations supported the 
well-known proposals that reunification would have 
to be paid for with abandonment of the East German 
territories. These were illusions.^
Second, the drafting in 1957 of the Paul-Report, which may 
be regarded as a precursor of the Jaksch-Report, illustrates 
the potential of the expellees to engage in integrative politics 
despite their perceived hard-line position.
The Forerunner of the Jaksch-Report: The Paul-Report
The representatives of the expellees had never been idle. 
The party which already indicated by its name that it had to be 
understood as an expellee pressure group, the Gesamtdeutsche 
Block/BHE, tried in the Foreign Affairs Committee to make the 
Federal Government commit itself in its Eastern policy to the 
interests of the expellees. The debates on the motion by the 
parliamentary party GB/BHE regarding the legal claim for the 
homelands of the German expellees6 led to the formation of a 
sub-committee within the Foreign Affairs Committee. The 
expellees' MP of the Social Democratic Opposition Ernst Paul 
was elected spokesman of the Committee in order to lend more 
weight to the concepts of the Committee and the plenum. (A 
similar step was taken later on with regard to the Jaksch- 
Report. )
The report by the SPD-MP Paul requested of the Federal 
Government that the "right of all expellees to their ancestral7homeland should be expressed unequivocably". The Committee 
had also been of the unanimous opinion that "the right of all
5 Deutsche Os teuropapolitik^ Berichte des Bundes tagsabg.
Wenzel Jaksch, Bonn, 1963, p.6 (hereafter cited as Jaksch- 
Report) .g
Deutscher Bundestag3 II, Wahlperiode (hereafter cited as BT, 
II.WP), Drucksache 2406.
7 BT, II.WP, Drucksache 3655, Bericht des Abg, Paul (cited 
hereafter as Paul-Report), p.36.
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expellees to their ancestral homeland includes all political 
rights in their native country". Furthermore the Committee 
regarded 'as necessary' that the Federal Republic should "very 
strongly express this opinion" towards all foreign diplomatic 
representatives at any future ambassadorial conferences. The 
Committee further addressed a 'strong appeal' to the German 
public "not to jeopardize the pleading of the cause of the 
expellees' right to their homeland through statements which
ocould be interpreted as willingness to forego German rights".
In paragraph V the report requested explicitly of the Federal
Government that 'concrete measures' should be taken "to prepare
and secure the pleading of the cause of the right to the German9Eastern regions which are under foreign control".
These perceptions concerning the Ostpolitik did not create 
any problems during the fifties for either the Federal 
Government or the Social Democratic Opposition. Even if there 
had been any criticism of this stance, everyone agreed that it 
would have been impossible for domestic policy reasons not to 
support these foreign policy principles. Nevertheless, there 
did arise some conflict during the discussions on the Paul- 
Report. The BHE-MP Linus Rather and his deputy Gille tried to 
make the Committee and the plenum commit themselves to the 
German borders of 1938 - including the Sudeten regions - as the 
official borders of pre-war Germany. However, this attempt 
failed - partly because of the objections of some expellees' 
representatives which were not members of the GB/BHE.^
The compromise which was reached included the "right to a 
homeland" of the Sudeten-Germans. However, at the same time it 
expressed quite clearly that the Foreign Affairs Committee of 
the German Lower House regarded the borders of the German Reich
Ibid.
9 Ibid., p.37.
^  Interview with the former SPD-member of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Ernst Paul, BoAan, ^ July 1973. (Hereafter cited as 
Interview Paul.) Essliiogßfl
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of 31 December 1937 as the basis for a solution of the border 
question: "The Foreign Affairs Committee is of the opinion
that the right to a homeland of expellees coming from regions 
outside the borders of the German Reich of 31 December 1937 
must not leave the Federal Government unconcerned".^
I) t
However, the search for a compromise of this kind had 
lasted a long time. When the Paul-Bericht was accepted 
unanimously on 24 June 1954 during the last meeting of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee before the federal elections, 
everyone knew that for the time being this effort by the 
Committee would have no influence on foreign policy decisions 
in the Federal Republic. A debate and vote on this report in 
Parliament had become impossible because of lack of time. Thus, 
legally seen, this report turned out to be futile.
However, it was less the contents of what had been agreed 
on that gave this report its importance; more decisive for 
future debates of the Foreign Affairs Committee was the fact 
that an agreement on a significant question in German 
Ostpolitik had been reached at all and that apart from the BHE 
representatives the expellees' politicians had played the part 
of an integrating power. This was even more surprising as the 
following election campaign revealed an undiminished policy of 
confrontation between Government and Opposition in the field of 
foreign policy. However, the conciliatory atmosphere which had 
become apparent during the debates in the Foreign Affairs 
Committee already pointed towards possible changes in the 
relationship between Government and Opposition in the field of 
foreign policy. At any rate, there was still a long way to go 
to reach these changes.
Third, the question of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia 
and Poland in the context of Belgrade's recognition of East 
Germany in 1957 demonstrates differences over Eastern policy 
both within the Foreign Ministry and the CDU/CSU parties.
11 Paul-Report, p.37.
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The Question of Diplomatic Relations with Yugoslavia and Poland
In 1957 the question of the West German posture towards
the East became a live issue as it became apparent that
Yugoslavia would shortly recognise the communist government in
East Germany. Rifts in the Foreign Affairs bureaucracy became
obvious when press reports indicated that the West German
ambassador to Yugoslavia was ready to abandon important parts
of the Hallstein-doctrine. Ambassador Pfleiderer had proposed
to recognise the People's Republic of Poland as this was the
only way in which Bonn could prevent Belgrade from recognising 
12East Germany.
When Belgrade finally announced the recognition of the 
German Democratic Republic in mid-October the ambivalence of 
the CDU/CSU became evident.
At a meeting of the CDU in Berlin immediately following 
this event, the MP-Majonica wanted the Government to respond 
without delay to the steps taken by the Belgrade Government. 
Majonica endorsed the arguments of the Secretary of State in the 
Foreign Ministry, Professor Hallstein, who had predicted that 
the recognition of Poland by the West German Government would 
cause a chain reaction; numerous African and Asian states would 
be inclined to recognise East Germany as well. Similar 
consequences had to be expected if Yugoslavia was allowed to 
set up diplomatic relations with East Germany. Accordingly 
there would be only one option for the Federal Government: 
immediately recall the German ambassador from Belgrade and break 
off diplomatic relations to Yugoslavia. The majority of the CDU 
parliamentary party did not want to make any hasty decisions and 
refused to adopt a definite stand on this question at this 
moment.
12 Die Welt, 15 October 1957; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15 October 
1957.
13 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16 October; Interview Majonica.
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On 16 October the CDU President of the Bundestag, 
Gerstenmaier, warned against an 'emotional decision'.^
However, two days later the Federal Cabinet decided to break 
off relations with Yugoslavia. The irresolution and ambivalence 
which the CDU had displayed in dealing with this problem must 
have been reason enough for the Opposition parties in the new 
Parliament to embark on new foreign policy initiatives. The 
joint action by the Opposition parties SPD and FDP with respect 
to a more flexible Eastern treaty also fulfilled the function 
of testing the solidarity within the Federal Government in 
general and the political stability of Foreign Minister Dr von 
Brentano in particular.
DIVISIVE POLITICS IN 1958-59: NO MOVEMENTS IN EASTERN POLICIES
In January 1958 the Committee took up the Opposition's
motion concerning the diplomatic recognition of Communist
Poland. The subsequent period lasting into 1959 was
predominantly one of divisive politics although an abortive
attempt to introduce integrative politics was made by the
Opposition. Initially both sides presented sharply conflicting
views within the Committee. Thus on 12 June 1958 CSU-MP von und
zu Guttenberg and SPD-MP Meyer argued their respective official
party's position. Von und zu Guttenberg expressed doubts mainly
concerning the consequences of recognising Poland for the
Hallstein Doctrine. He feared that "two German embassies in the
East European capitals would encourage non-aligned countries to
recognize the GDR. This also would favour the Soviet theory of
15the existence of two German Governments".
In contrast to this SPD-MP Meyer declared that "the 
influence of the GDR would increase, when there -were no West 
German representatives in the most important East European 
capitals".^
Die Welt, 17 October 1957. 
Jaksch-Report, p.ll.
16 Ibid.
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For a brief period in the middle of 1958 the Opposition 
tentatively attempted integrative politics. Opposition members 
sought to divert its activities away from rhetorical statements 
aimed at the public. They argued that general statements by 
party spokesmen should be replaced by detailed discussion under 
Committee confidentiality and requested that the Committee meet 
more frequently to deal with the Opposition motions. This 
approach, however, did not bear fruit, for, as in the words of 
SPD Committee member Paul, the CDU/CSU-members were unable to 
agree to such a procedure because they themselves were divided 
on the issue.
Given this rebuff the Social Democrats then turned again
to divisive politics and addressed the German public directly.
In autumn 1958 Die Welt published an article by SPD-MP
Professor Meyer advocating diplomatic relations with the East
18European countries. The Government parties also joined in
the public commentary and in October von Guttenberg, answering
as CSU-Foreign Affairs spokesman, declared "no ambassador to 
19East Europe". Von Guttenberg’s unequivocal statement, 
however, could not cover up divisions within the governing 
parties. These divisions were reflected in postponements of 
meetings to discuss the Eastern question by both the Cabinet 
and the Foreign Affairs working group of the CDU/CSU. As Die 
Welt commented with regard to the working group, "the second 
postponement of a discussion about this question reveals how
20there are apposite views even within the Christian Democrats".
When the Foreign Affairs Committee again formally took up 
the Eastern question in April 1959 after a lapse of nearly 
eleven months, divisive politics were more stridently in 
evidence than ever. In Committee debates expellees of the CDU,
Interview Paul.
1 o
Die Welt, 17 September 1958.
19 Die Welt, 18 October 1958.
20 Die Welt, 27 September 1958.
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CSU-MP von Guttenberg and CDU-MP Majonica not only strongly
opposed any change in the official Eastern policy - a position
also expounded by Secretary of State Hallstein before the
Committee - they also launched strong partisan attacks against
the SPD/FDP position. As von Guttenberg revealed in an
interview, these partisan attacks were at least partly designed
to polarise the issue along party lines with a view to
undercutting the manoeuverability available to Foreign Minister
von Brentano who favoured a more flexible approach. Although
the SPD leadership had probably already decided to modify its
Eastern policy in the partisan atmosphere created by some
CDU/CSU-MPs, most SPD- and FDP-MPs took up the challenge and
responded in kind. They demanded that the Government take
steps to prepare for the end of the rigid Eastern policy which,
they charged, was only able to react to actions by the communist
governments but which did not have any influence in these
countries because of the absence of diplomatic representation.
Full polarisation was not achieved, however, as Foreign Minister
von Brentano and CDU-MPs Furier and Kopf - together with
expellee leader and SPD-MP Wenzel Jaksch - according to Paul
21remained reluctant to embrace the hard line. Thus in the 
spring of 1959 discussion of the Eastern question was still 
dominated by sharply conflicting partisan views. However, 
there was already present in the views of von Brentano and the 
SPD leadership the basis for a compromise across partisan lines. 
What remained to be done was to gain new adherence to such a 
compromise particularly among the ranks of the expellees 
themselves.
THE FAILURE OF THE PROPOSALS FOR DETENTE PUT FORWARD BY THE 
FOREIGN MINISTER AT GENEVA, BECAUSE OF THE RESISTANCE OF THE 
EXPELLEES, AND A TEMPORARY REUNITING OF THE CDU/CSU
Before any movement occurred in the expellees;1 position, 
the Foreign Minister made a new attempt to alter German Eastern 
policy which produced a strong reaction from the expellees.
Interview with the former CSU Spokesman on Foreign Affairs, 
K.T. Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, Bonn,if December 1968 (cited 
hereafter as Interview Guttenberg); Interview Paul.
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On 26 July 1959, during the conference at Geneva, Die Vielt 
reported:
In order to find a new basis for the relationship 
between Poland and the CSSR, the Government is 
considering making the following proposal to these 
countries:
1. a non-aggression pact in the form of a treaty,
2. mutual renunciation of force,
223. discussion of a normalisation of relations.
It is unclear how far the Cabinet had been informed about this
plan; however, the CSU-MP von und zu Guttenberg was convinced
23that at least the Federal Chancellor had been told. The
CDU-MP Rasner had been advised of the plans of the Foreign
24Affairs Minister. The SPD parliamentary party, too, had
25learned in advance about details of von Brentano1s plan.
However, the foreign expert of the CSU, von Guttenberg, and the
chairman of the CDU working group for foreign affairs, Majonica,
2 6had not been informed.
After strong protests by the expellees' organizations, an
interview with the Federal Chancellor was granted to their
leaders. After additional protests by the CSU and parts of the
CDU led by MP Majonica, the Federal Chancellor declared
publicly that he disagreed with the offer to the East European
27states made by his Foreign Minister.
The decisive influence of the expellees was so evident that 
even the FAZ, a government-supporting paper, wrote:
Die Welt, 27 July 1959.
23 Interview von Guttenberg.
24 Die Welt, 30 July 1959.
25 Interview with the adviser to the SPD parliamentary party 
working group on foreign affairs, Eugen Selbmann, Bonn,$January 
1969 (hereafter cited as Interview Selbmann I).
^  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 30 July 1959; Die Welt, 
30 July 1959.
^  Die Welt, 1 August 1959; FAZ, 31 July 1959; Süeddeutsche 
Zeitung, 28 July 1959.
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But it is a different matter, whether we should 
allow the Eastern policy of the government to submit 
to the pressure of the expellees' organisations. We 
strictly oppose this.28
The political significance which the expellees organizations
had gained with regard to the formulation of West German
foreign policy was also reflected in the fact that foreign
newspapers as well reported on this topic, e.g. the Guardian
provided an analysis of the relationship between the German
29Foreign Minister and the expellees' organizations.
On 7 August the Foreign Minister reported the results of
the Geneva Conference to the Foreign Affairs Committee. Here
he stressed that the idea of the non-aggression pact was valid
in principle. The world had to realise that West Germany was
offering constructive suggestions. But, he admitted, theapppsife 3otiming had not been r-i-ght.
However, these apologetic explanations by the Minister
were not sufficient for the expellees' organizations. The
president of the Union of Expelled Germans, the CDU-MP and
member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Hans Krueger, talked
31of the 'surrender politicians of the Foreign Ministry'.
Thereupon the chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party,
Dr Krone, participated in a congress held by the expellees' 
committee of the CDU/CSU and the Exil-Landesverband Oder- 
Reisse (Exiles Association of Oder-Neisse, CDU) .
Following this congress, Dr Krone declared to the press
that the expellees' committee of the party agreed completely
with the policy of the Government. Subsequently, the chairman
of the Committee, von Keudell, specified, "We completely support
32the policy of the Federal Chancellor".
28 FAZ, 31 July 1959.
29 Manchester Guardian, 28 July 1959.
30 Interview von Guttenberg; Die Welt, 8 August 1959.
31 Koelnisehe Rundschau, 12 September 1959.
32 Koelnische Rundschau, 30 September 1959.
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THE BASIC CHANGE IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SPD AND THE 
CHANGE IN THE ROLE OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
From 1959 to 1961 neither party was forthcoming in public 
concerning Eastern policy. An attempt to reconstruct the change 
in the foreign policy concept of the SPD from the notes of the 
discussions on the Jaksch-Report as contained in the papers of 
the SPD working committee on foreign affairs failed. Eugen 
Selbmann, as secretary of the party working committee on foreign 
policy, is astonished abe^ it the lack of records of those months:
I cannot understand this: normally I write
everything down, but I have no records for this 
period. I always think I will remember the 
important points, however in the course of time one 
forgets a lot. I only remember that the meetings 
of the Party Working Committee were the best
attended I had ever experienced.33
However, some impression of the party working committee debates 
of 1959 concerned with the Ostpolitik concept of the SPD can be 
gained from interviews.^  Within the SPD working committee a 
majority prevailed, which decided not to force a decision 
within the parliamentary Foreign Committee. The SPD leaders 
argued that the CDU/CSU was united on at least one point; the 
CDU/CSU would vote unanimously if a division were forced by the 
SPD. What appeared to be decisive now was to arrive at a 
compromise in the Foreign Affairs Committee which would be 
acceptable for all parties, but which would still be so 
flexible as to allow for possible and desirable changes in the 
West German Ostpolitik. During meetings of the SPD Working 
Committee the expellees' representative, Paul, reminded members 
of the valuable experience which the Social Democrats; had 
gathered during the last legislative period in discussions with 
several MPs on the BHE motion. Not only at meetings of the CDU
33 hjilh Eoqe-ftInterview Selbmann -I 
UQry ( HerectfSe
 ^ The following is based on interviews with the SPD-MP and 
Chairman of the SPD working group on foreign affairs, Kurt 
Mattick, Bonn,^June 1973 (hereafter, Interview Mattick); 
Interview with the former SPD-MP and ex-Ambassador to Belgrade, 
Peter Blachstein, Hamburg,^ December 1968 (hereafter, Interview 
Blachstein); Interview Paul; Interview Selbmann I.
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working Committee, but the SPD working Committee too reported 
in detail in their meetings on informal talks between West 
German parliamentarians and communist East European politicians. 
Already in mid-1959 Herbert Wehner declared in one of the Party 
Working Committee meetings that West German politicians should 
muster their courage much more often to "get on the plane to 
the East". The Social Democratic MPs Erler, Ludwig Metzger, 
Mattick, Mommer, Paul and Wehner reported in detail to the Party 
Working Committee on their travels to Prague, Belgrade and 
Warsaw. Great importance was attributed to a talk between SPD 
parliamentarians and President Tito. Tito attached great 
significance to this meeting by inviting the Social Democrats 
to Brioni to participate in a more than two hour discussion.
The SPD working group on foreign policy recognised this 
importance: the "East-Europe travellers" repeatedly stressed
the significance of diplomatic and political contacts between 
East European states (particularly Yugoslavia) and West Germany.
However, it also became more and more evident that what 
the Social Democrats regarded as necessary in foreign policy was 
also useful in domestic policy. In autumn 1959 Herbert Wehner 
said in a discussion with SPD leaders: "Foreign policy must be
scrapped as an election issue. It does not help us, it can 
only do damage to us". Kurt Mattick, the now chairman of the 
SPD working Committee remembered: "We had learned from
experience. Soon after the 1957 elections our perceptions 
began to change". At what time this change in thoughts was 
completed and at what date exactly it was transformed into 
political actions v/ould be hard to determine, even if more 
detailed material were available.
Abraham Ashkenasi writes, "Between November 1959 and June
1960 the SPD executed a political turn-about in foreign 
35policy". Ashkenasi concedes that the SPD did not come to an 
apocalyptic realisation that their official concept of foreign
Abraham Ashkenasi, Reformpartei und Aussenpolitik, Koeln und 
Opladen, 1968, p.17.
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policy was hopelessly unrealistic. However, it seems that he 
dates the decision to change too late. This assumption is not 
only supported by the debates in the SPD working committee on 
foreign policy; it is also backed up by a press statement by 
the CDU-MP Professor Furier. Already in October 1959 the then 
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee told the press that 
a committee of eleven politicians had been created to "discuss 
openly in a small circle" the question of relations with the 
Eastern bloc countries and "to state frankly existing common 
views of the parties".^
The new SPD foreign policy posture had clear implications 
for the role of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.
As we shall see shortly, in October 1959 the leaders of the 
major parties on the Committee agreed to a sub-committee on the 
Eastern question to be headed by the SPD-expellee leader 
W. Jaksch. In proposing this sub-committee with the influential 
role for Jaksch and non-SPD expellees, the SPD leadership 
tacitly accepted the desirability of a compromise on the 
Eastern question. The very presence of the expellees clearly 
meant that any change in Eastern policy to emerge from the 
sub-committee would be a limited one. But since any change in 
Eastern policy requested the assent of at least a substantial 
portion of the expellee leadership this was an eminently 
practical objective.
The search for a compromise involved additional actors as 
well. For quite some time, but particularly in late 1959, 
numerous opportunities occurred to determine a common ground 
for all parties. Frequently meetings of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee acting officially and members of the Committee meeting 
informally took place in the dining room of Foreign Minister von 
Brentano's residence instead of being held in the dull conference 
rooms of the Bundestag building.
36 Koelnisehe Rundschau, 23 October 1959.
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In some of the informal meetings von Brentano met with the 
SPD leaders and Foreign Affairs officers to discuss overall 
problems of German foreign policy while excluding other leaders 
of the CDU/CSU.37
By these means von Brentano was able to determine the 
degree of flexibility in the SPD's position without involving 
those members of his own party who were likely to provide 
obstacles to change. Thus the Foreign Minister and SPD leaders 
could arrive at a good understanding of each other's position 
which could be of considerable utility when a compromise was 
hammered out within the forum of the sub-committee.
The SPD leaders, together with most parliamentary party 
leaders of the CDU, did not participate directly in the sub­
committee. Instead they co-ordinated policy with those 
parliamentarians of their respective parties chosen for the
sub-committee through their party's foreign affairs working 
38groups. This had the advantage of shielding the party leaders 
from personal involvement in any partisan differences which 
might emerge during sub-committee discussions, while at the same 
time providing in the party working groups an effective 
mechanism for keeping tabs on developments.
The change in climate in the political relationship 
between the parliamentary parties of Government and Opposition 
with regard to foreign policy was preceded by the social 
democratic discernment that any speculation on disunity among 
CDU/CSU committee members had to remain illusionary as long as 
the SPD expected short term party political advantages from a 
disunity within the CDU/CSU. Doubts harboured by some 
government representatives in how far the change in the SPD's 
perception was of a purely tactical nature were possibly not 
diminished until Herbert Wehner's speech in the Bundestag on 
30 June 1960.
37 Interviews Mattick, Paul, Kopf, von Guttenberg.
3 Q Interview Paul.
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From this time onwards the SPD leadership made it quite
clear not only towards certain members of the government but
also publicly towards the voter that they recognised the
practical realities and their implications for German foreign
policy. The new assessment of the situation was based on three
39considerations:
1. It is an illusion to believe the Social Democrats' 
main aim, German reunification, can be gained in the 
foreseeable future, because neither the West nor the 
East shows a great interest in a neutral reunified 
Germany.
2. The West German population has accepted this 
situation and its consequences.
3. In the face of present Soviet policy, NATO 
represents the only security guarantee for the 
Federal Republic and West Berlin.
These considerations conditioned the aims of the future foreign 
policy of the SPD, which were:
1. The SPD will have to win as much power and 
influence in Germany as possible. In the past this 
had failed mainly because the voter had rejected the 
SPD's foreign and security policy, but the SPD had 
been reluctant to adjust its perceptions to the voters' 
requests.
2. There is a need for any Federal Government to gain 
as much influence as possible within the Western 
alliance, which would also increase the Federal 
Government’s political value in the eyes of the Soviet 
Government.
This rationale implied for the parliamentary leaders of the SPD 
that both the internal and external situation of the Federal 
Republic demanded a common political response of the two major 
parties concerning essential questions of foreign policy.
39 See A. Ashkenasi, op*cit., pp.180-81.
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Consequently, the function of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee changed. So far the SPD had used the Committee, at 
least partially and temporarily, as an instrument to carry 
insecurity and unrest into the ranks of the majority; now the 
Committee was used for a different function: the Committee, or,
more precisely, the Sub-Committee, became the battleground for 
a test of the possibilities of a new joint foreign policy 
between the Government and the SPD.
To summarise, the following conditions favoured a 
compromise:
1. An institutional framework had been created, in 
which the Opposition and the majority party could come 
together.
2. The strict observation of confidentiality helped 
to enable the two groups to negotiate without being 
forced to give up former battle lines at this stage.
3. The 'refugees' of both parties represented in 
the Sub-Committee were to function as 'amalgamating' 
connecting links between opposing views - as Mattick's 
and von Guttenberg's were.
4. The simple fact that none of the floor leaders 
was a member of the Sub-Committee strengthened the 
chances of achieving a compromise. If the 
negotiations were to be deadlocked, neither party 
group leader would be involved and therefore kept his 
freedom of action.
From this time the full Foreign Committee was no longer 
involved as an institution in the process of decision making. 
However, this did not necessarily mean that the Sub-Committee 
hammered out the compromise in total isolation, as the 
following discussion demonstrates.
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THE JAKSCH-REPORT AS PARLIAMENTARY INSTRUCTION 
TO THE GOVERNMENT - THE INITIATIVE OF A 
CO-OPERATING OPPOSITION
CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE
Late in October 1959 the then Chairman of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee told the press that a committee of eleven 
politicians had been created, to 'discuss openly in a small 
circle' the Question of relations with the Eastern Bloc
4 0countries and to state 'existing common views of the parties'.
On 14 January 1960, it was announced that a special working 
party had been formed in order to 'investigate the question of 
political, economic and cultural relations with the Eastern 
European countries'.
The CDU/CSU deputies Guttenberg, Kraft, Majonica and von
Manteuffel-Szoege; the SPD deputies Jaksch, Paul, Mattick; the
FDP deputy Achenbach; and the DP deputy Schneider (Lollar) were
members of this working group. Kraft, Manteuffel, Jaksch and
41Paul were members of the expellees' organizations.
From this date we do not find any press references to the 
work of this group. It is only on 14 June 1960 in the House 
that we learn from Dr Kopf (CDU) that the membership of the 
group had been further reduced. Dr Kopf praised the work of the 
group and named Jaksch, Manteuffel, von Guttenberg, Paul and 
Mattick.^
Right from the initial meetings of the sub-Committee, it 
became clear that it would be advantageous to remain a closed 
group, a major party caucus in which there would be no room for 
the minor parties. The representatives of the minor parties, 
Achenbach (FDP) and Schneider (DP), had not participated in the 
work of the Committee.
4 0 Koelnische Rundschau, 23 October 1959.
^  Die Welt, 15 January 1960.
42 BT, III.WP, 162. Sitzung, p.9365D.
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The Common Area of Interest Between SPD Opposition, the Federal 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and German Industries
In examining the origins of the compromise contained in
the Jaksch-Report, one must keep in mind the initial point of
departure. On 12 February I960, when the Sub-Committee met for
the first of the nineteen sessions, there were the following
opposing opinions. On one side, von Guttenberg and Ernst
Majonica strongly opposed any change of the then official
Eastern policy; on the other side, SPD member Kurt Mattick
advocated the official SPD demand for an exchange of Ambassadors
with the East European states. The expellees' representatives
marked time during the first meeting. Right at the beginning
the SPD expellees' politician Wenzel Jaksch had been nominated
as chairman by the CDU expellees' politicians. This nomination
4 3won wide support. When the negotiations in even this
committee appeared to be deadlocked on the dispute over the
Kallstein Doctrine, the expellees' deputies 'rescued the fat
44from the fire', according to Wenzel Jaksch. However, this 
action was by no means an independent action of the expellees' 
politicians. It appeared to be only part of a new overall 
strategy of the SPD parliamentary party leadership. It may be 
assumed that the compromise which was presented to the Sub­
committee in May 1961 had already been designed as a realistic 
aim by the party leadership in late 1959, i.e. before the 
establishment of the Sub-Committee. At this time, Herbert 
Wehner had developed his ideas before a group of party 
colleagues. He assumed that there was only one way to realise 
a new Eastern policy. Because of the strength of the refugees 
in all parties, which had made it possible to destroy the
already published German plan for the Geneva Conference, a new
45Eastern policy had to be supported by the expellees.
The compromise which Herbert Wehner outlined in late 1959 
and which was adopted in 1961 implied;
43 Jaksch-Report, p.7; Interview Mattick.
44 Jaksch-Report, p.7.
45 Interview7 Mattick.
39
1. the first important foreign policy decision 
taken together with the majority party, and 
therefore a clear proof for the public of the 
sincerity of the new social democratic foreign 
policy;
2. a strengthening of Wenzel Jaksch's position 
within the refugee organizations, implying a gain 
for the SPD; and
3. the exclusion of this issue, which was widely 
disputed by the German public, from the electoral 
campaign in 1961.
However, this compromise also gave significant advantages 
to the Foreign Ministry - and here mainly the Minister - as 
well as to the German industrial world.
After the proposals of the German Minister of Foreign
Affairs for a reorientation of the Eastern policy had been
blocked by the refugees, von Brentano aspired to win back the
lost freedom in decision-making. The Sub-Committee asked the
Government 1 to grasp any potential possibility', 'to achieve
normalisation between the Federal Republic and the East European
46states without sacrificing essential German interests'. This 
request and the possibility of various interpretations of the 
wording extended the freedom of action of the Federal Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, especially in the light of the restriction 
of his activities imposed by the expellees' organizations and 
their political representatives. The interests of German 
industries were mainly concerned with increasing their share of 
the East European market for investment goods by normalising 
diplomatic relations. Their immediate aim was to get the 
Government to abandon the Hallstein doctrine to the extent that 
permanent trade missions in the East European countries could 
be established.
Jaksch-Report, p.40. 
^  Ibid., pp.26-29.
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The Political Personality of the Expellee Deputy Wenzel Jaksch 
as an Integrating Factor
However, in spite of these allies - the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ostausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaft - the SPD 
leaders had to face serious problems with regard to their new 
policy. Three obstacles had to be considered:
1. the SPD refugees;
2. the SPD parliamentary working committee on 
foreign policy; and
3. the Sub-Committee itself.
The CSU-MP von Guttenberg claimed in an interview that
Federal Chancellor Adenauer avoided influencing the deliberations
48of the Sub-Committee. In addition to Adenauer's assumed 
neutrality, the SPD parliamentary leaders expected that the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, the CDU parliamentary party, and the 
SPD parliamentary party would follow the lead of the majority 
of the Sub-Committee. This corresponded to experiences of the 
past. It also could be expected of the membership of the Sub­
committee which represented the two extremes in opinions thus 
including those of the other representatives. Therefore, 
everything was centred on the decisive question: Would the SPD
leadership succeed in separating the expellees' politicians 
from their coalition with the chairman of the CDU working 
committee on foreign policy, Majonica? The onl^ personality 
suitable for such a task, with any hope of success, was Wenzel
Jaksch. Jaksch had often been reprimanded by the SPD., , . / , _ ^ be^quse &f h/$ nne^ s^q hop# -boonparliamentary party witn- a W -cw to tna pfolafcy-e-f the expellees'
organizations. He had answered these attacks on his affiliation
by explaining that only collaboration with these organizations
could make sense politically. Failing this, the expellees would
turn to radicalism. Causing such a development would be an
irresponsible act with regard to internal politics, and a
catastrophe in foreign policy. Wenzel Jaksch gained a great
deal of respect and even admiration from his friends. As his
48 Interview von Guttenberg.
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former SPD-colleague Ernst Paul described it: "Jaksch was a
4 9good speaker and was able to convince people"; and the former
CDU Committee Chairman Dr Kopf argued that Wenzel Jaksch was
particularly useful for the SPD because "quite often he would
5 0go his own ways". On the other hand, the former SPD-MP and 
Ambassador to Belgrade, Peter Blachstein, regarded Jaksch as
51"always deeply rooted in the way of thinking of the refugees";
and even his friend Ernst Paul admits that Wenzel Jaksch1s
diction was often "too flowery to find general support among 
52the comrades".
This judgement coincides with the party political power
constellation within the SPD as reflected in the results of
party internal elections. In the elections for party Vorstand
on 4 November 1958 Wenzel Jaksch received the smallest number
of votes. MP Rehs, who had been running as the only other
5 3expellees' representative, got only three votes more.
However, the increasing isolation of the expellees' politicians 
within the Social Democratic parliamentary party did not 
diminish the significant role which Wenzel Jaksch was to play 
in the parliamentary sub-committee during the drafting of the 
compromise. On the contrary, his position in the sub-committee 
and particularly within the expellees' organizations had to 
become stronger the more his position differed from the official 
policies of the SPD.
On 5 November 1959 the SPD re-introduced a motion demanding
"a resumption of diplomatic relations with the East European
54States as early as possible". Whatever might have been the 
tactical motives for this move, which appeared to be quite
49 Interview Paul.
^  Interview Kopf.
51 Interview Blachstein.
52 Interview Paul.
53 Ossip K. Flechtheim, Dokumente zur parteipolitischen 
Entwicklung iyi Deutschland seit 1945, Vol. V, Document 411, p.61.
54 BT, III.WP, 87 Sitzg., Umdruck 403.
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extreme under the circumstances, it must certainly have 
strengthened Wenzel Jaksch's position for the impending debates 
in the sub-committee. It could be expected that SPD-MP Mattick 
would support the official SPD motion for diplomatic recognition. 
In that case Wenzel Jaksch could speak against the official 
views of his party and support a political move somewhere in 
between the Halistein doctrine and diplomatic recognition. In 
this atmosphere in the Sub-Committee it would appear possible 
that the 'CDU/CSU right wing* would make concessions for the 
benefit of a generally-agreed compromise.
The Estimation of the International Situation: the Foreign
Affairs Department Informs the Party Working Committees
Immediately before the Sub-Committee met for the first time
in February I960, the SPD and CDU working committees on foreign
policy repeatedly held detailed discussions on West German
5 5Eastern policy. Two studies by the Foreign Ministry, dealing 
with foreign policy perceptions of American politicians and the 
danger that West Germany might find itself isolated within the 
Western alliance, had been tabled in the working committees. 
Furthermore, representatives of both parties reported on talks 
with foreign politicians.
Neither party's working committee arrived at any formal 
decisions with regard to the impending debates in the Sub­
committee. However, both working committees discussed the same 
problems, although emphasising different details. Those in 
favour of a more flexible Eastern policy (which, included parts 
of the Foreign Ministry) no longer argued predominantly that a 
change in German Eastern policy implied advantages for West 
German foreign policy. They rather maintained that the Western 
allies would find it hard to accept that West Germany did not 
join their attempts at detente. German Eastern policy could not 
be treated in isolation. The NATO partners and in particular 
the new Kennedy administration had repeatedly expressed their
^  The following is based on Interviews Blachstein, SelbinannT 
(I- and II) , Mattick, Majonica lüiU^
Eugen Salbmcwn, 'Bonn, ^  March M 7 1  ( fle ro c ijlw  Se l b ^ n n j l ]
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wish that West Germany should undertake active steps towards 
detente. The USA particularly pressed for an improved 
relationship between West Germany and Poland, possibly because 
a number of Polish migrants had entered influential positions 
in the United States. If the Federal Republic did not comply 
with these demands, there would be an acute danger of her being 
isolated within the Western alliance.
Those in favour of the status quo conceded with regard to 
the study by the Foreign Ministry that there was a certain 
danger in this respect. However, they pointed out that this 
policy would reveal more dangers for the Federal Republic than 
for the Western allies. This did not only apply in the field 
of security policy; 'detente policies' could quite easily revert 
into 'renunciation policies', and no West German Government 
should ever abandon German territory. In addition it had to be 
considered that a potential loss of face was involved in 
modifying the Hallstein doctrine from one day to the next. With 
these considerations in mind and the feeling that 'something had 
to be done', the parliamentary parties met for the first time 
in the Sub-Committee.
THE DISCUSSION ON GERMAN OSTPOLITIK WITHIN THE SUB-COMMITTEE
The First Objections on the Part of the Majonica-Guttenberg 
Group and the Hearing of the Experts of the Eastern Committee 
of German Industries
After the first meeting of the Sub-Committee on 12 February 
1960 the Chairman, Wenzel Jaksch, reported to the SPD working 
group on foreign policy on 21 February 1960. The Sub-Committee 
had agreed on the basic questions. The report was almost 
completed. It was to be written up and put before the House as 
soon as possible. Ernst Paul remembers that the Social 
Democrats were under the impression that even CSU-MP von und zu
Guttenberg had been convinced 
5 6policy. However, during the second meeting the first
Interview Paul.
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impression proved to be too optimistic. Majonica and Guttenberg
suspected the unusual alliance between the expellees of the CDU
and SPD and the Foreign Ministry as well as the increasing
caution of Kurt Mattick. They feared that a general and
unanimously supported statement by the Committee and Parliament
would grant the Foreign Ministry in future unrestricted freedom
of action with regard to foreign policy decisions. Von
Guttenberg and Majonica even more insisted on going into more 
57detail. SPD expellees' politicians were rather annoyed with
Majonica's 'vigorous proceedings', which they did not attribute
to reservations based on his principles but rather to career-
oriented calculations. "Majonica always wanted to become Foreign
Minister. Since von Brentano was regarded as left in the CDU,
Majonica, as the parliamentary party working committee chairman,
5 8had to seek coalition with the CSU and the CDU expellees".
Majonica's and von Guttenberg's objections were followed 
by a further move by the Foreign Ministry. They proposed 
hearing the experts of the Eastern Committee of German 
Industries at the third meeting of the Sub-Committee. The 
Ostauschuss had been founded in 1952 on the proposal of the 
Federal Government in order to determine trade agreements with 
East Europe on a semi-official basis. In actual fact this body 
had assumed the function of official broker for all trade 
contacts between German trade and industry and the communist 
states. On the basis of agreements between government 
delegations, the Ostauschuss settled questions of delivery and 
payment conditions, problems of arbitrage and conditions for 
technological and scientific exchanges. Furthermore, this body 
served as a consultant to trade associations on all questions 
concerning trade with eastern countries. The Ostausschuss was 
supported by the Bund der deutschen Industrie, the Deutscher 
Industrie- und Handelstag, the Zentralverband des Banken- und 
Bankiergewerbes, the Gesamtverband des Deutschen Gross- und 
Aussenhandels as well as by the Importverband. Thus it
57 Interview von Guttenberg.
Interview Paul.
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represented a power potential which particularly the bourgeois 
parties were unable to disregard.
The east-west experts in German trade and industry
refrained from referring directly to the question of taking up
diplomatic relations with communist states at the Sub-Committee
meeting on 24 March 1960. However, their opinion that the
existing situation had to be regarded as "unsatisfactory and
5 9obstructive from purely trade technical points of view" 
supplied the supporters of a more flexible Eastern policy with 
new arguments.
Guttenberg's and Majonica's Delaying Tactics and New Initiatives 
on the Part of the Foreign Ministry
After hearing the experts of the Ostausohuss, it was no 
longer possible to finish the deliberations as speedily as had 
been intended. Majonica and von Guttenberg advocated having an 
in-depth discussion of the whole problem of a new Eastern 
policy. They hoped for a return of the expellees to their 
former attitude and opposition to any change in present 
principles.^  However, their expectations were not met.
When the Sub-Committee discussed the problem of the
emigrants from Eastern Europe and their importance concerning
61German foreign policy, von Guttenberg noted that particularly
the USA voiced an increasing request for diplomatic relations
between Poland and West Germany. He stressed, however, the
necessity for an independent German Eastern policy which should
not yield to the pressure of East European emigrants. Kurt
Mattick and Wenzel Jaksch advocated the contrary; since such
groups had great influence, the Federal Republic needed to do
everything possible to demonstrate that the Federal Republic was
6 2not opposing a policy leading to detente.
When nothing decisive had happened by January 1961 the 
Foreign Ministry made another attempt to lead the deputies
59
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Jaksch-Report, p.29.
Interview von Guttenberg.
See Jaksch-Report, pp.32-33.
Interviews von Guttenberg and Mattick.
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towards a decision. Early in January 1961, the General Manager 
of the Krupp Company, Beitz, recommended, following two trips 
to Warsaw, that it would be only reasonable to open a Trade 
Mission in Poland. The Press and Information Office of the 
Government announced "further talks through official 
channels".^
A Last Attempt: An Appeal to the German Public
Ten days later, on 23 January 1961, both Majonica and
Guttenberg warned the public of the dangers inherent in the
resumption of diplomatic relations with Poland. Majonica,
meeting the Westphalian press, emphasised that it would be wrong
"to give up the Hallstein doctrine at a time when such an
important power as India was approaching the German point of
view concerning the 'Soviet Occupation Zone'". In addition, the
German legal position regarding the German Eastern Territories
64under Polish administration would be 'undermined' ‘ by sending 
an ambassador to Warsaw.
However, this appeal was not only directed towards the
German public but also to the expellees' organizations. It
could be regarded as a hint to the expellees to carefully
control their top representatives in the House and in the
Foreign Affairs Committee. Furthermore, this appeal helped to
demonstrate to the other Sub-Committee members that Majonica and
von Guttenberg and their political groups would find a formal
end to the Hallstein Doctrine unacceptable. Under no
circumstances would they agree to diplomatic relations, for
65instance with Poland, at the present time.
The Decision of the Expellees in Favour of a More Active 
Eastern Policy
On 9 February 1961, in the eighth meeting of the Sub­
committee the final decision was made. Representatives of 
twenty expellees' organizations were heard on the problem of
^  Die Welt, 13 January 1961.
64 Die Welt, 24 January 1961.
65 Interview von Guttenberg.
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legal reservations and aspects of territorial birthrights.^^
According to a leading SPD-MP, Wenzel Jaksch "had done an
6 7excellent job". In long sittings, the humanitarian, social
and international legal problems of the expellees were
investigated. The secretary of the Missing Persons Service of
the German Red Cross was asked about questions concerning the
reuniting of separated families and the welfare of German 
6 8citizens. During the deliberations it was indicated that the
sub-committee intended to prepare a special report on ’the fate
of the German population in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
69after 1939', which was to be presented to the House. The
Sub-Committee fulfilled this promise and presented an additional
motion to the House, asking the Government "while establishing
relations with East Europe and the Soviet Union, to draw special
attention to the important human needs still existing among the
7 0German citizens and ethnic Germans...".
Some organizations, e.g. the Germans from Rumania, even 
demanded the resumption of diplomatic relations in order to 
counter the situation whereby German nationals who stayed in 
these countries were "exposed to the biased cultural influence 
of the SBZ regime".”^
Finally, Guttenberg and Majonica agreed to the compromise 
which had been drafted a full year earlier. They agreed because 
their own isolation as politicians was becoming apparent and 
because the danger of the Federal Republic being isolated seemed 
to be a very real one.
During a further eleven laborious sittings within the 
following few weeks, with the assistance of Fritz Erler, SPD
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floor leader, and Dr Baptist Gradl, CDU, the Sub-Committee
72prepared the final draft of the report.
A few days after the so-called Jaksch-Report had been 
adopted by the House, the new foreign policy principles were 
applied for the first time at the expense of an Assistant 
Secretary.
For the trade negotiations between Poland and the Federal
Republic which started on 19 June 1961, Ambassador Dr Allard
was sent to Warsaw instead of the representative of the Ministry
of Agriculture, Assistant Secretary Dr Otto Stallmann. The
Foreign Ministry justified this step by pointing to the
investigation of the public prosecutor into charges of
corruption - Stallmann had been charged with receiving large
sums from foreign sources - a charge which all knew to be
73without substance. In fact, the Foreign Ministry quietly 
abolished one of the principles of the Hallstein Doctrine. It 
had been stipulated that only representatives of specialist 
ministries should lead delegations to Eastern European 
countries. Diplomats from the Foreign Ministry were excluded. 
Thus all contacts with the East Europeans were intended to be 
technical and non-political. The Foreign Ministry discarded 
this principle, but, after the concessions made by the expellees' 
representatives on the Committee, no one was able to interpret 
this step as 'an abandonment of vital German interests'.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This case study details a small but significant shift in 
German foreign policy. Before Committee deliberations began in 
1958 German Eastern policy as most notably reflected in the 
Hallstein Doctrine precluded significant diplomatic moves 
towards the communist bloc. Shortly after the Jaksch-Report 
was adopted in 1961, however, the decision to send an
72
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ambassadorial-level official to Poland marked a significant 
wedge in this doctrine. The doctrine was later further eroded 
with the establishment of trade missions in East Europe.
What forces brought about this shift in German foreign 
policy? What role did the parliamentary Foreign Affairs 
Committee play in this confluence of forces? Was the Committee 
influential in and of itself or did it reflect a more complex 
set of forces?
There are a priori reasons for concluding that the Foreign 
Affairs Committee played an influential role in the development 
of the new German Eastern policy. The timing of the first 
breach of the Hallstein Doctrine - the despatch of the trade 
delegation and Ambassador Allardt to Warsaw - coming as it did 
so shortly after the Jaksch-Report suggests a strong link 
between the two, especially given the unsuccessful efforts by 
von Brentano to modify the policy earlier. Moreover, this 
linkage was supported by the observations of politicians which 
tied even the later trade missions with the ground layed by the 
Jaksch-Report.
W7hile it is clear that the Committee played an important 
role in the adoption of a new Eastern policy, this role must be 
seen in terms of the total configuration of forces. It is not 
simply a question of the Committee as an entity influencing the 
policy of the Government as an entity. Indeed, the Committee 
can be best seen as a convenient forum through which outside 
forces could, in combination with the Committee actors, reach 
a necessary compromise. Thus there were forces within the 
Government, most notably von Brentano, who desired movement on 
Eastern policy. Perhaps more significantly leading figures in 
the SPD-Opposition, most notably Herbert Wehner, also sought 
new initiatives towards the East. These politicians then worked 
through the Committee to advance their ends. But, in terms of 
the political realities of the new situation, movement on the 
Eastern question could only be achieved if the expellee 
representatives modified their stance. Here again the Committee 
played a crucial role. Particularly in the Sub-Committee the 
expellee leaders were drawn into the unfolding developments.
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These leaders - particularly the skilful and strong-minded 
Jaksch - were not simply manipulated by outside forces but were 
seeking to advance their own political aims in what they 
perceived as a changing international situation. With all of 
these forces, for their own reasons, seeking a compromise it was 
possible to lay down broad principles providing the Government 
with diplomatic flexibility. The crucial point was that by 
representing a broad consensus on this matter the Jaksch-Report 
defused the issue politically so that the Government could 
undertake new initiatives. In this sense the Committee was 
influential.
What factors facilitated the ability of the Committee to 
reach a compromise, a compromise which in turn facilitated the 
Government's decision? A number of factors can be mentioned.
First is the constitutional role of the Committee. As we 
have seen the standing orders of Parliament provided the 
Committee with powers of recommendation in the foreign policy 
sphere. These powers, however, should not be overemphasised in 
assessing the Committee's role in this case. Indeed, when the 
Government initially agreed to referring the matter to the 
Committee it was in expectation that the issue would be buried 
there. It was only the political circumstances which maximised 
the utility of the Committee as a forum for compromise.
A second factor is the international situation. Clearly 
there were some international developments - particularly the 
first moves towards East-West detente - which argued for 
flexibility in German Eastern policy. However, the importance 
of such developments must be considered small in this case. 
There was in fact no evidence of foreign pressure being brought 
to bear on the decision-makers.
The relative strength of the major parties in German 
Parliament has a somewhat more important influence on the 
decision-making process. The dominance gained by the CDU/CSU 
at the 1957 elections provided a degree of self-confidence for 
the Government which allowed for tentative initiatives which 
probably would not have been countenanced in a more evenly- 
divided Parliament.
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From the point of view of the SPD-Opposition the electoral 
setbacks of 1957 argued for a change in foreign policy posture 
and thus allowed the movement towards a position of compromise 
with the Government. Another factor facilitating a viable 
compromise was the close exchange of views between Committee 
members and Foreign Affairs officers during the Committee 
deliberations. By virtue of frank and detailed exchange of 
views Foreign Affairs was able to determine the political limits 
on its flexibility while the Committee politicians could 
appreciate international complexities.
The viability of the Committee's compromise was also 
enhanced by the fact that leading Committee members also held 
important positions within their respective parties and these 
men further had considerable prestige derived from their 
experience in dealing with foreign policy matters on the 
Committee in the past.
One of the most important factors aiding the compromise was 
the absence of polarisation along partisan lines or according to 
bureaucratic or other roles. Thus the diversity of views within 
the CDU/CSU inhibited the development of a monolithic partisan 
position. As a result important segments of the governing 
parties were available for compromise with the Opposition. 
Similarly conflicting views existed within the Foreign Ministry - 
as represented by the Minister and his Secretary of State - and 
this also provided potential for the formation of a fluid 
coalition for modification of Eastern policy.
Finally, a compromise solution depended upon the 
willingness of the major parties to pursue integrative politics. 
Neither party, at least after the initial stage, used the issue 
to appeal to the electorate or to undermine the position of the 
other in the House. Instead the emphasis was on reaching a 
solution which would not significantly favour one side or 
another in the short term, whatever the motives for the long
run.
CHAPTER TWO
THE FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY:
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ASSERTS ITS AUTHORITY
The signing of the Treaty on Franco-German Co-Operation on 
22 February 1963 thrust the parliamentary Foreign Affairs 
Committee into a central role in the shaping of West German 
foreign policy. This was partially due to the Standing Orders 
of the Bundestag which required Committee deliberation before 
the treaty could be ratified by the full House. However, the 
political difficulties facing the Committee in any effort to 
play a constructive role were underlined by the fact that the 
chances of an agreement between the governing parties and the 
Opposition were far less than in the Jaksch-Report. Although 
the general climate between the two major parties had improved 
further, a possible political agreement on any foreign policy 
issue no longer depended solely on the Social and Christian 
Democrats. The CDU/CSU lost their absolute majority in the 
September elections of 1961. They now formed a coalition 
government with the FDP who could no longer be disregarded as 
a political factor as had been mostly the case during the 
preparation of the 'Jaksch-Report1.
The political climate within the CDU/CSU had changed as 
well. Having lost the absolute majority and being frequently 
divided on foreign policy issues, the CDU/CSU had lost a great 
deal of the self-confidence which usually seems to be a 
prerequisite for the acceptance of compromise. The new internal 
disputes about foreign policy issues had had their origin in 
1960 when Chancellor Adenauer had met President de Gaulle in 
Rambouillet. It was rumoured that Bonn and Paris might intend 
a political, economic and military unification - and this at the 
cost of other West European states and particularly the USA.
The discussions concerning this possibility extended to the 
Government quarter. Although externally the Government concerned 
itself with its image of solidarity (albeit unsuccessfully), 
there existed nevertheless the following configurations: the
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Bavarian CSU and a group of CDU politicians around Adenauer 
opposed, as 'Gaullists', the Atlantic group, SPD, FDP and 
sections of the CDU. This confrontation was based primarily on 
suspicion and speculation. Neither side had ever articulated 
in precise terms its position on policy ideas. Generally one 
can say, however, that the Gaullists wanted to work as closely 
as possible with France and pretended that this need not 
involve damaging relations with the US. From the German 
Government's side, the Atlantic group advocated a more 
pronounced criticism of de Gaulle on account of his hostility 
towards Britain and the US. The differences were perhaps only 
gradations; the atmosphere, however, was such that both sides 
at any time suspected the other of secretly intending the 
opposite to what was said in public. The Gaullists feared a 
slavish dependency of Germany on the USA; the Atlantic group 
feared being involved in de Gaulle's anti-American policy and 
that this might endanger West Berlin's security. As the former 
CDU representative and chairman of the parliamentary working 
group on foreign affairs, Ernst Majonica, remembers: "Discord
within the party was immense, no dispute has ever been carried 
out in such a heated manner within the party as that one between 
'Gaullists' and 'Atlantics'".  ^ It was in this atmosphere that 
the Foreign Affairs Committee had to approach the Franco-German 
Treaty.
There were, however, further factors which seemed to 
indicate that one could not hope for a bi-partisan solution 
similar to the recommendations in the 'Jaksch-Report'.
While the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs had 
been concerned mainly with general principles in preparing the 
'Jaksch-Report', it was now required to make a practical 
decision on its attitude towards a treaty which had already been 
signed by the Federal Government. This left the majority party's 
representatives on the Committee little room for compromise, as 
they could not run the risk of laying their own Government open 
to the danger of censure.
1 Interview Majonica.
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Moreover, since the Federal Government insisted on rapid 
ratification of the agreement, the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
had little time at its disposal to reach unanimity. An attempt 
to refer the treaty to a special sub-committee failed owing to 
the indifference of the CDU, and the Social Democrats were 
forced to create a sub-committee of the party working committee 
on foreign affairs, whose special concern was to be the Franco- 
German treaty.
In the deliberations on the treaty the most important 
question was whether this treaty could be accommodated (and if 
so, in what way) to the obligations of the Federal Republic 
concerning the European Economic Community and the North 
Atlantic Defence Organization.,
Despite all the difficulties mentioned above which had
rendered agreement unlikely, on 8 May 1963 the Foreign Affairs
Committee succeeded in presenting a compromise. It suggested
unanimously in a written report to German Parliament that a
preamble should be added to the Federal Government's draft 2treaty. In this preamble Parliament demanded that the West 
German Government, in the execution of the Franco-German treaty, 
must abstain from any action which would conflict with the terms 
of earlier treaties, especially those concerning the EEC and 
NATO.* 3
DISAGREEMENTS ON THE ORDER OF PRIORITIES IN GERMAN FOREIGN 
POLICY
Two phases are apparent in the political process v/hich led 
to agreement on the preamble. The first phase, covering the 
plenary debate of the German Parliament on 7 February 1963, ma.y 
be seen as a grappling with the order of priorities in the 
Federal Republic's foreign policies. The second phase consists 
of the concrete application of the general decisions made in
3 BT, IV.WP, Drucksache 1252.
3 Ibid., Chapter VII.
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that debate. The best point of departure for a discussion of 
both phases is an examination of the ideas on foreign policy 
current in the Opposition Social Democratic Party, which feared 
a change in the existing priorities and attempted to use the 
parliamentary debate to force the Government into an unambiguous 
articulation of its ideas and goals.
When the first reservations about the treaty had been 
articulated, Herbert Wehner had explained to the SPD party 
working committee on foreign affairs: "We cannot simply say
'no' to this treaty". Fritz Erler, too, had explained that it 
would be impossible to reject the treaty in to to after the bi­
partisan display of enthusiasm which had so recently greeted 
de Gaulle’s visit to the Federal Republic. However, what had 
to be prevented at all costs was the possibility that the treaty 
could be interpreted by the German Government or foreign states 
as implying notions of German-French hegemony.
The reservations within the SPD centred primarily on two 
points dealt with by the treaty:
1. the relationship with the United States,
2. the relationship to the EEC and West European Union.
Further criticism, of a purely tactical nature, was forthcoming 
because the complex question of German reunification was not4referred to by the treaty.
But apart from issues of this nature, the treaty placed
the German Social Democrats in a position peculiar to their own
party, as the socialist parties of Western Europe (and to a
lesser extent of Great Britain) were energetically concerned to
dissuade their German sister party from supporting the Franco- 
5German Treaty.
Other external influences affected the attitude cf all the 
German political parties, including the SPD. Adenauer's meeting
4 Interview Selbmann I.
5 This aspect will be dealt with in more detail at a later 
stage.
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g
with de Gaulle at Rambouillet in July 1960 and the plans aired
7there concerning European federation had already given rise to 
fears of a German-French combination if the other members of the 
EEC were unwilling to extend their political co-operation along 
similar lines.
More than two years later, the explosive potential of the 
treaty suddenly became only too clear, when de Gaulle exercised9his veto against the entrance of Great Britain to the EEC.
This French action sharpened the suspicions of other West 
European countries and the United States about the Franco- 
German treaty and caused them to intensify their criticism. It 
also affected the nature of the discussions within the Federal 
Republic itself. As the former CDU representative Birrenbach 
commented later: "The ink on the Franco-German Treaty had not
dried before de Gaulle said 'no1 to Britain's entry into the 
EEC. That was too much". ^
Some West German politicians immediately thought about the 
international repercussions for the West German foreign policy 
following de Gaulle's veto and they acted accordingly. When 
Federal Chancellor Adenauer planned a trip to Paris in January 
1963, the President of the Bundestag and three parliamentary 
party chairmen issued a joint communique exhorting the 
Chancellor and the Foreign Minister "to secure the removal of 
obstacles impeding British entry into the European Common Market 
while at the same time satisfying all contingencies for the 
further development of German-French friendship".  ^ Furthermore, 
Social Democrats Fritz Erler and Karl Mommer asked the Federal
 ^Wilhelm Cornides, 'Europa's neue Kleider' in Europa-Archiv, 
17/1960, pp.533ff.
7
Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 3 August 1960.g
Deutsche Zeitung, 1 August 1960.
 ^Die Welt, 21 January 1963. .
10 ftämlJirf, W y  m  (Hereoper Jrf*-
^  SPD-Fraktionsmitteilungen (Karl Mommer, Ed.), 13 January 
1963.
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Chancellor - in accordance with their party's unanimous
resolution - to postpone his Paris journey until the time "when
no more danger exists that the visit might be misinterpreted by
other EEC partners and Great Britain with regard to the French
12attitude [to British entry] at Brussels".
The Clarification of American Foreign Policy Interests with 
Regard to the Federal Republic
Immediately before the commencement of talks between the
French President and the German Federal Chancellor, the American
Government made use of a means which "is not unusual for Anglo-
American diplomacy" whereby "certain journalists are given
indications..." and "the President and his closest collaborators
are ... at the disposal of some of their friends of the press
13for background talks".
Up to this time the Kennedy Government had exercised 
restraint in its public comments on the treaty. James Reston, 
Washington political correspondent for The New York Times, left 
no doubt, however, as to the opinion of the American Government 
on de Gaulle's policy. Under the unambiguous title 'What Do 
They Think We Are?' and the sub-title 'De Gualle Asks Adenauer 
to Base His Policy on Suspicion of US', Reston communicated the 
implications of the difficulties between Paris and London to 
the German Federal Government, clarified the American point of 
view, and placed before the Germans the stark alternative:
Paris or Washington. His influential article culminated with 
the words:
If de Gaulle and Adenauer are asking us ... to defend 
a Europe which questions America's good faith; to 
co-operate in the spread of national nuclear weapons 
first to France and inevitably, on the de Gaulle 
thesis, to Germany; if they expect that we will co­
operate with a Gaullist Europe that rejects and 
humiliates Britain ... if they believe we will
Ibid.
13 Thilo Koch, 'Bericht aus America' in Norddeutscher Rundfunk, 
22 January 1963.
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co-operate with a protectionist, inward-looking 
Europe which puts the continent before the Atlantic - 
then they are asking and expecting things that never 
have been and never will be. For the choice before 
Adenauer is not merely between France and Britain, 
but in the end between France and the United States.^
Reston's article caused strong reactions in the Foreign
Ministry, the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee and the
/ S ’SPD working committee on foreign policy. In a eonf-id-entiaJ, 
memorandum (the contents of which were, according to a foreign 
affairs official, communicated to the SPD leadership) idle 
Foreign Ministry linked US objections to de Gaulle's/press 
conference of 14 January and the prospect of the Franco-German 
treaty with the US President’s internal and external political 
difficulties.
The Kennedy government had not previously been able 
to exhibit in the arena of foreign relations any 
decisive successes. De Gaulle’s veto on the entry 
of Great Britain to the EEC likewise weakened the 
internal political position of/che American 
President and this at a time /n which opinion polls 
had shown that Kennedy's pogmlarity was in decline.
The Franco-German treaty/would also have external 
consequences for the United States; on the 
international level France, one of the sharpest 
critics of US policy", would be strengthened, and 
this would necessarily weaken the position of the 
United States. /
Germany would/be in a special situation. In 
particular the position of Berlin would make the 
presence or the Americans in the future absolutely 
necessary"; But that would have as a consequence the 
Federal/Republic's subjection to the elementary 
requirements of American policy, and there was much 
to be said in favour of the view that the Americans 
regarded the entry of Great Britain to the EEC as_one 
smeh elementary requirement of their own policy.^
] a J^anuary 3
New York Times, 21 Ma-s-on 1961.
Interview-with-.a Washington-Foreign Affairs official.,— Bonn, 
February 196S—
is Jrrter/ie^ s Kopf, $ irren hach, Selbmann- f
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The First Reactions of the CPU to the Objections to the German- 
French Treaty and Further Criticism from Foreign Countries
Immediately after the publication of the Reston article
Gerhard Schroeder is said to have commented on the Treaty
towards friends in the CDU and the Foreign Affairs Department.
He is supposed to have said that he regarded the German-French
treaty as 'superfluous, senseless and dangerous' but that he was
not able to persuade Adenauer in this respect and that therefore
16it would be best to ratify the treaty as soon as possible.
In 1961 Gerhard Schroeder had endorsed in public the
17Franco-German treaty whole-heartedly; and in a meeting of the
parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs about two years later
he again defended the Federal Chancellor's strong stand in
favour of the treaty, while on the other hand making it clear
that the Government would strongly support the erection of a
Multilateral Atomic Force for NATO. "Schroeder restrained
himself as far as possible in this matter in order not to ruin
his chances as Adenauer's successor", commented CSU-MP Freiherr
18von und zu Guttenberg. At the meeting of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee on 24 January, CDU-MPs Birrenbach and Furier argued 
that the policy of the Federal Government was liable to become 
subject to misinterpretation. A ratification of the German- 
French treaty would be possible only if it were to be 
unambiguously explained that this did not represent any special 
relationship between Germany and France in the form of separate 
alliances. Both CDU politicians stated that the Government 
should make a declaration to this effect before the German 
Parliament in order to counter all speculation that German 
foreign policy was changing its course. In effect, they were 
asking for a plenary debate in order to clarify German foreign 
policy.^
16 Interview with a CDU-MP.
17 •
Bulletin des Presse- und Infortnationsamtes der 
Bundesregierung, 22 January 1961, No. 13, p.102.
18
19
Interview von Guttenberg. UDhllc oihtT ZXp(cMclliOflS of 'SchrOGc/ßtS
** * 0Jt&red, this interpretation tua$ ' ako QWen fcy hirreribtcA
.j antf Umm iffee - Chairman köpf, poMiams horrffal/y
t  -foreign Minister. The Same cp'Mon ws also heJcf th SPfr*
rolt
Ibid
and journor c circles,
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In the meantime the reservation against the treaty by the 
member countries of the EEC and the USA had increased. The Vice 
President of the European Economic Community, Mansholt, 
described the rejection of the British entry as 'threatening' 
the future of the community. The Franco-German Treaty would be 
acceptable only if France was prepared to grant membership to 
Britain and other countries wishing to enter the EEC. He 
insisted:
If this route, however, is cut off then the treaty 
does not represent any addition but rather a 
dissolution of European integration through a 
coalition of two countries. Such a policy is 
backward-looking and not future orientated.20
21 22The Netherlands, Italy and the US ' expressed similar 
reservations.
Increased Opposition Within the CPU Towards the Existing Form 
of the Treaty as a Result of de Gaulle's Final Veto of British 
Entry to the EEC
American Government circles now made it clear that they
were prepared to initiate the construction of a Multilateral
Nuclear Force. A nuclear force would be able to operate well
2 3within two years if all European nations who were willing to
24enter made a binding decision in favour of the project. “
These proposals gave the 'Atlantics' within the CDU the 
chance to emphasise the importance of American support for the 
security of the Federal Republic and West Berlin. At a joint 
meeting of the presidium and the executive of the CDU at the end 
of January, Vice Chancellor Erhard reproached the Federal 
Chancellor for, in particular, the security aspects of his
FA Z, 24 January 1963; SPD-Pressedienst (P/XVIII 19),
28 January 1963.
^  FAZ, 24 January 1963.
22 Die Welt, 24 January 1963.
23 It should be noted, however, that training alone of mixed 
NATO-crews for Polaris submarines would have taken two years.
24 SPD-Pressedienst (P/XVIII 19), 28 January 1963, p.2; Die 
Welt, 24 January 1963.
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policy; he maintained it would be reckless if the German Federal
Chancellor were to be suspected of being a follower of de Gaulle.
Erhard, therefore, considered it sensible to postpone the
ratification of the treaty since de Gaulle could hardly be
expected to change his opinion on Britain's entry to the EEC by
January. "I think that Erhard did not want the treaty at all",
commented the former CDU-MP and chairman of the parliamentary
25working group on foreign affairs, Ernst Majonica.
During the following debates on the treaty within the 
CDU/CSU Vice Chancellor Professor Erhard was supported by MP- 
Birrenbach, who came forward as the strongest critic of the 
German-French treaty in its existing form. According to a 
Government official Birrenbach had 'right from the beginning' 
demanded a preamble to the German-French treaty in order to
integrate the treaty into the multilateral treaties and to
\diminish the general doubts expressed within and outside Germany 
on the motives and goals of the treaty. At first Birrenbach is 
said to have found only few supporters for his plan. However, 
he remained so determined in this matter that unusually heated 
disputes between him and Chancellor Adenauer had taken place.
CSU representative von Guttenberg said in 1968 that "without
26Birrenbach a preamble would probably not have been included".
The former Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee described 
the disputes within the party as follows: "A minority within
the CDU seemed to be determined not to accept the treaty in 
this form". Birrenbach himself did not want to comment on his 
role in the CDU internal alterations to the treaty. However, 
as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee who had repeatedly 
been sent abroad by the Federal Government on diplomatic missions 
of various kinds, he did not leave any doubt that, 'right from
25 Interview Majonica; see also SPD-Pressedienst (P/XVIII 19),
28 January 1963.
2 6 Interview von Guttenberg.
Interview Kopf.27
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the beginning', he had been of the opinion that the Franco-German 
treaty would be of value only if supported unanimously by 
Parliament.^
The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, H. Kopf, saw 
the danger of the treaty as follows. On the one side, the treaty 
could not be rejected by Parliament because this would have 
amounted to an extraordinary affront to the French partner. On 
the other side, it seemed politically impossible, in view of the 
general efforts to form a unified Europe, that two states, the 
two largest and economically most powerful at that, decided to 
join forces, thus indirectly stating a claim for hegemony. In 
interviews CDU politicians Kopf and Birrenbaeh agreed that in 
their view only a bi-partisan declaration of the German 
Parliament could have convinced the allied West European states 
and the USA that the German-French agreement's sole aim was to 
improve German-French relations and to manifest this intention 
in the form of a treaty.
In order to achieve unanimity in Parliament it was 
necessary to gain the approval of the 'Gaullists' - or at least 
to isolate them totally within their party - and the co-operation 
of the Social Democratic Opposition. The CDU politician who had 
the best chances in succeeding with the latter was Birrenbaeh.
Not only was he a diplomatically-skilful negotiator but, more 
importantly, he also had an excellent personal relationship to 
the former Foreign Minister and at that time CDU/CSU caucus 
chairman, Heinrich von Brentano. Moreover, he was on very good 
terms with SPD top politicians Herbert Wehner and, in particular, 
Fritz Erler.
Birrenbaeh, von Brentano, Kopf and, later on and to a lesser 
extent, Majonica as well laid the foundations within the CDU/CSU 
for a preamble to the treaty. The concept of a preamble, i.e. 
that Parliament had to unanimously comment on the German-French 
treaty, had two distinct advantages for these CDU politicians.
28 Interview Birrenbaeh.
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Firstly, it would lead to that clarification of West Germany’s
foreign policy priorities which these politicians desired and,
secondly, it would diminish the domestic problems of the CDU/
CSU. The chairman of the CDU/CSU working group on foreign
policy, Majonica, had already declared in the party room that
the Government probably would have to resign if it could not
29muster a majority in Parliament on such a decisive issue.
This possibility did exist indeed. Both the SPD Opposition and
the coalition partner of the CDU/CSU, the FDP, rejected to a man
the treaty in its existing form. Furthermore, there was the
real danger for the CDU/CSU that some 'Atlantic' CDU-MPs might -
if not cross the floor - at least abstain from the decisive vote
in Parliament. "We had no choice but to agree to the compromise
after we had split the party on this issue", one of the
'representatives' of the 'Gaullists', the CSU-MP von und zu
30Guttenberg, later commented.
As a first step towards this compromise members of the
CDU/CSU Foreign Affairs Committee renewed contacts with the
Social Democratic Party leaders, and both sides agreed to
determine the position of the Federal Republic within the
Western alliance in the foreign policy debate of the German
Parliament planned for 7 February. Worried CDU/CSU politicians
agreed with the SPD that an unambiguous determination and
confirmation of the order of priorities in the policy of the
Federal Republic was necessary, if only for the reason that the
ill will incurred by France as a result of the Brussels decision
31threatened to carry over to the Federal Republic.
The Final Decision on the Order of Priorities in German Foreign 
Policy in the Plenary Debate of the Federal Parliament on 
7 February 1963
The foreign affairs debate on 7 February thus took place 
in the spirit of the 'Atlantics'. The plenum unanimously 
supported the following foreign policy principles:
29 Interview Majonica.
30 Interview von Guttenberg.
31 Interview Selbmann I.
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1. The basis of the security of the Federal Republic 
is and remains its relationship with the USA;
2. The decisive guiding principle in German 
'Westpolitik' is the unification of Europe, 
including Great Britain.
ad 1: European, especially German, security rests,
because of the East-West conflict, on the unlimited 
military presence of the United States in Europe 
and especially in the Federal Republic. The 
security of a country deserves absolute priority 
over all other considerations of foreign policy.
These priorities find their affirmation in the 
German support for the plans of a NATO based 
Multilateral Nuclear Force.
ad 2: The second foreign policy goal of the Federal
Republic is the creation of a unified Europe 
including Great Britain. Reconciliation between 
France and Germany is a precondition of European 
union and in addition represents the basis of 
German European policy.3-2
This order of priorities declared by the Bundestag defined 
at once three essential conditions for German-French 
co-operation which formed the basis for further parliamentary 
treatment of the treaty.
1. German-French co-operation must not - in the 
military and political area - be in contradiction 
to the obligations of the Federal Republic under 
NATO.
2. It must not hinder the further development of 
European institutions in the sense of the Treaties 
of Rome.
3. It must not stand in the way of the inclusion of 
Great Britain into the Common Market.
After this debate there existed unequivocal clarity on the 
basic aims of German foreign policy, at least concerning the 
aims of the Bundestag.
It remains to be considered what means the foreign policy 
decision-makers employed in giving practical form to these 
goals, and what role the Committee on Foreign Affairs played in 
this process.
32 See BT, IV.WP, 58. Sitzg.
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THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE GERMAN-"FRENCH TREATY TO THE MULTILATERAL 
TREATIES BY THE SPD AND THE CPU
Influence from Outside the National System in the Area of 
Secret Diplomacy
From 7 February foreign countries refrained from public
criticism of the Franco-German treaty. It is true that the
33Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul Henri Spaak, expressed 
reservations which caused some concern in the SPD working 
committee and also in the parliamentary Foreign Affairs 
Committee; and it is also true that concern was caused by the 
views of the American Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, who stated in 
Bonn that he thought the German Parliament would be well advised 
to give further clarification and explanation of the Franco- 
German treaty. However, attempts at influence by foreign 
countries had essentially retreated to the level of secret 
diplomacy.
In this connection an extensive and secret expression of
opinion by the Soviet Government is not without significance,
but probably more decisive for the actual course of events was
the journey of the parliamentary leader of the CDU/CSU, von
Brentano, to Washington at the end of March. After his return
von Brentano explained that his conversations with President
Kennedy and Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, had allayed some of
35the American Government’s fears and some members of the
Foreign Affairs Committee explained to the author that the
result of von Brentano’s journey to America had been "of some
3 6moment for the continuance of discussions in the Committee".' 
However, this aspect of the decision-making process evades a
P.-H. Spaak in Westdeutscher Rundfunk, 8 March 1963.
^  Associated Press (147/2000), 3 April 1963.
Associated Press (76-gk-1421) , 3 April 1963.
3 6 Interview Kopf.
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more precise analysis for the time being, as its very nature 
limits the amount of material available and the interviews were 
comparatively unproductive.
The Influence of the Federal Upper House
In this case study some additional 'institutional factors'
emerge. However, the actual importance of the Federal Upper
House in its role as an institutional obstacle for treaties in
need of ratification should not be overrated. On 21 February36q1963 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Upper House - in 
charge of steering the treaty through the Upper House - and the 
Defence Committee recommended a decision on the Franco-German 
treaty. The decision took into account the deliberations of the 
Economics Committee of the Upper House. It recommended to the 
Federal Government a resolution preceding the actual text of the 
treaty which had the effect of encouraging the following goals 
through the application of the treaty:
1. close partnership between Europe and the US;
2. restoration of German unity;
3. the common defence in the framework of NATO and 
the integration of the military forces of the 
states bound together in this pact;
4. the unity of Europe and the inclusion of Great 
Britain and other states into the European 
Economic Community; and
5. the gradual dissolution of trade barriers between
the EEC, Great Britain and the USA as well as
37other states within the framework of GATT.
The 'Indicatory' Function of the Federal Upper House in the Area 
of Foreign Policy
The attention which discussions in the plenum of the 
Federal Upper House on the German-French treaty found in the
Bundesratsdrucksache, 58/1/63, 21 February 1963.
Member's of Ghc German bundesral and 'rfs Comtyiijdees
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respective State Prime Ministers.
Consecjven'tiyy there, is nc flexibtyoj for members
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o( fU  Qundesrcth and hundesrak -  CavvifeeS Cain m h  
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38press did not indicate the actual significance which this 
institution possesses in the area of foreign policy.
So that decisions of the Federal Lower House were not 
unnecessarily prejudiced, the Federal Upper House voted for a 
relatively unbinding resolution. However, where possible, 
reservations were articulated in detail. A justification along 
these lines was given by the Federal Upper House Vice President 
and Prime Minister of Nordrhein-Westfalen (Dr Meyers) before 
the Federal Upper House:
... imagine the case that in both the Upper and the 
Lower House a majority would like to accept the 
treaty, but the Federal Upper House ... includes its 
motives on the bill. The majority of the Lower 
House, however, possessing diffei:ent motives, ... 
may well refuse reception thereof because of the 
motives of the Federal Upper House even though both 
houses agree on the substance of the treaty ... For 
this reason I am of the opinion that the process 
which we have suggested in the Committee is the 
correct one.39
The further motions from Hessen - addendum to the text of
4 0 41the Law - and Hamburg - the inclusion of a preamble - were
not accepted by the majority in the Federal Upper House, but
they indicated the further course of discussions in the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the Lower House.
Despite the fact that strong reservations which had been 
expressed in the Upper House were later on included in the 
preamble, it still applies that the Upper House is not a 
decision-maker in the field of foreign policy but rather fulfils
See, for example, Bundesratsvizepraesident Dr Meyers, 
Westdeutscher Rundfunk, 1 March 1963; L.v. Danwitz, Westdeutscher 
Rundfunk, 1 March 1963; R. Klinkhammer, Hessischer Rundfunk,
1 March 1963; D. Schwarzkopf, Deutschlandfunk, 1 March 1963; 
Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 2 March 1963; Bonner Rundschau, 2 March 
1963; FAZ, 2 March 1963; Frankfurter Rundschau, 2 March 1963; 
Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2 March 1963; Die Welt, 2 March 1963; 
Handelsblatt, 4 March 1963.
39 Stenographische Berichte, 254. Bundesratssitzung, 1 March 
1963, p.34B.
40 Bundesratsdrucksache, 58/2/63, 27 February 1963.
41
Bundesratsdrucksache, 58/3/63, 27 February 1963.
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the function of a demonstrator. According to this role on
1 March 1963 Secretary of State Dr Carstens for the first time
mentioned one of the main problems in the parliamentary treatment
of the Franco-German treaty. He pointed out the constitutional
aspects of the treaty: "It is against the practical use of the
German constitution to include preambles into treaties of the
nature of 59 GG. Whenever a preamble is included the question
4 2arises whether the preamble is legally binding or not".
Before this question can be dealt with in detail in one of 
the following paragraphs, a further factor needs to be 
mentioned, i.e. the existing supranational institutions, 
particularly the deliberations in the European Parliament.
The Significance of the Supranational European Institutions for 
Decisions within the CDU/CSU
The President of the EEC Commission, Professor Hallstein,
explained on 27 March 1963 before the European Parliament that
the Franco-German Treaty would introduce into the EEC 'a foreign
influence', and that the danger would thus exist of weakening
the community through the voting block Germany/France. Hallstein
requested that in order to avoid this danger some form of
guarantee would have to be given so that the precedence of EEC
obligations could be secured in any ratification of the 
4 3treaty. The EEC Commission explained, in an official press
release of the speech of the President, that the point of view
maintained by Professor Hallstein could be termed "an urgent
appeal to the legal bodies responsible for the ratification and
the participating government" and that the ratification of the
treaty "should determine as clearly and in as binding a way as
possible that the interpretation or fulfillment of the treaty
would not distract from the permanence, functioning and
44dynamics of our community".
Stenographische Berichte, 254. Bundesratssitzunc, 1 March 
1963, p.4OB.
43 Ausfuehrliehe Sitzungsberichte des Europaeischen Parlaments, 
No. 3A, 27 March 1963.
44 Associated Press, 101/gk/1635, 3 April 1963.
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The chairman of the working committee on foreign affairs
in the CDU/CSU party, Majonica, had explained immediately after
the release of the Hallstein speech: "These are the serious
45words of a responsible European".
The debates in European Parliament, especially Professor 
Hallstein's speech, did have some significance for the 
discussion on the Franco-German treaty within the CDU/CSU, but 
the indirect influence of European Parliament proved, however, 
to be at least similarly effective. Thus in the CDU/CSU Party 
and working committee meetings members of European Parliament 
had given especially vigorous support for the clearing up of all 
reservations in the ratification of the treaty.*
Within the Social Democrats, however, it was not only the 
Socialist Party of European Parliament which accentuated 
reservations over the Franco-German treaty, but rather the 
socialist parties of Western Europe which exerted strong 
pressure on the German Social Democrats.
The Impact of the European Socialist Parties on the Consideration 
of the German-French Treaty
Already on 29 January 1963 the office of the Socialist 
International in London had reacted sharply against the 
declaration of de Gaulle on 14 January and had requested anew
47an "intensification of European co-operation and integration"."
On 14 March 1963 the joint office of the social democratic 
parties of the EEC made a statement after a special meeting in 
Brussels - at which, among others, the chairman of the SPD, 
Ollenhauer, and his deputy, Wehner, participated as did General 
Secretary Mollet of the French Socialist Party. The office 
decidedly came out against the present form of the Franco-German 
treaty. If the treaty could not be accommodated "in legally
45 Associated Press, 91/fi/1450, 28 March 1963.
46 Interviews von Guttenberg and Birrenbach.
47 ppp-Dokumentation, Parlamentarisch-Politischer Pressedienst 
(SPD-Vorstand, Ed.), 29 January 1963.
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binding form" to the existing multilateral treaties, "then the 
Social Democrats of the EEC could not support the Franco-German 
treaty under any circumstances".^
While the SPD in its internal SOPADE speech-copying service
printed the original text of the declaration, which expressed
tranchant criticism of the treaty, there appeared on 15 March
1963 in the official SPD press service a small section dealing
with the special meeting in Brussels in a careful and
significant way. A special treaty between Paris and Bonn could
only be agreed to if juridically it could be maintained, without
reservation, that such a treaty "did not run counter to
obligations already entered into under already existing 
49treaties".
These points of departure are indications of the further
behaviour of the SPD and the European socialist parties. While
the other social democratic parties, including the French,
proceeded from a dismissal of the treaty in its present form,
the SPD mentions agreement with the treaty if reservations
could be cleared up. The discussion of this problem, however,
was not held at common special meetings of all the socialist
parties but, instead, took place in individual conversations
between the leadership of the SPD and its sister parties.
"Erich Ollenhauer and Herbert Wehner were at this time mostly
50somewhere in Europe trying to calm down other comrades". 
Information on the contents of these talks rarely reached the 
public. However, as was confirmed by several SFD-MPs
there was a great deal of trouble especially with the 
French and the Belgians. The British Labour comrades 
were quite reasonable, even though it vitally concerned 
them. But Mollet did not care so much for the treaty, 
he was much more concerned with his opposition to 
de Gaulle.51
4 8 Tatsachen und Argumente,in SOPADE-Rednerdienst (SPD-Vorstand, 
Ed.), Sonderausgabe III, March 1963.
49 SPD-Presse dienst (P/XVIII/52), 15 March 1963.
50 Interview Selbmann I.
51 Interview with an SPD-MP who asked to remain anonymous.
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That the objections of the other Social Democratic parties 
were taken seriously by the SPD is shown by a press release 
from Herbert Wehner on the occasion of the parliamentary 
discussion of the German-French Chamber of Deputies:
The SPD can understand the decision of the French 
Socialists who believed they were not able to agree 
to the treaty because the legal situation in France, 
unlike the Federal Republic, does not permit the 
creation of a preamble which clearly assimilates the 
treaty into the multilateral treaties.5 2
The So-called Agreement of Cadenabbia
The previous history of the preamble to the German-French 
Treaty has remained, even until today, relatively unknown. The 
preamble was officially presented to the public as the so-called 
agreement formula of Cadenabbia. In fact, however, Federal 
Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Schroeder had up to 
that point expressed their opposition to any change in the text 
of the treaty, in the Foreign Affairs Committee, the presidium 
of the CDU/CSU as well as in the CDU working group on foreign 
affairs.
On 3 April, a few hours before internal coalition talks
between the CDU/CSU and the FDP and one day before the agreement
in Cadenabbia, CDU/CSU members explained that they wished to
clear up the reservations which had been expressed in foreign
countries and within Germany against the treaties. This was to
be accomplished by a resolution in which the Federal Government
and the Federal Parliament should recognise the opinion that the
multilateral treaties should have precedence over the friendship 
53treaty. Such a resolution would have been less legally 
binding than a preamble to the treaty. However, 24 hours later 
leading politicians of both ccaliticn parties met at Adenauer's 
holiday residence in Cadenabbia and it was unanimously agreed 
to:
52 Pressemitteilungen und Informationen (H. Wehner, Ed.), No. 
183/63, 14 June 1963.
Associated Press, 76/gk/1421, 3 April 1963.
1 .
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ratify in the near future the Franco-German 
Treaty; and 
2. to introduce a preamble to the treaty.
The principles of the preamble, whose final formulation was to 
remain a matter for Parliament, effectively the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, included;
1. emphasis of German-French friendship;
2. an agreement on the goal of reunification; and
3. an expression of faith in the European Community
and the extension of European unity as well as
54the North Atlantic Treaty.
Those participating in the discussions in Cadenabbia were
Federal Chancellor Adenauer and Federal Ministers Schroeder,
Krone and Scheel; CDU/CSU members Schmuecker, Lemmer, Majonica,
Gradl, Jaeger and Stiller; and FDP party chairman Mende, deputy
chairman von Kuehlmann-Stumm and FDP members Schultz, Zoglmann 
55and Achenbach. All the non-ministerial participants in the 
discussions at Cadenabbia were members of the parliamentary 
Foreign Affairs Committee and the working committee on foreign 
affairs of their respective parties.
According to a CDU-MP, Birrenbach did not participate in 
the Cadenabbia discussions by his own choice. Birrenbach, whose 
relationship to Adenauer had deteriorated considerably because 
of his outspokenness on this issue, later on confirmed this 
version: "I had been invited, but I did not want to
56unnecessarily provoke the Chancellor by my presence".
Political observers at that time agreed that the solution
57of Cadenabbia was arrived at "amazingly rapidly and smoothly".
54
Veroeffentlichungen des Presse- und Informationsamtes der 
Bundesregierung, No. 376/63, 4 April 1963.
Associated Press, 76/gk/1421, 3 April 1963.
56 Interview Birrenbach.
57 Interview with E. Majonica in Sueddeutschen Rundfunk, 5 April 
1963; Erich Mende in Sender Freies Berlin, 5 April 1963.
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Even the chairman of the CDU working group on foreign affairs,
Majonica, was surprised how easily an agreement was reached with
the Chancellor: "Der alte Herr greeted us with the words:
5 8'Well, why shouldn't we have a preamble'".
The Influence of the Social Democratic Opposition on the 
Compromise
The agreement to a preamble, however, was not primarily the 
result of coalition discussions in Cadenabbia; it was the outcome 
of a chain of discussions in which at an earlier stage the Social 
Democrats had taken part.
What were the individual steps which had smoothed the path 
towards a preamble and what was the role of the Socicil 
Democratic Opposition in this process?
It v^ as already mentioned that the parliamentary Committee 
for Foreign Affairs had not formed a sub-committee for the 
discussion on the German-French Treaty. The Social Democrats 
had, in early 1963 - immediately after knowledge of the text of 
the treaty - created a sub-coramittee of their party working 
group on foreign affairs. Members of this sub-committee were: 
Herbert Wehner as chairman and MPs Birkelbach, Erler, Mattick, 
Metzger, Mornmer and Carlo Schmid.
The sub-committee discussed in the beginning of February 
a total of 26 alternatives to the existing form of the Franco- 
German Treaty. These extended from a refusal of the treaty, the 
postponement of ratification, the inclusion of a new text, the 
decision that the treaty should remain open for other countries, 
and the addition of special protocols to a completely new 
treaty. Most suggestions were intended to demonstrate the fact 
that in principle one would agree to the treaty but had
R9reservations with regard to the present form.“
There is no direct evidence that there had been 
arrangements with the FDP. An SPD-MP, however, seems to
58 Interview Majonica.
59 Interview Selbmann I.
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remember that the FDP had been assured that the Social Democrats 
"would not participate in any coalition directed against the 
FDP" in case the existing coalition should break up because of 
controversies on the Franco-German Treaty. However, this SPD- 
politician insisted on not being quoted as his memory had let 
him down before.
With or without assurances the Social Democrats and the FDP
at the end of March agreed to proceed jointly. In a meeting of
the Council of Elders of the German Parliament the deputy of the
Federal Government requested that the first reading of the
Franco-German Treaty be placed on the agenda of the Federal
parliamentary meetings from 24-26 April. The FDP and the SPD,
however, objected to such an 'over-hasty treatment of the
agreement' and refused the suggestion which was supported by the 
6 0CDU/CSU. Nevertheless, the first discussion in Parliament on 
the Franco-German Treaty did take place in those days; however, 
only after agreement in general had been reached in Cadenabbia.
The Effect of the Strong Disagreement Within the CDU/CSU on the 
Political Climate in the Foreign Affairs Committee
Since the end of February, the SPD had maintained intensive 
contacts with the CDU. Its relationship with the Foreign Affairs 
Minister was of a dual nature. One aspect was that the SPD knew 
that Schroeder personally regarded the Franco-German Treaty as 
superfluous. Secondly, all were in agreement with the Foreign 
Minister that friendship with France should not occur at the 
cost of friendship with the USA. In the practical treatment of 
the Treaty, however, different opinions became evident. The 
Foreign Affairs Minister represented the opinion that the treaty 
should be ratified in the form in which it was proposed by the 
Government. He as Foreign Affairs Minister would then insure 
that the treaty was applied only in the sense which corresponded 
to the ideas of the SPD. However, the Opposition requested to 
lay down in the form of a binding preamble the notions of 
Parliament on the Franco-German treaty. Although in the Foreign
Associated Press, 72/bs/1400, 3 April 1963; SPD- 
Fraktionsmitteilung (H. Mommer, Ed.), 28 March 1963.
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Affairs Committee all agreed with the principles and goals of 
the undertaking, the question caused differences of opinion 
between the Opposition and the Foreign Minister. These 
differences of opinion, however, took place - as the SPD-MP 
Kurt Mattick formulated it - "in an atmosphere of mutual good 
will".61
As opposed to this 'good will' between Schroeder and the
Opposition, disagreement occurred in the Committee between the
CDU-Foreign Affairs Minister and the CSU spokesman on foreign
affairs, von Guttenberg. Guttenberg accused Schroeder of
directly provoking bad relations with the French Government
6 2through his 'indifferent attitude' towards the treaty.
These sharp disagreements within the CDU/CSU were an
important factor in forming, within the Committee, a "coalition
of the prudent ones" who sought "to find a unified opinion of
the Parliament on this important question". At the beginning
of the discussions in the Foreign Affairs Committee, individual
CDU members "on the basis of pressure from our Western friends"
had supported the ratification of the treaty only if Parliament
would clear up all reservations which had arisen over the
6 3Franco-German Treaty.
In this context Committee members conceived of the
Committee as having a virtual executive function in making
foreign policy. The reasons for this were given by Committee
Chairman H. Kopf, who argued that the Committee had to assume
a direct role given, on the one hand, the overriding importance
of the Western alliance to Germany and, on the other, the
inability of the bureaucracy of Foreign Minister Schroeder (who
was inhibited by his ambition for the Chancellorship) to impress
64upon Adenauer the need for modification of the treaty.
^  Interview Mattick.
6 2 Interview von Guttenberg.
6 3 Interviews Kopf and Birrenbach.
^  Interview Kopf. Cf Note / p - 03.
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In the justification of the parliamentary Committee *s behaviour
there were only minor differences of opinion between the
Committee members of the Opposition and those of the majority
party. While CSU-MP von Guttenberg spoke of 'means of
65explanatory interpretation', the secretary of the SPD working 
group on foreign policy defined the decision as 'parliamentary 
rectification'. ^
The Origin of the Preamble
Whatever one may term the decision on the preamble, in 
practice it was a compromise between the CDU party working 
committee and the SPD party working committee, negotiated by 
two of their leading representatives, namely Birrenbach (CDU) 
and Erler (SPD).
However, there is no hard evidence for the supposition that 
Birrenbach and Erler were the initiators of the compromise 
between the two major parties. Social Democrats, who had been 
informed by Fritz Erler about his negotiations with Birrenbach, 
were not prepared to convey any details. Birrenbach himself 
did not want to comment either; he said, however: "None of
those who had been to Cadenabbia were present at the hour of 
birth of the preamble".^
Thus it has to remain unknown who acted where and under 
what circumstances as 'midwife' to the preamble. Possibly von 
Brentano and Birrenbach had agreed on a preamble before 
Birrenbach began discussions with the SPD~polit.ician. However, 
it is also possible that Erler and Birrenbach had been the first 
to decide on the realisation of a preamble.
ve.ry L'lKzly
Whatever might have been the case, it wrl-n~;-n that those 
who made the decision were members of the legislative body, 
members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. q It has already been
Interview von Guttenberg.
^  interview Selbmann I.
6 7 Interview Birrenbach.
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shown how supporters of the preamble had created such favourable 
preconditions within the CDU/CSU that Federal Chancellor Adenauer 
was led to accept this.
The political actions of the FDP were hampered by the threat 
of a large coalition between the SPD and the CDU/CSU in case the 
FDP would insist on too high demands; and at this stage a 
coalition between the SPD and the CDU/CSU could have brought 
about the introduction of a new electoral system which would 
have meant the political end of this 'third power'.
The Social Democratic Opposition did not find it hard to 
accept the proposal which had possibly been devised by 
Birrenbach and Erler, because all realistic demands by the SPD 
had in fact been met. Furthermore, the legal status of the text 
had made the preamble more easily acceptable in the party. It 
is possible that those results which, according to the previous 
case study, had been arrived at by means of a sub-committee 
could in this case be achieved because of the fact that the 
majority of MPs ca n n c it^ S e -c eiftecrno i1 JSSS-^ le^S l ’io ^ ib  dctrails.
The Legal Preconditions of the SPD Demands and the Possible 
Foreign Policy Consequences
Because of its significance in the effecting of the 
compromise, a more detailed analysis of the constitutional and 
international legal aspects of the treaty will be added at this 
point. The enumeration of all the constitutional and 
international legal possibilities with regard to the objections 
of Parliament to the treaty in its original form makes clear 
the substance of the decision which was in fact made.
Thoughts and arguments in this chapter are based on 
material which had been prepared in the SPD working group on 
foreign policy.
The legal basis of the Social Democratic demands was 
repeated by various SPD spokesmen:
Before ratification of the treaty the Opposition was 
concerned that the parliamentary clarifications should be 
incorporated into the treaty
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(a) "in a legally unambiguous language" and
(b) "in a binding form with regard to international
Such clarifications would overcome their reservations to
the treaty in its original form. However, the terms 'legally
unambiguous' and 'binding with regard to international law'
, . 69require some analysis.
The dual formula 'legally incontestable' and 'binding with 
regard to international law' can only be understood - unless 
the statement is tautologous - in the sense that the Social 
Democrats were concerned that the preamble should be binding on 
both the German and the French Governments. It is already 
contestable whether such a preamble has legal binding force 
internally. Thus in v. Mangold-Klein it is stated that a 
preamble contains
no legally binding prescriptions, it is only 
enunciative or declamatory in nature ... Seen in 
its legal significance even the preamble of the 
German Constitution is only an article of faith, 
a statement of a general character but has no 
legal relevance ....70
Doubt concerning the legal obligation imposed by a preamble 
was also expressed by the State Secretary, Dr Carstens, on the 
occasion of the previously mentioned Federal Upper House debate.'
Franz Barsig in Sueddeutscher Rundfunk, 5 April 1963; 
Pressemitteilungen und Informationen (H. Wehner, Ed«), 4 April 
1963.
J See the following: Dahm, Voelkerreckt, Vol. III (1961),
pp.17, 63 (footnote 18), 64-66, 75ff., 77 (footnote 10), 97ff„; 
Berber, Lehrbuch des Voelkerrechts, Vol. I, Muenchen und Berlin, 
1961, pp.37ff., 410, 422ff., 426ff., 435, 439-41, 443-44; 
Verdross, Voelkerrecht, Muenchen, 1959, IV. Auflage, pp.lOlff., 
106ff.; Maunz-Duerig, Grundgesetz, Kommentar, 19 62 , 7*rt. 59, 
Randnr. 22ff.; Art. 32, Randnr. 3-5; Art. 59, Randnr. 3, 5-7,
11, 18.
7 0 Von Mangold Klein, Das Bonner Grundgesetz, Vol. I, Berlin und 
Frankfurt, 1957, pp.40-41. Similar opinions are expressed by 
Nawiasky-Leusser and Giese. See Nawiasky-Leusser, Die Verfassung 
des Freistaates Bayern, Muenchen, 1948, Ziffer 2 zum Vorspruch, 
p.78; Giese, Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches, (WRV)^,
Berlin, 1931, p.35; see also, Blessin-Wilden,
Bundesentschaedigungsgesetz, 2. Aufl., Frankfurt, 1957, pp.163-64
TOoj Scfc p- k?
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However, in 1956 a majority of legal opinion had accepted
the principle of legally binding clauses on the basis of the
lOfaKPD-judgement of the Federal High Court. There the highest 
German court had to concern itself with the objection of the 
Communist Party (KPD) that the outlawing of its activities was 
in contradiction with the expressed aim of reunification as it 
had been stated in the preamble of the Constitution. Inter alia 
the High Court was forced to investigate the binding nature of 
a preamble.
The conclusion of the report stated:
The preamble of the German Constitution is primarily 
of a political nature ... apart from this, however, 
the preamble is also legal in content.71
However, the internal legal binding force of the preamble
to the German-French Treaty was only a partial request of the
SPD. To establish the maximum demand - its internationally
binding nature - there were several possible complicated legal
arrangements. Hessian Prime Minister Zinn referred to one of
these possibilities in the above mentioned debate of the
7 2Federal Upper House on 1 March 1963. This was concerned with 
a reservation or clarification in the so-called ratification in 
the international sense. This work cannot deal with the 
comprehensive legal preconditions of the possibility referred 
to in detail. However, due to the significance of the problem 
in effecting the compromise between the SPD and the CDU it is 
referred to briefly.
A ratification of bilateral treaties through an exchange 
of notes has not only some affirmative or declaratory 
significance; it also has substantial legal importance. It is 
permissible in international lav; in the ratification, or mere 
precisely in the so-called ratification document, to express
^  BVerfGE, 17 August 1956, Vol. V, p.127.
72 Stenographischer Berichte, 254. Bundesratssitzung, 1 March 
1963, PP.30C-31A.
ich $w botei 611 70, 7%
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reservations, interpretational points or clarifications, which 
then - if they are accepted by the treaty partner - take 
international effect.
The political consequences of this legal construction would 
have meant massive pressure on the French treaty partner; for 
France would have been forced - expressly or implicitly - to 
respond to the clarifications of these reservations. In this 
three possibilities were feasible;
1. France respects the clarification expressively; 
then the treaty may only be applied and 
interpreted in the sense of this clarification;
2. France ignores the clarification; then the 
clarification likewise is assumed to be accepted;
3. France contradicts the clarification; then it 
is considered as not accepted; however, the 
German treaty partner would then know - as well 
as the foreign community - what France had in 
fact intended with the Franco-German Treaty.
The SPD demand for France being bound legally to a 
Bundestag interpretation of the Franco-German Treaty would have 
amounted to an affront to France, since in international 
affairs it would have signified, firstly, an additional 
demonstration of blame with regard to French EEC policy and, 
secondly, an additional demonstration of good will towards the 
United States.
The significance of the legal issues can be summarised as 
follows;
An internationally binding preamble would have been a total 
victory for the SPD position, but such a victory would have 
jeopardised not only the treaty through possible, if not likely, 
French rejection but also the likelihood of compromise on the 
CDU/CSU side. A non-binding declaration, on the other hand, 
would have met with considerable resistance within the rank-and- 
file of the SPD. Thus a middle way which reflected the
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intensity of the SPD's concern and which allowed the Government 
to avoid a confrontation with France was necessary - and this 
was found in the form of the internally binding preamble.
Drafting the Final Compromise
As we have seen the initial contacts resulting in a
virtual agreement on the principle of a preamble were between
leading Committee members CDU-MP Birrenbach, a frequent
diplomatic emissary of the Government, and SPD Party Vice-leader
Erler. Following their contacts both leaders discussed the
possible concepts of a preamble with their respective foreign
policy working groups. While these discussions were going on,
Birrenbach and Erler engaged in further consultations to inform
73each other about the thinking in their respective parties.
While admittedly their earlier discussions were of
considerable influence, the ultimate form of the preamble, the
actual hammering out of the document, was done by the Committee
itself. Indeed, it took two full working days for the Committee
74to finally produce an agreed-upon draft.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this case the Committee not only influenced German 
foreign policy, but through the device of the preamble directly 
formulated a key aspect of that policy. Beyond this, influence 
was exercised vis-a-vis the Government in that the Federal 
Chancellor was forced to accept modification of his treaty with 
de Gaulle. It is important to emphasise that while pressures 
had been building against Adenauer - such as the 7 February 
declaration of the full House - it was only the Committee which 
provided the specific vehicle for the modification of the 
Chancellor's position. The line-up of forces in this case was 
strongly against Adenauer. The Federal Chancellor had the 
backing of 'Gaullist' members of his own party and especially 
the CSU. This was a minority position within the Government
73 -Interviews Selbmann and Kopf.
^  Interview Kopf.
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parties. On the other side of the issue stood not only 
’Atlanticists1 within the CDU/CSU but Adenauer's coalition 
partner, the FDP, as well as the social, democratic Opposition.
In the middle there was Foreign Minister Schroeder, who, on the 
one hand, shared the concern of the 'Atlanticists' but, on the 
other hand, with a view to his possible ascent to the 
Chancellorship, refused to be drawn into opposition to Adenauer/^
In comparison to our first case study the Committee itself
played a much more central role in the configuration of forces.
Not only was the Committee the forum for the working out of an
agreement between the Government and Opposition parties, the
Committee leaders themselves were the critical actors behind
that agreement. Thus Erler and Birrenbach played vital roles,
both in their private discussions within the working groups of
their respective parties which were themselves composed entirely
of Committee members, and in the deliberations of the Committee
itself. Indeed, we can see in this case study manifestation of
a self-conscious assertion by the Committee of its right to
participate in foreign policy formulation. As Committee
Chairman Kopf put it six years later, foreign policy is a
75’’combined power" shared jointly between Government and 
Parliament. In this case the political realities support Kopfs 
assertion.
In considering the factors contributing to the Committee's 
influence on this case, we shall look at those examined in the 
preceding case study. This will show that, while many of the 
same factors remain influential, there are significant 
variations in their degree of importance.
The situation with regard to party strength in Parliament 
had changed considerably since the time of the Jaksch-Report.
In 1S61 the CDU/CSU lost its absolute majority and entered into 
a governing coalition with the FDP. This coalition provided a 
safe overall majority for the Government but it was, of course,
Hermann Kopf, 'Das Parlament und die auswaertige Politik', 
Aussenpolitik, May 1967, p.308.
Cf. noh f < f ( p ,  5 ?
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dependant upon the continued adherence of the FDP. The FDP, 
however, was handicapped in its room to manoeuvre by the threat 
of the introduction of a first-past-the-post electoral system 
which would have totally destroyed the party. This possibility 
was very much in the forefront of the minds of the FDP leaders, 
since a betrayed CDU/CSU could have been expected to make a 
temporary alliance with the SPD on this question. In the 
previous chapter it appeared that the overall CDU/CSU majority 
created a sense of confidence which ostensibly facilitated 
compromise; on that we could speculate that in a situation 
where a less-secure majority existed there would be less 
readiness to compromise. This was not borne out in this case 
study. But this does not cover all cases since the Government 
coalition still had a safe majority at the time of the Franco- 
German Treaty. In Chapter Eight we shall examine the extreme 
of a razor-thin parliamentary majority.
The importance of the Foreign Affairs bureaucracy is 
decidedly secondary. Although bureaucrats were consulted for 
technical advice by the Committee they were kept out of crucial 
decision-making discussions. Thus, in contrast to the presence 
of Foreign Affairs officers in von Brentano's dining room 
discussions in the previous case study, in this case the crucial 
consultations centering on the preamble consisted solely of 
parliamentarians. This difference must be related to the 
constitutional role of the Committee.
In this case the Standing Orders of Parliament placed the 
Committee in a more central position than was the case with the 
Jaksch-Report. While the Standing Orders allowed the Committee 
to take up the Eastern question or virtually any other foreign 
policy matter, this was still a matter for the Committee's 
discretion. Furthermore, in that case the report was simply a 
factor influencing a subsequent Government decision. In 
contrast, in the case of the Franco-German Treaty, the Committee 
was required to act before the treaty could be ratified. Thus 
an explicit responsibility - and power - was vested in this 
institution. While in many cases this power would not be used 
to modify a treaty agreed to by the Government, the fact that
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the responsibility existed meant that a conscious decision would 
have^ to be taken by the Committee. This in turn led to a dß-^ jo^ niiACj 
jfee 11 ne/°orujSa^ part of Committee members that they had clear 
rights and responsibilities to participate in the shaping of the 
nation's treaty obligations. ^
As indicated, even with these constitutional powers 
Committees do not necessarily assert them. Strong motives are 
required to modify the treaty commitment of one's own Government. 
In the case of the Franco-German Treaty these motives were 
provided by international pressures. In sharp contrast to the 
previous case study where no direct foreign pressures were 
brought to bear, here influence was exerted by the American 
Government, by the West European allies of Germany, by leading 
figures within the EEC bureaucracy and by the socialist parties 
of Western Europe. These pressures created widespread concern 
among key actors on the West German political scene that the 
treaty as drafted would be grossly detrimental to West 
Germany's interest. This perception was so widespread that a 
powerful coalition was formed which not only drafted the 
modifying preamble to the treaty but 'persuaded' Adenauer to 
assent.
Even with strong motives and clear constitutional 
authority, in the final analysis the Committee was only able to 
reach agreement and thereby successfully modify the treaty 
through the use of integrative politics. Even though a 
majority of the CDU/CSU saw the need for modification of the
been unacceptable /if the Opposition hadr treaty, this wcru A'
made a partisan issue of the matter. Thus from the point of 
view of the 'Atlanticists‘ within the governing parties, it was 
important to gain the co-operation of the Opposition in order 
to prevent polarisation which CDU/CSU 'Gaullists' and probably 
Adenauer himself could have used as an argument against change. 
From the point of view of the Opposition, although undoubtedly 
temptations existed to play the issue to electoral advantage, 
there were several reasons arguing for an integrative approach. 
One was the feeling (a feeling shared by CDU-'Atlanticists') 
that a chance existed for a rare victory over the Chancellor as
74b. This Opinion wqs expressed bu Cawmifee- Cbfl/rmetn kdßf
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long as the goal was relatively limited. Having been 
outmanoeuvred consistently by 'the old fox' these leaders were 
unwilling to see their advantage squandered by seeking Adenauer's 
humiliation. A more long-range consideration in the minds of 
Opposition leaders was the effort to build the party's public 
image as a statesman-like and constructive force in the foreign 
policy area - an image designed to undercut that of 'socialist 
irresponsibility' which the Chancellor had done so much to 
create. This, of course, enhanced the SPD's long term chances 
for forming a Government after a period of continuous opposition 
since the founding of the Federal Republic. These considerations 
provided the political circumstances which, together with the 
constitutional powers and policy motives derived from foreign 
pressures, facilitated the Committee's decisive role in 
modifying the Franco-German Treaty.
CHAPTER THREE
THE MUNDAT FOREST TREATY: A TREATY FRUSTRATED
On 31 July 1962 Couve de Murville and Herbert Blankenhorn
signed the "Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and
the French Republic concerning various border regulations".
After the Bundesrat had decided on 4 March 1966 not to raise
2any objections against this bill, Federal Chancellor Ludwig 
Erhard on 9 March asked Parliament to ratify it.
The German Bundestag, however, despite the fact that the
3French Parliament had already ratified the treaty, refused to 
consider the bill. This is the situation as it exists in 1976. 
To my knowledge this is the first time that a bilateral treaty4foundered because one of the Parliaments refused its consent.
This curiosity is the result of deliberations in the 
Foreign Affairs Committee. In Germany this Committee must reach 
a final conclusion and give a recommendation before the issue 
can proceed to Parliament. Since the Committee decided not to 
complete this undertaking, Parliament was unable to proceed to 
ratification. Furthermore, this proved to be the first time in 
West German history that the Committee, representing 
Parliament, unanimously opposed the executive without at any 
stage offering to compromise.
Contents, History and Problems of the Mundat Forest Treaty
5This treaty is divided into two parts. In the first part 
the French Government agrees to return border areas to the 
former German owners? in the second part the West German
 ^ BT, V.WP, Bundestagsdrucksache No. 405.
2 Ibid, , p.1.
3 BT, V.WP, 101 Sitzg , p.4683B.
 ^ However, the Parliament of the Netherlands only ratified a 
Dutch-German border treaty which had already been agreed to by 
the Bund.es tag, after both Government’s had been forced to 
renegotiate details of the treaty. See. K. Kopf, op,eit. , p.310.
5 BT, V.WP, Bundestagsdrucksache No. 405.
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Government, in return, legally recognises the post-April 1949 
de facto Rhenish-Palatinate borderline. Additionally, in this 
treaty the two Governments regulate the crossing rights for the 
border populations and tourists in the area of the Mundat 
Forest. Also, on the occasion of signing the treaty in July 
1962 the two Governments exchanged letters in which the French 
Government promised to return the German Christchurch in Paris 
to the German Lutheran Community in the French capita].. Taking 
the ratification for granted the French Government later carried7out this part of the agreement.
The real bone of contention eventually proved to be 
Article 8 of the treaty which reads:
To make allowance for the local needs, particularly 
for the drinking water supply of the town of 
Weissenburg the French Republic and Federal Republic 
of Germany recognise as the definite borderline in 
the area of Weissenburg that described in Appendix A 
of the treaty.8
This borderline in the neighbourhood of Weissenburg running 9through the Mundat Forest has the following post-war history. 
After it had become clear that as a result of the emerging 
East-West conflict a general agreement upon a German peace 
treaty between the Russian and Western victory powers would not 
be forthcoming, the Western powers and the Benelux countries 
met in London at the beginning of 1948 to discuss minor 
adjustments to Germany's Western borders. The above six powers 
created a working committee to deal with these problems in 
detail.
As a result Germany lost 135 sq. kilometres. The 
population of this area was approximately 13,500. At the 
German-French border in the region of Weissenburg, however, only
 ^Ibid., p.5.
7 BT, V.WP, Bundestagsdrucksache No. 405, Anhang 1 und 2 des 
Abkommens, pp.16-17.
 ^Ibid., p.5.
 ^Ibid., p.14.
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6.9 sq. kilometres were ceded. This area was unpopulated. In 
e. so-called 'Ueberleitungs' Treaty,^ Germany had to accept that 
these border adjustments could in future only be revised with 
the consent of the three Western powers.
This point seemed to be particularly relevant in the 
Mundat Forest Treaty. The West German Government argued that 
because of this clause it had proved impossible to recover all 
of the Mundat Forest territory. However, the West German 
Government presented the case that substantial improvements 
could have been obtained compared with the original borderline. 
These improvements amounted to the reclamation of one hectare 
of private agricultural land and one hectare of common forest.
On the debit side the West German Government relinquished a 
claim on 696 hectares of forest land of which 684 hectares 
originally belonged to the Federal and State Government and 
the remainder to private individuals.
The West German Government in its memorandum to the treaty 
showed itself aware of possible objections, on the basis that 
this could be interpreted as a precedent concerning Germany's 
Eastern borders, by emphasising that the French-German 
agreement did not represent a border change but rather a 
border adjustment.
The Discussions in the Foreign Affairs Committee on the Mundat 
Forest Agreement
The Foreign Affairs Committee analysed with extreme care 
the background, motives and possible consequences of the treaty. 
Members of the Committee even travelled into the Mundat Forest 
area in order to consider the treaty's pros and cons on the 
spot. Some members while in Paris discussed aspects of the 
treaty with French colleagues, civil servants and private 
citizens.
For varied reasons the members of the Committee came to 
similar conclusions. Some CDU and CSU members were opposed to 
the treaty on principle because border corrections could be
10 Bundesgesetzblatt 1955, Teil 2, pp.405-06.
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interpreted as border changes. SPD-MP Mueller-Emmert 
seemed to have in mind possible electoral repercussions; others 
were of the opinion that the Foreign Affairs Department had not 
been skilful enough in their negotiations; others again were 
worried about the lack of information. MP von Meerkcitz was 
supposed to have explained his specific affection towards the 
Mundat Forest as a sentimental consequence of a Ph.D. thesis by 
a friend of his on the history of the area. Finally, one has 
to mention that the hunting passion of the French military and 
their predilection for this region lent more scepticism to the 
views of the German MPs upon this treaty. Because of these 
various views it is difficult to isolate any single motive for 
the practical rejection of the treaty. Furthermore, bureaucrats 
and MPs are still reluctant to give quotable commentaries.
Nevertheless, the main arguments against the ratification 
of the Mundat Forest Treaty can be demonstrably summarised in 
the following way. Most of the Government members of the 
Committee were of the opinion that border corrections were 
obviously border changes; and border changes at the expense of 
West German territory could be interpreted as border concessions 
and precisely this could act as a precedent for a solution to 
border problems with East European countries.
The Committee members were convinced that alternative 
solutions existed to the problem of water supply for Weissenburg 
without involving border adjustments. These members were sure 
that, for example, a financial solution could have been found 
amenable to both sides, an alternative which the German 
Government appeared not to have pursued.
While the value of the territory returned to Germany in
the treaty was given as 6 million DM the West German Government
failed to give any estimate for the value of the area to be 
12ceded. The Committee members also received the impression that 
many local French officials would have been quite happy with a 
possible financial agreement.
Interviews von Guttenberg and Kopf.
BT, V.WP, Bundestagsdrucksache No. 405, p.13.12
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Those French diplomats, however, who were in favour of a
solution on the lines of the Mundat Forest Treaty, were in the
view of the West German Committee members more swayed by the
hunting interests of the Corps diplomatique and military than
13the water supply for Weissenburg. This suspicion by the 
Committee members is supported by the fact that, because of the 
liberal hunting habits and ubiquitous hunting zeal in France, 
there was hardly any desirable game left - except in those 
border regions such as the Mundat Forest, in which the well- 
protected German game strayed occasionally across the border.
All this was too much for the West German Committee 
members. While not rejecting the treaty they refused to reach 
a conclusion, thus effectively blocking ratification through 
the German Parliament.
Later on further attempts were made to ratify the treaty.
When in 1967 the Foreign Affairs Committee dealt again with
this issue the Committee's view had become even more inflexible.
Particularly within the CDU/CSU the opposition against the
14treaty had become stronger. This meant that the 'Gaullists' 
found themselves in an extremely difficult position. On the 
one hand, they tried to improve West Germany's relations with 
Gaullist France; on the other, they wanted to prevent at all 
costs border concessions towards France being seen as a 
precedent for future border regulations with the Communist 
Eastern European countries. This was precisely the reason why 
there was not even a minority within the Committee in favour of 
ratification of this treaty.
Reactions of Both Governments Towards the Attitude of the 
Bundestag Committee
After returning the Lutheran Christchurch in Paris in the 
spirit of the treaty, the French Government did not hide their 
displeasure about the attitude of the West German Parliament.
The French pressed on different levels for a ratification of the
Interviews von Guttenberg and Kopf. 
Interview Kopf.
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Mundat Forest Treaty. Consequently it was pointed out to the 
German Foreign Office that this treaty had been ratified in 
France and become law. Such a treatment, particularly by a 
German Parliament, had been so far unimaginable by the French 
Government.
On a lighter note, French Ambassador Seydoux, at a
diplomatic function in Bonn, was supposed to have greeted the
Chairman of the West German Foreign Affairs Committee, Dr
Hermann Kopf, and CDU-MP von Meerkatz with the jocular words:
"You Germans think you have come so far that you can break
treaties in the same way as you did in the past"„ At least this
is the way a foreign affairs officer remembered it. Dr Kopf,
however, cannot recall this incident and does not believe that
the French Government had taken umbrage over this issue. Even
in 1973 the former Committee Chairman thought it necessary to
emphasise that the Committee’s decision should in no way be
16regarded as an affront to France.
Meanwhile back in 1967 MPs Leicht and Becher asked in
Parliament whether there was any possibility of retaining the
Mundat Forest and regaining the agricultural land, which was so
necessary to the local German farmers, offered in exchange by
the French. In reply, State Secretary Schuetz from the Foreign
Office said that both aspects are part and parcel of the same
treaty and that the advantages for Germany would disappear if
the treaty was not ratified by the Bundestag. He argued that
continued deferral of the treaty would result in the possible
17loss of former German agricultural land. The German 
parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs still held to its 
course and refused to change its mind.
The Discussions Within the SPD Working Group on Foreign Policy 
About the Mundat Forest Treaty
It was the parliamentary Social Democratic party who 
decided at a poorly attended meeting in West Berlin to block any
15 Interview with a West German Foreign Affairs official. 
Interview Kopf.
17 BT, V.WP, 101 Sitzg., p.4683B.
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attempt to renew discussion in the parliamentary Foreign Affairs 
Committee about the treaty. This was done despite the fact that 
the SPD had formed a coalition Government with their Chairman 
Willy Brandt as Foreign Minister. Some leading SPD members 
ceased, on the French Government's annoyance, to argue in favour 
of a ratification of the treaty. Nevertheless, a majority stuck, 
to their previous decision.
Mueller-Emmert had argued that it could not be the task of 
the SPD to carry out controversial decisions of the former 
Erhard Government. The parliamentary party leadership, however, 
opposed Mueller-Emmert and pointed out that the German farmers 
whose land would not be returned would be disadvantaged and 
quite correctly annoyed.^^feut Mueller-Emmert was much less 
concerned with a few annoyed farmers than with the remainder of 
his electorate who would understand the Mundat Forest Treaty as 
giving away German territory.
Eugen Selbmann, the Secretary of the SPD working group on 
foreign Policy, explained the defeat of the SPD leadership on 
this issue in the following way:
Nobody realised that the treaty would be discussed. 
Otherwise the parliamentary party leadership would not 
have allowed a vote to be taken upon this problem in 
such an 'off the cuff' manner. But in Berlin all the 
work which had banked up over the year automatically 
comes up for discussion and thus this topic appectrec. 
all of a sudden on the agenda.18
The SPD working group on foreign affairs later on returned 
to this and again it was the local member Mueller-Emmert who 
forced the issue. The Secretary of the SPD working group sent 
the following letter to all SPD members of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee:
Adolf Mueller-Emmert brought to our attention the 
European Water-Charter which was passed by the 
Ministerial Committee of the European Council in 
Strassburg on 6 May 1968. In clause 7 the following 
principle is established: 'Water knows no borders.
It demands international co-operation. The
18 Interview Selbmann I. _
\1<\ Jnferi/iew SeJIowcmn iL
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international problems arising from the usage of 
water shall be solved jointly by all neighbouring 
states in the interest of preserving the quality 
and quantity of water'. The principles of this 
Water-Charter are recognised by both France and 
West Germany. Therefore a border concession, as 
in the Mundat Forest Treaty, is in no way necessary.
Adolf Mueller-Emmert conveyed this in a letter to 
(Foreign Minister) Willy Brandt and requested that 
this aspect should receive consideration in new 
negotiations with France in such a way that the 
Mundat Forest Treaty should be regarded as 
superfluous.
The French Government, however, indicated that the European 
Water-Charter was in no way a substitute for the ratification of 
the treaty by the German Bundestag. \°\c< )
Asked about the future chances of a ratification of the 
treaty a West German Foreign Affairs official replied in an 
interview with the author in December 1968: "It looks rather
grim. The 'Gaullists' within the CDU/CSU are touchy about the 
French flirtation with Moscow - the other MPs are rather 
sensitive over the Gaullist treatment of England and the US/\".
Hence, even in 1976 the treaty between the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the French Republic concerning various border 
regulations theoretically remains on the agenda of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the West German Bundestag.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
As in the last case study here the Committee's significance 
was a direct outgrowth of its powers vis-a-vis treaties. While 
in the case of the Franco-German Treaty the Committee forced a 
modification, in this case it went even further and took the 
unusual stage of rejecting outright the Mundat Forest Treaty.
The lines were sharply drawn between a unanimous Committee and 
the Foreign Ministry under successive Governments. Foreign 
Ministry officials had an obvious interest in the ratification 
of an agreement they had worked out with France. Because of the 
relative insignificance of the issue, however, the Ministry was
Letter from the Secretary of the SPD working group on foreign 
affairs to the SPD members of the Foreign Affairs Committee,
30 October 1968.I^ a) SelloiMviH 1
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unable to gain sufficient support from its own Minister. When 
the question first arose under the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition 
Foreign Minister Schroeder, although formally calling for 
approval of the treaty, exerted no political muscle to achieve 
that end. Later under the Grand Coalition, when SPD-leader 
Brandt had taken over the Foreign Ministry, there was apparently 
a greater effort to gain support for the treaty at the Berlin 
meeting of the SPD foreign affairs working group. This, 
however, was badly organised and, partially due to chance, 
failed. But this failure was clearly related to the low 
priority the SPD leadership placed on the issue.
In opposition to the treaty was a diverse collection of 
politicians on the Committee from all parties. In some instances 
this was based on highly parochial considerations, such as the 
electoral concerns of SPD-MP Mueller-Emmert. In others, it 
concerned the more important consideration of the possible 
implications of the treaty for former German territory in the 
East. Particularly important was the feeling of many Committee 
members, across party lines, that the Committee had been 
inadequately informed concerning the treaty and that this 
represented an unacceptable infringement of their rights. For 
all these reasons the Committee was able to manifest unanimous 
opposition to the treaty.
In turning to the factors contributing to Committee 
solidarity and therefore its ability to reject the treaty, we 
find, in contrast to the previous case study, a very small role 
played by international pressures. While there was some French 
diplomatic pressure brought to bear to gain approval of the 
treaty, this was a long way from the mass of international 
forces which galvanised Committee members to insist upon a 
preamble.
As in the Franco-German Treaty the constitutional role of 
the Committee was a central factor. The very fact that 
Committee action was required before a treaty could be dealt 
with in the full House placed in the hands of Committee members 
a power over the treaty which was potentially absolute. In this 
case the Committee exercised its power.
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While this was clearly an unusual case of outright 
Committee rejection of the Government's decision, elements of 
integrative politics can, as in the previous cases, be seen 
within the Committee. Committee members joined across party 
lines to rebuff the Government's treaty but this was made 
possible because the SPD-Opposition (and subsequently junior 
coalition partner) did not make this an issue for attacking the 
Government per se. Several reasons can be offered for the SPD's 
position. First, it might be argued that the treaty involved 
an issue which was not significant enough to promise partisan 
advantage. There are, however, reasons to believe that some 
political gains could have been made had the SPD pursued 
divisive politics. During the initial stages the SPD in theory 
could have belaboured the Government for the obvious defects of 
the treaty. Ironically, once Willy Brandt had assumed control 
of the Foreign Ministry, within the context of the Committee 
and German politics more broadly, divisive politics - i.e. the 
pursuit of short-term partisan advantage - would have argued for 
ratification of the treaty. One aspect of this would have been 
simply to demonstrate Brandt's effectiveness as Foreign Minister 
in contrast to Schroeder. Indeed, this might have been behind 
the abortive effort to revive the treaty at the Berlin meeting 
of the working committee. But the very laxness suggests that 
this was not a major partisan goal. A second possible partisan 
reason for supporting the treaty would have been to advance the 
course of a new Ostpolitik - which later became a major SPD 
programme - by creating a precedent for border revisions. The 
failure to aggressively push for ratification suggests that on 
this ground the SPD-leaders either consciously or unconsciously 
decided to forego making the matter a major issue. Finally, 
within the context of the Committee itself SPD members might 
have been tempted to deal a rebuff to those CDU/CSU members 
opposed to new initiatives to the East. That this was not done 
suggests that the SPD Committee members were, in this case, more 
concerned with the role of the Committee as a whole than with 
any transitory gains.
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As we have seen in the previous case study the conception 
of the Committee's role by its members was linked to i.ts 
constitutional prerogatives in the area of treaties. This led 
to a particular attitude towards the Foreign Affairs bureaucracy 
which indeed was probably the most significant reason for the 
position which the Committee eventually took. In the case of 
the Jaksch-Report we saw that consultation with the bureaucracy 
enhanced the Committee's task. In the Franco-German Treaty - a 
case where Parliament's ratifying powers were also at issue - 
the bureaucracy was less involved in the process of Committee 
decision as the Committee members emphasised their own role.
In this case the Committee's attitude towards the bureaucracy 
was even more sharply drawn. While, as in the previous case, 
Foreign Affairs officials acted as technical advisers to the 
Committee, here Committee members felt early on that the 
bureaucracy was not adequately performing its duty of informing 
and consulting them. Moreover Committee members also felt the 
Foreign Ministry had done a poor job of pursuing German 
interests in the negotiations with France. Thus rather than 
the consultative relationship of the Jaksch-Report 
deliberations, or the more distant advisory role performed with 
regard to the Franco-German Treaty, in this case the Committee 
took a sceptical and critical role of the Foreign Affairs 
bureaucrats. While this partially flowed from the specific 
responsibilities placed on the Committee relative to treaties 
by the Standing Orders, the lacklustre performance of the 
bureaucracy itself was clearly a key factor.
CHAPTER FOUR
AUSTRALIA'S JOINT PARLIAMENTARY FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
COMMITTEE AND AID POLICY, 1971-75
Academic analysts have consistently downgraded the
influence of Australia's Joint Parliamentary Committee on
Foreign Affairs on decision-making.^ In comparison to the
German situation there is an obvious factor supporting such a
view. While the German Foreign Affairs Committee has both broad
terms of reference and, more importantly, its action is required
before a treaty can be ratified, in Australia the Committee's
scope is limited to questions approved by the Foreign Minister,
it plays no necessary role in treaty ratification and it can
report only to the Foreign Minister and not to Parliament as a 
2whole. These legal considerations are reinforced by political 
factors which we analyse below. But while the sum of legal and 
political factors clearly weakened the role of the Australian 
Committee in comparison to the German case it would nevertheless 
be wrong to conclude that the Committee has been without any 
influence. The ability of the Committee to exert influence - 
albeit limited influence - over policy is illustrated by the 
development of Australia's foreign aid policy after 1971. 
Ironically, our examination of the specific factors allowing 
for Committee's influence in this case will reveal systematic 
factors which have sharply limited the Committee's role overall.
From March to October 1972 the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
on Foreign Affairs considered the effectiveness of Australia's 
foreign aid policies. I shall argue that the Committee's
Henry S. Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia, 
Durham, 1970, pp.19-22; John Knight, 'The Royal Prerogative and 
Foreign Policy: Notes on an Assumption' in Australian Outlook,
Vol. 30, No. 1, April 1976, pp.35-43; J.D.B. Miller, ov.cit.; 
for a more balanced view see H.B. Turner, 'The Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Australian Parliament' in Australian Outlook, 
Vol. 20, No. 1, April 1966, pp.18-28.
2 Later, under the Whitlam Government this obvious anomaly has 
been changed. Since 1973 the Committee can report directly to 
Parliament.
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deliberations, conclusions and recommendations, as well as their 
repercussions, were in this case more influential than any 
previous activity in the history of the Committee. This is not 
saying much, however, since the Committee's political muscle had 
never been properly developed. Be this as it may, most of the 
Committee's recommendations became official policy under the 
Whitlam Labor Government.
Committee Recommendations and Government Policy
The most essential recommendations of the Committee's 
report can be summarised in the following five points:
1. Against the wishes of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs the Committee recommended more emphasis 
on multilateral opposed to bilateral aid.
2. It further advocated that more stress be put on 
social and developmental aspects of foreign aid 
and projects be selected accordingly.
3. Australia's representative to the World Bank should 
not be appointed by Treasury.
4. The Committee, having found out that the Aid Branch 
in Foreign Affairs had never undertaken an 
evaluation of the effectiveness of any aid project, 
called for such evaluations in the future.
5. The Committee recommended emphasis on the 
development of educational institutions within the
1 recipient countries in place of programmes
facilitating the education of foreign elites in 
Australia.
All of the above Committee demands as we11 as others had, 
by October 1975, been implemented. They have been implemented 
for the Labor Government by the Australian Development 
Assistance Agency (ADAA). Ironically the Committee report was 
equivocal in its attitude towards an aid agency. While 
Committee Vice Chairman W. Morrison and other Labor members did 
press for such an agency with the result that it appeared in
9!)
the first draft of the Committee's report, one Liberal member, 
Sir John Cramer, realised that this merely reproduced Labor's 
Launceston platform and was unwilling to see his party so 
committed.
The result was that the final Committee report contained 
the contradictory recommendation that either the foreign aid 
branch in Foreign Affairs be strengthened or that a separate 
foreign aid agency be established. Nevertheless, as we shall 
see, the overall direction of the report's policy 
recommendations supported an independent agency, a point which 
had particular impact on Sir John Crawford's influential 
recommendations to the Prime Minister. Thus when ADAA was 
established in 1973-74 the decision can at least partially be 
traced to the Committee report. ADAA, as an independent agency, 
however, was not to survive the Labor Government and in 1976 was 
placed under the authority of Foreign Affairs.
Before describing the process leading to these 
recommendations, and how these recommendations were transformed 
into Government policy, it is desirable to first introduce the 
general framework within which contemporaneous debate on 
foreign aid was conducted.
The thrust of the Committee's recommendations reflected 
the world-wide change of emphasis in developmental philosophies 
and particularly the disillusionment wTith purely GNP growth- 
oriented concepts. While many academics and politicians were 
not demanding the complete discarding of traditional growth 
concepts, the demand for encompassing the principle of economic 
justice and income distribution was increasingly heard. In 
particular growing attention was given to the plight of the 
rural poor which made up the great majority of the Third World 
population in Asia. Thus new development strategies, in no 
small measure influenced by the Chinese model, shifted emphasis 
from often prestigious heavy industry to agricultural and light 
industry.
While aspects of these new strategies had by 1975 been 
acknowledged by even such traditionally efficiency-crient.ed
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institutions as the World Bank Group, the Asian Development
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and while by this
time even the Liberal Party Opposition included concentration
on the rural sector in its aid policy statement, before 1972 in
Australia it remained for academics and particularly voluntary
aid organisations to articulate the inadequacies of the growth-
oriented strategies in presenting and emphasising the new 
3approach. It is not my task here to evaluate whether these 
new aid strategies have been or can be successful nor the extent 
to which they have been implemented by the Australian4Government. In short, I am not asking to what extent the 
changes in aid policy carried out by the Labor policy have been 
changes of rhetoric rather than substance. The analysis here 
is restricted to the question of the Committee's role in the 
changes which were publicly announced.
To summarise at the outset, in terms of foreign aid policy, 
the Labor Government achieved a shift in emphasis from 
diplomatic and strategic objectives to developmental and 
humanitarian goals. Ironically most members of the Liberal 
Country Party Opposition supported the measures which
See for example: 'Australian Aid to Developing Countries,
Australian Development Assistance Agency, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1975; 'Australia's Overseas 
Development Assistance 1975-76', 1975-76 Budget Paper No. 10; 
Australian Development Assistance Agency; Media Release No. 
,75/14; 'New Directions in Australia's Development Assistance5, 
Paper delivered by Senator Don Willesee at the Conference of 
the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Melbourne, 
9-11 May 1975. Concerning the World Bank Group, the Asian 
Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund see their 
respective Annual Reports from 1970-75. See also Papers 
delivered at the Bi-Annual Meeting of the Asian Association of 
Development Research and Training Institutes, Canberra,
17-23 August 1975. Here particularly, M.L. Qureschi, 'Approach 
to a New Development Strategy for Asian Countries. See also:
The Liberal and National Country Parties, Foreign Policy, 
International Development Assistant Policy, October 1975.
A In this context my interviews indicate that at least
one recipient nation and some senior officials in the Australian 
Aid Agency,, have demonstrated less than total enthusiasm for the 
new approaches.
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accomplished this shift while not perceiving the implications 
of those measures. Parts of the conservative bureaucracy, 
however, did perceive these implications and fought fiercely 
but unsuccessfully to block the steps in question.
To return to the change in foreign aid objectives we must 
first look to the history of foreign aid from 1950 to the early 
seventies. Alan Wilkinson's analysis of the 'higher objectives 
and underlying considerations' (diplomatic and strategic as well 
as economic and humanitarian) came to the conclusion:
1. that the history of foreign aid in Australia (up 
to 1972) was very much conditioned by diplomatic, 
strategic and, to a lesser extent, ideological 
considerations;
2. that economic advantages for Australia were, for 
the most part, only of secondary importance; and
3. that there was usually an altruistic expression 
of concern for others which was not altogether 
rhetorical.5
It also showed, as Wilkinson concluded, that the primacy 
of political (diplomatic and strategic) considerations was due 
to the Department of Foreign Affairs which was in control of the 
more important bilateral aspects of Australia's aid programme.^ 
Wilkinson's study ends with the MacMahon Government.
But if we examine the policies of the Whitlarn Government 
we find a change, or at least a shift of emphasis, in the 
objectives of aid and a revolutionary change in the 
administration of aid. The change can be seen on the one hand 
as reflecting a new strategic outlook. On the other hand, this 
change ostensibly meant a shift from foreign policy and 
strategic objectives to social and economic development aspects. 
Aid was now primarily supposed to improve the rate of 
development in the developing countries. But not only was the
A.E. Wilkinson, 'The Politics of Australian Foreign Aid Policy 
1950-1972 (Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1976), p.354.
6 Ibid.
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new Government more concerned about the quality and actual 
effectiveness of aid; it was as well sensitive to the impact of 
aid on social values, that is what effect aid had on the 
distribution of wealth within the developing countries.
Since former Governments had paid considerable lip-service 
to at least the developmental aspects of aid, many Liberal 
backbenchers accepted most aspects of the Labor philosophy on 
aid as not too controversial. Indeed, that Liberal and Country 
Party members - especially the Liberal Foreign Minister, Sir 
Nigel Bowen - went along with the Labor outlook was as 
surprising as were the events which led to the first critical 
review of Australian Aid policy by the Joint Parliamentary 
Foreign Affairs Committee.
I do not intend to argue that there would have been no 
change in Australia's Foreign Aid policy without the 
deliberations and the report of the Joint Parliamentary Foreign 
Affairs Committee, but what I am arguing is that the Committee's 
actions greatly facilitated change by (1) criticising the then 
current administration of aid, (2) compiling detailed 
administrative information and sketching out an alternative 
administrative system, and (3) placing developmental and 
humanitarian rationales in the foreground. These considerations 
inhibited obstructive tactics by the bureaucracy and by the 
Liberal/Country Party Opposition after 1972. Furthermore, the 
detailed data compiled by the Committee supplied ammunition to 
all those inside and outside Parliament seeking change.
A Combination of Different Interests: Committee Rights and the
Aid Issue
The reason why the parliamentary Committee took up the 
foreign aid issue, however, was definitely not purely a question 
of dealing with a subject close to the Committee's heart. In 
fact, one can argue that, to a certain extent, the Committee's 
report was partially the product of a series of accidents. This 
applies both to the selection of foreign aid as a topic to be 
examined by the Committee and, because of the ignorance and 
apathy of some Committee members, to the substance of some of 
the recommendations.
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There were three distinct reasons why the foreign aid 
question was raised within the framework of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee.
1. The members of the Foreign Affairs Committee were 
seeking a means to extend the Committee's powers 
at a time when the aid issue fortuitously came 
along.
2. W. Morrison, Committee Vice Chairman and Labor 
spokesman, who believed he could control the 
Committee despite Labor's minority position, 
developed a plan for using the aid issue to 
bolster the Committee - and his chances of being 
elected by Labor Caucus into the shadow ministry.
3. The Liberal Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Bowen, 
being unaware of the existing problems with the 
aid programme agreed to a review on the assumption 
that aid was an uncontroversial matter.
However, all was not smooth sailing. It is necessary to 
review events by stages in order to understand the enfolding 
of Morrison's plan and the chance occurrences which furthered 
it.
A New Liberal Committee Chairman and Labor's New Aid Policy:
The Ingredients for W. Morrison's Strategy
It is further necessary to look very closely at the various 
attempts of the Joint Committee to extend its powers, especially 
the right to hold meetings in public. These attempts began in 
early 1971 when the Committee decided to establish a Sub­
committee consisting of its Chairman, Deputy Chairman and 
Senator Sir Magnus Corinack. This Sub-Committee had the task of 
formulating guidelines for public sessions of the Committee and7consulting with the Minister, whose approval was required.
Later in March the then Committee Chairman, David 
Fairbairn, was appointed to the Cabinet and the Joint Committee
7 Minutes of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, 16 March 
1971 (hereafter Committee Minutes).
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decided to postpone further action until a new Chairman was 
appointed. This happened at the end of April when Harry Turner
gwas unanimously elected Committee head.
Since Turner had been a strong proponent of parliamentary 
rights for over 30 years, this suggested that in the future the 
Liberal members of the Committee would be less subservient to 
the Ministry. However, the political circumstances of the time 
blunted the impulse to expand the Committee's authority.
In June 1971 the release of the Pentagon Papers raised
questions about the Australian role in the Vietnam War. Deputy
Chairman and Labor member Morrison attempted to obtain
information on the Australian role but was blocked by the
MacMahon Government.^ The majority Committee members then had
no choice but to oppose Morrison. The Labor Committee leader
in turn utilised this turn of events to publicise both the
Committee's importance and his own position on the eve ofqLabor's 1971 Launceston Conference.
It was in Launceston that Labor's policy was formulated and 
that Morrison developed his plan to utilise the Committee to 
further that policy. Labor's policy, although not very 
specific, did indicate a clear desire for change. It read:
In accepting the United Nations programme to work 
towards a national contribution of 1% of gross 
national product, the Labor Party recognises that the 
quantity of aid is not the full measure of its 
effectiveness. In pursuit of a more meaningful aid 
programme the Labor Party proposes:
(a) to establish an Institute of Development Studies 
for the overall examination of the problem of 
social and economic development;
(b) to reorganise the administration of the various 
Australian aid programmes and to establish a 
mutual co-operation agency; and
Committee Minutes, 27 April 1971.
9
Australian, 19 June 1971.
 ^ Interview with W. Morrison, Canberra, September 1974.
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(c) to support an increase in the opportunities for 
less developed countries to sell their goods.
A Labor Government will be sensitive to the quality 
of aid and the impact on social values.-*--'-
The Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the Labor
12Party formulated these proposals which the Launceston
13Conference adopted unanimously. The members of the Committee 
were E.G. Whitlam, J.F. Cairns, M.D. Cross, P.R. Young,
K.E. Beasley, J.L. Cavanagh and W.L. Morrison. According to an 
interview with M.D. Cross, Whitlam and Morrison were the most 
influential figures in the Committee's deliberations.^^ The 
crucial elements of Labor's new proposals were the intention not 
only to reorganise and centralise the aid administration but to 
do so via a foreign aid agency independent of Foreign Affairs. 
This would have denied Foreign Affairs an important tool in 
obtaining diplomatic influence in foreign countries. Of course, 
Foreign Affairs had never been so crude as to attempt to trade 
foreign aid grants for diplomatic advantage, but it was an 
undeniable fact that aid programmes facilitate access to the 
recipient Governments. The implications of an independent aid 
agency presumably staffed by former External Territories 
officers who had a history of conflict with Foreign Affairs plus 
idealistically orientated public servants and outsiders serving 
under a Labor Minister committed to change, might have 
facilitated the achievement of what the Launceston Conference 
called as 'sensitivity to the quality of aid and its impact on 
social and economic development'. Although most Liberal members 
of Parliament were unaware of this, the Foreign Affairs
Australian Labor Party, Platform, Constitution and Rules as 
approved by the 29th Commonwealth Conference, Launceston, 1971, 
pp.33ff.
12 Report of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, 29th 
ALP Federal Conference, Launceston, 20 June 1971, pp„2-3.
13 Australian Labor Party, Minutes of the 29th Commonwealth 
Conference, Launceston, 20 June 1971, p.35.
14 Interview with Labor MP M.D. Cross, Canberra, March 1973.
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bureaucracy understood it fully. The former permanent Head of
Foreign Affairs, Sir Keith Waller, said in an interview that
after the Launceston Conference he knew that there "would be
problems". But "we hoped that our better arguments would
prevail and we were confident, would Labor come to office, Mr
Whitlam could be convinced that aid policy is part of foreign
policy and that thus the permanent Head would still remain
15responsible for the whole area of foreign affairs".
While the Foreign Affairs Department focused on the
alternative Prime Minister, Mr Morrison was active within the
Committee. Morrison's tactics were a curious blend of
integrative and divisive politics. On the one hand, he sought
to build up support from Liberal members of the Committee. In
this he emphasised the rights of the Committee, an issue of
particular importance to the Chairman, Turner. On the other
hand, he was quick to seek partisan and personal political
advantage. Thus at the end of June 1971 he led a walk-out of
Labor members from the Committee both to protest against the
Government's referral to discuss its participation in the
Vietnam War following the publication of the Pentagon Papers and
also to emphasise the party's unwillingness to take part in
Committee work unless the Committee's authority was 
16strengthened. This pattern of action was typical of Morrison 
throughout Committee consideration of the aid question.
A September Committee Meeting with Foreign Minister N. Bowen:
The Origin of the Parliamentary Aid Investigation
By mid-September 1971 both the Government and Opposition 
believed some compromise was possible. The Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Bowen, appeared at the Committee's 28th meeting to
Interview with Sir Keith Waller, Canberra, July 1975.
16 Committee Minutes, 27 June 1971; and Interview with 
W. Morrison, Canberra, 2 April 1975.
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demonstrate his and his department’s willingness to co-operate. 
Indeed, a compromise seemed in the air; after the establishment 
of a Senate Foreign Affairs Committee with significant powers, 
it was hardly politically possible to have a Joint Foreign 
Affairs Committee with much more limited authority, particularly 
since many members of the Senate Committee also sat on the Joint 
Committee.
The rights conferred on the Senate Committee were: to hold
public or private meetings; to determine the agenda without 
restriction; to utilise adequate staff facilities and resources; 
and to have automatic access to the full Senate for its 
recommendations.
By contrast, the Joint Committee was not empowered to meet 
in public without ministerial consent, could only discuss issues 
with the prior agreement of the Minister, and the conclusions 
and recommendations were placed before the Minister upon whose 
discretion subsequent submission to Parliament depended.
At this point Morrison, aware of the political anomaly of 
the Joint Committee's lesser powers and of the support of the 
Liberal members for redressing this situation and having the 
Minister present at the Committee's meeting, seized the 
opportunity to not only press for enhanced Committee authority 
but also to further Labor's new aid proposals.
On the matter of Committee rights Morrison received a mixed 
but on the whole positive response. According to the Committee 
Minutes, Chairman Harry Turner said that the fundamental issues 
were whether the Joint Committee was to continue and if so, 
whether it should operate with no less authority than that of 
the Senate. Although the Minister admitted that he personally
17
Sir Keith Waller, the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
declared in an interview in Canberra, 26 June 1975, that he had 
never been in favour of an 'extremely docile Committee' and 
that although in the field of foreign policy a lot was to be 
said in favour of dictatorship, he personally always preferred 
to inform parliamentarians in advance about complicated issues, 
not only for getting further advice but also to avoid 'awkward 
questions' in public by politicians. ( H e r e o f ier  S'lt
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did not favour a change of the existing Terms of Reference, he
conceded that the Committee had a point and would consider
18possible changes.
Morrison then raised the problem of securing expert advice 
for the Committee and proposed that this expert advice could be 
drawn from the Legislative Research Section of the Parliamentary 
Library, the secondment of an officer of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs or from a member of the Senate Staff with 
previous experience in the field of foreign policy.
Surprisingly Minister Bowen not only promised to look at 
these proposals sympathetically, he also suggested that on 
occasion an outside expert could be used to the Committee1s 
advantage.
It was at this moment that Morrison attempted to realise
his plan to reform Australia's aid policy. Bowen, assuming aid
policy was non-controversial, gave his tacit approval by saying
2 0that an aid investigation would "not frighten" ' him.
Thus seven months before the aid investigation started 
Morrison had already laid the basis for a change in aid policy 
through focusing on the question of the Committee's rights 
rather than on the substance of the issue.
The above interpretation is based on the recently released 
Committee Minutes. A somewhat different interpretation, but 
one not incompatible with the foregoing, appeared in an article 
by Eric Walsh in the National Times shortly after the Committee 
meeting:
The Committee, Government and Opposition, spoke mainly 
through Labor member and former diplomat Mr Bill 
Morrison. But he ran into a singularly unco-operative 
Foreign Affairs Minister in stocky, taciturn Nigel 
Bowen.
18 Committee Minutes, 14 September 1971.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
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The Committee was becoming redundant, Mr Morrison 
reportedly argued. Mr Bowen replied that he could 
give no instant decision increasing its powers.
The Committee was misnamed, Mr Morrison said. It 
should not be a parliamentary committee but a 
'Minister's Committee'. Again Mr Bowen replied he 
would not become a kerbside decision-maker.
Mr Bowen appeared to have won the day. He showed 
little sign of capitulating. The informal meeting 
however did leave him with what might be described 
as a test case. It concerns foreign aid, a 
seemingly ii^ocuous subject on which there is no 
major difference between policies.
And Eric Walsh concluded: "If ever they are to get [expanded
21powers] it will he on an issue like this".'
Delays and a Difficult Start
Angered by the obvious fact that some Committee members had
broken the confidentiality stipulated by Committee regulations,
Chairman Turner, at the following Committee meeting, warned
22against any repetition of the indiscretions.
At the same meeting Vice Chairman Morrison circulated a
resolution to the Foreign Affairs Minister. The 'philosophical
approach' of this proposal was generally supported and, after
2 3revisions, the resolution was unanimously accepted. Minister
Bowen, however, possibly upset by the critical newspaper report,
was in no hurry to accommodate the Committee. Thus at the
beginning of December the Committee had to remind Mr Bowen "that
a reply had not yet been received to the Committee's submission
on open hearings".“ At the end of February 1972 Mr Turner and
25Mr Bowen finally discussed the problem again. ‘ Moreover, at
21 Eric Walsh, 'A new Committee highlights a Senate-House power 
struggle' in National Times, 27 September-2 October 1971. 
(Emphasis added.)
22 Committee Minutes, 28 September 1971.
23 Ibid.
24 Committee Minutes, 7 December 1971.
25 Committee Minutes, 22 February 1972.
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the beginning of March the Committee received a letter from the
Minister which was circulated to all members with an explicit
note that this was to be handled according to strict
2 6confidentiality. Nothing of Bowen's letter was included in 
the Committee minutes. From Turner's response, the contents of 
which were found in the Committee's minutes, one can conclude 
that the Minister did not meet all of the Committee's requests. 
Although Turner indicated general concurrence with the Minister 
he made specific points concerning the planned aid inquiry and 
declared that he
would make points that the subject matter of the 
inquiry should not be interpreted too narrowly, that 
on the question of the public appearance of officers 
it should be emphasised that evidence would not 
necessarily in all cases and at all times have to be 
heard in camera, and raising with the Minister the 
possible desirability of employing outside 
consultants with specialised knowledge to assist the 
Committee.27
Without waiting for an answer from the Minister the Committee 
decided to ask the Parliamentary Library and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs to commence gathering background material on
A month later a sub-committee consisting only of House
29members was established and at the end of April this sub­
committee elected Harry Turner as Chairman.
As one can see from the preface to the Parliamentary Aid 
Report Mr Bowen agreed to public inquiries by the Committee 
under certain conditions. However, he only agreed to an
Committee Minutes, 7 March 1972.
^  Committee Minutes, 21 March 1972.
28 Ibid.
29 Committee Minutes, 28 March and 11 April 1972.
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investigation of one specific area of aid - the question of 
’’what is the most effective form of aid - bilateral or 
multilateral?” ^
The Committee would not settle for this. At an early stage31and in order "to fulfil adequately the task imposed upon it"' 
the Committee approached the Minister and both sides agreed to 
broaden the scope of the inquiry which now encompassed the 
following:
1. The historical background and emergence of foreign 
aid programmes
2. The international setting for foreign aid programmes
3. The forms of aid -
(i) Bilateral Government aid;
(ii) Multilateral Government aid; and
32(iii) Other forms of non-Government aid.'
The Vice Chairman Establishes His Influence and Most Members’ 
Motives for the Aid Deliberations
Soon after the start of Committee deliberations, the 
Minister probably regretted his commitment because Committee 
members interpreted the above terms of reference so broadly as 
to publicly criticise a wide spectrum of aid-related matters:
1) Prime Minister McMahon's A$69 million aid promise to 
Indonesia; 2) the contentions devisa credit system of aid 
between Australia and Indonesia; 3) the possible exploitation 
by Australian business of low tariff rates for some goods 
imported into Australia from less-developed countrd.es; 4) the 
fact that the Government paid marked prices to the Australian 
Wheat Board for up to 250,000 tons of wheat given as overseas
Report on Australia’s Foreign Aid, Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs (hereafter Parliamentary Aid Report), p.I.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p.II.
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aid without demanding quantity discounts and even 5) the 
unavailability of RAAF aircraft to ferry emergency aid to 
Bangladesh in 1971.^
The familiarity of Labor's Committee Vice Chairman and 
former diplomat W. Morrison, with the detailed workings of aid 
administrations can be perceived in the dialogue between him and 
Alf Parsons, a First Assistant Secretary with Foreign Affairs, 
a dialogue which also reveals Morrison's political shrewdness. 
Parsons had earlier told the Committee thr^ t all aid to Indonesia 
was in response to Indonesian requests for specific purposes. 
When Morrison asked for what specific purposes McMahon's $69 
million dollar promise would be spent, Parsons replied that this 
was still being worked out.
Mr Morrison: If aid is given only for specific
purposes what requests were made for this aid?
Mr Parsons: The use of the $69 million is still
being studied.
Mr Morrison: Did the Prime Minister just pluck
this figure from the air?
Mr Parsons: No, the Foreign Minister was there, too.
Mr Morrison: Did the Prime Minister and the Foreign
Minister then just pluck that figure from the air?
34Mr Parsons made no reply.
Eric Walsh commented on the first meetings of the Committee in 
the National Times (10-15 July 1972) :
Around Canberra, which is bristling with high-powered 
and much publicised Senate committees, not many had 
heard of the Joint Parliamentary Foreign Affairs 
Committee on Overseas Aid. The way things are shaping 
a good deal is likely to be heard of the committee 
in the future.
And:
The Departments of Trade and Foreign Affairs are at 
present doing some unanticipated homework which could
33
34
National Times, 10-15 July 1972, p.8. 
Cited in National Times, 10-15 July 1972, p.8.
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lead eventually to a total review of the operations 
of Australian aid programs in South-East Asian 
countries.
Top men from both departments spent a considerable 
part of last week under concentrated grilling by 
members of the Joint Parliamentary Foreign Affairs 
Committee on Overseas Aid.
Walsh also discovered who was the most driving and influential 
force behind the Committee's operations.
Mr Morrison made most of the running at the hearings 
of the little-known aid committee, which looks like 
being far-reaching and effective.
W. Morrison's prominence, however, was not only due to his 
scathing polemical attacks on the McMahon Government which were 
avidly gathered by some members of the Canberra press corps.
In addition, concerning the substantive and often highly 
technical issues, which made the great bulk of the Committee's 
work, it was also Morrison who criticised old concepts and 
presented new ideas. Alan Wilkinson later on commented in a 
Ph.D. thesis:
Morrison, with a background of diplomatic service 
and involvement with aid administration in the 
Department of Foreign Affairs while on overseas 
postings and while based in Canberra, was the only 
member of the Sub-Committee who brought to the inquiry 
a detailed knowledge of aspects of the Australian aid 
programme. Consequently, in spite of the early 
availability of written submissions, most other 
members did not know what questions to ask of those 
who, after making submissions, appeared as witnessesbefore the Sub-Committee.35
Alan Wilkinson also discovered that the Liberal Chairman of the
Committee, Harry Turner, "like most other members ... appeared
3 6to have a relatively limited knowledge of the subject matter' 
and occasionally demonstrated an inadequate grasp of the
Alan Wilkinson, op.cit,, p.284.
3 6 See, for example, Turner's question on the possibility of 
local procurement of capital equipment in recipient countries. 
'Parliamentary Transcripts on Aid’, p.315.
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37submissions". Wilkinson also pointed out the important role
played by Nancy Viviani, a Ph.D. scholar in International
Relations at the Australian National University, who was
temporarily assigned to the Committee as a research officer.
Viviani prepared the "precis of many submissions as well as
lists of suggested questions which the Chairman put before the
3 8various witnesses". A considerable impact was also provided
by witnesses from universities, business and voluntary aid
agencies as indicated by the fact that much of the testimony of
39these witnesses was reflected in the Committee's report.
Wilkinson further investigated the motives of the Committee in
dealing with the aid problem. He was right in questioning
whether the aid matter as such was the main cause in inquiring
into the issue; he was wrong, however, in insisting that the
Committee members were doing it "to create a precedent for
members of the House of Representatives to undertake public
inquiries into foreign affairs issues, in competition with the
4 0expanding Senate inquiry system". The Committee Minutes from 
28 March and 11 April 1972, which were not available to 
Wilkinson, explicitly reveal that the intent was to expand the 
Committee's powers in addition to those of the Senate's 
Committee. While it is true that Senator McManus foresaw an 
independent House Committee developing, it is equally true that 
most members were keen to keep the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
on Foreign Affairs as an umbrella institution.
Apart from the genuine interest of a few members in the 
substantive issues, the overriding motive for the Committee's 
action was to create a precedent for increased rights for the
See, for example, Turner's question concerning Australian 
reservations on acceding to UNCTAD resolutions on the lowering 
of tariff barriers, ibid,, p.604.
3 8 A. Wilkinson, op,cit,, p.285.
3Q" This is treated in detail in A. Wilkinson, op,cit,, p.286. 
40 A. Wilkinson, op,cit,, pp.285-86 (emphasis added).
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Joint Committee, particularly the right to hold public hearings, 
and not to compete with the Senate's new Committee on Foreign 
Affairs. Thus, the Preface to the Aid Report deliberately 
ignored the fact that the Sub-Committee had solely consisted 
of members of the House of Representatives:
Apart from the historical importance of the inquiry, 
in that it is the first public inquiry held by a 
Sub-Committee of the Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, the Committee believes that the inquiry has 
indicated that a public inquiry by a Parliamentary 
Committee into matters which relate to foreign 
affairs are a valuable and natural extension of 
Parliamentary activity.
Wilkinson, however, is totally correct in stressing the very 
limited nature of the Government members' knowledge of and 
interest in foreign aid matters. It was one man, Vice Committee 
Chairman W. Morrison, who suggested the topic (albeit not only 
due to his concern with aid) and who made most of the running 
on the issue. It is clear, moreover, that Committee staff - in 
this case Nancy Viviani - have their own predilections which 
predate Committee deliberations and thus can significantly 
influence Committee procedures and recommendations, particularly 
in the absence of a determined and knowledgeable Committee 
Chairman. In this particular case where an active Vice Chairman 
and an energetic research officer shared the same basic outlook, 
then their view could be advanced given the apathy of the 
Committee majority. Liberal Committee Chairman Turner later 
admitted quite frankly in an interview that his main interest 
had been to widen the role of the Committee in the decision­
making process and not in the actual substance of the report.
The minimal interest of the Committee majority in the aid 
question is suggested by the fact that in 1975 interviews both 
Turner and former Liberal Committee member Sir John Cramer
expressed surprise and dismay when told that the Whitlam
4 2Government had established an independent aid agency.
41 Parliamentary Aid Report, p.III.
4 2 Interview with H. Turner in Sydney, October 1975; interview 
wit): Sir John Cramer, Noosa Heads, October 1975.
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Conclusions and Recommendations of the Parliamentary Aid Report 
and Some Reflections on their Importance
The question of whether to establish an independent aid
agency had been one of the central issues of the Committee’s
deliberations. According to Morrison the Committee's first
draft report contained precisely authorisation for an
independent aid agency.^ylvhen the final draft was considered,
43however, Sir John Cramer raised objections. He realised the 
report actually endorsed Labor’s Launceston platform and was 
unwilling to lend the Committee's stamp of approval.
It speaks well of the skill and determination of those 
supporting a change in aid policy that not only did the thrust 
of the Committee's recommendations favour such a change but 
also, despite Sir John's objections, the report kept open the 
option of an independent aid agency. The relevant paragraph of 
the Committee report reads as follows:
The Committee concluded that the organisational 
structure of Australian aid administration has 
developed in a largely ad hoc fashion over the last 
quarter of a century. The existing structure 
involving dispersal of aid functions among several 
departments needs to be substantially reviewed in 
the light of the increased complexities and 
sophistication of development assistance and to 
accommodate the administration of aid to an 
independent Papua New Guinea.
RECOMMENDATION: The Committee recommends that
consideration be given either to the strengthening 
of the Aid Branch of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs to administer all aid including multilateral 
aid and aid to an independent Papua New Guinea, or 
to the establishment of an authority responsible to 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Consideration must be given to the establishment of 
an aid consultative committee."-^
Before dealing with this crucial recommendation, I shall first 
examine other major conclusions and recommendations of the 
Committee.
------  4 2 / 0  J h f’ö A '/ß u ) (v? ornSec^43 This account was subsequently confirmed by Nancy Viviani and 
Sir John Cramer.
44 Parliamentary Aid Report, p.VI.
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Although it is impossible to prove that the Committee 
report brought about the change in Government policy following 
the 1972 election, the following is nevertheless clear: nearly
all policies proposed in the parliamentary report had been 
adopted by 1975.* 4^
The report stated: although bilateral aid had certain
advantages in terms of trade and goodwill from the recipient
countries, multilateral aid was less open to allegations that
’narrow national interests determined the allocation of aid'.
Moreover, under multilateral programmes less aid would be 'tied*.
sy'iheqThese multilateral programmes in any case were better mi&ledr to
supporting expensive infrastructure projects because of their
greater resources. The Committee, therefore, without
downgrading bilateral aid, recommended increased disbursements
to international bodies concerned with aid, especially the
Special Fund of the Asian Development Bank. The Committee
further recommended that 'greater emphasis be placed on ai.d
projects in the agricultural, social welfare and educational
fields’.46 All of the foregoing became official policy under
Whitlam. The change in policy was not only (at least in this
47case) limited to rhetoric. In the 1975-76 Hayden Budget, for 
the first time in Australian history, multilateral aid 
expenditures increased significantly while funds for bilateral 
programmes declined marginally.
Another major recommendation was that "more emphasis be
placed on the social aspects of development in the criteria on
49which projects are selected". As former Foreign Minister
45 Ironically, one of the few recommendations which was not 
implemented was the Committee's suggestion to itself that it 
conduct periodic reviews of aid policy.
46 Parliamentary Aid Report, pp.IV-V.
4  ^ See Senator Don Willesee, 'Mew Directions in Australia's 
Development Assistance’, op.cit.; and 'Australian Aid to 
Developing Countries', Australian Development Assistance Agency, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1975.
48 'Australia's Overseas Development Assistance 1975-76', 1975- 
76 Budget Papers No. 10.
49 Parliamentary Aid Report, p.V.
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Willesee pointed out in his speech to the Australian Institute
of International Affairs in 1975, this had become a guiding
50principle of foreign aid policy.
The next Committee recommendation which called for more 
attention to "the quality of aid, including terms of aid and 
the contribution to development" has, as one ADAA official put 
it "dropped a bit out of sight". This was not because "we don't 
share that philosophy" but because "in practice it proved hard 
to supervise". This vague recommendation, however, was, as well 
as the preceding recommendation, noteworthy not because of its 
practicability but precisely because it represented an expanded 
version of Labor's general aid philosophies expressed in the 
1971 Launceston platform. The Liberal Country Party members as 
well as DLP Senator McManus again failed to raise any 
objections.
Other Committee recommendations accepted as policy by the 
Labor Government include:
1. that Australia's representatives at the World Bank 
meetings should be officials from the Aid branch 
of Foreign Affairs rather than from Treasury;'J
2. that greater emphasis be placed on educating Third 
World students in their home countries instead of 
Australia;
3. that aid contributions to multilateral agencies 
and institutions be progressively 'untied';
4. that the tariff preference scheme be reviewed; and
5. that in place of tax deductions to private 
individuals for contributions to private aid 
agencies, the Government should adopt a system of 
pro rata grants to supplement the funds spent by 
these private agencies.
50 This was confirmed by interviews with senior ADAA officials.
51 At present (October 1975) ADAA officials are representing 
Australia at World Bank meetings.
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The Committee discovered that the Aid branch of Foreign 
Affairs had never systematically evaluated Australian-sponsored 
aid projects. The three-member Appraisal Section in Foreign 
Affairs, as one senior official conceded, had been 'hopelessly 
overworked' and had only finished one evaluation report in the 
entire period of its existence. Although other Foreign Affairs 
officials claimed that this section had been somewhat more 
productive, all agreed that due to staff shortages in the Aid 
Section as a whole the three members of the Appraisal Section 
were mostly used for other tasks.
Apparently, however, this was not the only reason for the
small amount of evaluation work carried out by this section.
This difficult task of evaluation is only now being confronted
by ADAA officials. These officials concede that many problems
remain in this regard and that it will be a matter of time
before it can be determined whether successful solutions can
be devised. Some are more hopeful than others. All ADAA
officials, however, agreed that it was the parliamentary
Committee's report which sensitised them to the problems
involved and caused them to be particularly careful in the
5 2selection of aid projects.
So much for the most important conclusions, recommendations 
and achievements of the Committee report. As I have already 
pointed out, it is difficult to 'prove' that it was the 
Committee's influence which made the Government adopt most of 
the Committee's recommendations as Government policy. Given 
the Launceston platform., it is safe to assume that the changes 
introduced by the Whitlam Government in aid policy might have 
occurred, although perhaps not exactly in the same fashion, even 
if the parliamentary report had been quite different.
Nevertheless, the influence of the report can be seen in 
a number of respects. Wilkinson noted the following 
significance in the Aid report:
52 Interviews w7ith several ADAA officials between Apri.» and 
September 1975.
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1. Connections ... were established between Members 
of Parliament and non-governmental interest groups.
2. The foreign aid inquiry was of greatest importance 
for the extent to which public service participation 
was required. This was the first occasion on which a 
large volume of departmental information was made 
publicly available. The Departments of Foreign Affairs, 
Trade and Industry, the Treasury, Education and Science, 
Immigration, External Territories and Primary Industry 
supplied written and oral evidence which ran to 1080 of 
the 1606 pages of transcript. This evidence was largely 
descriptive but many aid policy issues did emerge. For 
the first time in two decades of aid-giving, the 
departments primarily responsible for foreign aid were 
subjected to public scrutiny, albeit limited, across 
the whole range of activities encompassed by the aid 
programme.
The public release of this mass of departmental 
information through the medium of a parliamentary sub­
committee may well have had some impact on. the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. While the aid Sub-Committee was 
still deliberating, he delivered a major statement on 
‘Australian Foreign Aid1 in the House, and for the 
first time appended details of specific 'Country 
Programmes' in the form of statistical and descriptive 
material covering Australia's past and current aid 
projects in most recipient countries. 3^
Since Wilkinson did not deal with the Whitlam Government,
his analysis could not gauge the longer term effects of the
Committee's report. Nevertheless, Wilkinson does hint that the
54report was "a valuable reference document" in the 
establishment of an independent Aid agency.
Aid Decision-Making, Parliamentary Committee Influence and the 
Establishment of ADAA
As already demonstrated, the Committee recommendations 
concerning a new aid administration were by no means clear. 
While Morrison and the Labor Committee members were in favour 
of an independent Aid agency the Liberal members and especially 
Sir John Cramer preferred an expansion of the existing Aid 
branch in Foreign Affairs. Cramer's intervention which
A. Wilkinson, op.cit., pp.286-87. 
A. Wilkinson, op.cit., p.287.
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prevented full Committee approval of Labor’s Launceston platform 
on this particular point, according to one high ranking public 
servant, originated with Sir Keith Waller, former Head of 
Foreign Affairs. Both Waller and Cramer dispute this. In a 
lengthy interview, Sir John Cramer referred to Sir Keith Waller 
as a 'friend' with whom he might have discussed things like
55this, but he emphasised that "nobody put anything in my head". 
Indeed it became quite clear during the interview that Cramer's 
objections to an independent aid agency had their root in his 
perception of aid policy as a part of foreign policy and his 
aversion to new bureaucratic empires. In any case, the 
Committee compromised and explicitly proposed the alternatives 
of an independent aid agency or an expansion of the Foreign 
Affairs Aid branch for the Minister's decision. Subsequently 
those arguing diametrically opposed views had recourse to citing 
the Committee's report. Thus, on the first glance, one would 
assume that the Committee could have hardly played a significant 
role in the establishment of the Australian Development Assistance 
Agency.
Those with a detailed grasp of aid policy, and a belief in
the need for change, however, recognised a central problem was
the domination of Foreign Affairs over the aid administration
and that the Committee report pointed the way to the breaking
of that domination. While the Committee report straddled the
question of an independent aid agency the thrust of the
remaining Committee recommendations all argued for changes on
a scale which could not be accomplished by a mere expansion of
the Foreign /affairs aid branch. This was exactly the way in
which Sir John Crawford read and interpreted the Committee 
56report. Together with the Prime Minister's Principal Private 
Secretary, Peter Wilenski, it was Crawford who made the decisive 
proposals to Whitlam, and as Crawford admitted in an interview
55 Interview with Sir John Cramer, Noosa Heads, October ,
56 Interview with Sir John Crawford, Canberra, 7 July 1975.
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it was the Report of the Task Force for a unified aid 
administration and particularly the Parliamentary Committee
57report which shaped his recommendations to the Prime Minister.
But before dealing with this aspect it is necessary to 
place it in broader perspective.
After the 1972 elections had created a favourable climate 
for implementing the Committee's recommendations, the new Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister Whitlam created an 
interdepartmental task force to examine all options for a 
unified administration of aid, including bilateral, multilateral 
aid and aid to an independent Papua New Guinea. The task force 
was headed by Mr L.M. Border, Deputy Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, and included three First Assistant Secretaries from 
External Territories, the Treasury and the Department of 
Education. The Task Force made it clear that it. was relying 
primarily on the submissions to, deliberations of, and 
conclusions drawn by the Joint Parliamentary Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, but that it had also taken into account Labor's 
1971 Launceston Platform:
The Task Force had the benefit of the Report on 
'Australia's Foreign Aid' of the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, together with the 
transcript of evidence and departmental depositions 
before the Committee. The conclusions and 
recommendations, which have not yet been formally 
considered by the Government, are attached. As the 
Committee had recorded the opinions of the Australian 
Council for Overseas Aid, Community Aid Abroad, and 
various others interested in the administration of 
Australia's aid program, the Task Force felt, in view 
of the early date on which this report was due, that 
it was not essential to call further such evidence.
The Task Force took into account the aid aspects in 
The Australian Labor Party's 1971 Platform. Although 
the Government has not made a formal statement on the 
objectives of overseas aid, the Task Force noted that 
the Platform expresses a desire for a more meaningful 
aid program, one of high quality and one which would 
have some impact on social values. To this end, the
57 Ibid.
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Platform foreshadows the re-organisation of the
various Australian aid programs and the establishment
of a mutual co-operation agency.58
The two most important chapters of this report were Chapter 
II, which examined the concept of unification, and Chapter III, 
which set out the options for implementing this concept. The 
most significant aspect of the Task Force's Commission, however, 
was that it was only supposed to set out options rather than 
making recommendations. The Task Force offered three options 
concerning unification of aid. They were:
1. to amalgamate the External Territories existing 
aid functions with those of foreign affairs;
2. to centralise financial, personnel, review and 
evaluation powers while leaving policy 
implementation in the hands of the several 
concerned departments; and
3. to establish a completely unified aid
59administration.
Thus while the Task Force was in effect compelled to consider 
the option of complete unification, it nevertheless stressed the 
administrative and personnel disruption of such a change as well 
as the fact that it would cause a re-arrangement of ministerial 
responsibilities.^
There was an additional choice to be made: Where should
a new aid organization be located, what authority should it have 
and to whom should it be responsible? The Task Force offered 
five options:
Option 1: To expand the present Aid Branch within the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
Report of the Task Force on a Unified Aid Administration, 
Canberra, May 1973, p.2.
5 9 Ibid, r p.27.
^  Ibid,, pp.8-11.
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Option 2: To create an 'Office of International Aid'
Option 3: To create an aid agency as under Option 2
where the Director-General would have to 
report not directly to the Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs but to an advisory committee 
which would become the main articulator of 
foreign aid policy to the Government. This 
advisory committee, however, was supposed to 
chaired by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
thus ensuring considerable departmental 
influence.
Option 4: Establishing a separate department or a
Option 5s To create a separate department with its own
All these options were presented to the Prime Minister on 
31 May 1973.
These options did not surprise either Mr Whitlarn or the 
Foreign Affairs Department. Already at the beginning of 1973, 
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Sir Keith Waller, outlined 
similar options of those of the Task Force but gave advice as 
well. Concerning unification he declared that it was long 
overdue, while subtly indicating that after the independence of 
Papua New Guinea Foreign Affairs should take over responsibility 
for aid to that country. ^  *
Concerning the location of a totally unified Agency, Waller 
emphasised the dangers of a completely independent body - its
following jour pages. These, pages are on documes\{s jsla
headed by a Director-General with direct 
responsibility to the Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs.
statutory body responsible directly to the 
Minister but not to the Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs.
minister. 61
and internierwhich Inch be akd. ^
“author bad confronted P eh ^  bjd^is ' ^ / 2 / r
if s f i i s  if"""
£ • »  V.'yXSi-“-*
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presumed tendency to organizational aggrandisement and the 
likelihood that it would follow a policy at variance with that 
of Foreign Affairs, Waller stressed that Foreign Affairs was 
an important and integral part of Australian foreign policy and 
argued that responsibility of this area should naturally rest 
with the Department of Foreign Affairs.
In an interview more than two years after his retirement 
Waller was even more outspoken. He gave three reasons why his 
department had never been keen on an independent aid agency:
1. Duplication and waste of energy.
2. The difficulty of controlling the enthusiasm of 
more idealistically orientated aid agencies, which 
could lead to aid projects inconsistent with 
Australia's long-term national interest.
3. Aid was one of the most useful weapons in 
Australia's foreign policy arsenal.
After the Task Force had submitted its report suddenly matters 
came to a head. Top Foreign Affairs officials organised their 
opposition around four points:
1. Aid is one of the most important tools of foreign 
policy and must remain under the control of the 
Foreign Minister.
2. Since the Permanent Head is responsible for 
advising the Minister, foreign aid matters should 
also come under his purview.
3. The first three options laid out by the Task Force, 
particularly Nos. 1 and 2, were, as an internal 
document reveals, regarded as 'acceptable'. (By 
implication one could argue the others were not.)
4. There should be an interchange of personnel 
between the Aid Agency and other Foreign Affairs 
divisions to prevent the stultification of aid 
experts.
Meanwhile, outside advisors had direct contact to the Prime 
Minister,
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Sir John Crawford, on an official trip with the Prime 
Minister to India, was asked by Whitlam to comment on the Task 
Force’s report. Crawford chose option 4 and added that it was 
not merely a matter of administration but that all policy 
matters should be vested in the agency. He criticised, 
furthermore, what Foreign Affairs had regarded as essential - 
that there was a continual change in middle-ranking and senior 
personnel in Foreign Affairs - on the grounds that this 
prevented the necessary build-up of expertise. Back in 
Canberra, after talks with top Foreign Affairs officers Border 
and Shann, Crawford reformulated his advice to the Prime 
Minister. He now chose a course somewhere between options 3 
and 4. But the substance of his advice still stood. He 
suggested a statutory body with direct responsibility to the 
Foreign Affairs Minister and without being responsible to the 
Permanent Head.
So deep were the passions aroused that one of Crawford’s 
friends and senior Foreign Affairs official accused Crawford of 
performing a 'disservice' to his country. Crawford was ready, 
however, to take into consideration the fact that a completely 
independent Director-General might formulate a different 
foreign policy than Foreign Affairs. Therefore, he suggested 
a consultation process between the Director-General and the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs through an additional Advisory 
Board which should also include businessmen, private groups, 
academics and trade unionists.
On the basic point of the desirability of an independent 
aid agency Crawford gave three reasons.
1. An independent agency would have a clear public 
identity.
2. Staffing power would rest with the agency.
3. The influence of Foreign Affairs and Treasury on 
foreign aid policy would not be any more dominant.
In an interview in 1975 Sir John Crawford stressed that the 
report of the Task Force for a unified Aid Administration had
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been the basis for his advice. However, he had also studied the 
Parliamentary Aid Report:
I was very much stimulated by the Parliamentary Aid
Report. The Report deserves quite a lot of credit,
probably primary credit.62
A few days after Crawford had handed his advice to Mr Whitlam, 
the Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary, Peter 
Wilenski, summarised his view of the problems involved in the 
establishment of a unified aid agency under two headings.
1. Aid professionalism versus foreign policy input
2. Unification versus departmentalisation.
Wilenski came down strongly on the side of the principles 
of Aid professionalism and unification. But his advice included 
policy matters as well. Aid policy in the future had to be more 
flexible and innovative, more orientated towards socio-economic 
development. In his opinion foreign aid was at best a very 
imperfect and short-term instrument of foreign policy but he 
agreed Foreign Affairs had a point. In line with Crawford, 
Wilenski suggested an independent aid agency and argued that the 
Foreign Affairs Minister himself could reconcile different 
policy proposals from Foreign Affairs and the Aid agency. 
Wilenski, again like Crawford, suggested a Development 
Assistance Advisory Board. Furthermore, Wilenski argued that 
what was needed was not Foreign Affairs or Treasury or Education 
expertise but aid expertise, and this could only be achieved by 
a unified independent Aid agency. In the middle of June 1973, 
Whitlam approved Wilenski's and Crawford's proposals. Foreign 
Affairs ironically drafted the submission, which - after some 
minor alterations - became Cabinet Submission No. 634, and after 
Cabinet's approval, Cabinet decision No. 1290. Earlier on the 
morning of 17 September 1973, immediately before Cabinet sat to 
decide this issue, the Economic Cabinet Committee approved the 
submission. However, the Economic Committee said as well that 
the new Agency should not result in net increases in public
62 Interview with Sir John Crawford, Canberra, 7 July 1975.
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employment but should draw staff from those departments now 
already concerned with aid. This was to be the first issue of 
contention arising out of the establishment of the Aid Agency. 
Another problem arose out of the decision to establish the 
agency by 1 December 1973. This proved to be impossible. 
Consequently the bureaucracy decided to create an interim office 
of the Australian Development Assistance Agency under the 
control of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the absence of 
legislation. Furthermore, the Public Service Board staffed the 
Interim Office overwhelmingly with former External Territories 
officers and not with 'new blood' as had been hoped for by those 
advocating change.
It appears that the Foreign Minister gave his consent to 
this procedure. However, the Minister was not offered an 
alternative, i.e. postponing the establishment of the new agency 
for a few months. Later, Whitlam was reported to be unhappy 
with this decision. There were more points of contention 
between the Head designate of the Agency, Mr Johnson, and the 
Foreign Affairs bureaucracy. One such issue was whether the 
Aid Head could be required by the Foreign Minister to see the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs before reporting directly to the 
Minister.
Furthermore, the Prime Minister's Office and reportedly the 
Prime Minister himself were concerned about selective quoting, 
such as that by Sir Keith Waller in his advice to new Foreign 
Minister Willesee concerning the establishment of an interim 
office. There Waller attempted to keep aid as an integral part 
of foreign policy and wanted to restrict the 'new look of aid* 
to the establishment of a unified aid agency and an advisory 
board - as he saw it, a purely administrative operation.
Interviews and other information indicate that it is fair 
to say that the bureaucracy did try to argue legalistically and 
selectively, without always offering alternative possibilities; 
that Foreign Affairs did try to prevent a change of policy; and 
that the bureaucracy was keen to see members of the former 
External Territories Department staff the interim office and 
thus effectively prevent the introduction of new blood. It is
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probably also fair to say that the Public Service Board did try 
to interpret the Cabinet Economic Committee's desire to prevent 
a net increase of staff too narrowly; and that Foreign Affairs 
did not see, or did not want to see, that the Government wanted 
to change policy as well as administrative arrangements. On 
the one hand, it is clear that public servants had many 
resources at their disposal which they did use in their efforts 
to thwart Government's desires. On the other hand, one must 
recognise that there were divisions within the bureaucracy, at 
least between Foreign Affairs and External Territories, 
concerning the establishment of an independent Aid agency.
In larger perspective it must be recognised that public 
service opposition was only possible because of the imprecise 
terms and definitions in the Government's instructions, which 
gave some scope to the bureaucracy to raise objections. 
Furthermore, certain public service manoeuvres were only 
possible because Senator Willesee, at the very beginning of his 
term as Foreign Minister, seemed not to have shown the same 
determination in curbing Foreign Affairs' role in the field of 
aid policy as Foreign Minister Whitlam and his office had at the 
beginning of his term. That the bureaucracy used these 
opportunities to pursue its own interests should not be a 
surprise. Given the advantages of the bureaucracy in expertise 
and experience, it is perhaps more surprising that the Government 
prevailed in the end. The Government prevailed for two reasons: 
(1) the Prime Minister had both a clear concept of what he wanted 
and an understanding of how to control bureaucrats. (2) Whitlam 
utilised outside advisers: one, Sir John Crawford, had a
comprehensive grasp of aid policy and another, Peter Wilenski, 
had been a skilled and experienced, but critical, bureaucrat 
himself.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Two issues are intertwined in this case study. One 
concerns the powers of the Committee while the second concerns 
the substance and administration of foreign policy. The success 
of Morrison's efforts to produce a report favourable to a new
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aid policy to a large extent reflected his ability to link these 
two questions. The line-up of forces on these two issues, 
however, was different. On the question of Committee rights, 
Morrison and his Labor followers found allies among the 
Government members of the Committee, most notably Committee 
Chairman Turner. Opposing an expansion of the Committee's role, 
although giving the Committee free reign on the foreign aid 
issue, was Foreign Minister Eowen and Cabinet generally.
Concerning the substance of foreign aid policy, Morrison 
and his Labor colleagues were again the major proponents of 
change. On this question, however, Morrison did not have the 
unequivocal backing of the Government party members on the 
Committee. Although this report was unanimous this seems to 
reflect a disinterest by most Government party members. On the 
substance of aid policy, moreover, the bureaucracy was deeply 
interested and also divided. Foreign Affairs wished not only 
to keep aid policy under its administrative control but also to 
retain the traditional emphasis on political and strategic 
goals. Other bureaucrats, particularly from External 
Territories, supported initiatives for an integrated agency and 
developmentally-oriented aid policies. Morrison's success in 
gaining unanimous Committee support for the report can be viewed 
in terms of building a consensus for enhanced Committee powers 
while potential differences on substantive issues remained 
latent.
How did the Committee's report, once drafted, influence 
policy? As in the case of the Jaksch-Report, there is a prima 
facie case for Committee influence in that most of the 
Committee's substantive policy recommendations as well as the 
implied advocacy of an independent aid agency subsequently 
became official policy. In this case, however, the link may be 
to a certain extent illusie^ary. Was it the Committee's report 
which influenced the Government or was it Labor party policy, 
as embodied in the Launceston platform, which led to the Whitlam 
initiatives on aid policy?
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Given the new Government's penchant for new foreign policy 
initiatives - real or cosmetic - it is reasonable to conclude 
that the impetus for changes in aid policy predated the 
Committee's report. But even though the Labor Government may 
have been predisposed to aid initiatives, this does not negate 
the significance of the Committee's report in giving shape to 
the concrete policies which emerged. The Committee's report in 
fact was the most extensive and detailed examination of the 
question going far beyond the Launceston platform. Moreover, 
the report had a direct influence on the recommendations of Sir 
John Crawford which formed the basis for the establishment of 
ADAA. Thus, although the political forces leading to the new 
aid policy may have basically originated outside the Committee, 
the expert advice reflected in the Committee's recommendations 
did have an impact in shaping the details of policy. The limits 
of such technical influence are suggested by the failure of the 
independent agency to persevere under the post-1975 Coalition 
Government.
Turning to the factors contributing to, first, the 
conclusion of a unanimous Committee report and, then, to the 
adoption of the policy suggested by that report, we can see some 
of the paradoxes suggested above.
The extremely limited constitutional powers of the 
Committee obviously limit its influence. Nevertheless, the very 
perception of this situation by Committee members of all parties 
was crucial in obtaining unanimous support for the report as a 
means of asserting Committee rights.
The constitutional weaknesses were mirrored by political 
shortcomings. The members of the Committee were on the whole 
not leading members of the Government or Opposition parties.
Only ALP Committee Vice Chairman Morrison can be regarded as a 
major parliamentary figure. It was Morrison's drive and 
ambition, as well as his knowledge of the subject, which allowed 
him to manipulate the acquiescence of the Coalition party 
members of the Committee - members whose attitudes were marked 
by disinterest and ignorance of the question at hand. While 
these attitudes facilitated the successful adoption of the
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Committee's report in this case, they are clearly not the 
materials from which ongoing influence on Governments are 
constructed. This situation, moreover, is not the product of 
chance but reflects fundamental facts of Australian 
parliamentary life. First, the very smallness of the Australian 
Parliament limits the number of skilled and energetic 
politicians available for various committees. This is 
particularly the case for governing parties since the cream of 
their membership is drawn off into the Ministry. Thus 
Governments perceiving an inherent disadvantage within the 
Committee are reluctant to power to that body and attempt
to control the Committee's actions through the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs.^
Another consequence of the structural weakness of the 
Committee manifested in this case was the important role of the 
Committee staff. With most of the Committee disinterested, the 
Committee staff was able to draft a strong report for aid 
innovations in conjunction with Morrison. Indeed, it was only 
because Liberal MP Sir John Cramer woke up after the initial 
drafting of the request that an explicit recommendation of an 
independent aid agency was deleted. Another factor enhancing 
the staff's influence, one also flowing from the perceived 
weakness of the Committee, was the lack of effective action by 
the Foreign Affairs bureaucracy to argue a countercase before 
the Committee. Believing that the Committee would have no 
influence, the Foreign Affairs Ministry chose not to intervene.^ 
The situation was drastically altered under the Labor Government, 
however, when the issues raised by the report came under active 
Governmental consideration. At this point Foreign Affairs 
launched a strong campaign against changes in aid policy, but 
was unsuccessful. T4?e fact—erf the limitations of the Committee
^  Interview Morrison.
64 The low regard Foreign Affairs held for the Committee and 
Parliament as a whole can be seen in the remarks of a senior 
Foreign Affairs official, who did not mention Parliament at all 
when delineating non-Government influence in Australian foreign 
policy. See: Richard Woolcott, 'The Formulation of Australian
Foreign Policy' (paper delivered to the Victorian Association of 
Social Studies Teachers, Melbourne, 26 February 1972), pp.15-16.
6^a S&& hthtf hi c\ t poigz. Ilty
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indicated jarociooly by the fact that it was only at this 
later stage that Foreign Affairs intervened. In Germany and, 
as we shall see, in Canada Foreign Affairs officials were 
concerned with Committee deliberations from the outset because 
of their awareness of the possible influence of Committee 
decisions. The same point is reinforced by the failure of the 
Foreign Minister and the leadership of the parliamentary parties 
to concern themselves with the Committee's activities.
Finally, the paradox of Committee influence is indicated by 
the role of integrative politics. In this case integrative 
politics was crucial in winning unanimous Committee support for 
the report. Morrison was able to appeal across partisan lines 
on the question of the rights of the Committee. But can 
Morrison's actions be termed 'true' integrative politics? In 
fact Morrison pushed repeatedly for partisan advantage going so 
far as to virtually adopt the Labor party's Launceston platform 
as the Committee's position. That he could get away with as 
much as he did is partially further testimony to the disinterest 
and ignorance noted above. But it is also testimony to 
Morrison's skill in creating the atmospherics of integrative 
politics even while at the same time pushing partisan advantage.
The limits of pseudo-integrative politics in this case can 
be seen in subsequent developments. The adoption of policies 
recommended by the Committee was not due to any political 
influence created by the bipartisan nature of the report but 
rather precisely because the substance of those recommendations 
reflected the partisan position of the Labor Party. Given the 
weakness of real bipartisan support behind the new aid policies 
it is not surprising that they had been challenged following 
the defeat of the Whitlam Government.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE ON 
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND CANADA'S 1969 NATO DECISIONS
Having examined both examples of a strong degree of 
Committee influence in Germany and quite limited influence in 
Australia, we now turn to Canada which generally occupies an 
intermediate position. As in previous chapters our first aim 
is to demonstrate the exertion of influence by the Committee 
and then to determine the factors contributing to that 
influence.
In legal terms the Canadian Standing Committee of External 
Affairs and National Defence of the House of Commons shared 
with their German and Australian counterparts the right to 
recommend foreign policy positions to the Government under the 
concept of ministerial responsibility. In the Canadian case, 
however, the concept of ministerial responsibility was not 
carried to its logical extreme as had been the case in Australia 
before 1973; the Committee could investigate any subject and had 
the right to report to Parliament rather than only to the 
Foreign Affairs Minister. But the Committee lacked crucial 
powers in comparison to the German case in that its assent was 
not required before action could be taken on treaties.
Politically, Canada can also be seen as occupying the
middle ground between Germany and Australia in terms of
Committee influence. The parliamentary Committee in Canada had
neither the tradition of assertiveness nor the high-powered
membership of the German Committee. In fact, before the lateof leavt1960s the Canadian body, and Parliament as a whole, was^as
asinsignificant*. i£^no-b- dre-ss^  t-ha*i its Australian counterpart.
In 1968, however, the situation changed significantly as a 
result of the upgrading of parliamentary committees generally. 
This decision was taken by the Liberal minority Government of 
Lester Pearson as a quid pro quo for Opposition assurances that 
filibustering tactics in the Commons would cease. Under the 
slogan of streamlining parliamentary activities, it was agreed
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to increase the number of matters referred to committees and 
thus enhance their role in the decision-making process. From 
this point onwards members of parliamentary committees, 
including members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs 
and National Defence began to assume - and assert - their 
influence over policy.
One of the earliest and most significant demonstrations of 
this new role occurred in 1969 as the Canadian Government made 
major decisions concerning Canada's participation in NATO.
On 3 April 1969 the Canadian Government rejected any
suggestion "that Canada assume a non-aligned or neutral role in
world affairs". It intended, however, "in consultation with
Canada's allies, to take early steps to bring about a planned
and phased reduction of the size of the Canadian forces in
Europe".^ In June 1969 it became clear that this change would
be achieved "barring unexpected international developments,
within a defence budget which will be maintained for the next
2three years at its current dollar level . . . ". On 19 September 
1969 the then Defence Minister Leo Cadieux announced that 
Canada's forces in Europe would be reduced by half: the 10,000
strong motorised brigade and air division in Germany was to be 
phased out by the end of 1970 and replaced by interim land and3air forces with a total strength of 5,000.
The Decision: Some Interpretations and Commentaries
Cadieux's statement ended one of the most fascinating 
struggles about foreign policy issues in the history of4parliamentary democracies. However, even at that stage (and
Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, 3 April 
1969. (Hereafter all sources, unless otherwise stated, refer 
to Canadian sources.)
2 House of Commons, Debates, 2 June 1969, p.9306. (Hereafter 
cited as Debates.)
3 Department of National Defence, Statement by Leo Cadieux,
19 September 1969.
 ^ This case study deals with Canada's NATO policy which is only 
part of Canada's official foreign policy review in 1968-1970.
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possibly even today) it was still not certain who had actually 
won the battle, nor was it quite clear w7ho had been on whose 
side. Consequently politicians, journalists, and academics 
differ considerably in their assessment of the NATO decision. 
Bruce Thordarson concluded:
While tactical decisions might still originate in 
the civil service, it was in the Prime Minister's 
Office that the overall strategic decisions were 
being made.5
As a consequence of the NATO decision Peyton V. Lyon 
forecast already the retreat from Europe - and more:
The retreat from Europe, it appears 
of a larger retreat from the world. 6 is but part
Denis Stairs, however, claimed that the Government's 
decision
could hardly be described as radical shifts of 
policy .... They suggested little more than a 
compromise between the major opposing positions, 
governed as much by considerations relating to the 
drive for economy in government spending as by new 
principles of foreign policy behaviour.'
Peter Dobell saw the NATO decision as a dramatic 
demonstration of Trudeau's special position:
On a major matter of policy, with the two ministers 
principally responsible, most of the civil service, 
the House Committee, an important segment of caucus 
and public opinion ... all against him, he still 
went ahead and prevailed.8
The Prime Minister himself had similar feelings - at least on 
10 November 1971 when he stated:
Bruce Thordarson, Tvudeau and Foreign Policy, Toronto, 1972, 
p. 163.
 ^Peyton V. Lyon, 'A Review of the Review' , Journal of Co.nadian 
Studies, May 1970, p.34.
7 Denis Stairs, 'Pierre Trudeau and the Politics of the Canadian 
Foreign Policy Review' in Australian Outlook, December 1972,
Vol. 26, No. 3, p.284.g Peter C. Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles, Toronto, 1972, 
p. 15.
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Look when we decided to pull half our troops out 
of NATO. We v/ent against the advice of the 
parliamentary committee. We went against the 
advice, I believe, even of the Liberal Party itself.
And we went against the Gallup Polls at the time - 
I'm not sure about the Liberal Party, but certainly 
the Gallup Polls.9
Nine months earlier Trudeau had reflected on the substance of 
the NATO decision:
Perhaps we got the worst of both worlds. But in 
fact what our reasoning was is quite simple: it is
that we are over-committed in NATO, it's an 
important alliance, we don't believe Canada should 
be a non-aligned or neutralist country, because it 
would cost too much amongst others. If we would try 
and defend our own territory alone as the Swedes do, 
we would be spending much more in military 
expenditures as the Swedes do, therefore we decided 
we wanted to be an aligned country.10
Only a few days after the April 1969 statement the Cape Breton 
Post suggested that Trudeau might not have been completely happy 
with the Government's decision:
He started his reign with neatly turned bon mots 
questioning the validity of foreign and domestic 
assumptions. The questions themselves clearly 
implied that many of the assumptions were probably 
false .... A sadder and probably disappointed Prime 
Minister has said that we will stay in NATO.H
The Globe and Mail came to a similar conclusion:
By all accounts, Prime Minister Trudeau took office 
with at least a strong inclination to take Canada 
entirely out of NATO. Those who know something of 
his thinking believe he would really like to put 
Canada in some kind of non-aligned position 
internationally. To stand virtuously apart from
9 Transcript of the Prime Minister's remarks at meeting with 
students, Lambton Central Collegiate, Petrolia, Ontario,
10 November 1971, p.14.
Transcript of question and answer period for programme 'Under 
Attack' recorded at Carleton University, Ottawa, 24 February 
1970, p.16.
 ^ Cape Breton Post, 1 April 1969.
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all manifestations of power politics. Mr Trudeau 
was persuaded that Canada should stay with NATO, and 
indeed, with all the other military commitments of 
the existing foreign policy - more or less. So why 
all the fuss over the few thousand men and machines 
... that Canada proposed to remove from Europe?!^
But it was because of this 'fuss' that even several years later 
the Foreign Minister could not resist the temptation to look 
back and express second thoughts on the handling of the NATO 
decision, indirectly criticising bis own Prime Minister:
In retrospect it would have been preferable, to have 
given an early indication of the Government's 
thinking - a sense of direction - and to have avoided 
the impression of division and inactivity .... Looking 
back five years I am free to admit that we in the 
Government were a bit ham-handed in the way we handled 
the NATO issue ....13
The way the Canadian Government dealt with the NATO issue 
has also determined my approach in this case study. A 
chronological discussion best captures the division within the 
Government, the periods of inactivity, the confusion of some of 
the decision-makers (and the public), the contradictory 
statements by the Prime Minister and the Government's last 
minute rush to decision. The appearance of confusion in the 
following account can also be attributed to the extraordinary 
circumstances in which the decision-makers operated. Since the 
goals of some of the key participants both shifted from time to 
time and lacked clarity, an approach analysing well-defined 
objectives and means to secure those objectives is of limited 
utility in this case. This is not only because of the 
difficulties posed for the analyst in distinguishing 'real 
objectives' from 'tactical goals', but because the participants 
themselves, one is tempted to say, were often unsure of this 
distinction. As a result, I have not tried to rationalise the 
ambiguity and vagueness which appears in the behaviour of the
^  Globe and Mail, 27 January 1970.
13 Secretary of State for External Affairs, Statement to the 
Annual Meeting of the Canadian Press, 2 May 1973.
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critical actors, especially Prime Minister Trudeau. Nowhere has
the complex and multifaceted political personality of Pierre
Trudeau been better illuminated than in B. Thordarson's analysis
14of the Prime Minister's perceptions. Indeed it is difficult 
to overestimate Trudeau's importance in the NATO decision. This 
importance is reflected in the extensive treatment of the Prime 
Minister's actions and possible motivations which follow.
Nevertheless I shall argue economic constraints and the 
unwillingness of the Liberal caucus to countenance a withdrawal 
from Europe were in their conflicting ways as significant as the 
Prime Minister in arriving at the eventual compromise.
Each of these three factors must be understood in terms of 
their interrelatedness and concrete political environment in 
order to appreciate my hesitation to assign objectives to 
Trudeau and his External Affairs Minister.
The NATO decision, of course, did not take place in a
static international context. Denis Stairs has pointed to three
critical changes in the external environment which created
pressures for a policy review: the revival of West Europe, the
emergence of new states in the Third World, and East-West 
15detente. These changes in turn led to new Canadian 
perceptions of the international order and Canada's role in it.
The first two developments resulted in a shrinkage of 
Canadian pretensions as an important middle power in major areas 
of traditional concern: in the NATO alliance as European
economic and military power increasingly outstripped Canada's 
contributions; and in the United Nations where the new nations 
focused on issues and behaved in a style alien to Canadians.
The third development called into question the underlying 
rationale of Canadian defence policy; with the Soviet threat
Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, op.cit. 
15 Denis Stairs, 'Pierre Trudeau and the Politics of the 
Canadian Foreign Policy Review', op.cit.
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appearing less imminent, the need for force deployments and 
co-operative military arrangements designed to deter that threat 
were more open to challenge. Finally, still another development, 
the increasing American penetration of the Canadian economy and 
society and the resultant perception of 'independence' as a 
political issue, raised far-reaching questions for the 
cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy - alignment with the US.
Anti-American sentiment also played a significant role 
during the hearings and deliberations of the parliamentary 
Committee on External Affairs. This became particularly 
noticeable when the Committee heard testimony from academics.
B. Thordarson has already pointed out the counter-productive 
nature of the academics' activities. Since Thordarson has dealt 
extensively with this question, and with the hearings in
“I / Tgeneral, my analysis will not focus on these matters.
The Origin of the Policy Revision: Pierre Elliot Trudeau
Doubts about Canada's NATO policy predated Trudeau. In 
circumstances where even conservative circles were questioning 
basic assumptions, Prime Minister Lester Pearson initiated a
re-evaluation of Canada's role in NATO in 1967. 17 Pearson and
his reluctant Minister for External Affairs, Paul Martin, agreed
Schoolto ask Norman Robertson, Director of the Institute of
a t Car/c+eh (jHiver'SiiyInternational Affairs^and a former Under-Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, to head a small task force reviewing Canada's 
foreign and defence policy.
The task force was not alone in its concern over Canada's 
role in NATO; while it carried out its review politicians and 
journalists criticised Canadian policies. For example,
Mr Schreyer, Member for Springfield and Member of the Canadian 
Delegation to the 1967 NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels, 
writing in the Winnipeg Free Press came to the conclusion that 
what was required in Europe was only
B. Thordarson, op.cit., pp.127-35, pp.150-54 
interviews confirmed Thordarson's analysis.
My own
17 See Bruce Thordarson, op.cit., p.38.
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political and diplomatic initiatives so that the 
costly military arrangements of the past 20 years 
need not be carried into the future for 
generations to come.18
19The Vancouver Sun stated flatly: "NATO is no longer useful".
20However, after three months of study the Robertson Report
reached the same conclusion as the editorial writer of the
Edmonton Journal: "The savings, if any, of withdrawing from
21NATO are not worth the gamble at this point". Normally that 
would have been the end of foreign policy reviews for some time 
to come.
But at the end of 1967 Pierre Trudeau's analysis of 
Canadian constitutional problems and the alternatives open to 
the French-speaking Province of Quebec lifted the then Justice 
Minister into contention for the soon to be vacant Prime 
Ministership due to Pearson's retirement. August Choquette, 
Member for Lotbiniere, commented afterwards: "This morning he
[Trudeau] graduated from a College Professor to a political 
leader".^
On 6 April 1968 Pierre Trudeau won the leadership of the 
Liberal Party on the fourth ballot. At a press conference 
following his victory the following dialogue developed.
Q. Sir, I think you have suggested during your 
campaign that it might be time to bring the boys 
home from Europe. I was wondering if you might 
move in that direction now?
A. Most of our foreign policy today is based on 
either pre-war premises or immediate post-war 
premises, when Canada was a very important country 
in relative terms ... we had the strongest currency
Winnipeg Free Press, 16-17 January 1968.
Vancouver Sun, 27 January 1968.
See Peyton V. Lyon, 'A Review of the Review', Journal of
Canadio.n Studies, May 1970.
Edmonton Journal, 16 March 1968.
20
21
p. 5
Cited in W .A . Wilson, The Trudeau Question, Montreal, 1972,
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in the world .... We had the fourth largest navy 
and air force. We have a strong voice in Europe in 
those days and in world affairs and in the United 
Nations. I think now our voice is somewhat reduced 
in tone .... Therefore, complete re-assessment is 
needed and our participation in NATO is one aspect 
of it.23
Some commentators took this to mean that Trudeau wished to 
withdraw Canadian forces attached to NATO from Europe. The News 
Chronicle in an ironic allusion to Trudeau's statement as 
Justice Minister that he had not been long enough in Cabinet to 
change his mind said:
Mr Trudeau has not been Prime Minister long enough 
to change his mind, but when he has been thoroughly 
briefed by his own experts in the External Affairs 
Department perhaps he will.24
Meanwhile Defence Minister Leo Cadieux and Chief of the Defence 
Staff General J.V. Allard attempted to reassure Canada's allies, 
who had become concerned over the escalating debate. At the 
meeting of the NATO nuclear planning group at The Hague on 18 
and 19 April 1968 they made it clear that no cuts in Canada's 
troop commitment to NATO in 1968 were expected.
On the contrary they announced the following improvements
for the Canadian troops in West Germany: the introduction of
self-propelled artillery, the delivery of CF-5 aircraft and the
25construction of new naval vessels.
Hardly had the Defence Minister managed to calm the fears 
of the allies when the debate flared anew7 in Canada. Prime 
Minister Trudeau did nothing to discourage the revived 
speculation. And there were no domestic political reasons for 
curbing discussion; even Opposition Leader Robert Stanfield 
joined in the chorus of doubters questioning Canada's role in
23 Transcript of Press Conference with Pierre E. Trudeau, 
National Press Building, Ottawa, 7 April 1968.
24 News Chronicle, 16 April 1968.
25 J.L. Granatstein, 'External Affairs and Defence' in John 
Saywell (Ed.), Canadian Annual Review for 1968, Toronto, 1969, 
p.243. (Hereafter cited as Granatstein, Canadian Annual Review 
for 1968.)
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NATO. Stanfield not only supported a new review of Canadian 
foreign and defence policy but even envisaged a new role for 
Canada in NATO based on a mobile home force which could be 
rapidly transported to Europe in an emergency. And Stanfield 
concluded:
I still believe NATO has an essential role in world 
peace - we should review our role perhaps but only 
after the Commons' Defence Committee and others 
studied it.26
This was the first statement by a leading Canadian politician 
linking the Commons' Committee to the envisaged new review.
Stanfield's tactic was clear: The minority Liberal
Government did not control the Commons' Committee. Thus the 
further Parliament became involved in foreign policy decision­
making the greater the chance of Opposition influence.
Pierre Trudeau, however, dissolved Parliament in April and 
called elections for late June.
Meanwhile just as he was stepping down as Prime Minister
Lester Pearson suggested that it was no longer necessary for
Canada to keep an army brigade and an air division in the NATO
27defence line in Europe. The pro-Liberal Kingston Whig- 
Standard took up Pearson's suggestion and went a step further 
to define defence in broader terms including the fight against 
hunger and poverty:
Mr Trudeau is obviously looking at the question in 
this way. He is trying to find new and significant, 
humanitarian ways of using Canadian resources. NATO 
is surely no longer one of those ways.28
Trudeau, however, could not afford to treat NATO so 
lightly. At a press conference in Winnipeg at the end of May 
1968 he said that a "total withdrawal overnight [sic] from NATO
Toronto Telegram, 11 April 1968.
27 Toronto Star, 23 April 1968. Later on, however, while 
teaching at Ottawa's Carleton University, Pearson revealed 
privately that he was unhappy over the way the Trudeau 
Government handled the NATO review.
2 8 Kingston Whig-Standard, 8 May 1968.
144
would be a bad thing". Trudeau gave three reasons: Firstly,
Canada's withdrawal might lead to the dissolution of NATO at a 
time when NATO is still needed; secondly, it could be 
interpreted as Canadian isolationism; and, thirdly, contact with 
Europe was needed to offset Canada's overwhelming contacts with 
the United States of America. However, Trudeau again pointed 
out that
so far as the military involvement in NATO is 
concerned, this does need a very strong and perhaps 
drastic reassessment.29
Two days after Trudeau's press conference the Ottawa Citizen
argued that concern about Canada's membership in NATO was
growing and that it could well become an element in the coming 
30election. This was proved to be an exaggeration. The NATO
problem was mentioned a few times but never became an important
31issue during the campaign.
The election campaign, however, did reveal something about 
Trudeau's thinking on NATO. On 29 May 1968 Trudeau stated again 
that he intended to "take a hard look, in consultation with our 
allies, at our military role in NATO", and again he advocated
32the strengthening of the political and social ties with Europe.
A week later Trudeau anew emphasised the importance of 
political, social and cultural relations with Europe while 
downgrading the significance of the military aspects of the 
alliance.^
The Prime Minister, however, was not the only member of 
Cabinet who dealt with the NATO problem at that time. External
29 Transcript of the Prime Minister's Press Conference, 
Winnipeg, Manitoba, 23 May 1968, p.16.
30 Ottawa Citizen, 25 May 1968.
31 Granatstein, Canadian Annual Review for 1968, p.219.
32 Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, 29 May 1968.
33 Transcript of Remarks by the Prime Minister, Edmonton City 
Hall, Edmonton, Alberta, 4 June 1968.
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Affairs Minister Sharp speculated even on the possible outcome
of a new foreign policy review: this review might result in a
compromise; Canada would not cancel the NATO commitments, but
withdraw militarily from Europe and keep those troops in combat-
34readiness at home for immediate despatch.
Such speculation by Cabinet members was probably the reason
for a formal representation by the British Government
emphasising the advisability of maintaining strong NATO forces 
35in Europe. But Prime Minister Trudeau was not deterred from
reiterating his view that emphasis should be shifted from the
military to the economic, political, social and cultural aspects
of the alliance. He furthermore stressed that Canada's defence
potential would be needed at home, pointing out that "if there
3 6is going to be a major conflict, it will happen over our sky";
*• the did not, however, provide any concrete indication of what 
response these transferred forces could or should take against 
hostile forces, presumably on their way to Canada's southern 
neighbour.
At the same time as the conclusion of the election campaign
in Ottawa, the NATO members including Canada decided in
Reykjavik to press for mutual and balanced force reductions with
37the Warsaw Pact countries.
It is unlikely that this decision was directed solely at 
Moscow; the logic of NATO's position went against any unilateral 
force reductions by any NATO member which would have weakened 
the alliance's bargaining positions vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact.
Whatever constraints the NATO decision might have placed 
on the Canadian Government, the strong-willed Trudeau, bolstered
Montreal Gazette, 5 June 1968.
Montreal Star, 19 June 1968.
3 6 Transcript of the Prime Minister's remarks at Confederation 
Park, Toronto, 19 June 1968, p.4.
37 London Times, 26 June 1974.
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by an overwhelming electoral victory, which gave the Liberals 
an absolute parliamentary majority for the first time in many 
years, was now in an extremely good position to push his ideas 
for a re-structuring of Canada's role in NATO. The Prime 
Minister now needed only the support of his own party, but this 
would prove a difficult task indeed.
In summary, developments up to the 1968 elections had the 
following key features, which should be borne in mind when we 
discuss subsequent stages.
1. Trudeau repeatedly declared the need for a new foreign 
policy review centering on Canada's military commitment 
to NATO. His personal preference was made clear: 
reduction, if not total withdrawal, of Canada's forces 
from Europe.
2. All parties agreed that a new review was necessary.
The Opposition, however, demanded the participation of 
the parliamentary Standing Committee on External 
Affairs and National Defence.
3. Opposition leader Stanfield and External Affairs 
Minister Sharp even agreed that a home-based highly 
mobile force which could be rapidly transported to 
Europe might become the basis of Canada's new posture.
4. Even the election campaign did not cause a polarisation 
of views concerning NATO. Such polarisation would 
appear shortly in a situation marked by Trudeau's 
overwhelming victory, his specific style and external 
events.
Following the election Trudeau immediately moved to 
implement his ideas. A 35-man strong inter-departmental Special 
Task Force on Relations with Europe (later known as STAFEUR) was 
formed. Although External Affairs was formally in charge the 
committee included several other departments - thus indicating 
an attempt by Trudeau to weaken the influence of External 
Affairs which presumably was wedded to its recently completed 
review. But External Affairs was still not easily downgraded. 
Together with the Department of National Defence, External
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Affairs created a second task force. While the STAFEUR group 
dealt with the overall relationship with Europe, the External 
Affairs/Defence Committee specialised particularly on the 
military relationship with Europe - since it was here that the
3 8major danger to the conservative ideas of the bureaucracy lay.
On 28 July 1968 the Prime Minister again indicated his 
preferred role for Canada in NATO:
We are taking a serious look at NATO .... What we said 
during the election still stands ... that we weren't 
contemplating pulling out of NATO politically or 
economically or socially. But that our military 
involvement in it was still under consideration.39
A Temporary Setback for Trudeau: the Soviet Invasion of
Czechoslovakia
With the invasion of Czechoslovakia confusion reigned in- 
Ottawa. For at least nine months no one inside let alone 
outside Canada could decipher the Government's NATO policy.
Those who wanted to have a clear picture of Canada's NATO policy 
had to wait considerably longer. Economic difficulties, the 
search for logical conceptions of Canada's foreign policy, 
pressure from Canada's NATO allies, Trudeau's distrust of the 
bureaucracy, the difficulties securing adequate support in 
Cabinet and in the governing Liberal Party, Trudeau's 
determination to get it his way (whatever that was), and 
Trudeau's idiosyncratic style - all these factors resulted in 
a form of policy making probably unique in the history of 
foreign policy in parliamentary democracies.
Trudeau only once conceded the relevance of the invasion 
of Czechoslovakia to Canada's NATO policy, and that came at the 
climax of the crisis immediately after the Warsaw Pact action:
The way in which NATO develops may be conditioned 
by this happening within the Warsaw Pact countries 
.... This new fact will no doubt condition one 
element of our thinking on the peace and stability
3 8 Thordarson, op.cit., pp.135-36; see also pp.146-47, 149.
39 Transcript of Prime Minister's remarks upon arrival at 
Uplands Airport, Ottawa, 28 July 1968, p.3.
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of Europe. It's obvious that the Soviet Union is 
still basing itself on that kind of partition which 
was set up back in Teheran and Cairo after the 
Second World War.^O
But even then he argued there were no necessary military
implications for Canada: "I don't think any specific military
course follows obviously from this action in Czechoslovakia on 
„41our siae ....
Trudeau's assessment of the military implications was not 
based merely on a reading of the post-invasion situation; it 
reflected attitudes he had expressed before the invasion 
concerning possible changes in Europe as a result of detente.
At the end of July he responded to former Prime Minister 
Diefenbaker's assertion that any pull out of NATO at that stage 
would be 'a retreat from reality' with the following analysis 
of Warsaw Pact and Soviet intentions:
What's happening in Czechoslovakia could be 
interpreted to indicate that certain countries, 
members of the Warsaw Pact, would be prepared to 
pull out of that if the other members of NATO were 
prepared to pull out of NATO. Or you could argue 
to the contrary that USSR's new show of strength 
should be an incentive to us not to pull out of 
NATO.4 2
The Canadian public, however, did not look upon the 
invasion itself as 'that sort of thing you can argue both ways'. 
The overwhelming majority of Canadian newspapers now opposed any 
change of Canada's NATO policy. "... It is now plain that there 
is no way out of our domestic difficulties in cutting off our 
obligations to our allies", the Vancouver Sun editorialised on 
22 August 1968. The Toronto Telegram agreed a day later:
"There can be no withdrawal right now from our current 
commitments in NATO". The Edmonton Journal demanded on 
27 August 1968: "Mr Trudeau should abandon any talk of
^  Transcript of the Prime Minister's remarks, Uplands Airport, 
22 August 1968, p.l.
41 i ad.
42 Ibid,, p.3.
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reassessing NATO out of existence until the Soviet Union better 
learns to face up to the contradictions in its own system".
J.L. Granatstein subsequently summed up the general mood of the 
mass media:
Significantly, even the Toronto Star which had long 
called for a 1 new foreign policy' was shaken by the 
events of August, stating on 20 September that 'it's 
time to put aside thoughts of recalling the Canadian 
army brigade and air squadrons from Germany, and of 
letting NATO wind down to its close next year'.43
The most interesting debate, however, was in the Globe and 
Mail because it was directly relevant to the discussions in the 
Trudeau Cabinet. John Gellner claimed on 3 September 1968 that 
the speed and precision of the invasion had made any speculation 
concerning a Canadian mobile force at home illusory. George 
Bain disputed Gellner's argument in the same paper two days 
later:
If the idea that aggression may occur quickly and 
without warning were accepted as the sole basis for 
determining if NATO were to remain unchanged, then 
it would remain unchanged forever. The question 
that must be decided is whether that quick and 
unheralded aggression which is always possible, is 
also likely.
The question now was which view External Affairs Minister Sharp 
would support. Both Sharp and Opposition Leader Stanfield had 
been in the past prepared to look for new approaches to Canada's 
foreign policy. Both, however, were willing to agree to troop 
withdrawal from Europe only if troops could be transported back 
to Europe in emergency. But the proficiency of the Warsaw Pact 
forces had made it doubtful that any significant numbers of 
troops could be returned in time to be of any real use.
Prior to the invasion nobody in Canada objected to a 
foreign policy review, but after 20 August both public opinion 
and the conservative Opposition sharply opposed any change in 
NATO policy.
43 Granatstein, Canadian Annual Review for 1968, p.245.
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The end of the bipartisan policy concerning NATO, however, 
did not unduly restrict Trudeau. He not only had a large 
parliamentary majority, which would not have to face the 
electorate for several years, but in addition he probably could 
rely on the support of the socialist New Democratic Party and 
the Creditiste Party. Thus Trudeau's major task was to unify 
Cabinet and the Liberal Party behind a new NATO policy.
On 30 August 1968 the Prime Minister confirmed publicly 
for the first time that the foreign policy review within Cabinet 
had already begun and would continue despite Czechoslovakia:
... Our position is that we are not changing my 
expressed desire to review our NATO commitments in 
the light of European and other developments in the 
past 20 years when NATO was brought in.^4
To what extent the reference to "my ... desire" indicates that 
not all Cabinet Ministers shared Trudeau's enthusiasm for a new 
foreign policy review is a matter of speculation. However, it 
is clear that for many months to come Cabinet could not agree 
on Canada's NATO policy.
Hoping for decisive action on the issue the Edmonton 
Journal, a fortnight before Trudeau's speech opening the new 
Parliament, asked for an early decision but not without 
consulting Parliament:
The new Parliament should be given a realistic 
statement setting forth our defence responsibilities 
and our capacity to meet them. When the policy has 
been outlined in the House it should be sent to the 
Commons' Defence Committee, which has been an 
effective body.^5
Trudeau saw things differently. Concerning NATO policy his 
speech from the Throne did not produce anything new:
44 Transcript of the Prime Minister's Press Conference, Norlite 
Building, 30 August 1968.
45 Edmonton Journal, 29 August 1968.
151
The Government has undertaken and is pursuing a 
thorough review of our external and defence 
policies ... and, as conclusions are reached 
Parliament will be invited to consider them.46
Asked a week later in the House whether he could give "a
positive assurance ... that there will be no change in either
Canada's commitment or Canada's position in NATO without prior
disclosure and the opportunity for debate in this house", he
47flatly answered: "No, Mr Speaker".
The tactical position was considerably different five 
months later when the Prime Minister declared in Parliament:
With the Secretary of State for External Affairs 
and the Minister for National Defence we are 
considering ... whether we bring down our policy 
later than we had wanted. Our view was that we 
should make the announcement as soon as possible, 
so that the NATO meetings in Washington would be 
fully informed of Canada's position; that we tell 
our allies in advance what our decision was.
However, we realise the importance of waiting for 
the report of the house committee and this may make us reconsider the date.48
Trudeau's Main Ally: the Constraints of the 1968-69 Budget
If the House Committee was more important than the allies 
in February 1969, in September 1968 one thing took priority over 
the CSSR crisis: the budget situation in general and defence
spending in particular. There was hardly any room for manoeuvre 
in the September 1968 budget under existing economic 
circumstances. The dominating themes were fiscal conservatism: 
the need to limit Government expenditures, the necessity to 
curtail wage and price increases and to improve productivity.
In the Government's own words it wanted to
House of Commons, Debates (hereafter cited as Debates), 
12 September 1968, p.8.
47 Debates, 19 September 1968, p.195.
4 8 Debates, 21 February 1969, p.5801.
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continue to work towards all the broad goals which 
are widely accepted in western industrial countries 
- full employment, economic growth, price stability, 
balance in external payments and equitable sharing 
of rising incomes.49
The problem with this Government statement was that it v/as in 
considerable contradiction to the Government's action.
Within a year, most of these goals had been abandoned, 
the balanced approach which they imply scrapped in 
the pursuit of one overriding objective: price
stability.50
Although this development was unknown in September 1968, the
Defence Department was already in deep trouble. It had just
formally unified the Air Force, Army and Navy into the Canadian
Armed Forces. Although this meant some financial savings it
also involved many problems. Concerning the savings the Globe
and Mail reported that Defence Minister Cadieux and his military
staff had made it "painfully plain to the Cabinet that the
budget had been trimmed as far as possible and that further
51economies could be obtained only by reducing commitments".
As J.L. Granatstein correctly pointed out, the core 
problems of the Defence Department had already been explicitly 
described in a little noted 9 May statement by G.R. Lindsey, the 
Head of the Defense Gpoi a^-tiona-l Research Establishment. Lindsey 
had indicated that budgetary considerations would require some 
alterations in Canada's defence posture and that the withdrawal 
from Europe was at least a possible measure but one which raised 
other problems:
However, the consequences of withdrawal will extend 
well beyond the military sphere, and must be assessed 
in terms of international relations, foreign trade, 
effects on the internal economy, and several other 
factors.52
49 Cited in W.A. Wilson, The Trudeau Question, Montreal, 1972, 
p. 38 .
50 Ibid.
Globe and Mail, 4 October 1968.
Granatstein, Canadian Ayinuo.l Review for 19 68, p. 278.52
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Whereas Lindsey in May had only referred to the problems
created for a constant defence budget, in September 1968 the
defence budget was cut to 1.8 billion dollars. Even according
to conservative Defence Department estimates it would still be
necessary to spend at least 2.5 billion dollars if all existing
5 3military commitments were met. Others did not even attempt 
to put a dollar figure on current military programs.
J.L. Granatstein, summarising what was regarded as necessary by 
the Armed Forces, commented simply:
What the cost for this staggering list of requirements 
would be was unknown, but the figure was certain to be 
astronomical.^4
And:
The root of the matter, simply put, was that Ottawa 
was being priced out of the defence business.
The Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, Lt. General F.P. Sharp, 
however, admitted that the Department's predicament was not only 
due to budget cuts and rising inflation but also to inadequate 
planning in the past.
I don't know howT we got into this box. It's not 
right to have everything running out at the same 
time. But there we are. We will have to set 
priorities. We can't get in all at once.^6
For the Trudeau Cabinet, however, the problem was totally 
different. The question was not when the generals would get 
all they desired but what they would be denied.
The first issue with relevance to Canada's role in NATO was 
the question of whether Canada should participate in a multi­
billion dollar project for a new general purpose fighter bomber. 
The fact that Canada twice within one month asked for an 
extension of the deadline for a decision on this matter could
53 A. Westgll, Trudeau as Prime Minister, op.cit., p.202.
54 Granatstein, Canadian Annual Review for 1968, p.280.
55 Ibid., p.279.
5 6 Globe and Mail, 21 September 1968.
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suggest division within Cabinet. When Defence Minister Cadieux
announced in Parliament the first request for an extension he
admitted that the decision on the multi-billion dollar project
had to be seen in the light of the general foreign policy 
57review. On 23 October 1968 the Defence Minister announced in 
Parliament:
With the current budgetary restraints and the high 
risk factor of this venture we have concluded that it 
would be inadvisable for Canada to participate.^
Although Canada had been in the forefront of those advocating
the multi-role war plane project, she was now the first to
withdraw her participation. This decision possibly had some
implications for the nuclear strike role of Canada's air force
in Germany. Canada's part enthusiasm for the multi-billion
dollar project was due to two factors: Canada's Starfighter
CF-104 was regarded by some as doubtful of value, both because
it was 'soft' on the ground and had a short loitering time -
factors which increased the likelihood of its being prematurely
used in an attacking role. Furthermore since the Starfighter
was not used at home it was necessary to run a special school
in Canada solely to train air crews in the operation of the
59CF-104 for the Air Division in Europe.
Thus as a result of the decision the pro-NATO forces had 
to be content with a nuclear strike capacity whose value was 
questionable - a development which would prove a handicap for 
the status quo advocates in the future. To what an extent the 
participants were aware of this disadvantage at this stage is 
hard to say. It is clear that Cabinet was not publicly polarised 
on the NATO issue in October 1968. It is also clear that the 
Opposition refrained from criticising the Government's decision 
not to participate in the multi-billion dollar project. What
57 Debates, 1 October 1968, pp.624-25.
5 8 Debates, 23 October 1968, p.1941.
C Q See Peter Dobell, 'Canada and NATO' in Orbis, Vol. XIII,
Spring 1969, p.313.
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did divide Cabinet and antagonised the Opposition was of a more 
general nature concerning both broad philosophies and Trudeau's 
idiosyncratic style.
Confusion Reigns: A Journalist Explains
A series of contradictory and ambiguous statements by 
Trudeau began on 18 September 1968. A conservative member of 
the External Affairs and National Defence Committee had asked 
the Prime Minister:
In view of the statement by the United States State 
Department to the effect that Soviet military 
intervention in West Germany would lead to an immediate 
allied response in accordance with the NATO treaty, 
was the Canadian government consulted about this 
statement and asked to associate itself with it?60
C 1Most political commentators interpreted the Prime Minister's 
answer as virtually disavowing the NATO treaty:
... when the United States government speaks through 
one of its ministers it speaks in its own name, and 
it does not engage any other country. Its opinion 
of what is needed would be the opinion of a sovereign 
state, but NATO decides according to its own treaty 
arrangements.6 2
The 'treaty arrangements', however, clearly stated in Article 5
"that an armed attack against one or more of them [the NATO
countries] in Europe or North America shall be considered an
6 3attack against them all ...".
Thus the US did speak 'through one of its ministers' but 
what that minister had said was agreed NATO policy, and the 
'opinion' stated by the US Secretary of State was not only 'the 
opinion of a sovereign state', but also the heart of the NATO 
treaty which, of course, did bind the Canadian Government as 
well.
Debates, 18 September 1968, pp.163-64.
61 See, for example: Montreal Gazette, 19 September 1968;
Granatstein, Canadian Annual Review for 1968, p.246.
c o Debates, 18 September 1968, p.164.
6 3 North Atlantic Treaty - Provision and text quoted in: 
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 19-26 March 1949, p.9869.
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The next day under pressure from conservative members, 
particularly of the External Affairs and Defence Committee, the 
Prime Minister corrected his ambiguous statement. "... [W]e 
would be bound by the terms of the NATO treaty, and we would act 
accordingly". And despite the Speaker ruling out additional 
questions on the subject Trudeau insisted on a further 
clarification: "I think perhaps there was a bit of confusion
.... I do want to state quite clearly that there is no ground 
for believing Canada would fail in any wTay to discharge its 
obligation under the NATO treaty".
Trudeau, however, refused to answer directly the question
of the Conservative Member, Mr Hees, as to whether Canada was
"committed ... to go to the aid of West Germany if she is
attacked by the Soviet Union". The Prime Minister finished his
statement on NATO in making clear that Canada would decrease or
increase its NATO force in Europe according to the findings of
6 6the foreign and defence policy review.
The confusion continued when on the one hand Canada's NATO
allies urged her to maintain her troops in Europe and on the
other hand press reports appeared claiming that the Czech
invasion had merely postponed - not cancelled - Canada's plans
6 7for a troop reduction.
For the Toronto Globe and Mail this confusion was too much. 
The editorial writer on 21 September 1968, although normally 
balanced in his views, now bluntly commented:
With all this uncertainty immediately ahead it is no 
time now for any unilateral and dramatic gesture by 
Canada over our NATO commitments. It would simply 
add to present unease.
The NATO Secretary-General, Mr Brosio, in Canada on his 
customary visit to make contacts with the new Government, had
64 Debates, 19 September 1968, p.197.
65 Debates, 19 September 1968, p.198.
66 Ibid.
6 7 Montreal Star, 19 September 1968; Toronto Telegram,
20 September 1968; Glebe and Mail, 21 September 1968.
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a similar opinion» After talks with the Prime Minister and 
several Cabinet members he gave at a press conference his 
’personal opinion’: any reduction of NATO forces at this time
would be "detrimental to Western security, both militarily and 
politically". Although he conceded that some differences of 
detail had developed between Canada and other members, Brosio 
concluded:
I think after all that the Canadian Government will 
not think differently, because the Canadian 
Government has the same serious consideration for 
the necessity of the alliance.68
'Diplomats' and 'informed sources' said two days after Brosio
had left Ottawa that they believed that "there now is a swing
69away from any immediate military withdrawal from Europe".
The same sources revealed to the Edmonton Journal the 
arguments the External Affairs and Defence Departments had been 
placed before Mr Trudeau. These arguments also replied to 
previous NATO statements by the External Affairs Minister and 
the Prime Minister:
1. Trudeau's tendency to concentrate on continental 
defence in order to become less dependent on the 
US was countered by arguing that it was highly 
unlikely that a war would take place in North 
America and, if it did, it meant nuclear 
Armageddon anyway. Furthermore, Europe might not 
be interested in political, cultural and economic 
ties if Canada 'left Europe in the lurch 
militarily' - thus implying increased US-domination 
of Canada's cultural and economic life.
2. Canada's troops would have to be ’on the trouble 
spot in Europe' - thus ruling out any possibility 
of a mobile force stationed in Canada.
6 8 Edmonton Journal, 24 September 1968.
Edmonton Journal, 26 September 1968.69
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3. Canada's withdrawal might trigger a US withdrawal 
and thus undermine European security. NATO not 
only deters Soviet military action but also prevents 
West Germany from becoming an independent military 
power, thereby lowering the possibility of an East 
German/West German border incident which could 
escalate to nuclear warfare.
And "at such a critical time", anyway, it would be
70"irresponsible for Canada to leave Europe".
The Government could not have been very impressed with
these arguments, since at this time External Affairs Minister
Sharp for the first time sought advice outside the bureaucracy,
71particularly from academics.
Without being asked the US made clear its opinion about
72Canada's NATO policy. Following Canadian press reports Sharp 
admitted indirectly in Parliament that the US had asked Canada 
to increase its defence budget. The External Affairs Minister, 
however, rebuked the Americans:
There was also a comment in particular about the kind 
of response they [the US] would like Canada to make.
No reply has yet been made. I doubt very much whether 
a reply will be formally made.
Indeed, the Trudeau Government at this stage hardly attached a 
high priority to communications with its major allies. When the 
US State Department arranged a meeting of all NATO Foreign 
Ministers attending the United Nations General Assembly in New 
York, Sharp could not participate ostensibly because of lack 
of time:
Unfortunately the invitation I received was for a day 
for which I had made a prior engagement some months
See: Edmonton Journal, 26 September 1968.
Globe and Mail, 4 October 1968? Toronto Star, 3 December 1968. 
Montreal Gazette, 30 September 1968.
Debates, 30 September 1968, p.557.
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ago. I felt that I could not break this engagement 
because of the inconvenience I would thus cause to 
a great many people.
Asked whether he would be represented (and by whom) at that 
meeting, Sharp replied:
... I am not certain this will be necessary. This 
is not a meeting of NATO; it is a dinner being put 
on by Dean Rusk of the United States to which he had 
invited the foreign ministers who happen to be there, 
but not all of us will be there.^4
Problems of communication, concerning Canada’s NATO policy, 
however, did not seem to exist between the Trudeau Government 
and NATO's enfant terrible, France. Asked in Parliament whether 
he had talked about NATO with Premier Couve de Murville in 
Quebec City at the beginning of October and whether he would 
indicate the nature of the discussions, Mr Trudeau answered in 
unusual frankness and usual cockiness:
Yes, Mr Speaker. In our review of international 
affairs we did discuss the problem of NATO, France's 
relation to it, and the view of the French 
government on the happenings in Europe which have 
some bearing on NATO.75
On the same day Trudeau stressed France's importance for 
NATO and Anthony Westall predicted in the Globe and Mail:
The outcome of the present policy review ... is likely 
to be a decision to muddle along as Canada has been doing for several years. 6^
e one, of theWestall, p^ ofeafe-iy the leading Canadian political journalist and 
visiting Associate Professor at Carleton University, gave his 
explanation why the Government had asked academics to take part 
in the foreign policy review, wThy other independent auditors 
would participate and why - as Westall correctly predicted - the 
parliamentary Committee on External Affairs and National Defence 
would become involved.
Debates, 30 September 1968, p.558. 
Debates, 4 October 1968, p.791. 
Globe and Mail, 4 October 1968.
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Great expectations have been aroused by Mr Trudeau's 
promise to re-examine fundamentals which implied 
for many people new departures, fresh initiatives 
and bold adventures in foreign policy. The review 
in fact is not likely to produce any dramatic 
changes in policy. As far as it has gone, it has 
tended to confirm the wisdom of present policies, 
and the difficulties of taking new directions. To 
make these findings credible to the public, to let 
down expectations gently with the minimum of 
disillusion, the review must be endorsed by 
judgements other than those of officials and 
ministers.^ 7
This strategy explained not only the expansion of the ranks 
of the foreign policy advisers but explained as well why both 
the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister rebuffed in public 
the United States. If the existing policy had to be retained, 
then it should appear that this decision was a Canadian one and 
not influenced by the United States. WestSll, who probably 
accurately summed up Sharp's and his department's reasoning, 
also pointed to the reason why Trudeau allegedly abandoned the 
simple solution of solving all budgetary problems via military 
withdrawal from Europe.
If Canada withdrew from NATO, the smaller European 
countries might follow, and isolationist forces in 
the United States would be strengthened. The 
alliance might be seriously weakened; at worst, it 
could break up. Stability in Europe - and, 
therefore, in the world - would be threatened. The 
chance of negotiating a detente in Europe would be 
reduced.
On 4 October Westall was convinced that the External Affairs 
Department had won the battle:
Mr Trudeau, no doubt, was persuasively briefed on 
the official case for Canada's continued commitment 
to NATO when he became Prime Minister. In any 
event, he rapidly modified his views, backing away 
from the easy suggestion that Canada should reduce 
its military forces in Europe ....
77 Ibid.
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Trudeau backed down - according to WestÜll - because in face of
the invasion of Czechoslovakia "powerful political arguments"
spoke against withdrawal. "Indeed, it might be a gamble with
7 8the peace of the world".
The Prime Minister Shocks the NATO Allies and Canada's Pro-NATO 
Lobby
Trudeau’s answer to Westell’s article and, of course, to 
the External Affairs Department came at the beginning of 
November:
On NATO for instance I happen to believe that in a 
very real sense civilization and culture in North 
America are more menaced, more strongly menaced, more 
strongly threatened, by internal disorders than by 
external pressing.
And then Mr Trudeau elaborated in detail. Disorder in the US
caused by racial problems, by the problem of urbanisation, by
the underprivileged, by the young, by the trade unions and also
by the new elites "may quite seriously lead to large rebellions
and large disturbances of civil order and of social stability"
and the Canadian Prime Minister was "quite certain" that this
would overflow to Canada, where the Indian, the Metis and "a lot
of underprivileged" would join the "great riots and beginnings 
8 0of civil war". And then the Prime Minister stated what he 
’personally' happened to believe that it was these sources of 
disturbance that the Canadians "should fear and seek to correct 
with as great urgency as perhaps anything that is happening in 
Europe". He specified further in declaring that Canada was "not 
so much threatened by the ideologies of Communism or of Fascism 
or by atomic bombs or ICBM's as Canada was by two-thirds of the 
world's population that 'goes to bed hungry' and by those large 
fractions within Canada 'which do not find fulfilment in this
78 ibid.
19 Prime Minister's Transcript of Questions and Answer Period, 
Queen's University, Kingston, 8 November 1968, p.6.
o n
Ibid. - Trudeau added: "I don't think it would be the
separatists but this is another argument".
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society'". Mr Trudeau then explained what this all had to do 
with Canada's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization:
... this is the background of these [foreign 
policy] reviews in which we are embarked. I am 
not predicting what the outcome will be but I am 
saying that in my scale of values I am perhaps 
less worried now about what might happen over the 
Berlin Wall than what might happen in Chicago, New 
York, and perhaps our own great cities in Canada.81
This was an extraordinary statement for a Canadian Prime
Minister. It was even more extraordinary since Canadian
parliamentarians at the time were attending meetings of the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly and since the NATO Ministerial Conference
would soon open in Brussels. Journalists and politicians
interpreted the Trudeau speech differently. Some called it
8 2"apparent off-the-top-of-his-head musings", the Conservative
Leader of the House, G.W. Baldwin, talked about "a tendency to
8 3make hasty and off the cuff remarks"; Government Senators and
co-ordinator for the Canadians on the NATO Parliamentarians'
Military Committee complained that the Trudeau statement
8 4"couldn't have come at a more inopportune time". George Bain 
from the Globe and Mail commented:
There is another view on that, of course and one 
which is more appealing to me, namely that the 
Prime Minister said what he did, when he did, 
precisely because he thought it was the opportune 
time to do so. 85
It had been George Bain as well who pointed out that it had not 
been "the first time that Mr Trudeau had mentioned the danger 
of growing civil disorders in the United States in the same
^  Ibid., p.6.
8 2 Granatstein, Canadian Annual Review for 1968, p.246.
o o Debates, 12 November 1968, p.2627.
o A
Globe and Mail, 14 November 1968.
p C
Globe and Mail, 15 November 1968.
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breath with Canada's still uncompleted review of its foreign and
defence policy". The Prime Minister was supposed to have done
the same at an off-the-record dinner with journalists at the
8 6beginning of November.
Although the Canadian Defence Minister and Minister for
External Affairs had already departed for the NATO meeting in
Brussels, Trudeau did not leave the initiative with his two
responsible Ministers but stirred things up even more. In
Parliament the social democratic NDP, wanting to spend more
money for domestic and social purposes, tried to get assurance
from the Prime Minister "that at this Conference in Brussels
there will be no commitment to increase Canada's military part 
8 7in NATO". Trudeau's answer did not satisfy the NATO 
supporters at all:
We are not led to the immediate reaction, after 
the Czechoslovakian events, to conclude that we 
should necessarily escalate in NATO. This is our 
position. I repeat, however, that we will listen 
to the position of the other members of NATO and 
make up our minds then.
And he repeated again:
... our reaction is that the Czechoslovakian 
events do not necessarily call for an escalation 
of forces and therefore - (some Hon. Members:
Hear, hear) - our delegation to NATO is not going 
in there in order to achieve escalation, but on 
the contrary [I] to argue as much as possible that 
we in Canada are embarked upon a review of our 
NATO policy ....88
The Prime Minister's performance on the Canadian NATO policy 
the week before the Ministerial NATO meeting caused disturbance, 
'considerable eyebrow-lifting', embarrassment and anger not only 
on the part of the parliamentary Opposition but on the part of 
the NATO allies, the Canadian diplomats and even on the part of 
Liberal parliamentarians.
Globe and Mail, 14 November 1968. 
Debates, 12 November 1968, p.262.
88 Ibid.
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For the first time Liberal caucus members attacked their 
own Government publicly over its NATO policy. Senator Lang 
complained:
The equivocation of the Canadian Government in 
connection with our position in Europe already 
has discredited us in the eyes of our allies.
Any continuance of this equivocation through a 
limited future commitment will increase the 
distrust of our allies.89
A. Gillespie flatly stated that a pull-out from Europe 
would endanger Canada's relations with the US and threaten 
Canada's whole foreign policy. Other Canadian parliamentarians 
attending the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meetings told newsmen 
they found the Canadian position 'embarrassing' in discussions 
with their European colleagues.
There were some reports of 'considerable eyebrow-lifting
among the NATO delegates' about Trudeau's Berlin Wall comments
and some NATO countries were reported 'to be disturbed over
uncertainty about the future of Canadian armed strength in
Europe'; but NATO Secretary-General Mr Brosio 'stepped nimbly
around' suggestions that other NATO countries might put pressure
90on Canada at least not to reduce its forces in Europe.
One of the Canadian diplomats behaved less diplomatically -
if press reports were correct. Canada's ambassador to NATO was
supposed to have said that the prolonged uncertainty about
Ottawa's attitude towards NATO was 'disgraceful' and that he had
thought about resigning. Prime Minister Trudeau refused in
Parliament to comment on these press reports: "I take the
position that in this particular Government, policy is decided
92by the Cabinet and not by the press". Parts of Cabinet, 
however, Defence Minister Cadieux and Foreign Minister Sharp,
Globe and Mail, 14 November 1968.
90 Globe and Mail, 14-15 November 1968; Ottawa Citizen,
15 November 1968; Montreal Star, 14 November 1968.
91 Montreal Star, 14 November 1968; Ottawa Citizen, 11 November 
1968; Globe and Mail, 15 November 1968.
92 Cited in Ottawa Citizen, 15 November 1968.
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were in Brussels and had "in the face of strong American 
S3pressures" practically to decide, what Canada's contribution 
to NATO for 1969 was to be.
An Interim Decision and More Confusion
Although the Trudeau Government had been unable to conclude 
the foreign policy review, Cadieux and Sharp skilfully handled 
matters in Brussels. Trudeau revealed what his ministers had 
achieved in Brussels through a press release:
1. Canada would maintain its forces in Europe and at 
home at their present 'high level of training, 
equipment and operational readiness'.
2. Because of the Canadian Government's decision to 
close one of the three air bases in Germany,
Canada had planned to reduce the aircraft of the 
air division by about 20%. In face of the Czech 
crisis and in the light of the foreign policy 
review this planned reduction was cancelled and 
the final decision postponed.
What Trudeau did not reveal in this press release, however, 
was that 'maintaining the professional forces at their present 
level' included the following: An additional assignment of four
modern anti-submarine destroyers equipped with helicopters and 
two support ships. NATO officials in Brussels and Britain's 
Minister for Defence, Dennis Healy, took this to mean an 
increase in Canada's contribution to NATO. Trudeau later on 
denied this in Parliament and gave his interpretation: Dennis
Healy was wrong in saying that all but France and Iceland had
95strengthened their forces. Canada had made no new commitments.
Both Healy and Trudeau were both partially right and 
partially wrong. The anti-submarine destroyers on the one hand
93 Granatstein, Canadian Annual Review for 1968, p.247.
94 Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, 18 November 
1968; see also, Globe and Mail, 15 November 1968.
95 Debates, 15 November 1968, pp.2781-83; Globe and Mail,
15 November 1968; New York Times, 17 November 1968; Toronto 
Star, 16 November 1968.
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fulfilled an old commitment but on the other hand represented
an increased contribution to NATO, although an admittedly
theoretical one at this time. The four destroyers would not be
finished for another three years and, moreover, the orders
placed with a Quebec shipyard could still be cancelled, if
Canada should withdraw from NATO - a step which Trudeau
96acknowledged was not then contemplated.
While the parliamentary Opposition sought more clarity on 
this issue, Trudeau confused Parliament all the more. 
Postmaster-General Kierans had indicated that Canada's foreign 
aid ought to be at least equal to Canada's defence expenditure.
Asked in Parliament whether the problem of increasing 
foreign aid and decreasing defence expenditure was among those 
issues contemporary under review, the Prime Minister replied: 
"Yes, very definitely". And "... we are looking very actively 
at the alternative ways of spending our money usefully in our 
foreign relations".
Trudeau 'Accepts' the Committee as a Recognised Actor
Perturbed by the possibility of a total reversal of 
Canada's foreign policy priorities the Opposition tried anew to 
include Parliament in the foreign policy process. Former Prime 
Minister Diefenbaker asked whether the Prime Minister "will give 
this house an opportunity at an early date to discuss this 
matter and make known the views of the Canadian people as 
represented by members here, so that at least Parliament will
98not be a one-man show determining the future of this country". 
Diefenbaker did not get an answer. Following continuing 
questions on this subject and specifically on the role of the 
Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence,
Debates, 15 November 1968, pp.2781-83; Debates, 18 November 
1968, pp.2841-43; Debates, 20 November 1968, p.2977; New York 
Times, 17 November 1968.
97 Debates, 18 November 1968, p.2842.
98 Debates, 19 November 1968, p.2905.
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Trudeau replied three days later: "I do want to assure members
of this house, however, that we will not reach any policy 
through a device which has bypassed Parliament or indeed public 
opinion".^
The Conservative MP, J.A. Maclean, seized on this vague 
assurance to secure a commitment for technical and financial 
support for the Committee's operations:
... with regard to the examination in depth of 
external affairs and defence policy, will the 
Prime Minister assure the house that every facility 
will be given so that evidence before this committee 
can be taken into account and taken advantage of by 
the government in arriving at a policy in these very 
important matters which will have such a bearing on 
the future of our country? (Emphasis added)
Trudeau answered: "Indeed I can give that assurance".'*'^
The Constellation of Contending Forces Crystallises: Sharp
Seeks Committee Involvement
In the meantime not only NATO supporters but even critics
of the alliance became concerned about Trudeau's ambiguous
statements on NATO. Eric Kierans, Postmaster-General and a
personal friend of Trudeau's, was concerned that so far no
minister had publicly demanded total withdrawal from NATO and
NORAD. He therefore became the first to do so. He furthermore
suggested that Canada could send her NATO troops to Vietnam as
peace-keeping forces when they were needed t h e r e . K i e r a n s '
colleague, Defence Minister Cadieux, disagreed strongly and
replied angrily: "I don't really know why this should be
brought up at this time. Why talk about peace-keeping in
102Vietnam when the war is still on".
With this dialogue it became clear to the public that 
Trudeau's Cabinet was split on the NATO question. When Leo
99 Debates, 22 November 1968, p.3067.
Debates, 22 November 1968, p.3068.
See: Toronto Telegram, 20 November 1968 ; Globe and Mail,
25 November 1968; Winnipeg Free Press, 26 November 1968; 
Toronto Star, 26 November 1968.
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Cadieux was asked whether he would resign from Cabinet if Canada
withdrew from NATO, the Defence Minister replied that he would
'not like to answer' that question 'at this time'. The Toronto
Star commented: "He did nothing to squelch the situation and
103by refusing to deny it, in fact fed more fuel to it".
The apparent uncertainty about NATO in Cabinet proved too
much even for professional diplomats. The West German Ambassador,
Ritter, commented angrily that Canada's NATO policy frustrated
its allies and that it represented an 'enigmatic sphinx'.
Ritter taking the unusual course of publicly commenting on an
ally's domestic politics praised Cadieux and Sharp for their
co-operativeness in Brussels and criticised Trudeau's suggestion
that Canada's security was more threatened by racial turmoil in
104the US than by the situation in Berlin. Criticism also came
from official and unofficial sources in other NATO countries,
105as was admitted by the Defence Minister in Parliament.
Trudeau, however, was not deterred by unfavourable comment.
In an interview with the New York Times he argued that invasion 
of Czechoslovakia had actually weakened Moscow since the CSSR 
was no longer a reliable ally for the Soviet Union. He further 
commented if East European countries were 'genuine' in their 
desire "to be less part of the monolith ... I think we should 
also do so in NATO".^^
The Prime Minister, however, did not discuss whether the 
East European countries would be allowed to pursue their 
presumed genuine desire for greater autonomy from Moscow. But 
one thing which definitely was genuine was Kierans' desire that 
Canada should pull out of NATO and NORAD - and this desire
103 r, . i Ibza.
1 04 Toronto Star, 28 November 1968.
105 Debates, 26 November 1968, p.3192; see also: London Times,
21 November 1968; Winnipeg Free Press, 29 November 1968.
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Trudeau allowed to be again publicly expressed. Other key
ministers reacted to the escalating confusion over Canada's 
foreign policy. In front of the parliamentary Committee on 
External Affairs and National Defence they contradicted on 
3 December 1968 the Prime Minister's opinion that Canada's 
security must not be defended in Europe. Leo Cadieux:
The forum where superpowers' interest most closely 
impinge on each other is Europe and hence Europe 
is the geographical region where Canada's security 
is most in jeopardy. Thus Canada's security is 
very closely interlocked with the security of 
Europe.
These are inescapable facts of the world we 
live in.108
And External Affairs Minister Sharp added:
It is a misapprehension to think we are in Europe 
to defend Europe. We are there to defend 
ourselves.105
Trudeau the next day in Parliament was not prepared to 
declare his ministers' statements to be 'Government policy'.
He merely acknowledged that it was "a very important point of 
view". " Earlier through skilful questioning the Opposition 
led Cadieux to correct his Prime Minister: Canada could not
111withdraw from NATO in 1969, but only in 1970 at the earliest. 
Some newspapers interpreted this as a serious split between the 
Prime Minister and his two ministers, especially since there had 
been 'persistent reports' about disunity within Cabinet on the 
NATO question. Whatever the situation in Cabinet, it at last
107
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became clear during that question period in Parliament on 
4 December that Sharp and Cadieux co-operated effectively with 
Parliament in order to create a new institutional battleground, 
where the dispute over the NATO policy could be continued.
Sharp emphasised that his statement before the parliamentary 
Committee the day before still stood:
... it would be very agreeable to the Government 
if the Committee were to invite the views of 
members of Parliament and others who might like 
to appear before the Committee to express their 
views before the Government has completed this 
review. H 3
With this invitation for Committee participation in foreign 
policy decision making it also became clear that Cabinet was 
unable to reach a decision quickly. The apparent split which 
developed in Cabinet in November/December 1968 was not 
susceptible to rapid solution. The two responsible ministers 
indicated they did not want any basic change in policy; the 
Prime Minister seemed to be keeping his options open while 
pushing his personal preferences; and at least one member of 
Cabinet was publicly advocating total reversal of policy.
Preparation for the Decisive Battle
£ a cWhile the parliamentary foreign Affairs Committee was 
preparing itself for its new task the above pattern of behaviour 
by Government members changed little. The Prime Minister 
continued to confuse the public concerning NATO and while 
journalists and academics were astonished at Trudeau’s friendly 
words for NATO and some improbable comments on military 
technology during a question and answer session in Winnipeg in 
the middle of D e c e m b e r , t h e y  overlooked the Prime Minister’s 
stress on that occasion on the importance of fiscal
Debates, 4 December 1968, p.3485.
 ^  ^ Transcript of the Prime Minister’s Question and Answer 
Period, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, 13 December 1968; 
Globe and Mail, 14 December 1968; Bruce Thordarson, op.cit., 
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considerations. And although Trudeau engaged in some 
theoretical gamesmanship, he did note that most Canadians 
believed in collective security. The Prime Minister concluded:
... If we believe in collective security, we must 
remind ourselves that we are pretty much at a 
minimum now. We can't go very much lower ... only 
Denmark and Iceland spend less than we do.H5
Indeed, most of the public believed in collective security. In 
the middle of December 1968 a public survey revealed that only 
23% were in favour of withdrawal from Europe. In the Prime 
Minister's native Quebec one third demanded bringing the troops 
home for reasons which were more financial than philosophical - 
"the money can be used for better causes". And on New Year's
Eve the Prime Minister declared why he thought that a lot of 
money could be saved in the Defence Department:
Canada is in the extraordinarily fortunate position 
of not having to defend itself because we know darn 
well that the United States will defend us, they 
won't let hostile nations take over Canada to wage 
war in the United States. So in a sense we're much 
freer than other nations and I believe we should 
use this freedom to explore the ways in which middle 
sized nations can move the world towards peace in a 
way which many European countries cannot. What it 
will end up in I don't know.^-^
What it might lead to had just been explained by Roy Matthews, 
Director of Research for the Canadian-American Committee and a 
member of Prime Minister Trudeau's special task force reviewing 
Canada's foreign policy. Matthews' arguments in the Toronto 
Star may be summarised as follows:
In the third world the United States is mistrusted.
Europe and Japan are suspect because of their 
imperial or neo-imperial behaviour in the past.
115 Transcript of the Prime Minister's Question and Answer 
Period, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, 13 December 1968,
p. 16.
116 Cited in: Granatstein, Canadian Annual Review for 1968,
p.249.
117 Transcript of the interview with the Prime Minister and 
Ron Callister and Normal Depoe, CBC-TV, 1 January 1969.
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As a result Canada would have an advantage in 
these countries and should try to restructure its 
trade accordingly. To keep and increase this 
advantage Canada should concentrate on a peace­
keeping role and gradually abandon existing defence 
commitments and postures. This would not and need 
not upset the United States. The advantages of 
such a policy were not only of an economic and 
foreign policy nature, they would also foster a 
feeling of national purpose in Canada. The greater 
independence from the U.S. which a withdrawal from 
NATO would involve would permit Canada to shift 
its military investment into peace-keeping 
activities of a kind that would give Canadians a 
sense of adequate national involvement in the 
world's problems - as their present major defence 
functions do not.-^^
External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp, however, gave 
quite a different interpretation of Trudeau’s ambiguous 
statements on NATO. He commented ironically:
The Prime Minister is a great teacher and he is 
leading a public debate at the present time, and 
he is trying to get the people of Canada to think 
about the problem. This is a process of 
involvement, so he is saying some very stimulating 
things . . . . J-19
At the beginning of January 1969 Trudeau tried not only to 
get the people of Canada to think about the NATO problem.
During his European trip the Prime Minister met Harold Wilson 
and the Socialist Italian Foreign Minister, Pietro Nenni, and, 
according to Thordarson, Nenni especially seemed to have had 
more success in influencing Trudeau's thinking than some of his 
Cabinet colleagues. The Italian Foreign Minister skilfully 
appealed to the Prime Minister's biases by playing down the 
military aspects of the alliance and stressing the political 
role it could have in furthering arms control and detente - a 
role which would be weakened by a Canadian withdrawal and that
actually would have the effect of strengthening the alliances', , 120 hawks.
118
says
119
120
Roy Matthews, 'We'll be out of NATO by 1970, Trudeau aide 
', Toronto Star, 24 December 1968.
Granatstein, Canadian Annual Review for 1968, p.2.49.
B. Thordarson, op.cit., p.145.
173
While Trudeau's perceptions of the usefulness of NATO might
have been moderated during his trip to Europe, in Canada,
Cabinet was still bitterly divided and its divisions were
123increasingly obvious to the public. ' Since Cabinet members 
thought it necessary to prepare themselves for the NATO decision 
in Cabinet by stating diametrically opposed opinions in public 
the parliamentary Opposition was quick to underline the conflict 
in parliamentary Question time:
Following ... [the Prime Minister's] Marxist 
dialectical process of reasoning, would it be 
reasonable now for us to infer that the 
government's synthesis would be for Canada to 
remain half in and half out of NATO.122
And Mr Baldwin, referring to a planned trip by Trudeau to see 
President Nixon, asked in the House:
If the Prime Minister does in fact arrange 
discussions with the President of the United 
States regarding Canada's position in respect to 
NATO, will the Postmaster-General and the 
Minister of National Defence accompany the Prime 
Minister, so that Canada's position can be 
placed before the President in all its clarityand simplicity?3
Inputs and Timing: Trudeau and the Committee
Greater clarity and simplicity can be brought to the events 
of the January/April 1969 period by an analysis on three levels:
1. the struggle for public opinion;
2. conflict over the substance of the various reports; and
3. manoeuvering to determine the timing of the final 
Cabinet decision.
Although the three aspects are interrelated, my analysis will
124focus on the question of timing. Since others “ deal
1 21 Globe and Mail, 13, 27, 28 January 1969; Granatstein, 
Canadian Annual Review for 1969; Debates, 29 January 1969
pp.4897-98. 
Debates,
123 Debates,
27 January 1969, p.4826. 
7 February 1969, p.5264.
124 See:
op.cit.;
B. Thordarson, op,cit.; 
A. Legault, op.cit. P.
Dobell, op.cit.; A. Westell,
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extensively with the first two questions I shall refer to them 
in detail only where I have additional information or different 
interpretations. This restriction applies also to the 
deliberations of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.
Bruce Thordarson has already enumerated the different 
inputs for the Government's NATO review together with an 
attempted evaluation of the significance of each: the
consultations between academics and Government, the departmental 
and inter-departmental reports, the 'non-group report' from 
Trudeau's adviser, Ivan Head, Donald Macdonald's paper and the 
parliamentary Committee's report. These reports, however, did 
not merely play a role during the actual decision on NATO in 
Cabinet on 3 April 1969.
A close examination of the decision-making process from 
January to April 1969 leads to the conclusion that control of 
timing was crucial. Several key events of this period did not 
involve substantive aspects of NATO policy but instead centered 
on tactical ploys as well as timing. Leo Cadieux, for example, 
attempted to predetermine the outcome without directly dealing 
with NATO policy. He tried to secure a commitment for defence 
spending as a fixed percentage of the GNP; he disclosed at the 
beginning of February that he had had informal talks with the 
Treasury Board about a formula fixing defence expenditures at 
3% of GNP annually - the effect of which would have been a more 
than 15% increase of defence expenditures. According to Cadieux 
this formula was appealing to the Treasury Board, but he
125admitted he was not yet ready to submit a formal proposal.
However, this scheme was still-borne* Trudeau abruptly
referred to it as "purely an exploratory idea which he [Cadieux]
X 2 6wants to have discussed. It is not government policy".“ ‘ ^ Then, 
what was the Government's NATO policy to be? One thing was
Globe and Mail, 4 February 1969.
126 Cited in: Granatstein, Canadian Annual Review for 1969,
p.229.
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clear: a decision on NATO would have to be taken by April 1969.
This was partially due to budget considerations, but most 
importantly the need to formulate NATO policy for the following 
year: the NATO Council Meeting was to be held in Washington in
early April.
By the middle of February Cabinet had in its hands the
report of the inter-departmental Special Task Force on Relations
with Europe (known by the code name STAFFEUR). The 400-page
report came to the conclusion Canada should continue to keep its
127present troops in Europe. A specific report from the
Department of External Affairs and the Department of Defence 
(the so-called External-Defence Report) was finished at about 
the same time. Thordarson describes the conclusions of these 
reports as follows:
The External-Defence Report consisted mainly of little 
more than a set of options while STAFFEUR adopted a 
more descriptive approach and made definite policy 
recommendations. Nevertheless, since neither External 
Affairs nor National Defence were prepared to see 
their traditional policy of support for NATO rejected, 
the External-Defence Report clearly implied in its 
listing of options that a continuation of military 
activities in Europe was desirable.128
Even the External-Defence Report, however, caused some headaches 
for NATO supporters, because it dealt with the problems and 
costs of maintaining and replacing military equipment in Europe. 
So far no exact data concerning costs had reached the public. 
However, it was clear that Canada, if she kept existing defence 
programs, would have had to spend $Can. 2.5 billion per year.
Leo Cadieux's efforts at that time to ensure slightly more than 
two billion from the Treasury Board made clear the desperate 
situation of NATO supporters solely for financial reasons. In
P.V. Lyon, 'A Review of the Review', op.cit., p.37; WestGll, 
op.cit., p.201; Thordarson, op.cit., pp.135-36.
128 B. Thordarson, op.cit,, pp.136-37.
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a subsequent interview External Affairs Minister Sharp
underlined this by declaring: "Budgetary considerations were
123our greatest problems".
Nevertheless, it is not surprising that in 1969 both sides 
played down the financial aspect of the NATO decision, at least 
in public. Hardly anyone likes to admit that national security 
policy is determined by the Treasury's purse strings.
Although the External-Defence Report had revealed the
Achilles-heel of the NATO supporters, the thrust of both reports
was unequivocal in favour of the status quo. So unequivocal
were these reports that External Affairs Minister Sharp urged
for a quick decision in Cabinet without waiting for the report
130of the parliamentary Committee. ‘ * Defence Minister Cadieux, 
although unwilling to be pinned down on an exact date for 
reaching a decision, did not seem at all worried in his remarks 
to the House on 21 February as to whether the Committee report 
would be finished before Cabinet should act.
I think both the Prime Minister and the Secretary of 
State for External Affairs have indicated that a 
decision on this particular problem is going to be 
made in the very near future - if indeed it is not imminent.131
Without being asked, seconds later Trudeau seized the floor and 
in front of his speechless Defence Minister declared that the 
Government was contemplating whether the decision should be 
postponed:
With the Secretary of State for External Affairs 
and the Minister of National Defence we are 
considering -
Mr Stanfield: And the Postmaster-General.
Mr Trudeau: And the Postmaster-General, as the
Hon. Gentleman says - we are considering whether 
we will bring down our policy later than we had
Interview with External Affairs Minister, Mitchell Sharp, 
Ottawa, 28 May 1973.
130 See transcript of the press interview with the Prime 
Minister, 21 February 1969, p.l; Debates, 21 February 1969, 
p.5801.
131 Debates, 21 February 1969, p.5801.
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wanted. Our view was that we should make the 
announcement as soon as possible, so that the NATO 
meetings in Washington would be fully informed of 
Canada's position; that we tell our allies in 
advance what our decision was. However, we realize 
the importance of waiting for the report of the 
House Committee, and this may make us reconsider
the date.132
On the same d£iy at the press conference Trudeau was again asked 
when the decision would be made and whether it v/ould be before 
his planned talks with President Nixon in Washington. The Prime 
Minister's answer was once again extraordinary:
It depends on the date on which the Parliamentary 
Committee brings down its report into Parliament 
[sic]. We will not make our decision before this 
Committee reports, either in a final way or on the 
specific issues concerning our study of NATO, and 
I don't know when that report will be. We had 
assumed it would be before the middle of March, and 
we had assumed that we would be able to announce 
our NATO policy by the middle of March and if those 
assumptions are fulfilled then the announcement will 
be made before seeing President Nixon, but if the 
Parliamentary Committee only brings down its report 
later, then it will have to be later. 13 3
Further remarks of the Prime Minister in the same interview were
equally significant for purpose of analysis:
The input is just about ready now. Its various 
papers from the military, the international, the 
commercial, all the points of view, are going to be 
given to the Ministers over the next weeks.l-^
Apart from the parliamentary Committee report, however, there 
was another report which was still unfinished - that of Trudeau's 
top adviser, Ivan Head, whose report later proved vitally 
important for the outcome of the NATO decision. Head, on 
21 February, however, had not even started his report! Moreover, 
despite Trudeau's public assurances that Cabinet would have 
access to all points of view, Head's report was withheld from 
the relevant ministers.
132 Ibid,
133 Transcript of the press interview with the Prime Minister, 
21 February 1969.
134 rbid.
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The Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee and the NATO Review
Before dealing with this aspect in detail, however, it is 
useful to analyse the deliberations of the parliamentary 
Committee of External Affairs and National Defence which the 
Prime Minister ostensibly attached such great significance.
Hopes that the Committee actually would exert influence on the 
decision were not only based on the Prime Minister's remarks.
The Committee recommends staying in NATO
Bruce Thordarson observed that the changes of the rules 
made in December 19G8, which were meant to increase the 
participation of parliamentary committees in the decision-making 
process in Canada
contributed to the unprecedented atmosphere of 
optimism among MP's on both sides of the House.
Many felt that the Committee, formerly considered 
to be an investigative but not a policy-forming 
body, would be able to influence the government's 
eventual decision.135
Thus it was not surprising at the start of the proceedings that 
Committee Chairman Ian Wahn announced that he hoped to 
participate in the Government's decision.
Accordingly the Committee made thorough preparations to 
ensure that all view points were presented. Furthermore, in 
order to obtain all possible information the Committee went to 
Europe to obtain the opinion of the allies on the spot. Bruce 
Thordarson has dealt extensively with the Committee's role in
13~7the decision-making process. ' His conclusions were largely 
confirmed by my interviews. The overall majority of the 
Committee members favoured the status quo for the following 
reasons:
1. The alternative proposed by most academics would 
have been more expensive than existing defence 
programs.
135
136
137
B. Thordarson, 
Globe and Mail 
B. Thordarson,
op.cit., p.127.
29 February 1969. 
op.cit., pp.127-35.
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2. Hardly anyone shared the anti-Americanism of most 
NATO critics.
3. Many MPs "became 'rather fed up' with these academics
because of their apparent self-righteousness,
13 8arrogance, and ivory-tower idealism".
4. Most parliamentarians were impressed by their talks 
with NATO allies and with the Swedish Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. European politicians of nearly all 
ideological persuasions urged the Canadian 
parliamentarians to remain in NATO. The only 
exception was French General Gallois who argued that 
NATO was useless since its strategy was not 
sufficiently based on nuclear weapons; this argument 
had the effect of making the Canadians even more in 
favour of NATO.
As a result the Committee's recommendations were clear cut:
1. Canada should remain in NATO;
2. Canada should keep its troops in Europe;
3. Canada's brigade group and air force should remain 
as part of her contribution in Europe at least until 
the equipment would become obsolete in 1972;
4. The Government should begin a review of possible 
alternative military roles in Europe immediately so 
that new equipment could be secured;
5. Canada should use its influence for achieving a
greater degree of detente and a balanced reduction
139of forces of both NATO and Warsaw Pact's forces.
138 Ibid., p.129.
139 House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs 
and National Defence, Proceedings, No, 3 5, Including Fifth 
Report to the House, 26 March 1969, pp.14-15.
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Wahn manoeuvres to influence the Committee decision
Equally important especially with reference to intra-party 
discussions was the way in which the report was produced. The 
Committee set 26 March, a few days before the Cabinet decision 
on NATO was due, as a deadline for at least an interim report. 
This meant that the drafting of the report, as Chairman Wahn had 
already pointed out,xi would have to begin while the Committee 
was still in Europe. The Chairman of the Committee had 
summarised the aims of the trip as follows:
The visit to Europe is an integral part of the 
Committee's current consideration of Canada's defence 
policy, and concludes the first phase of its overall 
review of defence policy that began in January. The 
itinerary of the visit has been arranged to give the 
thirty members of the Committee an opportunity to 
explore at first hand the following issues:
1. How important is NATO and what does it achieve;
2. How do European political leaders regard NATO;
3. The effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping 
operations and U.N. collective security arrangements;
4. What are the possibilities in the field of civil 
defence;
5. The neutrality and non-alignment options;
6. The prospects for disarmament.
The Committee will visit Cyprus, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Great Britain, Switzerland, Sweden, France 
and Belgium. Members will meet and hold discussions with 
political leaders of all parties, officials, non­
government experts and journalists from those countries.
They will also have the opportunity to meet Canadian 
diplomatic and military representatives in the countries 
visited and to see in the field Canadian military forces 
in Europe.141
At least one Liberal parliamentarian, N. Cafik, suspected that 
Wahn's known anti-NATO sentiments were shaping the scope of the 
Committee's enquiry; he noted that only the first tw7o of the 
issues noted by Wahn dealt directly with NATO while the remaining
Press Release of the House of Commons Standing Committee on 
External Affairs and National Defence, 7 March 1969.
141 Ibid.
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14 2questions concerned alternatives to NATO. Thordarson's
subsequent analyses and my own interviews tend to confirm
Cafik's view. Thordarson argued that Wahn in utilising the
Chairman's prerogative of drafting the Committee's preliminary
14 3report, solely emphasised his own anti-NATO views.' This
draft in Thordarson's version, was shown 'for the first time'
to the other members of the Committee during the weekend plane
trip from Geneva to Ottawa on 23 March. Interviews with major
participants, including the Committee's adviser, Peter Dobell,
and Ian Wahn himself as well as evidence found in the so far
unpublished 'Wahn Papers', indicate that Thordarson's version
144'based on interviews with a senior official' was not totally 
correct.
14 5According to Peter Dobell, Wahn did show his drafts to
the Steering Committee during his visit to Europe on three
14 6occasions, each time in a revised form. In the 'Wahn Papers1
there are remnants from several drafts and the complete draft
of '5+' in which it simply says that the "Committee recommends
147that Canada continue in NATO". Wahn himself said that he
prepared drafts "nearly ten times to persuade my colleagues"
and he flatly admitted that he tried "everything to get a
better report". Wahn further admitted that he wanted Canada to
withdraw completely from NATO. When he failed to secure the
support of even the Social Democratic NDP his new aim became the] a owithdrawal of Canadian forces from Europe. ' How closely Wahn
142
143
14 4
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Interview with N. Cafik, Ottawa, 31 May 1973. 
B. Thordarson, op.cit,, p.134.
Ibid,, p.164, footnote 26.
Peter Dobell is Director of the Parliamentary Centre for 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, an institution partly financed by 
Parliament, private enterprise and other bodies, which was 
specifically established to advise parliamentarians about 
foreign policy matters.
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co-operated with the three NDP members, David Lewis.- Harold
Winch and Andrew Brewin, is illustrated by the fact that
substantial parts of the first Wahn drafts were based upon notes
14 9of the NDP politicians. Ironically, a reading of the 'Wahn
Papers' reveals that Wahn was isolated within the Committee, but 
at the same time he had the effect of welding together the NDP 
politicians.
The NDP in its opposition to NATO had been a classic 
example of individual viewpoints preventing a common stand: 
three members, three opinions, one party.
Bruce Thordarson describes the opinion of the NDP
politicians as follows: "Although David Lewis's inclination was
toward a complete withdrawal from NATO, the party's defence
spokesman, Andrew Brewin, wanted only a military withdrawal from
Europe, while Harold Winch believed that some Canadian troops
150should be left in Europe". At the end of March, however, the
NDP had worked out a compromise, which explicitly approved the 
Committee's proposal for staying in NATO, but which criticised 
the majority report "on the ground that it failed to spell out15]clearly what Canada's future role in NATO should be".'
The NDP politicians suggested that
I
while remaining a member of the North Atlantic 
Alliance, Canada should withdraw the Air Division 
and Brigade Group now in Europe and develop an air 
transportable, conventionally armed, highly mobile 
force available for peace-keeping under the United 
Nations and as a mobile reserve for use in Europe 
under NATO when necessary.152
The Liberal Member Warran Allmond disagreed with the majority 
view as well and issued a minority report on similar lines as 
the NDP compromise statement. Ian Wahn told me that he had
149
150
151
These notes were included in the 'Wahn Papers', op.cit. 
Thordarson, op.cit., pp.133-34.
Statement of the NDP members of the Parliamentary Committee 
on External Affairs and National Defence, Press Release,
26 March 1973.
152 Ibid.
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considered issuing a joint minority report in order to increase
153the impact of the opposition to the majority report.
However, he decided against this move and drafted another report
(Draft No. 5) in which he simply stated that Canada would stay 
1 54in NATO.
I decided against issuing a minority report because 
I tried up to the end to influence the majority report.
I hoped to prevent the majority from stating all their 
reasons for staying in NATO. That’s why I drafted a 
report saying we simply should stay in NATO. But 
earlier, I tried to get a more radical report. But 
it didn’t work either.155
Indeed, neither approach worked. It didn't work at all. As 
Thordarson pointed out, Ian Wahn's persistent attempts to issue 
a radical report against the wishes of the majority might have 
had the opposite effect:
... members who had favoured a modest military 
cutback in Europe became proponents of maintaining 
the status quo until 197 2 , in reaction against Walin's 
proposal for a complete withdrawTal. 156
Although Wahn's tactics seemed to become more flexible 
when he realised the determination of the majority, he had 
undermined his credibility through at least five fruitless 
attempts to draft the Committee report. And what Thordarson 
did not mention was that it was now possible for other forces 
to step in and exert decisive influence on the Committee.
The Chairman departs and the vacuum is filled
After all of Wahn's drafts had been rejected, Peter Dobell, 
who had closely observed the Committee's deliberations as a 
permanent advisor, on 24 March at 9 p.m. started to work out a 
plan whereby a report and recommendations could be completed and 
reach Cabinet as soon as possible. This was done within eleven
153
154
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'Wahn Papers', op.cit.
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Thordarson, op.cit., p.153.
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1 57hours." Committee Chairman Ian Wahn later on commented that
it was "not only a bad, a very bad report, but a Dobell-report 
] 58•coo" . Dobell denied this and maintained that he acted
159basically "more as an arbitrator than an advocate". Most
Committee members agreed with D o b e l l . D o b e l l ,  however,
admitted that he kept close contact with the Department of
External Affairs, especially with the Head of its European
Division, John Hdlstead. ^  Although External Affairs Minister
Sharp did not remember Holstead or any other member of his
department having any 'significant influence' on the final draft
of the Committee report, he remembered quite well that his
colleague in the Defence Department, Leo Cadieux, was always
extensively informed about the different stages of the
Committee's operations: "Cadieux's secretary was the real go-
1 ?between". What Sharp meant was that David Groos, the
parliamentary secretary to the Minister of National Defence had
163been present 'by traditional arrangement' quite regularly when
the Committee met, and that he had been present on that night
when the final report was drafted, too. The Liberal MP Norman
164Cafik claimed that Groos had been 'quite influential' and
Peter Dobell conceded that Groos presented quite a few formulas
165which were used prominently in the report's conclusion. Thus
157
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Wahn's desperate attempts to determine the Committee's report 
against the wishes of the majority produced precisely the 
opposite effect. But Wahn did not give up yet!
I was appalled by the fact that the Committees' 
report would be used in Caucus and in Cabinet as 
ammunition for the status quo. After all, it was 
the Committee which I was the Chairman of. ^ 6
WTahn manoeuvres to minimise the Committee's decision and 
the Ontario Liberal Party meeting
Wahn told me in May 1973, "I decided to write a letter to
the Prime Minister, in which I tried to twist the interpretation
•| (5 7of the report in order to put more emphasis on my own views"."
This is quite an extraordinary admission by a Chairman of a
Committee. His actual letter, however, was considerably more
subtle than Wahn's ex-post explanation of his tactical approach.
In his letter to the Prime Minister of 27 March 1969 ('Private
and Confidential') Wahn admitted that the Committee's report
recommended that Canada should remain in NATO "until the main
items of equipment for our Air Division and Mechanized Brigade
168in Europe require replacement - the mid 197 0's".
A further recommendation urges that our review of our 
long term roles commence now so that decisions can be 
arrived at in sufficient time to negotiate changes (if 
any) without allies, to acquire new equipment and to 
retrain our forces.
This recommendation in paragraph 4 (which appears 
in Part III of the report) must be read in conjunction 
with the paragraph which appears immediately preceding 
Part III. This paragraph points out that the future 
role of the Canadian forces now in Europe is one of 
the most important questions facing the Committee, that 
the Committee has not received sufficient evidence on 
this point but that it intends to pursue the matter 
with a viev.7 to making definite recommendations in a 
future report.
Interview with Ian Wahn, Toronto, 27 May 1973.
167 Ibid,.
168 'Wahn Papers', op.eit.
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The report leaves open the question as to what 
Canada's defence roles will be after the mid 
1970’s.169
Wahn indeed tried to twist the Committee’s interpretation. The 
Committee’s report quite clearly stated that Canada should stay 
in NATO, that Canada's troops should remain in Europe, and the 
Committee rejected Trudeau's notion of a 'free ride'. The 
Committee's report did not even see any sense in stationing 
Canadian forces at home instead of in Europe.
What W7ahn deliberately confused was Canada's 'long term
roles' with Canada's 'military roles'. At no point did the
Committee question Canada's 'long term roles' (Canada should
remain in NATO and maintain troops in Europe) but left open
17 0Canada's specific military roles after the mid-70's. Wahn
subsequently told the Prime Minister his personal opinion:
"... I hope we could adopt a more independent and self-reliant
foreign policy in the future". The influence of Walin's
letter on the Prime Minister is hard to determine. Wahn himself
claimed the letter was discussed in Cabinet and counter-balanced
172the impact of the Committee's report.
Donald Macdonald, Cabinet member and NATO opponent but no
admirer of Wahn's tactical skills, regarded this as 'wishful
thinking'. He did not recall that Wahn's letter was mentioned
17 3in Cabinet at all. External Affairs Minister Sharp was also
uncertain as to whether Wahn's letter was discussed in Cabinet 
but conceded that he had heard about the letter: "That was
another of Ian Wahn's tricks". ‘ ' Wahn himself admitted that
169 Ibid.
17 0 House of Commons, The Committee on External Affairs and 
National Defence, Fifth Report to the House Respecting Defence 
and External Affairs, 25 March 1969.
171 ,Wahn Papers', op.cit.
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he was party to another 'trick'. The day after Wahn sent the
private letter to the Prime Minister he repeated the same
argument to the Annual Meeting of the Liberal Party of Ontario:
the Committee report only proposes a continuing Canadian
presence in Europe until the mid-1970's when military equipment
will have become obsolete. "After that", Wahn argued, "we don't
175say what our role should be ...".
In a subsequent interview Wahn claimed that friends of
Trudeau and NATO opponents managed to manipulate the Ontario
delegates. Wahn asserted that the Chairman of the policy
discussion of the Ontario meeting was biased against NATO, and
the official discussants all favoured a change in NATO policy
17 6and were selected for this reason. John Roberts, Liberal
Member for York-Simcoe, a panelist at the Liberal meeting and a
proponent of withdrawal from Europe, while admitting that none
of the discussants was in favour of the status quo disputed
177Wahn's version and claimed it all happened by accident.
Wahn, however, argued that anti-NATO Liberals must have
carefully selected the panelists: "They even found cne or two
17 3External Affairs people who were against NATO".' Dr Roberts, 
however, replied that the annual event in Ontario was anything 
but well planned and organised: "It was a piece of splendid
disorganization. There was no coordinated approach, no plan,
179no tactics, however surprising this might seem in retrospect".
Be this as it may, it is undisputed that all papers being 
distributed were opposed to the status quo. One of the more 
powerful papers was delivered by Escott Reid. Reid, a former
17 5 
17 6
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deputy Under-Secretary in the Department of External Affairs
during the period of NATO’s conception who at that stage "more
than any other Canadian official, developed the intellectual
framework for NATO", was now advocating a dramatic change in
Canada's foreign policy. Reid's suggestion was to cut Canada's
defence budget in half, withdraw from Europe and spend that
181money on foreign aid. The Globe and b1o.il asserted that Reid
18 2had a decisive influence on the Ontario Liberal delegates.
While none of the panelists spoke in favour of the status 
quo, there were a few parliamentarians who came out for NATO:
N. Cafik, A. Gillespie and Senator Aird.^'°^
The battle, however, was won by the NATO opponents. And,
a],though John Roberts had disputed that the Ontario panel
meeting had been staged, he agreed that "Ontario was one of the
few institutional possibilities to exert influence, not
directly, but in building up ammunition which could be used by
184Cabinet members later on". The NATO critics had to work hard,
howTever, to achieve this aim at the Liberal Party meeting in
March 1S69 in Hamilton, Ontario. A general poll conducted among
convention delegates showed that the powerful Ontario Liberals
18 5were 'cautious' about the NATO issue. Of the 256 delegates 
who filled out a questionnaire circulated by party officials,
41% wanted no change, 31% wTanted to phase out Canada's military 
commitment gradually, 22% wanted an immediate and complete
Peter Dobell, 'Canada and NATO' in Orbis Vol. XIII, Spring 
1969, No. 1 (Special Issue on NATO and European Security), 
p.320.
181 Escott Reid, Declaration on Foreign Policy, Press Release 
of the Address to the Annual Meeting of the Liberal Party in 
Ontario, Hamilton, 28 March 1969.
182 Globe and Mail, 29 March 1969.
Interview with Ian Wahn, Toronto, 17 May 1973; Interview 
with Dr John Roberts, Ottawa, 2 June 197 3; Interview with 
N. Cafik, Ottawa, 31 May 1973.
Interview with Dr John Roberts, Ottawa, 2 June 197 3.
185 Toronto Star, 29 March 1969.
189
withdrawal from NATO and 4% even wanted to increase Canada's
186military obligation. In the actual panel meeting on foreign
policy the NATO critics were more successful. Forty delegates 
wanted to stay in NATO but with a reduced military commitment,
20 supported a complete withdrawal and only 15 opted for no 
reduction in Canada's involvement in the alliance.
Alan Linden, Chairman of the policy discussion, guaranteed
that the result of the meeting would be immediately passed on
to Prime Minister Trudeau. And Ian Wahn, although not a formal
member of the panel, gained the widest news coverage by
'warning' the Ontario delegates that the fight in Ottawa for
change would be much harder than in Hamilton: "Powerful forces
in the Liberal Party are opposed to any reduction in Canada's
187commitment in the collective security pact".
The Liberal Caucus Debates NATO Policy
Of all people Wahn should have known that the fight in
Caucus would be much harder. Indeed, shortly before the Cabinet
decision the conflicting opinions clashed in Caucus. In
particular Cabinet members were reportedly so emotional as to
provoke further antagonism within the parliamentary Liberal
Party at this stage. The sporadically bitter debate, however,
supposedly also had the effect of creating among the still
undecided Liberals, who valued party unity above all else, a
188recognition of the necessity of compromise.
There is no evidence for Thordarson's version that many of
the same Committee members who shortly before had voted in
favour of the parliamentary Committee's report were now pressing
in Caucus for a partial reduction similar to that later on
] 89announced by the Government.
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There is, however, an indication that non-committed or
only slightly-committed Caucus members, including Committee
members, felt the necessity of a compromise, particularly after
seme members hinted at the possibility of a party split. There
were still strong groups in Caucus led by the powerful Minister
Donald Macdonald (who never operated in public) demanding total
withdrawal from NATO. Macdonald received support from Ian Wahn.
19 0Wahn simply repeated the arguments made in Hamilton.
N. Cafik, who had been investigating in Halifax what became
later known as the Bonaventure affair and who had flown back to
the Caucus meeting at the request of Ministers Sharp and
Cadieux, became so furious with Wahn that he forecast a split
of the party if the Government decided to get all troops out of 
191NATO.
Others were not as outspoken as Cafik, but Messieurs
Proud'homme, Gillespie, Watson and Lang also strongly supported
1 92Canada's role in NATO.
No wonder more and more moderates were looking for a line 
acceptable to both sides. Although the actual decision was made 
in Cabinet and although this section is naturally solely based 
on interviews, I will argue that the most far-reaching 
alternatives to current policy-increased military involvement 
in Europe and total withdrawal from NATO and NO RAD were precluded 
by Caucus. But these extreme options, although listed by 
Trudeau, were net the real political issue as either would have 
irrevocably split both Caucus and Cabinet.
The practical alternatives were total military withdrawal 
from Europe while remaining in NATO, partial military withdrawal
Interview with Ian Wahn, Toronto, 17 May 1973; Dr John 
Roberts, Ottawa, 2 June 1973.
1 91 Interview with N. Cafik, Ottawa, 31 May 1973; Interview with 
Ian Wahn, Toronto, 17 May 1973; External Affairs Minister 
M. Sharp declined to comment on this aspect.
192 Interview with John Roberts, Ottawa, 2 June 1973; Interview 
with N. Cafik, Ottawa, 31 May 1973.
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from Europe and the status quo. I shall further argue on the 
one hand that the views of Trudeau and particularly the hardcore 
anti-NATO group in Cabinet - using the arguments of financial 
constraints and detente - prevented the maintenance of the 
status quo. On the other hand, Caucus - adopting the opinion 
expressed by Canada's European allies - ruled out a total 
military withdrawal from NATO. The bitterness of the conflict 
over the relatively narrow question of how much of a military 
withdrawal from Europe can be explained by both the vagueness 
of the 3 April Cabinet decision and Trudeau's violation of 
proper form in dealing with his Cabinet associates. This 
violation of form, however, was not merely a gaffe on the part 
of the Prime Minister but was a direct factor in strengthening 
his hand within Cabinet. These several factors are discussed 
in detail below.
Form or Substance; The Nature of the Trudeau/Sharp Clash?
The question of the breach of form concerned a single 
report. While Cabinet was informed of departmental reports, the 
parliamentary Committee report and the mood of Caucus, there was 
one report which was kept under extreme secrecy up to a few 
hours before the Cabinet meeting on 29 March. Even the
19 3responsible Ministers Sharp and Cadieux had not been informed.
Sharp, however, admitted in an interview he had been aware that
the Prime Minister's office was working on a paper, but that he
194had no knowledge of its contents. Although the Head of the
Prime Minister's office, Ivan Head, had told the author in 1973
that the ideas which went into the report were "at least a year 
195old" it was only in the middle of March 1969 that Trudeau had 
asked him to prepare these in written form. Concerning the exact 
contents of the paper and the workings of his small committee 
which prepared it Head would say nothing. Thordarson's research, 
however, revealed the following:
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Head chaired a small committee that examined both 
general and specific questions dealing with military 
policy. Working with him were senior civil servants 
who served as ’resource people', answering any 
detailed questions that he raised in the course of 
his study. By March 29 Head had completed his 
special report, entitled 'Canadian Defence Policy - 
a Study’ but referred to by a few knowledgeable 
insiders as the 'non-group report' (a somewhat 
caustic allusion to the large bureaucratic and 
parliamentary committees that had prepared the other 
NATO studies).
And the document apparently contained the 
recommendations that Canada remain in NATO, retain 
in Europe approximately 3,000 men out of its existing 
9,800-man contingent, and abandon its nuclear-strikerole.196
Thordarson based his account on interviews with 'senior
government officials' and on Albert Legault's article in 'Le
Devoir'. Legault's article, however, did not cover all the
specifics of the proposed forced reduction. In a footnote
Thordarson conceded that "for the most part, the contents of
this document (Head's 'non-group report') are a matter of
speculation; some government officials are aware of its general
198contents, but few appear to have actually seen the report". 
Admitting, as Thordarson does, that the contents of the Head 
report are a 'matter of speculation' is one thing; treating 
his suppositions as if they v;ere the facts and tempting others, 
like Denis Stairs, to do the same,^^ is another thing. The 
appeal of Thordarson's account is perhaps explained by the lack 
of direct evidence concerning the period just before and after 
the 3 April decision. Now, however, I shall attempt a closer 
reconstruction of events.
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Some political observers believed that the Government's 
decision on NATO had already been made in March 1969. All the 
official reports prepared by that time, most of which were made 
known to the press, supported the status quo. As we have seen 
there was no doubt of Cadieux's views on this score. Moreover, 
on 1 March 1969 the other relevant Minister, Sharp, in a 
skilfully worded address to the Canadian Institute of
2 01International Affairs, was so strongly in favour of NATO that 
George Bain from the Globe and Mail concluded: "The decision
has been made".^^
Peter Dobell later asked whether Cadieux and Sharp had been
203’perhaps over-confident' that the Government would follow 
their lead. It is not only questionable whether Sharp and 
Cadieux had been 'over-confident', it is even questionable 
whether Sharp was actually in favour cf the status quo.
Ivan Head, for example, later commented that Thordarson's 
mcst significant misjudgement was to overestimate the 
differences between Sharp and Trudeau. “ The conflict between 
Sharp and Trudeau can hardly be overestimated. It is necessary, 
however, to focus on the nature of the conflict between the 
Prime Minister and his External Affairs Minister. Nowhere had 
Sharp ever demonstrated discontent with the Cabinet decisions 
of April and September 1969; even before the April decision 
Sharp had nowhere rigorously argued in favour of the status quo. 
"Trudeau and Sharp were in substance much closer than it was 
reported", Ivan Head commented. Concerning 'substance' this
M. Sharp, 'NATO in Canadian Perspective', Press Release, 
Transcript of a speech by the Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, M. Sharp, to the Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs, 7 March 1969.
207 Globe and Mail, 4 March 1965.
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is quite possible, but one has to keep in mind that it was in 
the interest of both Sharp and Head to downplay any differences 
in public.
No attempt was made, however, to deny the conflict between 
Sharp and Trudeau over the manner of handling the NATO decision.
Although Sharp never complained in public, it is clear that 
the Park Plaza Hotel ’Cabinet meeting* did not accord with 
generally accepted procedures. Jack Granatstein labelled the 
meeting of Ministers Macdonald, Kierans, Pepin, Lang, Hellyer, 
and Richardson with a group of academics at Toronto’s Park Plaza 
Hotel on 16 March 1969 as ’Cabinet decision-making'. It could 
not have been more appropriate.
Less important was the fact that all ministers of this 
meeting except for Hellyer were regarded as 'doves', less 
important was that "the tenor of discussion was dovish although 
realistic"(sic!); less important were the subsequent 
disproven prophecies of some participants; more important was 
Granatstein's conclusion:
The significance of the Park Plaza meeting was this:
Cabinet Ministers felt it essential to their 
understanding of the issue to go outside the 
establishment for ideas? advice and consultation; 
the Cabinet was clearly gearing up for a last fight 
on the issue; and the doves were numerically 
stronger than had been suspected.^07
At least one Minister was quite disturbed that a part of Cabinet
felt it necessary to meet in a hotel; others pointed out that
the function of the meeting was basically to inform those
Cabinet colleagues about the views of a number of leading
academics. The reason why the two responsible Ministers Sharp
and Cadieux were not invited was explained on the grounds that
208those two Ministers had had previous talks with academics. °
206 J. Granatstein, Canadian Annual Review for 1969, p.231.
207 y 1 . ,Id -id.
208 Ibid.
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Whatever the motives for the Plaza meeting, it is clear
that Macdonald who organised the discussions at the Plaza Hotel
presented in Cabinet on 29 March another report. This was
supposed to be highly critical of NATO, although nobody seems
to (or wants to) remember whether Macdonald recommended total
2 09withdrawal from NATO or only total withdrawal from Europe.
External Affairs Minister Sharp commented in an interview 
that he could not care less how many reports prepared by how 
many people were presented to Cabinet, but:
Things are totally different, when the Prime 
Minister signs one of them without even consultinghis Minister.210
Trudeau did not sign Macdonald’s report, but he did sign that
prepared by Ivan Head. According to Sharp, the Prime Minister
did not. attach his signature to the report itself but only to
a cover note. This, however, was enough to cause Sharp 
211anxiety. Legault subsequently wrote that it was the right
of the Prime Minister to ask for a report from whomever he 
212wanted to' but what Legault did not say was that Trudeau’s 
signature automatically put additional and outstanding weight 
to Head’s report.
It was this much more than the fact that extracts from
Head’s report were later found in the Prime Minister’s statement
213on NATO which angered the two ministers. ' This plus the fact 
that Ministers Kierans, Macdonald, Pelletier and Marchand 
insisted on a radical change in policy on NATO, prevented
209
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Cabinet making a decision as had been intended before Parliament
214rose for the Eastern holidays. Sharp's Press Secretary,
B. Gorham, later on even thought Head's paper should have only
been distributed in Cabinet after the responsible ministers had
been consulted. In this case, Gorham argued, the principle of
ministerial responsibility had been violated. "Sharp and
215Cadieux must have been embarrassed".
Sharp assured himself, in his own words, that "it would not 
happen again". J J He obtained this assurance in a meeting with 
Trudeau and, again according to Sharp, he made sure the top
217bureaucrats in his department were informed of this agreement.
In an extensive interview Sharp threw additional light on the 
decision. (Of course, one must bear in mind that the External 
Affairs Minister had a vested interest in bolstering the image 
of his department after Trudeau's belittling of External 
Affairs.)
Sharp argued that the Prime Minister's range of options was 
limited by the need to prevent a party split. Since a Caucus 
meeting had taken place immediately proceeding the decision 
Trudeau had to be aware of how strongly some Members of
? i QParliament felt about the NATO issue. " This applied for the 
Cabinet as well as for the Party in general. Both Cadieux and
22 0Sharp never denied that they would resign if Canada left NATO.
The counter argument to the threat of a party split was the 
stringent budgetary situation:
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Cadieux and I accepted that from the beginning.
Both of us knew that re-equipment was necessary.
Both of us knew that big, big money was involved 
if we wanted to keep up our strength in Europe.
And at least I knew that we wouldn't get awav 
with i t . ^ 1
What Sharp thought Cadieux and he would not get away with
was according to Legault - at least 300-400 million additional
222Defence dollars. The Toronto Star, however, learned from
Cabinet sources that the cost would be as high as 425 million 
223dollars. J
To what an extent Sharp believed in 1968-69 that the status
quo would be difficult to maintain solely for financial reasons
is difficult to determine. This much is clear, however, that
Sharp and his department never publicly admitted that they had
considered alternatives to the status quo simply for financial
reasons. In any case, whatever the motivation of Sharp and his
department, a solely financial argument could not have been
articulated in Canada (or, for that matter, anywhere else) where
no one could afford to admit that defence policy was a function
of the budget. At least Sharp's differences between himself and
Trudeau reduces the question to a matter of etiquette, an
analysis which was shared by the Prime Minister's top adviser 
224Ivan Head. * It was not the substance of the issue but rather
225its handling, according to Sharp, which was the main problem.^ 
Sharp would have been satisfied, he claimed in 1973, with29g
'a. certain troop reduction in Europe'. " He felt, however,
that the very decision to withdraw any troops from Europe should
227have been cleared with the allies in advance.-
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On 3 April, in Sharp's viev,T, it would have been sufficient
to announce simply that Canada would remain in NATO. Any
decision concerning a reduction of forces in Europe should have
been postponed until consultations with the allies and not made
during NATO's 20th anniversary "[but] Cadieux and I had to go
2 28to our allies and say: 'Sorry we did not consult you'".
Trudeau, however, according to his External Affairs
Minister, believed in 'shock tactics' and this 'for domestic
reasons'. Sharp went on to say that the move was taken for
purposes of demonstrating change to the Canadian public and as
229such it "had to be dramatic".
An 'Ami jiguous' Decision Further Upsets Some Liberals
For some people Trudeau's 3 April Announcement was dramatic 
indeed, for others it was an anti-climax. The reason for the 
wide differences in the interpretation was not simply one of 
conflicting ideology but also because what actually had been 
decided was anything but clear. The following decisions were 
announced on 3 April:
The government has rejected any suggestion that Canada 
assume a non-aligned or neutral role in wTorld affairs.
Such an option would have meant the withdrawal by 
Canada from its present alliances and the termination 
of all co-operative military arrangements with other 
states in the interests of Canada's national security 
and in defence of the values we share with our friends.
But at his press conference the same day Trudeau added:
Canadian forces are now committed to NATO until the 
end of the present year. The Canadian force commitment 
for deployment with NATO in Europe beyond this period 
v,Till be discussed with our allies at the meeting of the 
Defense Planning Committee of NATO in May. The Canadian 
government intends, in consultation with Canada's allies, 
to take early steps to bring about a planned and phased 
reduction of the size of the Canadian forces in Europe.231
228 Ibid.
229 Ibid.
2 30 Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, 3 April 1969.
2 31 Transcript of the Prime Minister's Press Conference, Ottawa,
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Concluding Trudeau stated:
In summary, Canada will continue to be a member of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to co­
operate closely with the United States within NORAD 
and in other ways in defensive arrangements. We 
shall maintain appropriate defence forces which will 
be designed to undertake the following roles:
(a) the surveillance of our own territory and 
coast lines, i.e., the protection of our 
sovereignty;
(b) the defence of North America in 
co-operation with the United States 
forces;
(c) the fulfilment of such NATO commitments 
as may be agreed upon; and
(d) the performance of such international 
peacekeeping roles as we may, from time
to time, assume.* 2^
The first foreign and domestic reaction to the decision was 
described extensively by J. Granatstein in the Canadian Annual 
Review. 233
What was immediately apparent in the 3 April decision was 
that the term ‘phazed reduction' was very vague, as probably was 
the intention. It is hardly imaginable, however, that following 
extensive emotion-laden deliberations, both sides in Cabinet 
would have been satisfied with a formulation wiiich could mean 
the withdrawal of either a handful of troops or all but such a 
handful. Politically it would have been impossible for the 
Trudeau Government to start again in Cabinet, Caucus, Parliament 
and public the tense conflict over Canada's military commitment 
in Europe - this time concerning the exact number of Canadians 
overseas. Thus it is likely that an informal agreement had been 
reached in Cabinet over any probable range of the projected 
force reduction.
Even without reopening the entire issue the Government had 
enough problems contending with dissatisfaction within Liberal
232 Ibid. From this and only this Granatstein and others 
concluded that Trudeau in his 'list of priorities' had placed 
NATO "in third place behind the protection of Canadian 
sovereignty and the defence of North America". See 
0. Granatstein, op,ait., p.234.
2 33 J. Granatstein, Canadian Annual Review for 1969, pp.233-43.
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Party ranks. The prolonged gestation of the decision-making
process which had already made the Opposition furious, albeit
only in the plenum, was not without an impact of the Liberal's
Party backbench. Pro-NATO backbenchers had been disturbed by
rumours that the departure of the Postmaster-General for a
vacation in the West Indies marked a victory for the anti-NATO
position which was only awaiting final drafting. Norman
Cafik remembered that he had expected 'the worst1 and that he
235had made contacts with likeminded colleagues. The party
would have split had the Government quit NATO or pulled all our
? 3 6troops out of Europe.J But things were bad enough for the
Liberals as they stood. When the Toronto Star reported that
Trudeau and a sizeable segment of Cabinet had favoured
withdrawal rather than a force reduction and when rumours spread
that the Prime Minister had deliberately muddied the water to
remain the support of pro-NATO ministers like Sharp and 
2 37Cadieux, ' Cafik was ready "to organize a backbench revolt.
I didn't do it in the end because I heard Sharp saying that he
2 38was 'very happy' with the Government's decision - and I
2 3Qtrusted his judgment".
Furthermore, in the first Caucus meeting following the 
3 April decision, Cafik, according to his own account, made 
quite clear to the Prime Minister how strong the sentiment in 
Caucus was for the retention of a substantial military 
commitment in Europe. Cafik indicated that a total withdrawal 
from Europe would result in 'a revolution' within the party. 
"This was probably the first time that the Prime Minister was
234
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aware of the strength of our feeling", Cafik commented later.
"It’s one thing to see it in Hansard, it's one thing to see it
in the paper, but it's another thing to see it in the members’ 
240eyes". Cafik admitted, however, that had it come to a Party
241split only ’a few’ wTould have actually left the Party.
Another Caucus member who felt strongly about the NATO 
issue was Senator John Aird. Aird was so concerned about the 
principle involved in a Canadian troop reduction that he phoned 
the Prime Minister on 4 April to tender his resignation as 
Chairman of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association. The 
Liberal Senator, who had been extremely successful as the 
Party’s chief fundraiser, told the Toronto Star that he was "in 
basic disagreement with the government’s announced defence 
policy".
What was more important, however, was that he also said
that "there were many others" who felt the way he did, in
2A 3Parliament and in the Government party. * It was precisely
this impression that key members of the parliamentary External
Affairs and Defence Committee had. wanted to prevent from 
244spreading." They discounted reports of ’wide discontent’ in 
the Party over the Government's decision. Cafik, however, now 
in public made it quite clear that some members would only 
support the Government as long as the troops would not be 
withdrawn totally and immediately from Europe. Otherwise the 
decision "would split the Party wide open". On the one hand 
Cafik thought that Senator Aird's decision "was a little 
premature, unless he knows more about wThat the Cabinet has in
240
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mind than I do"; on the other hand he warned his Government that 
'rumblings of discontent* would continue until Cabinet announced 
what the 3 April decision exactly meant in practice.
The 19 September Decision: Was It Taken on 3 April?
Cafik's statement indicated that he was unsure whether more
was actually decided on 3 April than what had publicly been
revealed, but he felt confident that the "real battle was over"
and that the fight would then only centre around "not so
246terribly important details".
Indeed, that a clearer decision had actually been made on
3 April is suggested by the fact that despite rumblings on the
backbench no Cabinet Minister indicated dissatisfaction with the
decision. This is further supported by the explicit statements
in interviews by tvro of the leading Cabinet exponents of the
conflicting viewpoints - Sharp and Macdonald - that the basic
decision had been made on 3 April, although both added that
there was still some room to manoeuvre in response to the views
247of Caucus and the pressure of the allies.
Exactly how much room for outside influence remained after
3 April is still a matter of dispute which my research has not
been able to resolve totally. It was repeatedly pointed out
that Ivan Head's report contained a recommendation for a two-
248thirds reduction of Canadian forces in Europe. Ivan Head
24 9disputed this in an interview. It has been argued that
245 Ibid.
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24 7 Interview with M. Sharp, Ottawa, 
D. Macdonald, Ottawa, 3 June 1973.
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250pressure from the allies and Cadieux's determination to keep
251as many troops as possible in Europe succeeded in September 
1969 in limiting the reduction to one-half.
There is no doubt concerning Leo Cadieux's determination.
I would argue against overestimating the influence of the
allies' pressure. Not because such pressure was absent but
because it was counter productive due to widespread reportage 
252in the press. Moreover, I would suggest that the sharpness
of the allies' criticism indicates that the basic decision had 
been taken in Ottawa prior to any consultation.
For the post-3 April-phase there is an even more radical 
interpretation, which totally excludes foreign pressure for 
reasons which are partly different from the above. This view, 
which was argued by a leading defence official who does not wTant 
his identity revealed, asserts that the implementation of the 
3 April decision was solely left with Cadieux. Cadieux, 
however, was limited in turn by the three-year freeze imposed 
on the defence budget as he revealed in Parliament at the
0 C. -3beginning of June 1973.
An alternative explanation to both the above and Cafik's
254interpretation exists however. The fact that Trudeau and
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Many analysts, in my opinion, overestimate the significance 
of the "Calgary speech" and use it to elaborate Government 
policy. The Prime Minister's motives after all were unclear and 
could have reflected a wide range of alternatives continuing to 
argue the case prior to a final decision, on the one hand, to 
obfuscating a defeat on the issue, at the other extreme.
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255Cadieux continued to make ambiguous statements could indicate
that the issue had not yet been finally settled. Furthermore,
256discontent continued within the ranks of the Liberal Party.
At the beginning of June Liberal Senator Lang announced he would
not attend a military committee meeting of the North Atlantic
Assembly in Brussels because he regarded the Government's NATO
policy as "childishly petulant, amateurish and, indeed,
257dangerous". What made this view particularly significant
was that Senator Lang had been the second key Liberal fundraiser 
and top Party executive to publicly protest against his 
Government's foreign policy.
Moreover, the Minister for Transport and Housing resigned
from Cabinet and rumours spread that this was in part due to
258his objections to Trudeau's foreign policy. And later in
December 1969 the Liberal backbencher, Perry Ryan, left the
• 25 9Liberal Party - again for foreign policy reasons.“
To what extent these moves indicated a still undecided 
conflict or to what extent they represented the emotional 
repercussions of an already made decision could not be 
conclusively determined. If the latter was the case, it could 
be explained by the normal political tendency to signal groups 
on both sides of the issue, both within the Party and the public 
that their respective positions on balance came out ahead. 
Moreover, Sharp and Cadieux had an interest in proving to their 
allied friends how wholeheartedly and successfully they were 
fighting to uphold Canada's commitment to NATO. In this sense 
I would partially interpret Cadieux's statement to Parliament 
in December 1969 in which he declared that the Canadian
n r aGovernment "had modified considerably ... [the] original plan".
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More pronounced were the self-congratulatory statements of
Trudeau and Sharp concerning the NATO decision-making process.
In February 1970 Trudeau indulged indirectly in self-
glorification by boasting that the Government's decision was
taken against the advice of many including the parliamentary
261Committee and the public opinion. In November 1971 Trudeau
was still so much infatuated with this line of argument that he 
repeated and elaborated on it.
We went against the advice of the Parliamentary 
Committee. We went against the advice, I believe, 
even of the Liberal Party itself. And we went against 
the Gallup Polls at the time - I'm not sure about the 
Liberal Party, but certainly the Gallup Polls. We 
went against public opinion, we did it ....262
And, Trudeau might have added: "W7e went against the advice of
the responsible Ministers and their departments and against the 
advice of our allies".
Much later in May 1973 the External Affairs Minister,
M. Sharp, retaliated: "Looking back five years I am free to
admit that we in the Government were a bit ham-handed in the way 
we handled the NATO issue but it was fortunate that we made our 
mistakes early and had time to profit from them". And:
In the end we reached a reasonable and acceptable 
decision to continue in NATO but to reduce the numbers 
of our troops in Europe.
In retrospect it would have been preferable to 
have given an early indication of the government's 
thinking - a sense of direction - and to have avoided 
the impression of division and inactivity. To put the 
matter bluntly, we should have reached agreement in 
Cabinet, at least in principle, before seeking the
261 Transcript of Question and Answer Period for Programme 
"Under Attack" recorded at Carleton University, Ottawa,
24 February 197C.
Transcript of Prime Minister's remarks at meeting with 
students, Lambton Central Collegiate, Pet.rolia, Ontario,
10 November 1971, p.14.
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reaction of the public. This, I suggest, is basic 
to our form of responsible government in a 
parliamentary democracy. 3
When asked directly in an interview whether this 'agreement' had
been achieved on 3 April, Sharp answered: "more or less".
As already mentioned, NATO opponent and Cabinet member Donald
2 6 SMacdonald was even more specific indicating the affirmative.
Concerning the substance of the NATO decision the Canadian 
Government even to this day is suffering from its repercussions. 
The question of equipment for the reduced Canadian forces is 
still undecided; in this the Government failed to follow the 
advice of the responsible parliamentary Committee which had 
already argued in 1969, as we have seen, that preparations 
should be taken in dealing with this question.
Concerning the basic political decision to maintain troops
in Europe, however, little can be expected in the foreseeable
future. It is ironic that the Trudeau Government now sees a
greater link between NATO policy and the problem of foreign
trade than it did when the decision was made. Eric Downton from
the Far Eastern Economic Review noted that in 1974 Pierre E.
Trudeau "... beset by domestic problems of inflation, recession
and an election ... made a special effort in Europe. He went
on a peace-mending mission to Paris, pushed Canada's case for
a more favourable agreement with the European Economic Community
and reassured his NATO partners that he had no intention of
266reducing Canada's contribution to the alliance". And Downton
concluded:
Statement of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
Notes for an address by the Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, to the Annual Meeting 
of the Canadian Press, 2 May 1973, Toronto, p„2.
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Interview with Mitchell Sharp, Ottawa, 28 May 1973. 
Interview with Donald Macdonald, Ottawa, 3 June 1973.
E. Downton, 'The Key in Asia: Trade, Aid", Supplement to
Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 December 1974, p.4.
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... Trudeau's well-nigh fruitless visit to Europe . .., 
a trip intended to obtain more favourable trading 
terms from the EEC, came as a sharp reminder to Ottawa 
of how much trade with Japan means to Canada.^67
It was also a reminder of the importance, at least economically, 
of avoiding riding rough shod over allies with long memories.
A year later, again, Trudeau demonstrated that he had 
learned some diplomatic lessons. In September 1975, when U.S. 
Secretary of Defence A. Schlesinger requested "a more aggressive 
[Canadian] role in NATO", the Prime Minister, while avoiding
268commitments, in Schlesinger's words, reacted "sympathetically".
An Assessment of Influence: A Critique of Thordarson's Argument
It is always difficult to assess influences on a political 
decision. This NATO decision is no exception. It must first 
be determined what is the most important aspect of the various 
decisions relating to NATO. The following should be considered:
1. the decision to alter the status quo;
2. the decision not to become a neutral nation;
3. the decision to remain in NATO;
4. the decision to keep troops in Europe;
5. the vague decision for a planned and phased 
reduction of Canada's force in Europe;
6. the more concrete decision to reduce the troops 
by about a half;
7. the decision to give some of the remaining troops 
different military roles;
8. the decision that defence policy was supposed to 
flow out of foreign policy;
267 TU ' A cIbtd., p.5.
^  Australian, 18 September 1975.
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9. the decision, as some interpreted it, that NATO
ranked only third after the protection of Canadian 
sovereignty and the defence of North America;
10. the decision to freeze for three years the dollar 
value of the defence budget; and
11. the decision, if indeed there had been an explicit 
decision, concerning the form in which the above 
were made known both to the Canadian public and 
the NATO allies.
The decision or combination of decisions one regards as 
most significant will necessarily shape one's perception of who 
exercised the most decisive influence. For example, the 
decision to keep troops in Europe was probably influenced more 
by the parliamentary Committee (particularly indirect via 
Caucus) than by the otherwise powerful and dominating Trudeau.
In contrast, the decision not to maintain the status quo can be 
clearly attributed to the Prime Minister himself. The decision 
that defence policy should flow from foreign policy and the 
presumptive decision that NATO only ranks third in Canada's 
priorities could also be attributed to the academically-minded 
Trudeau.
Here special attention must be given to the work of Bruce 
Thordarson, who in his path-breaking work has consistently 
overestimated the role of the Prime Minister. Thordarson's 
investigation has hitherto been the definitive study on the NATO 
decision and as a result any subsequent effort must take his 
arguments into careful account. Closely linked to Thordarson's 
overestimation of Trudeau's role is his downplaying of the 
influence of financial constraints. Even where Thordarson does 
recognise financial restraints his description of how they work 
is not bolstered by adequate data.
There is no evidence whatsoever that the "most significant 
part of the 3 April statement was the announcement of the 
Government's new defence priorities, based on the concentric- 
circle principle that money would be provided for low-priority
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activities only after those of high priority had been adequately 
269financed". At least not in the sense implied by Thordarson
that funds for the fulfilment of the NATO commitments would only
be granted if the surveillance of the Canadian territory and the
defence of North America had been 'adequately' financed.
Thordarson himself declines to footnote his assertions linking
Trudeau's theoretical rationalisations concerning foreign and
27 0defence policy with concrete budgetary policy.
In general, Thordarson's approach which focuses on
Trudeau's perceptions and beliefs grossly overstates the
271importance of the Prime Minister. This critique still stands
although Thordarson calls the NATO decision a 'compromise' and 
although he mentions other factors - for example, the influence 
of the parliamentary External Affairs and Defence Committee via 
Caucus. Thordarson's overestimation of Trudeau's role in the 
NATO decision is furthermore underlined by his failure to point 
out that a total military withdrawal from Europe would have been 
a more faithful reflection of Trudeau's idiosyncrasies, 
perceptions, philosophical beliefs or images if these indeed 
had been so dominant in the decision.
This concentration on Trudeau's beliefs, in my opinion,
leads to Thordarson's major mistake - his underestimation of
economic factors. Thordarson notes: "If financial
considerations played an important role in the Government's
decision, it was not apparent from the Prime Minister's 
272comments". “ Even if true, the mere failure of Trudeau to cite
B. Thordarson, op.cit., p.139.
270 Ironically, although Thordarson generally neglects economic 
factors, here he seizes upon financial priorities without 
providing any supporting evidence.
271 In this regard Thordarson is heavily influenced by the 
theoretical framework of Brecher, Stein and Steinberg, a 
framework which he used only in a rudimentary fashion. For a 
systematic critique of the Brecher framework see: G, Patz,
Brecher and Beyond, paper presented to the Department of 
International Relations, A.N.U., Canberra, March 1975.
272 B. Thordarson, op,cit,, p.146.
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financial reasons would hardly be evidence of their absence.
In any case Trudeau does mention financial considerations. 
Admittedly the Prime Minister never cites budget figures 
publicly as the dominating factor but, as we have seen, he does 
note repeatedly that since the founding of NATO Europe’s 
financial condition had considerably strengthened while Canada's 
had considerably declined.
Sometimes Thordarson himself does not totally overlook 
economic and budgetary considerations. When he does, however, 
these are generally counter-balanced by opposing interpretations 
which are usually dominant. For example, Thordarson states:
One thing is clear, however, the Government did 
decide to freeze the dollar value of the Canadian 
defence budget for at least the next few years and 
those who shaped Canada's defence policy would have 
to keep this limitation very much in mind.^73
But Thordarson then distinguishes between 'in the short run' and
'in the long run', arguing that in the short run financial
considerations hardly played any role. Thordarson's definition
of the long run, however, where he does admit some influence for
financial considerations, is only for a period of three years 
274up to 1972 - that is the period which was the object of
debate in 1968-69.
A similar method of argumentation on a critical point is
used by Thordarson in a footnote when he admits that "financial
considerations dictated some of the tactical changes associated
27 5with the new defence posture". But then he concludes:
Once Canada's main national interest was defined as 
'national identity and independence' rather than 
peace and security, it was inevitable that NATO would 
be accorded a lower priority in Canada’s defence 
policy than formerly. It was this new 'philosophy of 
defence' (to use Mr Trudeau’s expression of 3 April),
273
274
B. Thordarson, 
Ibid.
op.cit., p. 14 6.
275 Ibid.
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not financial considerations, that determined the 
money that would be made available for Canada's 
various military roles and the priorities given
to them.
This view, however, ignores the fact that about 400 million 
dollars over the next few years were at issue and every 
politician involved in the decision was well aware of this.
This is not to argue that Canada would have been incapable of 
financing an increased defence budget if it had been refereed 
as absolutely essential nor is it to deny that perceptions of 
the international situation in the era of detente were a strong 
factor working not only against an increase in defence spending 
but also against the status quo concerning Canada's commitments. 
This factor is particularly influential in Canada where the 
general idealism towards foreign policy militates against 
defence spending. Nevertheless there are a number of reasons 
why financial constraints were especially important.
At the most general level, budgetary considerations lie at 
the heart of politics in Western democracies; specifically in 
Canada, at a time of shrinking resources, defence spending had 
to be seen in terms of alternative spending on domestic 
programmes, and politicians feared an electoral backlash if 
domestic needs were not met. Moreover, from the point of view 
of individual Cabinet members dramatically increased defence 
spending, or even increases at the same rate as domestic 
spending, potentially could have come at the expense of the 
departments of any minister and therefore at the expense of the 
minister's power.
Finally, as Trudeau himself noted, Canada's peculiar 
strategic relationship to the US which virtually guaranteed 
American defence of her northern neighbour considerably eased 
security problems and thereby increased the leverage of domestic 
claimants on the Canadian treasury. Thus even granted that 
Trudeau's philosophically-based desire for a change on Canada's 
foreign policy played a significant role, financial
276 Ibid.
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considerations - and also the strategic facts of life - were a 
major factor in convincing some NATO supporters of the necessity 
for reaching a compromise with the Prime Minister. Trudeau, for 
his part, had his philosophical biases reinforced by the 
financial situation, but he too was forced to compromise - in 
his case because of a threat of a Cabinet and/or party split.
To argue that Trudeau's role was the decisive factor would 
require a scenario whereby the Prime Minister all along sought 
only a withdrawal of one half of Canada's forces from Europe, 
but in order to achieve this he deliberately 'stimulated' public 
and party debate by making it appear he favoured total 
withdrawal. This would have meant not only that Trudeau had 
conned friends and opponents alike but that he was one of the 
most successful strategists in the history of Western 
parliamentary democracies.
Even Thordarson argues that the NATO decision was a 
compromise undertaken to prevent the fragmentation of Cabinet 
and party. I would argue that the parliamentary Committee 
directly and indirectly participated in this compromise.
277As Thordarson himself states this influence was
primarily exercised via Caucus. In addition, the Committee
exercised direct influence by articulating the overwhelming
opinion in Parliament that no drastic change of policy was
tolerable. It seems unlikely that, after extensive debate had
27 8produced a bipartisan consensus in the Committee, Cabinet 
could totally ignore such a relatively rare consensus. It is 
undeniable, however, that the indirect role was more 
significant. Committee members were naturally mere familiar 
with the substance of the issue than other Caucus members and, 
indeed, than most Cabinet members.
Furthermore, Committee members had particular confidence 
in their own opinions due to their exposure to the views of
277 B. Thordarson, op.cit,, p.150.
27 8 Representing Parliament.
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allied parliamentarians, governments and bureaucracies. This 
certitude on the part of Committee members undoubtedly 
influenced wavering Caucus members, as well as other politicians, 
v/ho were impressed with the authoritative knowledge of the 
Committee members - the possession of Herrschaftswissen which 
is normally confined to the Government.
Thordarson came to the conclusion that the parliamentary
Committee's influence was greater than that of the responsible
Government departments, External Affairs and Defence. This is
correct, but it does not take into account that, as we have
seen, the Committee's views had been heavily influenced by
External Affairs and Defence officials. While 15 of 18
politicians interviewed believed that the Committee's influence
was overwhelmingly decisive in preventing Trudeau from, obtaining
more radical measures, three - Ministers Sharp, Macdonald and
Trudeau's top adviser Ivan Head - disagreed, but for different
reasons. The results of these interviews are supported by
Bruce Thordarson who cited a Cabinet member saying that the
parliamentary Committee's report tipped in Cabinet "the balance
27 9slightly in favour of staying". The readiness of some
members of Caucus to leave the Liberal Party if a decision to 
withdraw all troops from Europe had been taken, does seem to 
have placed definite limits to the options of Cabinet.
The influence of the parliamentary Committee, therefore, 
did not consist of obtaining Government approval of a Committee 
report but rather of the determination of Liberal members to 
prevent a more radical Government decision.
It is not surprising, however, in this case study that 
the parliamentary Committee exerted some influence. Once the 
Prime Minister had made it clear that he rejected the advice cf 
External Affairs and Defence, the Prime Minister sought out 
other advice which he hoped would be more congruent with his 
preconceptions. Trudeau succeeded with Ivan Head's report but
279 B. Thordarson, op.cit.r p.152.
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not with that of the parliamentary Committee. Once the
Committee’s opinion had been formulated, however, the Prime
28 0Minister could not totally neutralise its effect.
It is thus more surprising that the Committee did not have
even greater influence. Thordarson's short description of the
Caucus discussion indicates that "the great weight of opinion
in the party was in favour of continuing a strong relationship 
281with NATO". On the one hand this is confirmed by interviews
with several Caucus members; on the other hand these interviews 
revealed that there was some pressure for withdrawal not only 
from Europe but from NORAD and NATO as well. Furthermore one 
must recall that Wahn's tactics in producing the report had the 
actual effect of making the report more conservative than some 
Liberal members might have wished.
The Chairman's behaviour not only had the effect of 
unwittingly strengthening the position of NATO supporters 
however. Within the influential Ontario Liberal branch Wahn 
was more skilful. Moreover, because of his excellent contacts 
within the press corps Wahn obtained wide publicity for his 
views. It is also possible that Wahn's 'confidential and 
personal' letter to the Prime Minister, whether or not it was 
discussed in Cabinet, might have limited the impact of the 
Committee's report, at least with Trudeau.
In conclusion, one can say that from the outset the 
Committee's potential to influence the decision was quite great, 
but the fact that the Committee's Chairman was actively opposing 
the Committee report to a certain extent undermined the 
Committee's impact.
Lest one think that the Committee can have influence only 
when either External Affairs is weak or the opinions of External 
Affairs and the Committee coincide I will later argue that under 
certain circumstances the Committee has a potentially 
independent influence.
B. Thordarson, op.ait., p.151.281
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Generally, it is accepted that the Committee prevented the 
total withdrawal from Europe. One has to keep in mind, however, 
that a strong group in Cabinet also would not have accepted such 
a withdrawal. In my view, one pays just tribute to Trudeau's 
tactical skills and his determination by noting that only the 
combination of a majority of Caucus and a part of Cabinet 
prevented an even more extensive military withdrawal from 
Europe.
Paradoxically, the Committee's influence may have been 
limited precisely because it dealt so extensively with the NATO 
review. The Prime Minister, by pointing to the thoroughness of 
the Committee's work, was able to delay the decision when in 
fact the substance of all other reports clearly favoured the 
commitment in Europe. Neither Donald Macdonald nor Ivan Head 
had at that stage even started their report. This generally 
overlooked factor of timing proved extremely significant.
Trudeau could conceivably have found other pretexts for delaying 
the decision but the Committee's work certainly provided a 
convenient and effective excuse.
CONCLUSION
S ome.
As the foregoing analysis has demonstrated the
parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs was an
important factor in shaping the eventual decisions taken by the
Canadian Government on NATO in 1S69. This does not mean,
however, that the Committee functioned as an independent actor
isolated from other, political forces. Indeed, somew{ia?^sfmi 1 nr 
w h a t S/Wtar^ho Phase, tw elve#  th tZpiicde.fcQ the Jaksch-Reporx^/vanous actors outside the
Committee attempted to use it for their own advantage. Thus the 
Opposition sought reference of the NATO question to the 
Committee in order to enhance its ability to affect policy. 
Similarly, when there were divisions within Cabinet, Ministers 
Sharp and Cadieux used the Committee as a platform to articulate 
their pro-NATO views. This did not mean, however, 
undifferentiated support for the Committee as an institution; 
subsequently when all other signs indicated support for his 
position Cadieux was quite willing to bypass the Committee.
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Trudeau in contrast, who had demonstrated little sympathy for 
the role of Parliament in decision-making, suddenly discovered 
the virtue of waiting for the Committee’s report - practically 
declaring the parliamentary report as of greater significance 
than a NATO meeting - when it suited his purpose to delay a 
decision. A final indication of the importance attached to the 
Committee by outsiders was the role of Cadieux's parliamentary 
secretary and possibly that of John Halstead, Head of External 
Affairs, European Division, in drafting the final Committee 
report.
With the adoption of the report by an overwhelming majority 
of the Committee, the Committee became a force in its own right. 
By presenting a clear position with a broad basis of support the 
Committee presented evidence of a strong political configuration 
in favour of the NATO status quo much as the Jaksch-Report had 
manifested evidence of political backing for flexibility towards 
the East. There was a critical difference, however. While the 
Jaksch-Report served to diffuse the Eastern question 
politically, thus allowing new diplomatic initiatives, the 
Standing Committee's Report clashed head on with the strong 
predispositions of the Prime Minister. Thus the Committee 
served to mobilise political forces inhibiting Trudeau from 
attempting a total military withdrawal from Europe. In 
mobilising political support the key arena was Caucus. Here 
the political weight of the Committee's position was enhanced 
not only by the near unanimity of the report but also by 
expertise and self-assurance which the Committee members had 
gained during the course of their deliberations.
What factors contributed to the NATO decisions?
As we have seen one parameter was set by the mood of Caucus 
and the danger of party defections if more drastic changes in 
Canada's NATO policy had been implemented. This attitude in 
turn was bolstered by the international environment; particularly 
that following the invasion of the CSSR in August 1968. In 
addition, the Committee members were impressed with the views 
expressed by Canada's NATO allies, especially during their fact-
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finding mission in Europe. These considerations, it should be 
noted, also affected key members of Cabinet - most notably 
Cadieux and possibly Sharp. Thus the constraint on Trudeau was 
not simply possible defections within Caucus but also within 
Cabinet.
While the above considerations served to limit changes in 
NATO policy two forces can be identified which militated against 
maintenance of the status quo. First, the strong commitment of 
the Prime Minister to change; and secondly, financial pressures 
which argued for reductions in Canadian defence spending in 
Europe.
Given the weight attached to the Committee's role in the 
above analyses, it is appropriate to ask what factors apart from 
the implicit threat of defections within the Liberal Party 
contributed to the Committee's influence. First, the recent 
commitment of the Government to enhance the role of parliamentary 
committees created both a need for responsiveness on the part 
of the Government and an assertiveness on the part of Committee 
members. Moreover, the Committee was bolstered by the creation 
in 1968 of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and 
Foreign Trade which provided the Committee members with 
information and advice. The role of the Centre was demonstrated 
by the involvement of the Director, Peter Dobell, in the 
drafting of the Committee Report. The significance of ehe 
Centre was further demonstrated by the enthusiasm and interest 
with which the Committee members utilised the resources made 
available to them. In contrast to the Australian case where a 
lack of interest on the part of most Committee members was 
striking in this case the intense commitment of the Committee 
members, especially in Caucus, clearly enhanced their impact on 
the decision. This impact was all the more striking because the 
Committee members lacked high-ranking positions in their 
respective party hierarchies.
As in all previous cases where significant Committee 
influence was exerted here too a high degree of consensus was 
developed within the Committee. How did this pro-NATO consensus 
come about?
218
This is a particularly interesting question when we realise 
that initially there was a contrary view shared by leaders of 
both Government and Opposition that some changes in Canada's 
NATO role were acceptable. While following the CSSR crisis and 
persistent provocative remarks by Trudeau this shared view was 
fractured on the floor of the House, within the Committee a 
non-partisan atmosphere prevailed. Several reasons can be given 
for this atmosphere conducive to integrative politics. First, 
there were no major electoral benefits perceived in the issue.
Not only had foreign policy played a minor role in the recent 
Federal election but new Federal elections were years away. In 
contrast to the floor of the House where Trudeau's posture 
virtually forced Opposition attacks, within the Committee the 
strongest proponent of the anti-NATO position, Committee 
Chairman Wahn, acted according to the norms of integrative 
politics in his various unsuccessful attempts to build a 
consensus for his view. Second, in contrast to the atmosphere 
on the floor of the House there had been created a sense of 
special responsibility in the foreign affairs sphere which stood 
above partisanship. This non-partisan attitude was partially 
inculcated by the activities of Dobell's Parliamentary Centre, 
partially by the exceptional working conditions of the Committee, 
such as the trip to Europe, and partially by the sense of self- 
importance engendered by the nearly luxurious environment 
afforded Canadian Members of Parliament. Finally, a crucial 
support for non-partisanship within the Committee is the larger 
context of Canadian politics where the major parties are rarely 
polarised on philosophical issues.
CHAPTER SIX
INFLUENCE WITHOUT POLITICAL POWER:
THE CANADIAN SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
AND THE WEST INDIAN SUGAR REBATE
In January 1970^ the Canadian Government decided to rescind
the sugar rebate which it had undertaken to pay the West Indian
Governments at the Commonwealth-Caribbean Conference in 1966."
Within six months Canada backtracked from this position and
3announced that the rebate would be paid for 1970. In December 
the Canadian Government retreated even further from this 
decision and extended the rebate for an additional calendar year. 
What accounts for this dramatic turnabout?
Many participants in, and close observers of, the decisions 
have concluded that the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee was as 
influential in the matter as any Canadian parliamentary Committee 
had ever been in foreign policy. What is particularly striking 
is that the influence of the Senate Committee in this case was 
even more clear-cut than that of the Commons Committee in the 
NATO decisions. While the Senate Committee shared with the 
Commons Committee the right to investigate any issue of their 
choosing and make recommendations to the Government, in political 
terms the Senate body would be expected to be far weaker. The 
fundamental reason for this is that the Senate consisted of 
members appointed by the Government for terms up to the age o::
75. As these members were not periodically answerable to the
Ottawa Citizen, 6 October 1970; Interview with the Minister 
for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, Ottawa, 28 May 1973.
2 ’Canadian Government Proposal on Sugar’, Annex ’B’ in: Canada,
Department of External Affairs, Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada. 
ConferenceOttawa3 6-8 July, p.119; see also: 'Report by the
Chairman of the Trade Committee', Annex 'A' in: Canada,
Department of External Affairs, Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada 
Conference> Ottawa3 6-8 July 1966, p.115. (Hereafter all
sources used in this chapter, unless otherwise stated, refer to 
Canadian sources.)
 ^Ottawa Citizen, 25 June 1970.
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people and their party, a strong tradition of a non-assertive 
Senate developed in Canada. Thus the centre of parliamentary 
politics was in the elected House of Commons while by convention 
the Senate's role was, with rare exceptions, limited to one of 
discussion and minor amendments to legislation. If this 
situation applied to domestic policy then it is even more 
surprising that a parliamentary Committee could play a critical 
role in reversing foreign policy which in theory is the sole 
prerogative of the Government.
Canadian-West Indian Relations, 1966-1970: Problems, Promises
and Frustrations
In 1966 an effort was made to overcome some major problems 
in Canadian-West Indian relations - most notably that of sugar. 
The 1966 Conference between the leaders of 13 Caribbean4countries and Canada as well as the Minister of Natural 
Resources and Trade of British Honduras established a trade 
committee which had paid "considerable attention to the problems 
faced by the Commonwealth Caribbean sugar producers in their5sales of sugar to Canada" . The Canadian Government subsequent..;/ 
adopted the report by the Chairman of that Committee and made 
it the basis for a unilateral proposal on sugar. The Government 
unilaterally suggested abolishing 29£ per cwt. tariff for a 
quantity of raw sugar equal to the average of imports over the 
previous five years. Furthermore the Canadian Government 
promised to use its influence with Canadian sugar refiners to 
see that the amount of the tariff free quota would in fact be 
taken up.^
4 Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Canada, Dominica, Grenada, Guyane, 
Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Mevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago.
5 'Report by the Chairman of the Trade Committee', Annex 'A' in: 
Department of External Affairs, Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada 
Conference, Ottawa, 6-8 July 1966, p.115.g
'Canadian Government Proposal on Sugar', Annex 'B' in: 
Department of External Affairs, Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada. 
Conference, Ottawa, 6-8 July 1966, p.119.
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For technical and legal reasons in 1S67 the proposal was
altered to retain the 29C tariff but to rebate the amount
collected to the West Indian Governments. The West Indian
Governments, however, while appreciating the Canadian gesture
of effectively removing the tariff impediment, did not regard7this as adequate. The Jamaican Prime Minister, J.L. Shearer, 
after lengthy talks with Canadian officials, including Prime 
Minister Lester Pearson, Finance Minister Mitchell Sharp and 
Industry Minister C.M. Drury, told a press conference in Ottawa 
in August 1967 that Canada paid $6 million less a year forgJamaican sugar than it costs to produce. In order to offset 
the situation created by the extremely low world sugar price 
in 1966-67 the West Indian Governments made two additional 
requests:
1. Canadian support for West Indian demands for a 
new international sugar agreement;
2. A doubling of the price which Canada paid for9raw sugar to 4 cents a pound.
The Pearson Government promised to fully support the West
10Indian demand concerning the International Sugar Agreement 
and, failing such an agreement, it would seek satisfactory 
bilateral arrangements concerning better sugar prices.^
A year earlier, in November 1966, Jamaica had complained
that Canada was buying sugar from the West Indies at depressed
world market prices while at the same time increasing prices on-
export goods, such as salted codfish, which is the favourite
12dish among West Indian lower classes.
Globe and Mail, 3 August 1967.
8 Ibid.
 ^Ibid.
10 Ibid.
^  Ottawa Citizen, 6 September 1958. 
12 Financial Post, 26 November 1966.
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And a year later, after the new Trudeau Cabinet had come
to power, the Jamaican Prime Minister again visited Ottawa and
again urged Canada to buy more sugar at better prices. Agdiin
after lengthy talks with the new Prime Minister and several
Ministers, both sides agreed that Canada as well as the West
Indies would press for an international price agreement when
the sugar talks would resume at the end of September in Geneva.
The Trudeau Government assured the Jamaican Prime Minister that
it stood behind the Pearson promise and again promised a
bilateral improvement of prices in case no international
13agreement could be reached. This time, however, Jamaican 
Prime Minister Shearer was not content with Government promises 
and forcefully spoke out in public causing the Globe and Mail
to comment that the Jamaican leader was "unusually outspoken
14and blunt ... for a visiting head of government". Shearer 
warned that Canada's failure to improve prices had a ruinous 
effect on Jamaica's economy and that this might in future15endanger the relations between the two countries.
A week later, Barbados' Prime Minister, Evrol W. Barraw, 
took the unusual step of criticising Canada while on an official 
visit to a third country, the United States of America. Canada 
was 'taking unfair advantage' of his country in the purchase of 
raw sugar under the Commonwealth preference agreement, whereas 
the Americans were paying a higher price for sugar than the 
world price: "Our real problem is Canada". Asked what Barbados 
was going to do about that situation he laughed and said:
"We're arguing".^
Another year later, in November 1969, the situation 
concerning West Indian sugar exports had not improved 
significantly. Admittedly, an International Sugar Agreement,
13 Globe and Mail, 6 September 1968; Ottawa Citizen, 6 September 
1968.
^  Globe and. Mail, 7 September 1968.
15 Ibid.
16 Toronto Telegram, 13 September 1968.
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for which Canada had worked, had been signed in Geneva in
October 1968, and in addition there were Commonwealth trading
preferences and tariff rebates, but Canada still paid only
$3.60 Canadian per hundred pounds of raw sugar, compared to
17$5.45 Canadian by Britain and even $7.80 by the US.
Subsequently, External Affairs Minister Sharp admitted to the 
Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee that progress in the sugar 
question was considerably less than many had hoped during the 
Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada Conference three years 
previously.®
From the above it is clear that sugar was a major stumbling
block in Canadian-West Indian relations and that it was one of
the key reasons for which the Senate Committee launched an
19investigation into those relations. This investigation was 
launched in 1969 before sugar became an obvious issue of 
dispute, but by 1970 events had conspired to place the rebate 
question at the centre of Canadian-West Indian relations. As 
a result the Committee's deliberations began to focus on sugar 
but they still maintained a concern with a variety of other 
problems such as tariff, trade and investment. This type of 
problem was common to relations between developed and developing 
countries but in Canada's case it gained a particular poignancy 
because of the country's self-image concerning foreign relations.
Canada's public opinion leaders, particularly academics and 
journalists, but also parliamentarians of all parties in both 
Houses, accepted the proposition that foreign aid could and 
should deal effectively with the problems of developing 
countries. These people were also sensitive to charges of
20colonial and racist attitudes in dealings with such countries.*''
^  Globe and Mail, 24 November 1969.
1 o
Globe and Mail, 20 November 1969.
19 Interview with Senator Gros^art, Ottawa, 22 May 1973;
Interview with Peter Dobell, Ottawa, 3 June 1973.
2 0 This impression is based on a reading of articles by accidemics 
and journalists as well as the Minutes of the Senate's Foreign 
Affairs Committee. See for example the articles and newspapers 
cited in the following pages.
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This sensitivity was heightened when anti-Canadian demonstrations 
and violence broke out in the West Indies. The press gave 
considerable attention to both developments, thus publicising 
the Canadian-West Indian problems and indirectly pressuring the 
Government for action.
Joint plans for a Canadian/Caribbean shipping line which
had been suggested at the 1966 Conference had not gone further21than the first report stage. West Indian complaints that
Canadian aid projects took too long to be implemented and that
communications between the West Indian Governments and the
Canadian Government were too complicated began to appear in the
press. West Indian requests for projects for example had to be
sent via the Canadian trade consulate in Port of Spain - an
office that had not been set up to handle such matters and which
consequently had no executive authority - acting purely as a
post-office. Thus Ottawa repeatedly asked questions concerning
planned projects which could easily have been answered if there
22had been experts stationed in the Islands.
Furthermore, even in the field of education where aid
projects were efficiently implemented, the results were often
problematical if not counterproductive. West Indians educated
in Canada tended to stay there rather than return home, thus
23contributing to the Islands’ ’brain-drain’. William Demas, 
Trinidad's chief planner, consequently told the Senate’s Foreign 
Affairs Committee that stopping that exodus was probably more 
important than receiving foreign aid.
West Indian requests for tariff cuts and for a greater
25share in the Canadian market had already been raised in 1967. 
Furthermore, general problems of Canadian investment in the West
Globe and Mail, 24 November 1969; Ottawa Journal, 22 April 
1970.
22 Toronto Telegram, 24 December 1969.
See Globe and Mail, 14 March 1970. 
Ottawa Citizen, 26 March 1970. 
Ottawa Citizen, 4 November 1967.
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Indies were highlighted and brought to public attention by the
deliberations of the Committee. The profitable bauxite and oil
industries were solely controlled by Canadian and American
commercial interests, a situation which applied as well for the
banks, tourist industry and land development. It was estimated
by some academics, for example, that from a dollar's worth of
finished aluminium the contribution to the gross domestic
product of Guyana and Jamaica was 17C whereas the remaining 83C
2 6went to Canada or the US.
More generally it became clear that a large portion of
profits found their way back to Canada and very little was used
for reinvestment in the West Indies. Precisely how much was
taken out of the West Indies as profits was never revealed;
Senator Grosfcart for example claimed the Committee was
frustrated for over a year in its efforts to obtain verifiable
statistics on the total Canadian investment and the total
profits removed. The Committee also heard of gigantic profit
margins realised in developing countries such as the West Indies
and dealt with complaints of virtual West Indian slavery since
the sources of wealth were white and foreign and the sources of
27labour local, black and cheap.
The general problems of investment were particularly severe 
in the fields of tourism and land development. The extent of 
the problems is indicated by the fact that Canadian tourists and 
temporary residents imported even their food from North America.
In addition further tensions arose out of the interactions 
between Canadians and the local population:
1. Patronising and degrading behaviour on the part of 
Canadians towards West Indians, particularly those 
hired as cheap domestic labour.
Globe and Mail, 24 November 1969.
^  Globe and Mail, 14 March 1970; Toronto Star, 14 March 1970; 
Ottawa Citizen, 26 March 1970; James Eayrs, 'Canada's Caribbean' 
(Part I and II) in Montreal Star, 16 March and 17 March 1970.
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2. Incidents growing out of the development of v,"inter 
resorts for Canadians - for example, water 
shortages in mountain villages due to Canadians 
watering lawns and filling swimming pools.
3. The ramification of 'genital imperialism' resulting
from seasonal treks "of white adventurers (not men
2 8only) looking for a black experience".
In short the difference in life styles between the tourists
and winter-residents on the one hand and the local people on the
other contributed nothing to improve the Canadian/West Indian 
2 9relationship.
The anti-white, anti-colonial sentiments engendered by
such behaviour were further exacerbated by internal economic
problems, particularly bounding birth rates and rising
unemployment, inadequate natural resources and trade 
30imbalances. These economic problems in turn were intensified
by racial problems within West Indian society, i.e. job and
31social discrimination favouring lighter skinned blacks.''
The racial problem was further complicated by tensions 
between West Indian blacks in Canada and white Canadian 
authorities. In 1969 the West Indian students had been involved 
in a computer-wrecking rampage at Sir George Williams University 
in Montreal; in March 1970 seven of them were found guilty by a 
Montreal jury and fined a total of $32,500. This sum was
James Eayrs, 'Canada's Caribbean' in Montreal Star, 17 March 
1970.
29 On these problems see: Globe and Mail, 3 August 1967;
Stuart B. Philpott, 'The deep troubles that spark W7est-Indian 
violence' in Toronto Star, 14 March 1970; James Eayrs,
'Canada's Caribbean' in Montreal Star, 17 March 1970; Ottawa 
Citizen, 26 March 1970; Toronto Telegram, 4 April 1970; Ottawa 
Journal, 6 June 1970.
30 Halifax Chronicle Herald, 25 May 1970; Ottawa Journal,
6 June 1970.
31 Stuart B. Philpott, op.cit.j James Eayrs, op.cit.
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subsequently paid by the Trinidad Government in a successful 
effort to take the steam out of a series of demonstrations during 
which three Canadian banks had been fire bombed. The violence 
had grown out of protests organised by the Black-Power movement 
not only against Canadian racism, exploitation and foreign 
ownership but also against the local Government, the church and 
West Indian social conditions in general.
In particular the Black-Power movement was demanding
nationalisation of foreign-owned industry, an objective which
32ensured wide-spread press coverage in Canada. Later in the
year cautious steps were undertaken by Commonwealth Caribbean
33Governments in response to 'popular demand' to pursue a policy 
of quasi-nationalisation of successful foreign businesses which 
took more out of the West Indies than they put into the local 
economies.
Although the explosiveness was drained from many of these 
issues within a short period, at least for the Canadians, they 
nevertheless came to a head at the precise time when the 
Canadian Government was cancelling the sugar rebate and, 
moreover, when the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee was 
embarking on its study on relations to the West Indies.
The Anatomy of the Sugar Decisions
Although the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee was examining
Canadian/Caribbean relations in 1969, the question of sugar did
not figure in initial discussions. This absence was first and
foremost the result of the Committee's decision to deal with
35this subject at the later stage of their deliberations. This 
decision turned out to be convenient because events critical for
Toronto Star, 14 March 1970; Toronto Telegram, 4 April 1970; 
Halifax Chronicle Herald, 25 May 1970; Toronto Star, 16 March 
1970; Globe and Mail, 16 March 1970; Globe and Mail, 11 March 
1970.
^  Globe and Mail, 5 August 1970.
34 Ibid,] see also Winnipeg Free Press, 27 August 1970.
35 Interview with Peter Dobell, Ottawa, 3 June 1973.
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the sugar issue did not develop until 1970. Thus as late as
December 1969, when External Affairs Minister Sharp testified
before the Committee, this issue was not raised by either the
Minister or the Committee. However, the other problems of
Canadian/West Indian relations which had been or would be raised
3 6by the Committee, although already the subject of some press
comment, were to receive much more searching scrutiny once the
sugar issue came to a head in 1970. Indeed, nearly all press
reports dealing with the problems discussed in the pr$ce$ding
section made specific reference to the Committee's deliberations.
Furthermore it is likely that the comprehensive information on
these problems of Canadian/Caribbean relations would not have
come available to the press in such detail without the Senate
Committee's proceedings. Although, as we shall see, the
Department of External Affairs held similar views to the
Committee on the sugar question it had failed to push those
views energetically and successfully until the Senate Committee
issued its report. Indeed, it was the sluggish response of
External Affairs to the matters raised at the 1966 Commonwealth
Caribbean Conference which had significantly contributed to the
problems. The Conference undertakings had not been put into
effect fully and premonitions that such inaction might even lead
to violence in the West Indies were ignored. As a result,
several Senators and the Committee's adviser Peter Dobell
37decided to launch the parliamentary inquiry. This context 
must be borne in mind when evaluating Foreign Affairs' role in 
the 1970 decisions and Minister Sharp's account of his actions 
in Cabinet.
See specifically: Senate of Canada, 'Proceedings of the
Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Respecting the 
Caribbean Area', No. 6, 19 February 1970; No. 7, 25 February 
1970; No. 8, 3 March 1970; No. 9, 17 March 1970; and No. 11, 
21 April 1970.
37 Interview with Senator Grosfart, Ottawa, 22 May 1973; 
Interview with Peter Dobell, Ottawa, 3 June 1973.
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It was revealed to the public only in October 1970 that the 
initial decision to cancel the sugar rebate was made in January 
1970^ "among a 1,000 things"^ and caught External Affairs 
Minister Sharp by surprise.^
Most ministers, probably fearing cuts in their own budgets,
41agreed that the subsidy should be withdrawn. "I did protest
during that meeting", Sharp commented later on, "but I must
admit I wasn't aware of just how explosive the issue would 
42become". The West Indian Governments, though not consulted
before the decision, were informed immediately after it was 
4 3taken, and, in the words of Senator Martin, "they raised hell,
44especially the Jamaicans".^" The West Indian Governments not
only 'raised hell' within normal inter-Government channels, but
once this objection had failed and the Canadian decision had
been made public, the West Indians adopted unconventional
tactics and indirectly threatened retaliatory action against
45Canadian investments in the Islands. Both when Sharp announced 
the cancellation of the rebate on 17 April 1970 and when he 
subsequently defended the action in Parliament,^  there was no 
public indication of intra-Governmental differences on this
Ottawa Citizen, 6 October 1970.
39 Interview with Senator Paul Martin, Ottawa, 29 May 1973.
40 Interview with the Minister for External Affairs M. Sharp, 
Ottawa, 28 May 1973.
41 This possibility was mentioned by Senator Paul Martin in an 
interview, Ottawa, 29 May 1973.
42 Interview with the Minister of External Affairs M. Sharp, 
Ottawa, 28 May 1973.
^  Ottawa Citizen, 6 October 1970.
44 Interview with Senator Paul Martin, Ottawa, 29 May 1973.
4 5 Ottawa Journal, 22 April 1970.
^  Debates, 22 April 1970, pp.6162-63; Debates, 23 April 1970, 
pp.6195-96; Globe and Mail, 23 April 1970.
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question; frictions with the West Indian Governments, however, 
were revealed to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee only 24 
hours after Sharp's April statement.
The April Announcement and Critical Testimony Before the Senate 
Foreign Affairs Committee
The sugar rebates paid to West Indian Governments amounted
to one million Canadian dollars annually and had been in effect
for the previous three years. According to Canadian Government
plans a five million dollar agricultural development fund would
replace the sugar rebate; this fund, however, was little
consolation for the Commonwealth Caribbean Governments since
the money was to go largely to projects of development and thus
to private sources and not to the public treasury. In
explaining its decision the Canadian Government argued that the
International Sugar Agreement of 1969 had created increased and
more stable sugar prices on the world market, thus making the
47rebate system unnecessary. Sharp, however, not only explained
and defended the cancellation of the sugar rebate but denied any
link between Canada's policy and the riots which had just broken
out in Trinidad. In response to Opposition questions in the
House concerning the sugar rebate and the disorders in 
4 8Trinidad, External Affairs Minister Sharp oversimplified the 
issue and stated categorically:
... the troubles that are taking place in Trinidad are 
not related specifically to Canada. There is no 
evidence of this whatsoever.^ 9
The day before, however, Jamaican-born George Eaton, 
Professor of Economics and Director of the Division of 
Professional Studies in Atkinson College, York University, 
testified before the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign 
Affairs: "... At the moment there is stronger resentment and
47 Globe and Mail, 23 April 1970.
^  Debates, 22 April 1970, p.6162.
49 Ibid.
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hostility to Canada as a power than against any other power
that I know of in recent years. This is a very recent turn
arising out of developments in the sugar industry". Eaton
presented to the Committee a resolution passed by the Caribbean
Governments a few days earlier which voiced strong disapproval
of Canada’s action - an action which was taken unilaterally
without consultation with the Caribbean Governments. Caribbean
reaction so far had not reached the public and particularly the
Canadian press. Eaton did not merely publicise the resolution
of the West Indian Governments however. He further drew
attention to a detailed listing of Canadian investment in the
West Indies by the resolution in such a manner as to imply a
threat to those investments, thereby guaranteeing all the more
51publicity in the Canadian press.
Eaton explained the intensity of the West Indian reaction 
to the cancellation of the sugar rebate in terms of growing 
resentment over many years concerning the overall Canadian 
position on sugar. Eaton brought to the attention of the 
Canadian public that, on the one hand, since the Commonwealth 
sugar agreement in 1948, the Caribbean producers were obliged 
to meet a specific Canadian quota for sugar, while on the other 
hand Canadian sugar importers were never obliged to take up this 
quota. Indeed, Eaton continued, whenever the world price was 
relatively high, Canada’s sugar importers bought cheaper sugar 
from South Africa, but they were, however, quite anxious to 
accept the whole quota whenever the world market price had 
fallen to very minimal levels - thus forcing the Caribbeans to
Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Committee or. 
Foreign Affairs Respecting the Caribbean Area, 21 April 1970, 
p. 11.
51 Ibid.', Ottawa Journal, 22 April 1970; Toronto Star, 22 April 
1970.
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5 °sell sugar at prices which did not even cover production cost' 
and preventing the sale of that amount at higher prices to the
us.53
While Canada could not be blamed for low world sugar 
prices, nevertheless the Canadian Government did not take 
measures which had been implemented by other countries to assist 
the West Indian sugar producers - for example, by creating a 
central purchasing agency which bought raw sugar at above world 
market prices in order to further long-term relations with the 
West Indies. Indeed, not only did Canada not take such measures 
but also she cancelled, without consultation, the inadequate, 
in West Indian eyes, rebate arrangements which had existed since 
1967.
The Opposition in the House drew on Eaton's testimony 
before the Committee to attack the Government on two grounds:
1. The cancellation of the sugar rebate occurred 
without consultation wTith the West Indian 
Governments.
2. The West Indian Governments were extremely
54dissatisfied with Canada's action.
Ironically, the Minister for External Affairs now had to counter 
the Opposition's attack, although at the beginning of the year
A The Senate of Canada, Proceedings ..., op,cit,, p.13.
53 Even before Eaton's testimony there was criticism of 
Government and External Affairs policy with the revelation of 
a confidential Government report concerning the implications of 
free trade arrangements with the Commonwealth Caribbean. The 
report's contents became known when the Senate Foreign Affairs 
Committee interviewed its author, Roy Mathews of the Private 
Planning Association of Canada. Although the report came to 
no clear conclusions it was lukewarm concerning the possible 
benefits of a tariff revision. (Globe and Mail, 14 March 
1970.) The skill, of the Committee members in examination, not 
to mention the weakness of Mathew's argument, can be seen from 
the fact that Mathews altered his viewpoint during his testimony 
before the Committee. {Ibid,; see also Ottawa Journal, 6 June 
1970.)
54 Debates, House of Commons, 22 April 1970, pp.5162-63;
Debates, House of Commons, 23 April 1970, pp.6195-96.
233
it had been him who had used similar arguments in Cabinet to 
prevent the Minister of Finance from cancelling the rebate 
system.
The West Indian Visit; the Committee Report, and Subsequent 
Government Decisions
The visit of representatives from the Commonwealth sugar
producing countries, Jamaica, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla and
Barbados, who held talks with External Affairs Minister Sharp
and Trade Minister Pepin, gave the initiative to the Department
of External Affairs whose position had been weakened on this
issue both because of their inadequate handling of West Indian
affairs since 1966 and because the January sugar decision went
against the Minister's recommendation. On this occasion the
Department proceeded with great care. Their representatives,
cautious not to stand in conflict with the Cabinet decision to
5 5cancel the rebates declared on 12 May 1970 that the meeting
had been for information only and that no decision had been
, 56made.
Six weeks after the West Indian visit a new Government 
decision was made. In the interval the Committee's unanimous 
report had been issued. To demonstrate the Committee's skill 
in stating its conclusions and to illuminate some of the 
reasons for its influence it is appropriate to quote at length 
from its report.
Serious misunderstandings have recently arisen, due 
in part to the manner in which the 1966 tariff-rebate 
assistance scheme for sugar was withdrawn. Full 
understanding of this step by the sugar-producing 
countries involved does not appear to have been 
established. In future, full consultation, on a 
political level, should precede any major change in 
Canadian policies involving Caribbean countries.
The agricultural assistance fund, which replaces 
the rebate scheme, can be of great benefit if it is
External Affairs Minister Sharp in an interview, Ottawa, 
28 May 1973, agreed with this interpretation, but added that 
this caution was to be expected in such a situation.
56 Ottawa Citizen, 12 May 1970.
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managed on a basis of close co-operation. It is 
important that there be no net loss of benefit to 
sugar-producing countries.
Canada should take full account of the dilemma of 
the sugar-producing countries and recognize the 
difficulties involved in diversification efforts.
Buying Caribbean sugar at prices below the cost of 
production obviously does not engender good will.57
Under the section dealing with 'Trade' the Committee elaborated 
on the history of the problem without frontally attacking the 
Government or directly making demands upon it.
The Committee has devoted considerable attention 
to the question of sugar imports, which form an 
important, and often controversial, element in Canada's 
relations with a number of countries in the Caribbean 
area. The Canadian programme of tariff-rebates, 
undertaken after the 1966 Conference, was well received 
by the governments of the area, although it did not 
compare with the generosity of British and American 
subsidies and still meant that Canada was buying 
Commonwealth Caribbean sugar at a price below the cost 
of production. For these reasons, the exporting 
countries filled their other commitments first and 
never took full advantage of the Canadian tariff-rebate 
quota.53 The realization of the new International Sugar 
Agreement in late 1968 resulted in a general price 
increase beneficial to the Caribbean producers.
The Committee believes that there was probably 
sound, long-term economic grounds for the recent 
decision of the Canadian Government to discontinue the 
rebate scheme and replace it with a direct annual grant 
of $5 million to an Agricultural Assistance Fund. It 
remains, then, to ask why the decision was so bitterly 
protested by the Caribbean governments and 'deprecated' 
in a resolution passed by the sixth Commonwealth 
Caribbean Heads of Government Conference in April of 
this year.
The Committee has concluded that this regrettable 
misunderstanding resulted from a very serious failure 
in communication between the Canadian and Caribbean
57 'Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
Senate of Canada on Canada-Caribbean Relations', 1970, p.22. 
(Hereafter cited as Senate Committee Report on Canada-Caribbean 
Relations.)
58 The sugar producers were not required to meet the quota 
except when explicitly asked to do so.
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governments. The Committee believes that more 
effective consultation and dialogue could have 
prevented the dispute and its damaging consequences.
The Caribbean governments felt that they were 
inadequately consulted on the decision and that the 
new Fund was no substitute for the rebate scheme.
They were also apparently concerned by the lack of 
clear information about the objectives and possible 
duration of the Fund. The sugar-producing countries, 
in particular, were alarmed by the fact that the Fund 
will be under regional rather than national control 
and that there was no assurance of continuing benefit 
to the ailing sugar industry.
The Committee hopes that these problems have been 
resolved in subsequent discussions and that the new 
Fund will be managed on a basis of close co-operation.
In addition to projects aimed at agricultural 
diversification, the new Fund should extend substantial 
assistance directly to the sugar industry, which is in 
a situation comparable in many respects to that of 
Canadian wheat producers.59
Ten days after the release of the Committee's report a spokesman 
for the External Affairs Department announced that the 
Government was ready to reverse the decision to stop the sugar 
rebates to the Commonwealth Caribbean. This offer was sent to 
the Council of Ministers of the Caribbean Free Trcide Association 
which was meeting in Guyana.
The Canadian proposal, however, was only to extend the
6 0rebates to the end of 1970. Furthermore, Canada was to send
'senior Government officials' to the West Indies in order to
discuss the whole problem of sugar rebates and the agricultural
development fund. In September 1970 none other than Senate
Leader Paul Martin was the senior official who undertook a
goodwill tour through the West Indies. The problem of sugar
6 2imports was to be a key topic of discussion on this tour.
Senate Committee Report on Canada-Caribbean Relations, op.cit., 
pp.44-45.
^  Ottawa Citizen, 25 June 1970.
61 Ibid.
^  Toronto Telegram, 17 September 1970.
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Before Senator Martin's visit Robert Lightbourne,
Jamaica's Minister of Trade and Industry, announced in Port of 
Spain that a completely new approach should be worked out 
between the West Indies and Canada concerning sugar and that 
until Canada paid the Caribbean sugar producers a fair economic 
return any cancellation of the sugar rebate system by the
6 3Canadian Government would be regarded as "a breach of faith".
Concerning the agricultural development fund, which was supposed
to have replaced the sugar rebate, Mr Lightbourne argued that
64they were "two completely separate and distinct matters".
During Senator Martin's visit to the West Indies, the 
sugar-producing countries reaffirmed their stand on this issue 
and requested that the Canadian Government again modify its 
decision and continue paying the rebates for a further year up 
to the end of 1971.
In December 1970 External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp 
announced that the Canadian Government had responded positively 
to the sugar countries' request.^ He thereby not only 
satisfied the Caribbean Governments' demands and the wishes of 
the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee but also re-established 
in this case his and his Department's role in Cabinet 
decision-making.
The Decision Evaluated - Assessments of Participant Observers
Most participants who expressed an opinion on the decision 
shared a common view. Canada's Minister for External Affairs, 
bureaucrats, parliamentarians and the Director of the 
Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade
^  Ibid.
64 nid.
65 Toronto Telegram, 18 December 1970.
66 Ibid.
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unanimously declared that the influence of a parliamentary 
Committee on foreign policy was never greater than in the 
decision to reverse the determination of West Indian sugar 
rebate.
In the words of Minister for External Affairs Mitchell 
Sharp, the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee report had been "of 
great importance for and had great influence on the Canadian/
West Indian relationship". He further noted that concrete 
Committee suggestions had been adopted by the Government and 
that these had contributed to an improvement in the relationship 
to the West Indies.^ Without the report, he continued, 
relations with the West Indies might have remained unsatisfactory 
for a longer period.^
Nevertheless, the report was not uniformly influential in
all of its aspects. The influence of that section of the report
dealing with the problems of sugar imports obviously was very
important; it not only affected the Canadian Government's
decision but also led to the revision of publicly declared
policy. External Affairs Minister Sharp, the Vice-Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Senator Grospart, and the
Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and
Foreign Trade and adviser to the Committee, Peter Dobell, all
7 0agreed on this point. Only one major political figure, member
of Cabinet and former Minister for External Affairs, Senator
Paul Martin, described the Committee's report on the sugar
71rebate question as 'helpful', rather than 'decisive'.
6 7 Interview with the Minister for External Affairs, 
Sharp, Ottawa, 28 May 1973.
68
Ibid.
Mitchell
69 Ibid.
70 Interview’ with the Minister for External Affairs, Mitchell 
Sharp, Ottawa, 28 May 1973; Interview with Senator Gros4art, 
Ottawa, 22 May 1973; Interview with Peter Dobell, Ottawa,
3 June 1973.
71 Interview with Senator Paul Martin, Ottawa, 29 May 1973.
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Concerning the Committee report as a whole, however,
Senator Martin admitted that nearly all recommendations were
72subsequently met - for example, the establishment of a High
Commission in Barbados and the improvement of governmental
7 3machinery dealing with the West Indies in general.’ Martin
74further conceded that the report asked for increased aid and
that the Government granted this. However, he argued that while
nearly everything the Committee wanted to be done was done, this
was "because we in Cabinet wanted it to be done and not because.
75the Committee wanted it to be done".
Martin's downplaying of the Committee's role can perhaps
be explained by the fact that he, a former Foreign Minister and
still member of Cabinet, was convinced that foreign policy was
solely the prerogative of the Government, as he himself
7 6emphasised in an interview with me. Martin's attitude can be
seen, for example, in his failure to inform his Senate
colleagues of his planned goodwill tour of the West Indies as
a representative of the Canadian Government in October 1970:
"I didn't tell the Senate I would go. Of course, that was a
77matter for the executive".
Another sign of Martin's attitude was the story frequently
told in parliamentary circles of his standard response to any
questions about foreign policy within Cabinet during his tenure
as Minister for External Affairs - "What the hell ...i Bo you
7 8want to become Minister for External Affairs?"
72 Ibid.
13 See: Senate Committee Report on Canada-Caribbean Relations,
op.cit,, pp.20-21.
74 Ibid,, pp.23-25.
^  Interview with Senator Paul Martin, Ottawa, 29 May 1973.
76 Ibid.
77“  Ibid,
7 8 Interview with Minister for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp, 
Ottawa, 28 May 1973; Interview with Senator Gros^art, 22 May 
1973; Interview with Peter Dobell, 3 June 1973.
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While the thrust of Martin's position can be viewed in
terms of his uncompromising approach to the management of
foreign policy, the factual validity of his assertions concerning
the limitations of the Committee's influence must be carefully
analysed. There is reason to treat the testimony of both
Mitchell Sharp and Peter Dobell with some caution as both were
interested actors. The External Affairs Minister said that the
7 9Committee's report was used regularly within his Department.
Peter Dobell went so far as to conclude from this information 
that the Committee's report was in this decision the "mosto n
influential single factor".
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It is important to place the Senate Foreign Affairs 
Committee's report in the context of divisions within the 
Government. The effect of the report was to bolster the eroded 
position of External Affairs Minister Sharp and his Department. 
The weakened standing of External Affairs had been due to a 
variety of factors, not the least was Prime Minister Trudeau's 
scepticism concerning the Department's performance, particularly 
in the NATO policy debate, discussed in the previous chapter, 
and in the sugar question where the Department's advocacy on the 
sugar rebate had already been overruled, a fact which went 
unnoted in journalistic and academic comment. But if the 
Committee's report bolstered the standing of External Affairs, 
it should also be noted that External Affairs support of the 
sugar rebate enhanced the impact of the report. It was not 
simply a case of the Committee influencing or determining 
Government policy. It was instead a case of a de facto alliance 
between the Committee and a part of the Government which had 
already adopted a position similar to that of the Senate's 
Committee.
79 Interview with Minister for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp, 
Ottawa, 28 May 1973.
80 Interview7 with Peter Dobell, Ottawa, 3 June 197 3.
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One must not, however, overestimate the role of External 
Affairs. It must be emphasised additionally that the Department 
had been ineffective in dealing both with West Indian matters 
in general and the sugar issue in particular since 1966.
For all the above reasons it appears that while External 
Affairs did play an important role in reversing the cancellation 
of the sugar rebate, it cannot be said to have played the 
decisive role. Therefore, two other factors remain to be 
considered: first, the Senate's Committee report and
particularly the subtle way in which it was presented; and, 
second, the vigorous public protest of the West Indian 
Governments.
This case study has been characterised by the following 
'confrontation constellation': on the one side was the majority
of Cabinet and especially the Minister of Finance; on the other 
side was the Minister for External Affairs and his Department, 
the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, the West Indian Governments 
and to a lesser extent the Canadian parliamentary Opposition.
The first group did little to defend the decision to cancel 
the sugar rebate - in fact, the defence was left to the Minister 
of External Affairs, who actually had opposed the cancellation.
To revise the decision the latter group's primary means were 
indirect pressure on Cabinet via public opinion. It was 
precisely the fact that the parliamentary Opposition played only 
a minor role in the dispute which made it easy for the Department 
of External Affairs, the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and 
the West Indian Governments to pressure or convince the Canadian 
Government to reverse its original decision. The abrasive 
polemic of the West Indian Governments was effectively channelled 
by the press and the Committee report which brought out the 
underlying rational justification of this critique. In achieving 
this reversal the cautious and skilful conclusions of the 
Committee report played an important role.
How was it then that the Committee was able to play such 
a significant role?
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This was in large measure due to the nature of the topic 
which the Committee chose to investigate. As Peter Dobell 
recognised when he, together with Committee members, selected 
Canadian-West Indian relations, this was an area of some 
volatility which most likely would require some policy 
adjustments. At the same time it was not an issue upon which 
sharp party lines had been drawn, as was witnessed by the 
relatively restrained comments of the Opposition in Parliament. 
In this non-divisive atmosphere a Senate Committee of extremely 
limited political clout could achieve influence by mobilising 
the resources of expertise, particularly through Dobell’s 
recently formed Parliamentary Centre. Apart from the choice of 
topic and mobilisation of expertise, the impact of the Committee 
was enhanced by the unanimous nature of its report. Indeed, of 
all the cases examined in this thesis, integrative politics are 
most fully developed in the VJest Indian sugar rebate case. From 
start to finish the Committee approached the problem in a 
constructive, non-partisan manner. This, no doubt, was also 
made easier by the Committee's lack of power in conventional 
political terms.
CHAPTER SEVEN
DIVISIVE OPPOSITION TACTICS AND UTILISATION 
OF THE COMMITTEE BY THE GOVERNMENT: GERMAN FOREIGN
POLICY AFTER THE FAILURE OF THE EDC
The previous case studies have all demonstrated the ability 
of Foreign Affairs Committees to influence in some degree 
governmental policy. This has ranged from such far-reaching * 
examples of Committee influence as the refusal of the Bundestag 
Committee to act on the Mundat Forest Treaty to such an indirect 
and tenuous impact as in the case of Australian Foreign Aid 
policy. Overall, of the cases examined, it appears that the 
role of the Committee has been most pronounced in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Thus the question naturally arises as to 
whether Committee influence has unique dimensions in Germany due 
to such factors as the centrality of foreign policy issues in 
the politics of the Federal Republic, the particular importance 
of the question of German re-unification and its ramifications 
for domestic politics. Furthermore, it could be argued that the 
experience of the Weimar Republic, the Second World War and the 
common experience of some socialist and bourgeois politicians 
in the struggle against fascism might have enhanced the 
possibilities for integrative politics in the West German 
context. Finally, others might argue that, despite formal 
similarities, most notably the principle of ministerial 
responsibility, the German parliamentary system is substantively 
different from the Westminster system or its variants in 
Australia and Canada.
Thus it is particularly appropriate to examine a case in 
the German context where the Committee not only was unable to 
influence Government policy but, in fact, was manipulated by the 
Government for its own ends. This, moreover, will allow us to 
focus on aspects of the mode of politics adopted - i.e. 
integrative or divisive politics - which transcend the historical 
peculiarities of a given system.
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The case chosen concerns German foreign policy following 
the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954.
During the mid-fifties the foreign and security policies 
of the Federal Republic of Germany focused primarily on the 
realisation of the European Defence Community (EDC). However, 
the principal feature of the proposed EDC, the supra-national 
character of the intended defence community, represented at the 
same time the major obstacle for speedy ratification by the 
individual countries. After the EDC treaty had been ratified 
by the Benelux countries and West Germany, and the Deutschland- 
Vertrag, too, had been signed in the USA, Great Britain and the 
Federal Republic, the whole set of agreements depended on 
agreement by the French Parliament. It was not by chance that 
the French had hesitated so long. The French Government had 
believed that they could support the existing draft of the 
treaty only if EDC's supra-national character was qualified. 
Therefore, the French began new negotiations with their possible 
future partners. On 18 August 1954 the countries which had 
already ratified the treaty sought a compromise with the French 
in Brussels. On 22 August the conference was terminated without 
having reached an agreement. On 30 August the French National 
Assembly rejected the EDC Treaty. Dr Adenauer commented: "This
caused an acute crisis throughout the entire Free World".’*'
On 28 September 1954, following an invitation by the 
British Government, the six European countries which had 
intended to form the EDC met with Government representatives of 
the USA and Canada in order to discuss the new situation which 
had arisen after the failure of the treaty and to develop 
alternative possibilities. The results were laid down in the 
final document of the London Conference which concerned three 
subjects:
1. the position of the Federal Republic of Germany 
under international lav;;
1 BT, II.WP, 46 Sitzg., p.2228.
244
2. the European federation on the basis of the 
Brussels agreement; and
3. the West German defence contribution within the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
On the first matter, the USA, Great Britain and France
agreed on jointly trying to terminate the occupation of Germany
as soon as possible, i.e. cancel the Occupation Statute and
abolish the Allied High Commission. Secondly, in order to
broaden the Brussels pact, the member countries encouraged West
Germany and Italy to adhere to this agreement. The mutual
assistance pact was to be extended to the two new member
countries. On 5 October 1954 Dr Adenauer commented on this in
German Parliament: "This fact, ladies and gentlemen, throws a
2light on the changed situation like no other incident does".
And finally the NATO partners agreed that it was desirable that 
the Federal Republic of Germany should become a member of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Subsequently all armed 
forces of the continental member countries of the Brussels Pact 
were to be placed under the military command of NATO. The size 
of the German military forces was to be in accord with that 
projected by the EDC Treaty.
In other words, what had been prevented by the French 
National Assembly’s rejection of the European Defence Community 
was to be achieved by means of broadening the Brussels Pact and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: the integration of that
part of Germany occupied by the Western allies into the western 
defence system. This was aimed at for two reasons: on the one 
hand to prevent a resurgence of nationalistic tendencies (or 
even Communist tendencies) in Germany because of discriminatory 
treatment by the western victor nations; and on the other hand 
to use developing West German economic power and possible 
military potential as a deterrent weapon against communism, 
without, however, putting West Germany in the position of being 
able to control her own military potential in an independent 
manner.
2 BT, II.WP, 46 Sitzg., p.2231A.
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The Positions of Government and Opposition: Priority of
Security Policy Versus Precedence of Reunification Policy
On 1 October 1954 the Federal Government announced its new 
foreign policy line in a cabinet decision:
Consistent with the past course of German foreign 
policy and with the conviction that only this policy 
will lead to the reunification of Germany in peace 
and freedom, the following objectives have been laid 
down:
1. Continuation of the policy of European unification 
of all interested countries and in all suitable 
fields, consultations on military integration with 
those countries which have already ratified the 
EDC or are about to ratify it;
2. Restitution of sovereignty;
3. Participation in western defence arrangements 
without discrimination;
4. Legal agreements on the presence of foreign armed 
forces in the Federal Republic by means of 
treaties;
5* Immediate negotiations with the USA and Great 
Britain.3
The argument that only this policy would lead to the 
reunification of Germany developed into the central matter in 
dispute between the Government and the Opposition in Parliament 
as well as in the Foreign Policy Committee.
On 5 October 1954 the German Lower House opened its 46th 
session. The only item on the agenda was the hearing of a 
declaration by the Federal Government on the London Conference. 
In this declaration the Federal Chancellor, Dr Adenauer, 
commented on the failure of the European Defence Community:
The fact that our foreign policy was able to withstand 
a period of heavy blows appears to me to be clear 
evidence that its basic concepts were correct and 
still are correct.^
The Social Democratic Opposition firmly rejected the basic 
concept for the German reunification policy as indicated by the
3 BT, II.WP, 46 Sitzg., p.2228B and C.
4 BT, II.WP, 46 Sitzg., p.2232D.
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Federal Chancellor: "Cooperation with our treaty partners
will ... also lead to full support by our allies concerning the
solution of special German problems, especially our desire for
reunification in peace and freedom .... In this community we
will be able to pursue our aim of reunification with far greater5chances of success".
Juxtaposed to these ideas was the view presented by the 
SPD: before ratification of the London agreement the Federal
Republic should undertake renewed attempts to arrive at 
reunification through negotiations with the victor nations. In 
the Opposition argument, "nobody, especially no one within the 
German nation, can ... bear the responsibility of refraining 
from such an attempt before we commit ourselves irrevocably and 
for a long time to a policy, which is based on the assumption 
that the division of the world into two blocks, and thus the 
division of Germany for a long time to come, are unalterable 
facts".^
The Lack of Basic Concepts in the Opposition Strategy
The balance of power in domestic politics as a possible
starting point for social democratic opposition policy
In considering the question of how much importance to 
attribute to the Foreign Affairs Committee during the conflict 
between Government and Opposition, wTe must first look at the 
domestic political situation at that time. In Parliament the 
CDU almost held an absolute majority during the summer of 1954. 
The 'bourgeois' Government coalition included the CDU/CSU, FDP, 
BHE and DP. Although one coalition partner would have been 
sufficient for the Christian Democrats to gain an absolute 
majority, the majority group tried to back up the most important 
decisions on foreign policy principles with a wide coalition 
majority. Nationalistically-orientated representatives within
5 BT, II.WP, 46 Sitzg., p.2233D.
6 BT, II.WP, 47 Sitzg., pp.2241D and 2242A.
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the three coalition parties gained particular importance with 
respect to a joint foreign policy, especially as the Social 
Democratic Opposition presented a nationalistic attitude to the 
German public.
Controversies over foreign and reunification policy were 
important factors in the decision of Dr Linus Kather to leave 
the CDU at the end of June and join the BHE group. Until then 
Dr Kather had been a regular CDU member of the Foreign Policy 
Committee of the Lower House. His defection cost the Christian 
Democrats their absolute majority and also meant a considerable 
weakening of the CDU/CSU within the coalition Government.
In order to prepare for controversies within the
'bourgeois' camp, CDU representatives urged representative Josef
Roesing, a centre politician who so far had not belonged to any
party, to join the majority group. By 1 July the Government
representatives were successful: Roesing joined the CDU.
However, the tension within the coalition not only remained but
even increased notably. The tactics of the oppositional Social
Democrats seemed to work: BHE and especially FDP stressed the
priority of German reunification policy; the FDP incessantly
demanded a division of the Federal Chancellor's office and the
7foreign ministry.
The First Phase: Opposition Antagonism in the Committee and
the Plenum
On 4 September 1954 an interview with Dr Adenauer by the 
London Times introduced a new crisis into the already tense 
atmosphere among the coalition parties. In this interview the 
Federal Chancellor gave the impression that the foundation of 
a European Defence Community was a higher priority foreign 
policy goal than reunification. Dr Adenauer declared:
... but of course I raised the strongest objections 
when he (Mendes-France) demanded, that each partner 
to the Treaty should have the right to cancel its
7 Die Welt, 9 and 10 September 1954.
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membership in the defence community in the case of a 
reunification of Germany. In my opinion ... this was 
an invitation to Russia to attempt the reunification 
of Germany at all costs and thus break up the EDC.^
When the FDP representative Becker demanded an explanation 
of this remark by the Chancellor in the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, he was supported by the Social Democratic Opposition. 
Fierce arguments between Government and Opposition as well as 
among the coalition parties marked the Committee meeting of 
9 September 1954. Again the FDP demanded the division of the 
Federal Chancellor's office and the foreign ministry as well as 
the resignation of State Secretary Hallstein who allegedly had 
failed to inform sufficiently Parliament and the Committee.
While members of the BHE and of the Deutsche Partei remained 
quiet and waited, FDP representative Becker and SPD 
representative Dr Luetkens tried to force the Federal Chancellor 
to give an interpretation of his Times interview. A rather 
vague explanation by Dr Adenauer was interrupted by Herbert 
Wehner who attacked the entire foreign policy of the Federal 
Government in scathing terms, thereby causing the coalition9members to close ranks.
Only after this antagonistic behaviour by the Opposition 
did Federal Chancellor Adenauer succeed in closing the 
discussion by the Committee on points which were controversial 
within the coalition as well. With a promise to the coalition 
groups to resolve the impending foreign policy problems in 
Cabinet, the Federal Chancellor managed to shift the conflict 
from the Committee to the Government: there it was up to the
Chancellor to determine the time and the atmosphere for the 
discussion and his opponents, restricted by Cabinet discipline 
and the desire to remain ministers, could not manoeuvre as 
freely as the more independent members of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee.
8
9
Cited in: BT, 11. VIP, 47 Sitzg.
Interview Blachstein; Die Welt,
p.2240D.
10 September 1954.
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Tactical considerations of this nature did not seem to
occur to the Social Democratic Opposition at that time: when,
on 21 September, the FDP demanded another meeting of the Foreign
Affairs Committee, the SPD rejected the motion.^ The Social
Democrats were not interested in a detailed discussion of these
matters in the parliamentary Committee, especially not after the
BHE had again raised coalition controversies in public only two
days before. And indeed, it appeared the SPD had some reason
to believe they would gain more politically in keeping the
issue out of the Committee and in the public limelight. In the
presence of BHE Federal Chairman Oberlaender, the BHE State
President of Lower Saxony, von Kessel, declared "the German
reunification to be the first and foremost aim". A few days
later the FDP representative and State President of Hesse Euler
called it a ’scandal' that the leader of the CDU/CSU
parliamentary party, von Brentano, had announced reunification
was not the most urgent but only one of the most urgent tasks
12of German politics.
On 27 September, after the failure of the EDC Treaty and
immediately before the London Conference, Secretary of State
Hallstein granted an interview to the Hamburg paper Die Welt.
V7hile former governmental declarations had stressed that there
was no conceivable alternative concerning the EDC. Professor
Hallstein described the situation differently: "For a long time
the Federal Government has been prepared for a possible
rejection of the EDC. In a small group a total of eleven
alternative solutions were developed which turned out to be
identical - partly even in the wording - with those plans later
13presented by the other partners, especially England".
But the SPD still could not resolve to demand the immediate 
convocation of the Foreign Affairs Committee. SPD representative
Die Welt, 22 September 1954. 
Die Welt, 20 September 1954. 
Die Welt, 26 September 1954. 
Die Welt, 2.1 September 1954.
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Dr Luetkens pointed towards the possibility that Committee
members of the FDP and BHE might join the Opposition and thus
possibly provide a means to force Professor Hallstein to resign.
However, the SPD party leadership seemed hardly interested in
political disputes within the Foreign Affairs Committee.
"Wehner said that there [in the Committee] Adenauer would lead
14us up the garden path", former SPD representative Peter 
Blachstein recalled.
Again, Opposition policy was not directed at the 
potentially dissatisfied coalition partners of the Adenauer 
Government, it was aimed instead at the German public. On 
7 October 1954 the Opposition leader Erich Ollenhauer commented 
in the Lower House on Professor Hallstein's interview: "... it
is characteristic of the relationship between Government and 
Parliament, that even the members of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee only learn of this astounding activity in the Foreign 
Ministry through publications by the Secretary of State and 
there can be no doubt that this method is highly effective in 
shaking the people's confidence in the reliability of official 
statements".
However, the SPD leadership must have had its doubts as to 
whether this was really the case: again and again they
addressed the German public. During the following plenary 
debates on reunification and on rearmament Ollenhauer as well 
as Wehner and Erler appealed to the national conscience of the 
German people.
In this situation, when the entire Government coalition 
was strongly attacked by the SPD during plenary debates and in 
press releases, Federal Chancellor Adenauer succeeded in binding 
at least the majority of each coalition party to his foreign 
policy.
Interview Blachstein.
15 BT, II.WP, 47 Sitzg., p.2241D.
16 See: BT, II.WP, 47, 61, 62, 69, 71 Sitzg.
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While the Social Democrats deliberately refrained from
using the Foreign Affairs Committee because they regarded it
an unsuitable means to reinforce their policy, the Government
concerningchanged its mind ao te what part the Foreign Affairs Committee 
could play. While the Opposition proved incapable (or unwilling) 
of using the Committee as a tactical means, the Government 
parties now used this possibility in a 'classical' way.
At the end of his first speech on the declaration of the 
Federal Government Opposition leader Erich Ollenhauer put the 
following motion to the Lower House:
The Federal Government is requested to
1. establish the basis for a common policy in 
discussions with the three Western Occupying 
Powers, which is to bring about the reunification 
of Germany in future four-power conferences; 
therefore
2. to w7ork for the constitution of a further commission 
in addition to the special negotiating commissions 
provided for in the London document to set up 
common guidelines for the goal stated in No. 4 of 
the Declaration of the three Western Powers in 
paragraph V of the document, thus providing for a 
unified policy; and
3. to influence the Western Occupying Powers to take 
up negotiations with the Soviet Occupying Power as 
soon as possible on the reunification of Germany 
in freedom and the integration of Germany into a 
European security system within the United Nations; 
furthermore
4. in the treaties which are provided for in (the
effectuation of) the final document of the London 
Conference, the Federal Government is to consent 
only to those liabilities and commitments which 
agree with its basic duty to fulfil its most 
important obligation: to bring about by peaceful
means the reunification of Germany in freedom.17
During the plenary debate the Government used the following 
tactics:
1. no roll call voting on the SPD motion;
17 BT, II.WP, 47 Sitzg.
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2. referral of the Opposition motion to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee;
3. CDU/CSU, FDP, GB/BHE and DP offer an alternative 
motion.
Roll call voting on the SPD motion would have made apparent the 
disunity within the Government coalition. As several 
representatives of the coalition parties had already publicly 
advocated the pre-eminence of German reunification, they either 
would have had to oppose the Government or would have had to do 
an about face within a very short period of time.
The minutes of the debate on voting procedures which are 
quoted in detail below elucidate the possibilities (and 
readiness) of the Government parties to withdraw unwanted 
plenary motions from political discussion without obligatory 
voting by means of referring them to the appropriate committee. 
Vice President of the Lower House, Dr Jaeger (CSU):
There are two motions: the motion by the SPD
parliamentary group on document 863 and the motion by 
the parliamentary groups of the Government coalition 
on document 864. I proceed to vote on the motions in 
succession as they have been handed in, first of the 
motion by the parliamentary group SPD on document 863. 
(Rep. Dr von Brentano: Referral!) On this motion
roll call voting has been proposed. (Opposition from 
Government MPs) May I ask you to let me finish. I 
know exactly how to handle this. The motion for roll 
call voting has sufficient support. However, the 
CDU/CSU parliamentary group has moved for referral to 
the Committee. This motion for referral has priority 
over the factual motion. No roll call voting has been 
proposed for this motion and would not have been 
possible anyway according to paragraph 58, letter g of 
the standing orders. I ask you to vote on the motion 
by the CDU/CSU to refer the motion by the SPD 
parliamentary group on document 863 to the Committee.
(Call from the SPD: To avoid the issue! - Rep. Dr
Gerstenmaier: To refer to the Foreign Affairs
Committee!) The Committee on Foreign Affairs. Those 
who agree to the motion for referral to the Committee, 
please raise your hand. - Check-test please.
- Abstentions? - The ayes are the majority; the 
motion is referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
I proceed to the motion by the parliamentary groups of
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the CDU/CSU, FDP, GB/BHE and DP on document 864.
Those who agree to the motion, please raise your hand. 
- Check-test please. - Abstentions? - It has been 
accepted by the majority against the numbers of the 
Opposition.
Second Phase: Adaptations in the Behaviour of the Opposition
Within the Foreign Affairs Committee
While prior to the decisions of the London Conference in 
late September the polemicf^nature of Committee deliberations 
had served to unify the Government members and thus facilitate 
the Government's ability to control Committee proceedings, a new 
situation arose subsequently. The London Conference had in 
effect presented the Opposition with a fait accompli. In these 
circumstances the Government majority in the Committee made some 
conciliatory gestures towards the Opposition which in no way 
altered the substance of policy. These gestures, which are 
detailed below, had the effect of both appeasing Government 
Committee members who felt uneasy with the official policy and 
it: avoidäS provoJäeg ^ he Opposition. Indeed, this strategy was 
so successful that the Opposition not only raised no objections
within the Committee to the Committee report, but the full House
handfulsubsequently agreed to the report with only a soattfcr-ing of 
abstentions.
On 7 October, the Government and all other parties in the
Foreign Affairs Committee "basically agreed on the request in
figure 1 of the (SPD) motion. The debate also removed difference
19of opinion on the nature and tasks of the desired commission". 
During this meeting, representatives of the Foreign Affairs 
Department confronted Social Democratic Opposition representatives 
v.Tith the exact political tasks of the commissions which had been 
formed in order to carry through the Paris conference.
Additionally it became obvious that the Social Democratic
Ibid., p.2320B and C.
] 9
Schriftlicher Bericht des Ausschusses fuer auswaertige 
Angelegenheiten lieber den Antrag der SPD betreffend Londoner 
Abkommen und Aussenpolitik der Bundesregierung in BT, II.WP,
61 Sitzg., Anlage 1.
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request for a Reunification commission' was already an illusion
because of the time factor. Furthermore, the representative of
the Foreign Affairs Department argued that the Western victor
nations felt no inclination to form this additional commission.
That part of the SPD motion, which the Opposition had argued in
public, was declared removed from reality and unpracticable.
The parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee report passes over
2 0this point without actually commenting on it.
When the Foreign Affairs Committee met for a second time
on 9 November the Paris Conference had already ended; because
of lack of time the aim of the motion could not be attained.
What the SPD did accomplish in the Foreign Affairs Committee,
was a vague (and possibly ironic) appreciation of the
significance of their motion. In the report of the Foreign
Affairs Committee the Government majority generously conceded:
"This formal fate of the motion, however, does not imply
anything regarding the significance and value of the political
21questions contained in it".
During the 62nd sitting of the German Lower House the SPD
2 2motion discussed above had been termed 'without substance’
with no adverse vote and only a few abstentions. Already at
this time the Social Democrats had to accept the following
sentence in the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee which
criticised their former tactics: "There also arose the
generally accepted necessity of not referring to the three
Western Occupying Powers throughout the motion, but to specify
clearly that this joint task and all preparatory steps were, the
responsibility of the United States of America, the United
23Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany". With
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 BT, II.WP, 62 Sitzg., p.3258C.
^  Schriftlicher Bericht des Ausschusses fuer auswaertig e 
Angelegenheiten ueher den Antrag der SPD betreffend Londoner 
Abkommen und Aussengolitik der Bundesregierung in BT, II.WP,
61 Sitzg., Anlage 1.
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this report of the Foreign Affairs Committee the Federal 
Government also succeeded in making the Social Democratic 
Opposition publicly admit that they had carried their 
'nationalistic bravado'^ too far.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This case study illustrates the Social Democratic 
Opposition's lack of a tactical plan during the parliamentary 
debates as well as in discussions of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee. The antagonistic behaviour of the Opposition during 
the first phase could not be maintained consistently by the SPD 
in the Foreign Affairs Committee. The Government and especially 
the Federal Chancellor, Dr Adenauer, had always been av/are of 
the dangers but also of the possibilities for foreign and 
defence policy, which the role of the parliamentary Committee 
contained. The tactical behaviour of the Government proved to 
be correspondingly flexible. If Committee discussions became 
embarrassing for the Government parties and dangerous for the 
coalition unity, the significance of the Committee would be 
played down and the level of decision was transferred to Cabinet. 
But if it appeared to be possible to point out weaknesses in the 
Opposition's stance, the Government tried to back up and increase 
the significance of the Committee and use the results of the 
Committee's work for its own ends: As a working body with a
limited and fixed number of members this institution proved to 
be a most suitable means for the Federal Government to urge a 
mainly polemical Opposition to co-operate.
In conclusion we can say: the Government and Opposition
held diametrically opposed views on the basic concept of West 
German foreign policy. In the Foreign Affairs Committee the 
situation was temporarily slightly different: A few FDP and
BHE representatives seemed to waver and hold views on foreign 
policy which could be placed somewhere in between the positions
Abraham Ashkenasi, Reformpartei und Aussenpolitik, Opladen, 
1968, p.24, footnote 6.
256
of Government and Opposition. The Social Democrats' trenchant 
attacks on the entire Government coalition, however, in effect 
guaranteed that no support for SPD conceptions could be expected 
even from those representatives who held a critical opinion on 
several aspects of Dr Adenauer's policy.
The tactical clumsiness of the Opposition together with 
Adenauer's skilful tactics do not entirely explain why the 
Opposition was so clearly defeated in this case. One major 
factor supporting the Government was the views of the Western 
powers concerning Germany's role in Europe. As had been 
graphically demonstrated by France's rejection of the EDC, there 
was little stomach in Western Europe for an independent West 
Germany, to say nothing of an independent and re-unified German 
State. The whole thrust of allied policy was to integrate 
German military potential in a Western defence system so that 
German power would only be used against potential communist 
aggressors. In conjunction with international factors the high 
priority attached to security by the West German populace argued 
strongly for integration in the Western defence system. This 
in turn was reflected in the large majority of the Government 
coalition, a majority which made divisive attacks from the 
Opposition particularly futile.
The foregoing analysis argues that the divisive factors of 
the Opposition played a crucial role not only in its defeat on 
the issue but also had the effect of preventing any independent 
Committee influence. This is not to argue, however, that the 
use of integrative politics would have achieved much in terms 
of the basic issues at stake between the Government and 
Opposition. Nevertheless, some gains can be hypothesised for 
the Opposition if it had adopted an integrative approach: by
seeking common ground with Government members of the Committee, 
they conceivably could have created problems for the Government 
in keeping its forces in line and perhaps even secure some 
minor adjustments in official policy. This, of course, would 
have required substantial modifications of the larger policy 
goals of the Opposition. Integrative politics within a 
Committee framework is simply incompatible with diametrically
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opposed positions. Only if some room for compromise exists can
there be the development of new approaches which the relatively
»businesslike atmospheire of the Committees format facilitates.
In this case, moreover, the lack of Committee influence was 
further due to the absence of any tradition of a strong 
Committee at this stage of the development of the Federal 
Republic. Such a tradition would only emerge in the early 
sixties as exemplified in earlier case studies. Only when this 
tradition and integrative methods had developed side by side 
would Committee influence have a marked impact on German foreign 
policy.
CHAPTER EIGHT
POLITICAL POWER STRUGGLE AND THE EMASCULATION OF 
COMMITTEE INFLUENCE: OSTPOLITIK BEFORE
THE WEST GERMAN PARLIAMENT
In the preceding chapter we demonstrated that even in 
Germany when inappropriate political methods were used the 
influence of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee was 
negligible. It might be argued, however, that the absence of 
significant Committee influence in the wake of the EDC was 
actually a function of the circumstances of the 1950s and that 
subsequently a tradition of Committee involvement in decisions 
grew within the German system. While it is undeniable that such 
a growth did take place, this chapter shall argue that even 
where such a tradition did exist the wider political 
circumstances of the moment are decisive in determining whether 
influence can be exerted by the Committee. The case for 
elaborating this view is the parliamentary manoeuvering 
surrounding the centrepiece of Brandt's Ostpolitik - the 
ratification of the Eastern treaties with the Soviet Union and 
Poland in 1972.
As we have seen in earlier chapters, Germany's relations 
with the East occupied a key place in both her foreign and 
domestic politics. In the 1950s the conservative Government 
led by the CDU/CSU essentially opted for a policy of security 
based on an alliance with the Western democracies at the expense 
of exploring avenues for national reunification - although, of 
course, never publicly renouncing the goal of reunification.
The SPD Opposition, on the other hand, was much more reluctant 
to see Germany join forces with the West on the undoubtedly 
unrealistic assumption that negotiations with the Soviet Union 
could result in an acceptable basis for reunification. By the 
1970s the international situation had been transformed. The 
Cold War had given way to the politics of detente, which made 
approaches to the East a more realistic and acceptable posture 
for West Germany. In these circumstances the positions of the
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major parties, while having some continuity with the 195Cs, in 
the larger sense were reversed. The SPD, in Government as part 
of the Grand Coalition since 1967 and as a major coalition 
partner from 1969, as in the 1950s pushed for negotiations with 
the East. In substance, however, the position of the SPD had 
changed dramatically. The aim of Ostpolitik, unlike the 1950s 
reunification efforts, was to establish mutually beneficial 
relations with the East on the basis of the post-war division 
of Europe. This, indeed, stood at the heart of the conflict 
between the Government and the CDU/CSU Opposition in 1972.
Beyond the treaties' assurances of bilateral co-operation stood 
a fundamental point of interpretation. Were the treaties simply 
a renunciation of the use of force, a position pushed by the 
CDU/CSU in its newly emphasised, if somewhat fraudulent, posture 
as the advocate of reunification? Or did the treaties accept 
the existing division of Germany and the borders with the East 
European countries as irrevocable political facts, a position 
which, although never explicitly articulated by the Government, 
was the underlying rationale for its policy and reflected a deep 
sense of the need to atone for the transgressions of the war? 
Thus not only partisan advantage but underlying philosophical 
differences marked the dispute on Ostpolitik.
This dispute came to a head in 1972 when Parliament 
considered the treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland. These 
treaties were ratified, but not before a crisis upon which the 
very fate of the Brandt Government hung. This crisis was a 
classic instance of divisive politics with each party seeking 
electoral advantage and, indeed, the defeat of their opponents 
at the polls on the issue of Ostpolitik. As we shall see in the 
following analysis, in these circumstances the parliamentary 
Committee was unable to exert an independent influence in 
shaping foreign policy. The final result of the parliamentary 
manoeuvres was the ratification of the treaties together with 
the adoption of a parliamentary resolution which served to paper 
over some of the fundamental differences. This, however, as the 
following analysis will show, was not the product of genuine
260
compromise but rather the most optimal solution for the dominant 
forces on each side following both significant international 
pressures and intensive manoeuverings within both major parties.
The Domestic Political Context of the Ostpolitik Debate
The basic political context for the Ostpolitik debate was 
set by the 1969 election which resulted for the first time in 
a Government led by the SPD. The SPD, by forming a coalition 
with the FDP, was able to obtain a fragile majority of no more 
than 12 votes in. the Bundestag. In fact, the majority was 
significantly less than the theoretical 12 votes as witnessed 
by Willy Brandt's secret ballot election to the Chancellorship. 
This situation had several consequences.
First, after having been in Government throughout the 
history of the Federal Republic, the CDU/CSU found it extremely 
difficult to adjust to opposition. Indeed, it would not be too 
strong to say that "a born to rule syndrome" existed which 
encouraged the new Opposition to bid for power at every 
opportunity, a situation intensified by the very narrowness of 
the Government's majority. Second, much of the CDU/CSU's 
tactics were directed at the FDP, formerly a member of coalition 
governments led by the CDU/CSU, but which had now joined the 
socialist camp. The hostility of the CDU/CSU towards the FDP 
was manifested in several tactics designed to destroy the FDP. 
One approach was to appeal to right-wing FDP voters in State 
elections in an effort to eliminate FDP representatives from 
State Parliaments - a move which almost succeeded. Another 
tactic adopted at the Federal level was to win over individual 
parliamentarians to the ranks of the CDU/CSU in order to gain 
the votes necessary to overturn the coalition Government. Such 
approaches were successful in several cases and similar attempts 
were made with regard to individual right-wing SPD 
parliamentarians - some of which were prominent members of 
expellee organizations. As we shall see, these successes 
resulted finally in producing an evenly divided Parliament which 
one political situation even more volatile and thus the 
need for new Federal elections all the more certain.
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The commonly shared expectations of a new election further 
intensified the political struggle and became a dominant factor 
in the approach to Ostpolitik by the respective sides. This 
was at the most basic level because various key political actors 
saw Ostpolitik as a decisive election issue. Indeed, when the 
election was held about six months after the ratification of the 
Eastern treaties, the SPD emerged from a campaign heavily 
emphasising Ostpolitik with a substantial coalition majority in 
the Bundestag. At the time of the Ostpolitik debate, however, 
the way in which the issue would prove to be decisive vas 
subject to varying assessments by different political actors, 
including those within the same party. Leader of the SPD 
parliamentary party, Herbert Wehner, saw Ostpolitik as the 
party's most potent electoral issue, one which could convert 
popular support for detente into votes for the party at the 
ballot box. Others on the Government side, such as Chancellor 
Brandt and Defence Minister Schmidt, were less convinced of the 
electoral potency of the issue and appeared more concerned with 
the fate of Ostpolitik as foreign policy than with its possible 
domestic uses. The junior coalition partner, the FDP, initially 
had no interest in an election because of internal divisions 
and the loss of right-wing electoral support to the CDU/CSU at 
State elections - a situation which threatened the party with 
falling below the 5% vote required for parliamentary 
representation if new elections were held.
Ostpolitik presented opportunities for the CDU/CSU 
Opposition in terms of either parliamentary or electoral action. 
If significant defections could be won, particularly from the 
FDP, the CDU/CSU would have been in a position to elect its own 
Chancellor and subsequently sustain a relatively secure 
Government with the expected fragmentation of the FDP. In the 
event of an election CDU/CSU strategists - most notably CSU 
leader Franz-Josef Strauss - hoped to turn the Ostpolitik issue 
to their parties' advantage by drawing votes from the more than 
4% of the electorate which had voted for the ultra right-wing 
National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1969. Not all leading 
members of the CDU/CSU were as sanguine about the appeal to the
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right as Strauss, nor were they necessarily totally hostile to 
the Government's Ostpolitik. Given the need for party unity in 
either parliamentary manoeuverings or an election campaign, it 
became imperative for the CDU/CSU leader and alternative 
Chancellor, Rainer Barzel, to attempt to mediate among the 
strong demands of Strauss and the reservations of others. The 
whole situation was further complicated by the ambitions of 
other leaders, most notably Strauss himself, CDU State Premier 
of Rheinland Westphalia, Helmut Kohl, and former Foreign Minister 
and Chairman of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee 
Gerhard Schroeder, who desired the Chancellorship themselves.
Thus a loss for the CDU/CSU on Ostpolitik-related matters was 
not necessarily inimicable to the interests of these powerful 
leaders if it could be laid at Barzel's doorstep. In short, the 
stakes were high, the strategies problematic and the motivations 
of leading actors complex.
The following analysis examines in detail the unfolding of 
events under the above circumstances. The story begins in 
early 1972 when the Eastern treaties - which had been concluded 
in 1971, together with the Berlin treaty negotiated by the four 
occupying powers - reached the Bundestag for the first reading.
Differing Positions Within the CDU/CSU
During the first weeks of 1972 parts of the Opposition were 
keen to evoke the general impression that Rainer Barzel wanted 
to say 'no' to the Ostvertraege, but at the same time did not 
want to jeopardise seriously their coming into effect. This 
desire was influenced by the considerable international pressure 
which the Western allies and conservative parties of Europe 
tried to exert on the CDU/CSU leadership.
All NATO, WEU and EEC partners supported the foreign policy 
of the Brandt/Scheel Government. Even conservative European 
party colleagues publicly dissociated themselves from the 
foreign policy ideas of the CDU/CSU.^" Rainer Barzel's early
1 Der Spiegel, No. 6, 31 January 1972.
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1972 journey to the US also made quite clear that the CDU could
not expect any support from the allies for their foreign policy
concept. Furthermore, the CSU must have suspected that Rainer
Barzel might yield to pressure from the US: without having
informed the Opposition's party chairman, the CSU published
2their own draft treaty immediately before Barzel's return. 
However, this was not the first attempt by the CSU and parts of 
the CDU to counterbalance pressure from abroad on the party 
chairman.
On 16 January 1972 CSU Chairman Franz-Josef Strauss had 
declared: "We don't fire blanks". He had emphatically pointed
towards the CSU's declared policy of rejecting the treaties and 
had reminded the candidate for the Chancellorship that precisely 
this policy had been unanimously agreed upon at a joint meeting
3of CDU/CSU representatives on 9 December 1970. And, to be on 
the safe side, he suggested fighting further the Eastern 
treaties in the Federal Constitutional Court if there really 4should emerge a parliamentary majority in favour of the treaties. 
Chairman of the Hessian CDU Dregger, who strongly opposed the 
treaties, regarded it as a 'catastrophe' for the CDU/CSU if 
circumstances would force his party to unanimously agree to the 
treaties. This would also apply if the CDU/CSU members 
themselves were privately convinced that the treaties'5ratification was the proper thing to do. In order to prevent 
this 'catastrophe' Strauss and Dregger claimed that the passing 
of the treaties would later result in Moscow's making reparation 
claims amounting to "thousands of millions". Moreover, in an 
'open letter' to Chancellor Brandt, CSU-MP von und zu Guttenberg 
warned of belittling the 'red fascist danger' and explained w* 357hat 
was the greatest worry of the strict treaty-opponents in the
FAZ, 2 February 1972.
3
Bild aw Sonntag, 16 January 1972.
A
Der Spiegel, No. 4, 17 January 1972.
5
FAZ, 14 February 1972.
 ^Der Spiegel, No. 9, 21 February 1972.
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CDU/CSU: "Whoever grants equality to the left totalitarianism
in East Berlin will - even if he intends the opposite - pave the7way for the left extremists' attack on our freedom".
During the first reading for the treaties in Parliament, 
representatives of the Opposition's 'right' wing emphasised 
their objections on principle against the treaties. Rainer 
Barzel, although he very strongly attacked the Government, 
carefully avoided finally committing himself. "Not in this way" 
he paraphrased the Opposition's attitude and suggested that thegtreaties should be shelved. The 'shadow foreign minister' of
the Opposition and Chairman of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs
Committee, Gerhard Schroeder, explained the CDU/CSU's further
dissatisfaction with the treaties. He pointed out that in the
case of the ratification it would solely be the Government
parties who claimed the laurels. "The Federal Government", he
said, "claims any chance of success solely for themselves. They
also have to bear the risk of failure. A failure of the
treaties would be a disaster only for the Government who9negotiated them".
In order to make a failure of the treaties into a disaster 
also for the Opposition, the Federal Government repeatedly 
referred to the international repercussions of a rejection. In 
order to underline the isolation of the Opposition's criticism, 
the SPD and FDP pressed the Opposition to criticise as well the 
Berlin Treaty which had been negotiated by the Western allies^ 
and had found great public support in West Germany.
Doubts About Party Members Crossing the Floor and Preparations 
for the State Elections
Inside the German Parliament, however, the Opposition was 
not isolated at all. Immediately after the plenary debates on
 ^Cited in: FAZ, 21 February 1972.g
Die Welt and Frankfurter Rundschau, 25 and 26 February 1972.
9 FAZ, 25 February 1972.
Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 26 February 1972.
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the Eastern Treaties, SPD-MP and expellees' politician Hupka
crossed the floor and joined the CDU, returning to the Foreign
Affairs Committee as an alternate CDU member. It was also
disturbing for the Government that SPD-MP Mueller allegedly
intended to deceive his party. Press reports claimed that he
wanted to vote in favour of the treaties in the Committee, but
reject them later on in the plenum. At the same time FDP-MP
von Kuehlmann-Stumm indicated that 'possibly' he, too, would
not be able to vote in favour of the treaties.^ The FAZ, which
hitherto had been convinced that "the acceptance of the treaties
by the coalition had been secure", now felt that "the Eastern
12Treaties are endangered". Government Spokesman Conrad Ahlers,
however, still did not admit any serious danger for the
Government, especially because an actual rejection by the German
Parliament would have been followed by international
repercussions that could not be calculated. "Mr Chancellor,
this is just like a NATO exercise. They always stop short
before the detonation of the first atom bomb, because no one
13knows what would come after that".
SPD-MP Mueller who was suspected of having a closer than 
just social relationship to CSU Chairman Strauss, however, 
objected to the NATO exercise metaphor. Pie maintained that he 
knew of two further FDP members who would not vote for the 
Eastern Treaties. Der Spiegel named a few more: Helms, Gallus,
Kienbaum, Kuehlmann-Stumm and Wurbs of the FDP and Mueller 
himself of the SPD. The journal also offered a suggestion on 
how to save the SPD/FDP Government: in view of the difficulties
on the domestic scene, the Government should combine the vote 
on the treaties with the vote of confidence. If the Opposition 
should win, new elections would equal a plebiscite on the
FAZ, 27 February and 4 March 1972; Die Welt, 27 February- 
1972; Der Spiegel, No. 12, 13 March 1972.
12 Compare: FAZ, 11 February and 3 March 1972.
Cited in: Der Spiegel, No. 11, 6 March 1972.
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14Eastern treaties, which seemed to appeal to parts of the SPD 
parliamentary party. SPD-MP Guenter Wiehert realised that
"the strategic conflict around the Ostvertraege is better than
15the controversy on reforms that never eventuated".
Thus it was quite clear at the beginning of March that if 
the SPD - similar to the CDU - should declare ratification of 
the treaties the basis for a domestic power struggle, the CDU 
candidate for the Chancellorship, Rainer Barzel, would be under 
pressure from two sides. If the CSU and parts of his own party 
pressured him into a definite rejection of the treaties, he not 
only would have to reckon with foreign political consequences 
(and even more so if his own chances of becoming Chancellor 
increased), but. also he was threatened with the loss of certain 
CDU-MPs. This was possible because, in the meantime, the 
former chairman of the CDU party working group on foreign 
policy, Ernst Majonica, had pointed out the foreign policy 
consequences of a rejection of the treaties, and CDU-MP and trade 
union man Adolf Mueller had voted for a resolution in favour of 
the treaties during a meeting of West German trade union 
officials. ^
While the press was speculating on further possible
turncoats, the head of the CSU-Landesgruppe in the German
Bundestag, Leo Wagner, explained that no dramatic developments
could be expected before the end of April when State elections
17were due in Baden-WTuerttemberg.
However, in the meantime both sides were concerned that 
the outcome of the State elections should not be influenced 
merely by chance. The Government used the positive statements 
foreign politicians had made with regard to the Eastern
Der Spiegel, No. 11 and No. 12, 6 and 13 March 1972. 
^  Der Spiegel, No. 11, 6 March 1972.
^  Ibid.
17 Ibid.
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Treaties; Herbert Wehner threatened to hold new elections in 
case "something happened during the vote on the treaties";
Helmut Schmidt predicted the "worst Berlin crisis of all time" 
if the treaties were rejected; and Erhard Eppler foretold: "A
Chancellor Barzel would be stewed on low heat by both East and
T 7 4-11 1 8West .
The Opposition Leader, on the other hand, held the Federal
Government solely responsible for the difficult situation in
both the fields of domestic and foreign policy. Even before
the signings in Moscow and Warsaw the Government had known, he
said, "what the realities in Bonn looked like"; therefore it had
been irresponsible to force the foreign policy initiatives
19concerning the East any further in this form. The Frankfurter
Neue Fresse formulated this even more clearly: the Government
had cheated when they assured the treaty partners and the German
public that the treaties would get a parliamentary majority.
If there was not "constantly strong pressure from the Soviet
side as well as from the West" the rejection of the treaties by
Parliament would be certain. The Government had entered the
debates on the ratification either "foolhardy or purposely
untruthful" and was now playing "a game with new elections"
20which resembled the "tricks of a gambler".
Foreign Pressure on the Opposition
However, the risks which were connected with this 'game' 
had to be shared by the Opposition. The Opposition not only 
had to take its chances on new elections but also had to fear 
isolation of the Federal Government within the Western alliance 
which would be likely in the case of a rejection of the treaties 
and which particularly a CSU/CSU Government would have to face. 
Following Barzel's visit to the US and the Soviet Union, Gerhard 
Schroeder tried to decrease this danger by means of a trip to
Der Spiegel, No. 12, 13 March 1972.
19 FAZ, 24 March 1972.
20 Frankfurter Neue Fresse, 8 March 1972.
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Great Britain where he explained his party's stand. Further
travels of the CDU's foreign policy experts, Birrenbach and
von Weizaecker, to West European partners illustrated the
Opposition's concern about the possible isolation of West
Germany. Journalists reported that a planned visit to
Washington by Gerhard Schroeder did not eventuate because
President Nixon had made it known that he was not interested in
2 2meeting CDU/CSU politicians. Talks between CDU/CSU candidate
Rainer Barzel and the French President also must have brought
it home to the Opposition that a rejection of the treaties would
result in problems. Barzel himself commented on the talks in
Paris: "I don't think that Georges Pompidou will congratulate
23me if the treaties are rejected". The Opposition Leader tried 
to appease the foreign countries: "If the treaties will not
yet (!) be accepted, the international timetable will be upset 
but not the running of the trains".24
After his return from France, Foreign Affairs officials 
showed Rainer Barzel a 'strictly confidential' telegram from the 
German Ambassador to Washington, Rolph Paul - which had also 
been leaked to the press. In this telegram the West German 
ambassador had stated:
1. that a rejection of the treaties would endanger the 
foreign policy unity of Bonn and Washington;
2. that in the event of a new cold war which held 
already been threatened by Brezhnev, Bonn would
not be able to rely on total support from Washington;
3. that the world's recognition of the German Democratic 
Republic could not be prevented anymore in any event; 
and
21
Gerhard Schroeder, 'Zu den Ostvertraegen' in Bundespresseamt/ 
Abt. Bachrichten, Referat II/4, Europagruppe, BBC London
deutsch, 1 March 1972.
22 Der Spiegel, No. 13, 20 March 1972.
22 Der Spiegel, No. 14, 27 March 1972.
24 FAZ, 24 March 1972.
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4. that in the case of a rejection of the Eastern
Treaties by the Bundestag the Berlin Treaty would 
not become valid.
Barzel now accused the Government of being irresponsible
"because they used the prestige of foreign countries and
25friendly states in German domestic politics".
The Opposition Leader's reaction and his suggestion tc wait
for the ratification of the treaties until after President
Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union made it quite clear that
because of foreign pressure the CDU/CSU Opposition would indeed
run great risks if they rejected the treaties in the Bundestag.
The Federal Government and particularly the Social Democratic
parliamentary party did not attempt to hide the fact that the
foreign pressure was the safest guarantee for ratification of
2 6the treaties and the survival of the Federal Government. Not 
only the Western Allies but also the Soviet treaty partner 
tried to help the Brandt/Scheel Government.
At the beginning of March Pravda had pointed out the 
possible consequences of a rejection of the treaties by German 
Parliament. This was widely criticised by the CDU/CSU, parts 
of the press and even FDP Minister of the Interior Genscher as 
meddling with German domestic politics. Later on the Soviet 
attitude proved more useful for the West German Government. 
Moscow declared that the treaty would be interpreted by the 
Soviet side in the same manner as it was interpreted by Bonn; 
it was also hinted that the Soviet attitude towards the EEC 
would be revised; the German Government's letter which 
accompanied the treaty affirming the goal of German unity would 
not only be officially acknowledged but handed on to the 
appropriate committees of the Supreme Soviet (when Chancellor
^  FAZ, 28 March 1972; Der Spiegel, No. 14, 27 March 1972.
^  FAZ, 18 and 28 March 1972; SPD-Mitteilung fuer die Presse 
(Ed. H. Boerner), No. 77, 96 and 101, 11 and 24 March 1972; 
Bundespresseamtj Abt, Nachrichten, Referat II/4, deutsche 
Gruppe, Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen, Journalisten fragen - 
Politiker antworten, 23 March 1972.
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Adenauer had presented a similar letter in 1955 the receipt was
not even acknowledged by the Soviet Union); and, finally, the
Soviet Union would sign the trade treaty between the two
countries, which included West Berlin. This treaty had been a
controversial issue for a number of years and had always failed
27because of the Berlin clause.
Government Attempts and Persuasion Fail in the Committee
In the above context the Government attempted to argue its
case before the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee. Chancellor
Brandt himself appeared in extended sessions before the
Committee where he both elaborated in detail the Soviet
modifications and emphasised the international consequences of
2 8a rejection of the treaties by Parliament. Rainer Barzel 
responded outside the Committee. While recognising the Soviet 
explanations as a step forward, the CDU/CSU leader indicated
continuing opposition to the treaties, saying "this is not the
u 29 way".
Already at this stage it became apparent that the heavily 
partisan atmosphere in Parliament at large was preventing the 
development of integrative politics within the Committee. The 
Committee Vice-Chairman, SPD-MP Kurt Mattick, later explained
The attempt to develop common positions apart from the 
controversy has not yet proceeded very far. This has 
made it clear to us that the spokesmen of the CDU are 
determined that an acceptance of the treaties by the 
CDU should not eventuate.30
Thus it appears that the Opposition within the Committee was 
unwilling to seek clarifications of specific matters of concern
Die Melt, 9 and 10 March 1972; FAZ, 8-11 March 1972; 
Informationen dev Sozialdemokratischen Fraktion im Deutschen 
Bundestag (Ed. K. Wienand), Tagesdienstausgabe No. 198, 16 March 
1972; Frankfurter Rundschau, 17-18 March 1972; Der Spiegel,
No. 13, 20 March 1972.
o o
FAZ, 17 March 1972.
Die Melt, 25 March 1972.
30 Informationen der Sozialdemokratischen Fraktion im Deutschen 
Bundestag (Ed. K. Wienand), Tagesdienstausgabe No. 160, 8 March 
1972.
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to the conservative parties by working together with the SPD 
and FDP Committee members. Indeed, CDU Committee member 
Birrenbach stated flatly that he had never been interested in 
the details of the treaties but regarded Ostpolitik as wrong in 
principle. By approaching the question as a matter of 
principle (or as a means for parliamentary or electoral 
advantage) the Opposition both prevented the Committee from 
exerting independent influence on the nuances of Ostpolitik and 
also did not permit the Government to mobilise bipartisan 
Committee support for its policies.
A Temporary Lessening of Confrontation: ’The Calm Before
the Storm1
Because of the pressure from abroad and the instability of 
parliamentary majorities, it appeared at the end of March and 
at the beginning of April as if both sides were now seeking an 
agreement. Rainer Barzel explained that he "was not in a 
hurry"; several CDU politicians thought that it would be best 
not to have new elections before 1973. The CDU's criticism of 
the treaties became more moderate. CDU Treasurer and Shadow 
Cabinet member Walther Leisler-Kiep could even imagine that "an 
agreement will still be reached on the treaties between 
Government and Opposition". SPD politicians sought out the 
Premier of Rhineland-Palatinate, Helmut Kohl, to explore 
possibilities of how the treaties could be passed in the hostile 
Bundesrat. Even the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn, Valentin Falin, 
asked to hold talks with Helmut Kohl. Supporters of the Eastern 
Treaties within the SPD and FDP actually seemed to be afraid of 
further Soviet concessions of a 'cosmetic' nature because this 
would have backed the accusation by the CDU/CSU that the 
Government had not negotiated in a sufficiently tough manner. 
Such a 'gesture of good will' was the GDR declaration that 
citizens of West Berlin and of the Federal Republic would be 
allowed to visit the GDR during the Easter holidays. When 
opinion polls showed that the Baden-Wuerttemberg State elections 
would not result in a disaster for the Government, even CDU-MPs
31 Interview Birrenbach.
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began to backpedal and reject efforts to overthrow the
32Chancellor "as long as we are not quite certain to win".
FDP-MP Kienbaum informed the chairman of the FDP parliamentary
33party that he now intended to vote in favour of the treaties. 
This increased the chances for the Government to gain an 
absolute majority in favour of the treaties. However, a foreign 
policy expert of the SPD commented later: "We knew already that
this was only the calm before the storm".^
President of the German Bundestag Kai Uwe von Hassel also
prepared himself for a 'storm* 1 in Parliament: he asked public
servants to prepare a detailed account of legal difficulties
which he might be confronted with in the case of a resignation
of the Government, and in the event of a successful vote of no
35confidence by the Opposition.
Government Provocation and a Leak Heighten the Dispute
In early April a new and more combative atmosphere appeared 
between Government and Opposition. Initially it seemed as if 
the Government parties wanted a confrontation with the 
Opposition in Parliament or that they regarded such a 
confrontation with the Opposition as inevitable or even 
desirable. FDP leaders, now apparently less worried about 
election prospects, pointed out that all conditions set by the 
CDU/CSU for possible acceptance of the treaties had been met 
by the Soviet Union and the GDR, that opinion polls in the 
Federal Republic had proven the popularity of the Ostpolitik of 
the Brandt/Scheel Government, and that the CDU/CSU would be 
entirely isolated within the Federal Republic as well as 
internationally if they pursued their foreign policy line: "A
rejection by the CDU/CSU won't find any supporters within the
Frankfurter Rundschau, 26 March-12 April 1972; Die Welt,
1 Apr.il-13 April 1972; FAZ, 30 March-6 April 1972; Der Spiegel, 
No. 15 and 16, 3 and 10 April 1972.
33
Pressedienst der Bundestagsfraktion der FDP3 fdk-tagesdienst 
(Ed. E. Hoffmann) (hereafter cited fdk), No. 151/72, 13 April 
1972; FAZ, 13 April 1972.
34 Interview Wischnewski.
35 Der Spiegel, No. 16, 10 April 1972.
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Federal Republic or the Eastern and Western nations except for 
two groups: the right wing radical NPD and the Albanian
communists". ^
Herbert Wehner tried to ridicule the CSU "and besides the
CDU as well" because of their claim that the parliamentary
ratification of the treaties was up to Moscow and not the West
37German Government. The general secretary of the FDP, Karl-
Hermann Flach, encouraged the CDU/CSU to "come to their senses
3 8concerning the Ostpolitik". The head of the Chancellor's
Office, Horst Ehmke, requested "a clear answer at last" from the
CDU on two basic questions: "Does the Opposition seriously
believe we can depart from the territorial status quo in the
future? Is the Opposition in all seriousness against the Berlin 
39Treaty?" Obviously, the Government parties wanted to make use 
of both the disunity of the Opposition and foreign pressure on 
the CDU/CSU in order to gain advantages for future disputes on 
foreign as well as domestic policies.* 34^
Rainer Barzel might have hoped to become Chancellor even 
without new elections and a plebiscite on the Eastern Treaties 
and then have the treaties ratified - possibly with minor 
alterations - by his own Government. Franz Josef Strauss, 
however, was pressing so hard for a 'no' to the treaties that 
Barzel's room for manoeuver was seriously circumscribed.4'*'
Finally, in this atmosphere of heightened conflict the 
Opposition made use of the minutes of the German/Soviet 
negotiations which had been leaked by Foreign Affairs to 
CDU/CSU politicians.
fdk, Ausgabe 55, 4 April 1972.
37
Pressemitteilungen und Informationen der SPD (Ed. H. Wehner), 
No. 78/72, 5 April 1972.
3 R
fdk, Ausgabe 57, 6 April 1972.
39 Horst Ehmke, 'Opposition und Ostvertraege' in Bulletin,
No. 53, 13 April 1972, p.747.
4 0 fdk, No. 146/72, 11 April 1972.
41 F'AZ, 18 and 24 March 1972.
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The leaking of strictly confidential Government material 
was described by Der Spiegel as the most serious case of 
disclosure of confidential material in Germany since Bismarck 
on 24 October 1896 had released the 'reinsurance treaty' between 
the German Empire and Russia in order to internationally 
compromise his successor Caprivi. This latest indiscretion 
spoiled the last chance that might have existed for the 
Government and Opposition to reach an agreement on the Eastern 
Treaties. The embarrassment felt by the Government towards the 
public and its own backbenchers, not to mention the Soviet Union, 
left it in no mood to compromise. Barzel, for his part, had he 
wanted to modify his party's posture on the treaties could no 
longer do so with his party aroused by the new accusations. The 
tense atmosphere between the parties was manifested at a summit 
meeting in mid-April between representatives of the Opposition 
and the Government, ostensibly to explore possible common 
aspects with regard to Ostpolitik. This became the scene for 
Rainer Barzel to produce the minutes from his briefcase and 
hand them to the Chancellor with a request to check whether 
these notes were genuine. They were - more or less - genuine. 
However, as the Government stressed repeatedly, they were taken 
out of context and were slightly distorted so as to substantiate 
the suspicion that Bahr and Scheel had been weak and amateurish 
in their negotiations and Gromyko tough and successful. These 
notes were politically dangerous particularly as they were aimed 
at evoking the impression that Bonn had yielded to pressure from 
Moscow to recognise the German borders in an Ersatz-peace 
treaty - a subterfuge made necessary by German Basic Law which 
forced the altering of this de facto peace treaty into a 
non-aggression pact.
The publication of these notes offered the CDU/CSU the 
opportunity to renew their demands for access to all notes on
Der Spiegel, No. 18, 24 April 1972.
^  Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 14-29 April 1972; FAZ, 14-29 April 
1972; Die Welt, 14-29 April 1972; Der Spiegel, No. 17 and 18, 
17 and 24 April 1972.
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negotiations and deliberations. The Government was able to
refer to the fact that this would be against international
practice and that previous CDU Governments had never responded
4 4to requests of this nature. Furthermore, the Government
parties accused the Opposition, and in particular Rainer Barzel,
of basing their arguments on 'criminally obtained material*.
The Opposition was accused of "collaborating with forgers and
fanatics who endangered the public weal". The foreign policy
spokesman of the Opposition, Werner Marx, rejected this
accusation and declared that the 'panicky polemics' of the
Government could not detract from the fact that the German
negotiation partners in Moscow had "grossly acted against German
interests and had sought formulations which would deceive the
45public, parliament, the constitutional court and allies".
The Committee Votes for Ratification by a Partisan Vote
The Standing Orders of the Bundestag requiring Committee
action on treaties naturally brought the Ostpolitik issue before
the Foreign Affairs Committee. In mid-April the Committee
dealt with relevant reports by two other parliamentary
committees - the Committee for Intra-German relations, which
handled all matters dealing with the two German states, and
the legal Committee, which was responsible for examining the
the constitutionality of the Treaties. In the course of
Committee deliberations on these reports intransigent positions
46were taken by the Government and Opposition parties.
44 For an extensive documentation of the fierce disputes between 
Government and Opposition on this matter, see: G. Patz,
Barlament avis che Kontrolle der Aussenpolitik, Meisenheim, 1976 , 
pp.174-75.
4b FAZ, 21 April 1972.
4 6 Parlaments-Korrespondenz, heute im Bundestag (Ed. Presse- und 
Informationszentrum des Deutschen Bundestages), No. 88, 12 April 
1972; Schriftlicher Bericht des Auswaertigen Ausschusses zu dem 
Vertrag vom 7. Dezember 1970 zwischen der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen über die Grundlagen der 
Normalisierung ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen, BT, VI.WP, 
Drucksache VI/3396, Anlagen 1 und 2, pp.9-14; Schriftlicher 
Bericht des Auswaertigen Ausschusses zu dem Vertrag vom 
12. August 1970 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der 
Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken, BT, VI.WP, Drucksache 
VI/3397, Anlagen 1 und 2, pp.12-21.
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In this context the Opposition in the Committee adopted
delaying tactics since the full Parliament could not act until
there had been a Committee vote. These tactics, according to
SPD and FDP Committee members, involved "permanently repeating
47questions which had already been resolved". Moreover, Werner 
Marx (Chairman of the CDU/CSU party working group on foreign 
affairs) and Georg Kliesing (CDU/CSU spokesman of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee) again sought time through a letter to the 
CDU Committee Chairman Gerhard Schroeder requesting detailed 
information on the following points before a final Committee 
vote on the treaties:
1. the remark made on television by Paul Frank, State 
Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, that "for 
months the Foreign Ministry had been the target of 
German secret service organizations"; and
2. the published fragments of the Moscow minutes in 
order to gain "clarity on the true character of 
the published texts".
Dealing with these requests would have meant altering the
timetable which all parties within the Committee had agreed to,
a timetable calling for a vote on ratification of the Eastern
treaties and any possible additional motions by 25 April. The
Government parties refused to play the Opposition's game and
would not comment on these questions until after the vote. Thus
the vote was taken on schedule and the Committee supported
ratification upon strict party lines: 17 SPD and FDP votes
49against 16 CDU/CSU votes.
Informationen der Sozialdemokratischen Fraktion im Deutschen 
Bundestag (Ed. K. Wienand), Tagesdienstausgabe No. 254,
14 April 1972.
4 8 Letter by Werner Marx and Georg Kliesing to Gerhard Schroeder 
in: CDU/CSU- Fraktion des Deutschen Bundestages, Pressereferat,
21 April 1972.
49 Parlaments-Korrespondenz, heute im hundestag, No. 97,
25 April 1972; Interview Mattick.
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Even after this failure, however, the CDU/CSU sought 
further delays in the parliamentary legal committee. Although 
the legal committee had already issued a final positive 
statement concerning the treaties, CDU/CSU members tried to 
force renewed debate on the Eastern treaties during a special 
meeting of this committee. The publication of the Moscow 
minutes had posed new questions they argued which were "of 
greatest importance for the critical examination of the internal 
implications of the legal commitments entered into and their 
constitutional assessment". SPD-member of the legal committee 
Claus Arndt replied that it was not in accordance with the 
dignity of Parliament to base debates on 'anonymous 
concoctions' which were derived from 'criminal actions'. In 
this bitter atmosphere the CDU/CSU motion for re-opening the 
debate on Ostpolitik in the legal committee was rejected, again 
on strict party lines.
The Announcement of the Constructive Vote of No Confidence
The result of the Baden-Wuerttemberg state election on
23 April, which had been eagerly awaited, brought a majority of
52.9% for the CDU. But the SPD and FDP, too, had gained votes
in comparison with the federal election of 1969. However, it
was not the election result which was decisive, but rather the
fact that FDP-MP Helms left his party on the very day of the
election. Helms explained in a telegram that he left his party
because he had gained the conviction that the "position of
unconditional independence of the liberal middle" was not
supported anymore by the policy of the FDP parliamentary party.
According to Helms, the Baden-Wuerttemberg election result had
51not influenced his decision.
After Helms had left his party the Government was left with 
a majority of 249 to 247 votes in Parliament - and rumours 
increased that soon a number of additional coalition MPs would
FAZ, 26 April 1972; see also: Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 20 April
1972; Die Veit, 26 April 1972.
51 Die Veit, 24 April 1972.
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cross the floor. In this situation it became apparent that the 
emphasis was shifting from foreign to domestic issues. Not only 
had Helms' concern with "the independence of the liberal 
middle" been largely over internal matters, but the CDU Premier 
of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Filbinger, declared after his victory 
that the Eastern treaties would be decided in Bonn and it had 
been domestic issues which had decisively influenced the State 
election result. Generally one could detect a tendency 
within the CDU/CSU to seek confrontation with the Government 
over domestic policy. SPD Committee Vice-Chairman Kurt Mattick 
stated later:
The change in the direction of Opposition attacks from 
foreign to domestic policy for the second time within 
a few weeks supported our view in those days that the 
CDU/CSU strove for more than just the rejection of the 
Eastern treaties.53
On 24 April the CDU/CSU announced its strategy: it would seek
a constructive vote of no confidence in order to replace Willy 
Brandt with Rainer Barzel as Chancellor. This device of the 
German constitution requires that a parliamentary majority 
nominate an alternative Chancellor when voting a Government 
out of power. The political tactic behind this move was the 
Opposition's attempt to decouple the fate of the Government from 
the fate of Ostpolitik, a tactic reflecting the apparent trend 
to view domestic rather than foreign issues as the Government's 
major weakness. If the Government could be brought down on a 
sweeping range of issues rather than on the single question of 
Ostpolitik, it would have manifest advantages for the new CDU 
Chancellor. Domestically, it would decrease the SPD's ability 
to mobilise opinion on the Ostpolitik question. Internationally, 
it would allow a new Government to move towards ratification of 
the treaties - albeit undoubtedly after some face-saving 
adjustments.
52 FAZ, 24 April 1972. 
Interview Mattick.
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This strategy required some delicate footwork on the part
of Rainer Barzel. When he sought to justify the constructive
vote of no confidence, Barzel was forced to devote considerable
attention to Ostpolitik, particularly in order to reassure the
Western allies. Thus rather than flatly oppose Ostpolitik he
claimed that the Brandt Government was not in a position to
54have the Eastern treaties ratified in the Bundestag. The
clear implication of his statement that a Barzel Government 
could successfully implement Ostpolitik naturally raised 
questions in the minds of those elements in the CDU/CSU strongly 
opposed to Ostpolitik.
Nevertheless, Barzel*s approach was strategically sound.
In terms of the constructive vote of no confidence, Barzel could 
assume that the anti-Cstpolitik forces within the CDU/CSU would 
prefer his Eastern policies to those of the socialist Brandt. 
Moreover, once in power, he would have the full resources of 
Government at his disposal to win over such doubting colleagues 
as Strauss. Nothing succeeds in politics so much as success. 
However, this strategy held grave dangers for the Chancellor 
candidate. For, if he failed in the crucial vote, he would be 
open to attack from his party's right wing for having abandoned 
the agreed-upon position on Ostpolitik.
In the event, in one of the most dramatic votes in the 
history of the Bundestag, Barzel, on a secret ballot, came up 
two votes short of the absolute majority required. It appears 
that at least one Opposition member did not vote for Barzel.
The reasons remain obscure despite allegations of bribery on 
both sides of the House. What did become clear was that neither 
side could muster a working majority in the Bundestag. For the 
very day after the no confidence vote, Brandt's budget was not 
passed when an open vote resulted in a tie.
After the No Confidence Vote: Common Interest or Confrontation?
With the rejection of Brandt's budget a so-called week of 
harmony began. This apparent conciliatory period was an
54 Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 25 April 1972.
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outgrowth of disquiet and concern which had been expressed both
domestically and internationally following the no confidence
and budget votes. The spectacle of an evenly divided Parliament
with members crossing the floor, perhaps as a result of bribes,
sent ripples of anxiety throughout the German body politic. It
seemed to many West German voters that the politicians in Bonn
were in danger of approaching a point where the borderline
between legal and legitimate political conduct could become
55blurred in the eyes of at least half of the population.
The particular issue over which conciliatory efforts seemed
appropriate at the time was Ostpolitik. Indeed, with regard to
the Eastern treaties which were on the agenda for Bundestag
debate in early May, it was generally expected "for the ’yes'
of the Christian Democrats only the 'how' was still unclear"
and that even some of the ’hawks’ within the CDU/CSU agreed with 
56this. With regard to Ostpolitik, however, the disquiet and
concern shown by Eastern and W7estern states had at least as much
influence in creating ’harmony’ in Bonn as did domestic
pressure. The implications of this foreign concern were
apparent in a New York Times article by W. Averrell Harriman
which argued that the CDU/CSU in pursuit of domestic power had
upset the progress of reducing tensions in Europe and that the
United States should bring strong pressure to bear on the CDU
57in order to ensure ratification of the Eastern treaties.'
Thus we can see that in the period immediately following 
the no confidence vote the need to reassure both the German 
public and foreign leaders created a semblance of bipartisan 
civility in Bonn.
55 Marion Graefin Doenhoff, Bonn ist doch nicht Weimar, Dieter 
Buhl, Staatsmann bei Stahlwerkern, both in: Die Zeit, No. 18,
5 May 1972; Der Spiegel, No. 19, 1 May 1972; Ernst Guenter 
Vetter, Was der 1. Mai nicht sein sollte in FAZ, 29 April 1972.
Juergen Busche, 'Das Trauma des 17. Mai' in FAZ, 10 May 1973. 
57 W. Averrell Harriman, 'Giving Brandt a Chance’ in New York 
Times, 2 May 1972.
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How deep was this 'week of harmony'? A careful 
reconstruction of the events suggests that in spite of the 
above pressures key actors in both major parties - notably 
Herbert Wehner (SPD) and Franz-Josef Strauss (CSU) - were at 
no time prepared to look for common ground between Government 
and Opposition on the question of Ostpolitik.
Immediately after failure of the vote of no confidence, 
cabinet and chairmen of the Government's parliamentary parties 
met to decide on future tactics and strategies. Although the 
Government parties agreed to continue work as normal and to 
"force the CDU/CSU to a truce with an appeal for unity", this 
did not mean that Herbert Wehner would make it easy for the 
CDU/CSU to agree to the treaties. When Erhard Eppler had 
suggested during the cabinet meeting to seriously try to reach 
an agreement with the Opposition on Federal elections, Herbert
C OWehner had replied: "Now is the time to be hard".
As indicated before, Herbert Wehner could rely on the
attitude of western and eastern foreign countries when using 
59his tactics. According to his view, the "ratification
timetable" could not be changed because of "foreign policy
necessities". In an interview with the Deutschlandfunk on
29 April he indirectly admitted that the Government had to some
extent given in to Rainer Barzel in that they did not insist on
holding the ratification debate during the following week, but
there was "not much play in this" and this was "no domestic
6 0policy ... but a foreign policy question".
In actual fact, however, the 'foreign policy necessities' 
did not prevent the Government from granting the CDU/CSU more 
time than Herbert Wehner had been prepared to do. On 3 May 1972 
Herbert Wehner had succeeded in reaching an agreement with
Der Spiegel, No. 19, 1 May 1972.
59 FAZ, 27 April 1972.
6 0 Informationen der Sozialdemokratischen Fraktion im Deutschen 
Bundestag (Ed. K. Wienand), Tagesdienstausgabe No. 286,
29 April 1972.
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Federal Chancellor Brandt that the ratification of the Eastern 
treaties should be settled by 10 May. The Federal Chancellor 
admitted that the spirit of the parliamentary party was "quite 
good" but that "the colleagues ... soon want to have more than 
just parliamentary party meetings. They want to know when the 
Bundestag will resume work".^ In other words, the SPD 
parliamentary Party members, led by H. Wehner, wanted to force 
a vote on the Eastern treaties before Rainer Barzel could sort 
out his internal party problems. Wehner's tactics, however, 
were limited by both the Government's concern with the passage 
of the Eastern treaties and public opinion during the period 
of 'harmony' which would not allow for blatant inter-party 
conflict.
Franz Josef Strauss, of course, felt similar pressures.
On 2 May the Frankfurter Rundschau reported that "a joint
resolution was in sight" after the four party chairmen Brandt,
Barzel, Scheel and Strauss had met and reached a
6 2"rapprochement". It is to be questioned, however, to what 
degree Strauss was really willing to reach a compromise. His 
participation in the meeting of the chairmen can be seen as a 
tactical response to the atmosphere of 'harmony'. Indeed, 
Strauss was under pressure from the right wing of his own party 
which argued strongly against an understanding on Ostpolitik. 
Thus, the CSU party working group on Ostpolitik warned the 
Federal Opposition:
This Ostpolitik endangers domestic and foreign peace, 
it acts contrary to unity, disregards justice and 
jeopardises freedom. These reservations against the 
treaties cannot be overcome by a resolution by the 
Bundestag nor by a preamble to the ratification acts.
Such one-sided declarations would not make the least 
difference to the contents of the treaties.63
The Rheinische Merkur, a paper supporting the CDU/CSU, explained 
in detail which consequences would follow a possible agreement
^  Willy Brandt, Interview in Mittagsmagazin, Westdeutscher 
Rundfunk II, in Bundespresseamt, Abt. Nachrichten, Anhang I,
3 May 1972.
^  Frankfurter Rundschau, 2 May 3.972.
6 3 Frankfurter Rundschau, 3 May 1972.
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by the CDU/CSU to the treaties. This would irritate the 
conservative voter and possibly cause the foundation of a new 
party which was more oriented towards the 'right'. "It does 
not take a computer to work out from which party such a new 
party would gain its votes''.^
Strauss, however, saw tactical advantages in his apparent 
conciliatory stance. The working out of a joint resolution 
allowed the CDU/CSU to present its own draft which caused the 
Government acute embarrassment by using the Government's own 
statements for domestic consumption over the preceding years.
As early as 2 May the CDU/CSU had indicated that utterances 
from Government members made in speeches and statements in the 
Bundestag and in the respective committees could be used as the 
basis for a joint draft resolution. On 3 May the Opposition 
published 'their' draft resolution.^ Here the Opposition's 
main concern was that the modus-vivendi character of the German- 
Soviet treaty was stressed and that the reunification of Germany 
would not be ruled out; in short, that the treaties wTould not 
have the effect of a boundary treaty and thus were not of legal 
nature. The renunciation of force was thus the 'core' of the 
treaty and not just a 'substantial part'. Furthermore the 
Opposition requested that, after an agreement on this question, 
the Soviet Union should not only accept the parliamentary 
resolution without objections but also approve it under 
international law.^^
While attempts were made on different levels to reach an 
agreement between Government and Opposition, it was of course 
difficult for the Government to explain that their own statements
Otto R. Roegele, Gemeinsamkeit - aber welche? in Rheinischer 
Merkur, No. 18, 5 May 1972.
^  FAZ, 3 May 1972; Wortlaut des von der CDU/CSU vorgelegten 
Entschliessungsentwurfes, in Die Welt, 4 May 1972.
^  Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 4 May 1972; Die Welt, 3 May 1972.
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in the Bundestag were not necessarily suitable for a
parliamentary resolution. The Minister of the Chancellor's
Office, Horst Ehmke, tried to solve this problem: ".. . one
cannot accomplish a task like this which is connected with
great responsibilities particularly for the Government by simply
picking a few sentences out of various documents which were not
intended for international use [!] and then somehow putting
6 7these sentences together".
Herbert Wehner evaded such difficulties with great skill.
Based on the assumption that the chances for an agreement with
the Opposition were in any case 'quite insignificant' he stated:
"Foreign policy treaties are not material for games on a
6 8domestic policy football field". He warned that the striving 
for a joint resolution by the Bundestag contained the danger of 
becoming a 'treaty on the treaty'. He told the CSU and "besides 
the CDU" that it was "a bad joke" that a signed treaty which had 
already been ratified in Moscow could not be passed by the 
Parliament in Bonn until the Soviet Union had further bound 
itself under international law on a resolution of the German 
Bundestag which had not even been completed. "The treaties have 
been negotiated and are signed. The treaties themselves cannot, 
be altered". If the CSU was of the opinion that these treaties 
were bad "for domestic and foreign policy" they could vote "no". 
"... Nobody could deny this right". But "all this" was anyhow 
only a "screen" behind which the CDU/CSU tried to blame the SPD 
and FDP for "allegedly not having done enough in order to make 
the treaties acceptable for the CDU/CSU". As the Opposition 
could determine the limit of agreement between Government and 
Opposition, Barzel was only intent on gaining time to hide this 
fact from the public. In other respects President Nixon's
Horst Ehmke zu dem Bemuehen von Koalition und Opposition, 
eine gemeinsame Basis fuer die Aussenpolitik zu finden, 
Interview zum Zeitgeschehen, Suedwestfunk, 7 May 1972, in 
Bundespresseamt, Abteilung Nachrichten (hereafter cited as BPA, 
Abt. N.), Anhang II, pp.6-8.
6 8 Die Vielt, 4 May 1972; see also: Theo Sommer, Neues
Feldgeschrei nuetzt niemandem in Die Zeit, No. 19, 12 May 1972.
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visit to Moscow and the planned NATO Council meeting in Bonn 
did not allow any further delay: "On Tuesday and Wednesday it
will have to be decided".^
Generally the leadership of the SPD expressed themselves
far more moderately but they went along with Wehner's opinion
that "the decision on the Eastern treaties has to be arrived at 
7 0at last". However, a few hours later this decision was again
deferred: Barzel and the CDU/CSU believed that not enough had
yet been achieved by way of new agreements. The Government
tried to make it easier for the Opposition to approve of the
treaties by allowing CDU-MP Birrenbach to have read to him in
the Foreign Ministry the minutes of the Moscow treaty
negotiations. It was also hoped that talks between US Secretary
of State Rogers and Messrs Brandt, Scheel and particularly
Barzel would bring new progress. Rainer Barzel declared that
on Tuesday, 9 May, the Opposition would decide on their final 71stand.
In the period leading up to the Opposition’s decision, 
negotiations were carried on between the Government and 
Opposition sides through a variety of contacts. The most 
important, apart from the meetings of the four party leaders, 
was the drafting committee consisting of Franz Josef Strauss, 
Chairman of the CDU/CSU working Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
V7erner Marx, the Minister of the Interior, FDP-MP Genscher and 
Head of the Chancellor's Office, SPD-MP Professor Ehmke. From 
the perspective of this thesis it is significant to note that 
these arrangements by and large by-passed the Bundestag Foreign 
Affairs Committee.
Herbert Wehner zur Situation um die Ratifizierung der 
Ostvertraege, Die Woche in Bonn, Norddeutscher Rundfunk, 6 May 
1972, in: BPA, Abt. N., Anhang IV.
7 0 /Kommunique ueber die Sitzung des Vorstandes der SPD am 5. Mai 
1972 in Bonn (Teil I), in: SPD-Pressemitteilungen und
Informationen (Ed. H. Wehner), No. 176/72, 5 May 1972.
Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 6 May 1972.71
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Not only was the Committee forum ignored at this crucial 
stage, but of the members of the drafting body only Marx was a 
full Committee member. Strauss had the status of an alternate 
Committee member, but it is clear that both Marx and Strauss 
were chosen in capacities other than those connected with the 
Foreign Affairs Committee. Strauss, of course, wras leader of 
the CSU, while Marx's position as head of the CDU/CSU working 
group and as party spokesman on foreign affairs was clearly the 
reason for his selection. Moreover, both were known as 
opponents of Ostpolitik and therefore convenient choices for 
Barzel since they would then be responsible for any compromise. 
On the Government side both Genscher and Ehmke were selected as 
Cabinet members and not as representatives of the parliamentary 
party to say nothing of the Foreign Affairs Committee. In sum, 
in this situation where the stakes were immense for the power 
of the Government and Opposition, the vital decision-making 
functions were assumed by the highest party leaders leaving no 
role for the Committee to work out a compromise solution 
oriented towards the substance of policy.
In any case, the deliberations of the party leaders and 
of the drafting committee had less to do with matters of 
substance than with face-saving manoeuvres.
During the meetings of the drafting committee efforts
focused on how Moscow was supposed to accept a decision of the
West German Bundestag and on the question of "self-
72determination". Parliamentary secretary of the CDU Olaf von
Wrangel had publicly admitted that if the CDU/CSU insisted on
their goals, this would bring about new negotiations with 
7 3Moscow. Chairman of the CDU/CSU party working committee on 
foreign policy Werner Marx had also stated that a parliamentary 
resolution was only meaningful if it was "interpreted in the
Die Welt, 6-7 May 1972; Karl Wienand zur Situation in Bonn, 
Interview, Westdeutscher Rundfunk, 6 May 1972, in BPA, Abt. N., 
Anhang VI.
73 Olaf von Wrangel zur Ratifizierung der Ostvertraege, 
Interview, Saarlaendischer Rundfunk, 7 May 1972, in: BPA,
Abt. N., Anhang IX.
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same way by the German and by the Soviet side". It was not 
only unusual in international practice but quite absurd that 
Moscow should agree to new negotiations and explicitly declare 
the CDU/CSU's interpretation of the treaty as binding for the 
Soviet Union. It was always clear that nothing could be 
factually changed in the treaties and the Soviet interpretation 
of the treaties. In actual fact they represented a boundary 
treaty and - if one likes - a confirmation of the fears held by 
the CDU/CSU. Theoretically it was only a treaty on 
renunciation of force.
While the Government could refer to one side or the other 
according to the requirements of the situation, the Opposition 
had to content themselves with the theoretical aspect of the 
treaties if they wanted to have even a small influence on the 
German interpretation of the treaties. This was a difficult 
task for a party which normally preferred to follow a 'realistic' 
and practical foreign policy. This 'ambiguity' in the treaties 
was described by Werner Marx in a very picturesque, if 
simplified, manner as "politics of winking", the reasons for
7 5which were possibly different "within [Germany] and outside".
Herbert Wehner marked the Opposition by saying there was
nothing to be decided as some people were only "fumbling with
a legend". Marx reacted angrily charging that Wehner had made
7 6it quite clear that he did not wish an agreement. He claimed
Wehner would feel "the striving for an agreement ... as 
obstructive", regarded "the whole affair as not serious" and 
regarded "the treaties actually more ... as a weapon in the 
domestic policy battle ... than as an element of serious foreign 
policy".^
74 Werner Marx zur Behandlung der Ostvertraege, Bericht aus 
Bonn, Deutsches Fernsehen, 5 May 1972, in BPA, Abt. N., Anhang X
75 Ibid.? Werner Marx zu den Bemuehungen um die Ostvertraege, 
Mittags-Magazin, Norddeutscher Rundfunk II, 6 May 1972, in: BPA
Abt. N., Anhang XII.
^  Ibid.
77 Werner Marx zu Fragen der Ostvertraege, Politik der Woche, 
Sueddeutscber Rundfunk, 6 May 1972, in: BPA, Abt. N., Anhang XI
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In his anger Marx expressed, on 7 May, v/hy he found the
treaties to be disturbing: "One has to look closely at the
contents, the implications which they have, the consequences
for us. I regard all this as exactly that which Herbert Wehner
in his own drastic language once called 'a disaster of 
7 8policy!'". To prevent Herbert Wehner's policy from becoming
a disaster for the CDU/CSU as we11, Marx made it quite clear
that the CDU/CSU did not feel defenceless in any way: "If there
is no agreement ... on a joint resolution we will of course
issue our own resolution and present this resolution for a vote
79in the Bundestag".
Confusion over this situation must have been felt by the
CDU/CSU expellees' MPs. Theoretically they could have been
indifferent to the efforts for agreement between Government and
Opposition; as far as they were concerned the Eastern treaties
were out of line with the constitution, with or without a
resolution. In practice, however, CSU-MP and expellee
representative Czaja pointed out the dangers to which Rainer
Barzel had exposed himself within his party: "We observe very
closely on whom we can rely in serious difficulties. We are not
a sponsoring party for those who want to avoid responsibilities.
8 0We are prepared to support those who help us!" Der Spiegel
reported that some groups within the CDU/CSU already backed
Gerhard Schroeder as the Opposition's new candidate for the
81Chancellorship.
Werner Marx zu den Kontroversen um die Ostvertraege und ueber 
die Situation nach 'stattgehabter' Entscheidung, Interview der 
Woche, Deutschlandfunk, 7 May 1972, in: BPA, Abt. N., Anhang
XIII.
7 9 Werner Marx zu Fragen der Ostvertraege, Politik der Woche, 
Sueddeutscher Rundfunk, 6 May 1972, in: BPA, Abt. N., Anhang XI.
8 0. Rede des Praesidenten Dr, Herbert Czaja MdB auf der 
Deutschland- Kundgebung des Bundes der Vertriebenen am 7.5.1972 
auf dem Bonner Marktplatz, unkorrigiertes Manuskript; see also: 
Rede des Vizepraesidenten Dr. Herbert Hupka MdB auf der 
Deutschland-Kundgebung des Bundes der Vertriebenen am 7.5.1972 
auf dem Bonner Marktplatz, unkorrigiertes Manuskript.
O 1
Der Spiegel, No. 20, 8 May 1972.
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The so-called 'week of harmony' thus had existed only for
Rainer Barzel and a few CDU politicians on the one side and
Willy Brandt and some Ministers on the other side. Gerhard
Schroeder, in the presence of Government members, had described
Barzel's unrelenting efforts for an agreement on a parliamentary
8 2resolution as useless: "The treaties interpret themselves".
Rainer Barzel himself must have known that. However, he wanted 
to rid himself of the problems of Ostpolitik which were irksome 
with respect to new elections and international contacts and was 
looking for a way to achieve this without any great loss of face 
for himself and his party. The question was in how far the CSU, 
parts of the CDU, parts of the SPD around Herbert Wehner and the 
Soviet Government were prepared to help him in this task.
The Tactics of Franz Josef Strauss in the Drafting Committee
Help alone was not quite enough: in order to prevent a
split in his parliamentary party over this question Rainer 
Barzel also needed time. More time was requested by the CDU the 
first thing on Monday morning, 8 May. The statement of US 
Secretary of State Rogers to Barzel that in view of the Vietnam 
crisis it was not certain whether President Nixon would visit 
the Soviet Union at the scheduled time was used to justify 
further delay. Also, CDU-MP and opponent to the treaties Kurt 
Birrenbach claimed he needed at least 'a fortnight' in order to 
gain a general view from the minutes of the Moscow meetings.
And Franz Josef Strauss declared: "I think ... this haste is
wrong". Since the Eastern treaties had been discussed for such
a long time, he argued that "a few more weeks would not
, , „ 83matter".
Herbert Wehner reacted immediately: the debate on the
treaties would commence in the Bundestag as scheduled on 
Tuesday. An agreement with the Opposition was possible, he
82 Ibid.
8 3 Stuttgarter Zeituiig, 9 May 1972; Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 9 May 
1972; Die Welt, 9 May 1972.
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84stated, but this was now "entirely up to the Opposition".
Franz Josef Strauss had seen the possibility of an agreement
with the accommodation by the opposite side: the Government and
the Soviet Union. "After today's talks" - referring to a
meeting of the CSU leadership in Munich - the CSU would insist
that the Soviet Union confirm the joint resolution by the
Bundestag as the Soviet interpretation of the treaty "through
8 5a corresponding announcement under international law". Armed 
with the decision of the CSU leadership Strauss could risk 
entering the decisive talks with the Government as the CSU's 
representative on the drafting committee.
Before the final and decisive meeting of the drafting 
committee, Ehmke, on 7 May, met with the Soviet Ambassador to 
Bonn to determine how flexible the Soviet position was. 
Misunderstandings arising at this meeting would have major 
repercussions affecting Strauss' tactical position and the mood 
of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party. According to Ehmke, Falin 
gave his approval to a draft resolution incorporating the 
CDU/CSU view that the treaties did not present a legal basis 
for the existing boundaries - an approval apparently based on 
the misconception that the draft had been agreed to by 
Government and Opposition.
On the basis of this Ehmke gained Strauss' approval for 
an overall resolution in which the CSU leader gave up his 
earlier demand for a statement advocating the reunification of 
the nation. Strauss' agreement was contingent upon final 
Soviet acceptance of the border clause and approval by the
O /TCDU/CSU parliamentary party.
There are two alternative ways of judging Strauss' tactics:
84 Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 9 May 1972.
8 5 Stuttgarter Zeitung, 9 May 1972.
O £ See: Der Spiegel, No. 21, 15 May 1972; Werner Diederichs,
CDU und CSU haetten fast ihr weitgestecktes Ziel erreicht, in: 
Die Welt, 10 May 1972.
291
1. Either the leader of the CSU had 'capitulated' and 
had no more decisive reservations against the 
Eastern treaties after the agreement on the joint 
resolution; or
2. he assumed that Ehmke had made a tactical mistake 
and that either the SPD or the Soviet Government 
would not go along with a resolution of this 
nature.
If Strauss indeed was assuming a tactical error on Ehmke's part, 
he would have achieved the absolute optimum: the treaties could
be rejected; the 'fault' would lie with Ehmke and the Government 
who could not compel the Soviet Union or their own parliamentary 
party to go along after the drafting committee had agreed on a 
compromise with the CDU/CSU.
Even according to some public servants in the Foreign 
Ministry, Ehmke had made 'a mistake' by accepting Strauss' 
demand concerning borders. Members of the Ministry told the 
author that they, in contrast to the Federal Chancellor, had 
warned Horst Ehmke against accepting publicly the so-called 
'Strauss paragraph* which had been drafted by the Ministry 
itself but had only been intended for 'use within Germany'. Kka 
Although this would not change anything concerning the rights 
and duties under the treaties, the Soviet Union might possibly 
raise objections for 'reasons of prestige'. Furthermore, the 
'moral impulse' of the treaties, acknowledging the errors of the 
past, would be lost to a large extent. Some SPD-MPs, in talks 
with the author, expressed similar opinions, particularly with 
regard to the second part of the argument.
Further Confusion Strengthens Confrontation Tactics
With Falin's 'approval' Strauss' hopes for avoiding the 
opprobrium for rejecting the treaties now rested solely with the 
SPD parliamentary party led by Herbert Wehner. The problem was 
that the CDU/CSU had to deal with the issue before the meeting 
of its Government counterpart. The attitudes of Strauss and 
Marx are suggested by the fact that during the CDU/CSU 
parliamentary party meeting neither spoke in favour of the
This account cov^irw i& p f by b.< Se./hm cihn.
Zlnbz-\rv/ejAj £<&/fb w a  JJb .
292
8 7agreement which they had negotiated. Werner Marx even stated
that the deliberations in the drafting committee "had not quite
finished yet" and that "one point" was still to be agreed 
88upon.
While several MPs had spoken in favour of the treaties,
several leading CDU politicians, among them Barzel's competitors
Schroeder and Kohl, strongly opposed CDU/CSU support of the
Eastern treaties. Furthermore, a number of CSU-MPs announced
their strict opposition to the treaties and said that an
agreement was 'unthinkable'. Journalist Klaus R. Dreher
commented: "It is equally unthinkable that they should hcive
8 °formed this opinion against the opinion of their Chairman"«,
In this volatile situation the news broke that Moscow had
reversed Falin's acceptance of the border clause. The meeting
immediately broke up amid expressions of confusion, anger and
outrage. Within a few hours, however, the Russian position was
again reversed for reasons which remain obscure. Barzel,
claiming he was still confused by developments, said he needed 
9 0sleep and could not be contacted by Foreign Affairs officials,
91despite repeated efforts during the night.
The next day, when the vote on the Eastern treaties was 
scheduled, the CDU/CSU unanimously came out in opposition and 
threatened to reject the treaties if a vote was forced. Herbert
87 FAZ, 10 May 1972.
8 8 Klaus R. Dreher, Trennen Bonn und Moskau wirklich zwei 
Punkte?, in: Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 10 May 1972.
89 Ibid.
9 0 This later assumed significance as Barzel was ridiculed both 
by the Government and Franz Josef Strauss for his conduct during 
a period of crisis.
91 Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 10 May 1972; FAZ, 12 May 1972; Der 
Spiegel, No. 21, 15 May 1972.
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Wehner was in no mood to yield to the threats of the Opposition. 
While he could hardly argue the point in public, Wehner saw the 
electoral advantage of pushing for a vote on the treaties even 
if the result was negative. Wehner, however, was finally 
stopped by the Government which was more concerned over the 
fate of the treaties and agreed to a further delay of the vote.
Although Barzel and the Government, after new negotiations, 
agreed to the previous resolution, Wehner and Strauss stuck to 
their guns. Wehner did his best to provoke the CDU/CSU
92hardliners by declaring the resolution "legal bullshit", and
further claimed that a Bundestag resolution was of no
significance in the field of foreign relations which were solely
9 3a responsibility of the Government. Rainer Barzel attempted
to ignore Wehner1s barbs and convince his parliamentary party
to accept the resolution. The barbs of Strauss, however,
carried greater wTeight within the CDU/CSU. Strauss declared
that he would split the Opposition if there were any 'yes' votes
in favour of the treaties from the Opposition. As a result most
Opposition members abstained while a few hardliners voted
94against the treaties.
Franz Josef Strauss had been guided throughout by the view 
that a ’yes' from the Opposition would have to be paid for by 
the loss of too many votes from the right. But because he did 
not succeed in creating a situation where the SPD parliamentary 
party would provide sufficient excuses for a 'no' from the 
Opposition, the Ostpolitik issue became a positive factor for 
the Government in the subsequent Federal election. Wehner and 
Strauss had both attempted to place the responsibility for
Der Spiegel, No. 21, 15 May 1972.
9 3 Informationen der Sozialdemokratischen Fraktion im Deutschen 
Bundestag (Ed. K. Wienand), Tagesdienstausgabe 305, 10 May 1972.
^  Die Zeit, Mo. 20 and 22, 19 May and 2 June 1972; Der Spiegel, 
No. 21 and 22, 15 and 22 May 1972; FAZ, 12 May 1972; Rheinischer 
Merkur, 12 May 1972; Frankfurter Rundschau, 17 May 1972.
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failure - a failure they both had hoped for - in the efforts to 
reach a bipartisan agreement at each other's doorstep. In the 
end Strauss completed what Wehner had regarded as his task: to
increase the unpopularity of Rainer Barzel and provide the 
Government with a decisive advantage in the election campaign 
as a result of the CDU/CSU abstaining on a fundamental foreign 
policy issue.
CONCLUSION
As we have seen in the preceding chapter, in the mid-1950s 
the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee exercised little 
independent influence on German foreign policy. By the 1960s, 
however, following the adoption of a new foreign policy approach 
by the SPD, the Foreign Affairs Committee began to exert 
influence through the use of integrative politics. Thus in 
such diverse cases as the Jaksch-Report, the Franco-German 
Treaty and the Mundat Forest Treaty, the Committee had a major 
influence on foreign policy outcomes. In this period a 
tradition of Committee involvement in foreign affairs grew 
within the Federal Republic. Committee members came to 
jealously guard their perceived rights and responsibilities in 
the foreign policy sphere. Yet after more than a dozen years 
of the development of such a tradition, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee was essentially impotent during the Ostpolitik crisis 
of 1972 - despite the fact that under the Bundestag standing 
orders its action was required on the related treaties. How did 
this state of affairs come to pass?
The impotence of the Committee grew out of the larger 
situation in German politics. The crucial factor was nearly 
equal division of the Parliament between Government and 
Opposition plus the volatility of a handful of key votes. Thus 
at any moment it was possible to imagine the SPD-FDP coalition 
being removed from office and replaced by the CDU/CSU and, 
moreover, to believe that new Federal elections would in any 
case be imminent. Ironically, this very situation which 
emasculated the Committee served to greatly enhance the 
influence of Parliament as a whole. With the very fate of the
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Government hanging on a parliamentary vote on Ostpolitik, the 
need of both sides to gain a majority gave great weight to 
those wavering elements of Parliament who had to be won over.
In this sense the ability of the full Bundestag to modify 
Government policy was significant.
In these circumstances divisive politics formed a prominent 
but not the sole feature of political developments. Within the 
Bundestag MPs on both sides and particularly leaders Wehner and 
Strauss were constantly conscious of the consequences of their 
positions on Ostpolitik for both the survival of the Government 
and the expected elections. This could not be the only factor, 
however, because the substance of Ostpolitik was a vital concern 
to both individual politicians and important sections of the 
German public on policy and ideological grounds. Even W7ehner 
saw important intrinsic value in the success of Ostpolitik as 
a way of absolving the German nation for the sins of the past. 
Moreover, the Government itself tended to place at least equal 
weight on securing the passage of the treaties as on any 
electoral advantage. Thus in the last stages of the crisis it 
was willing to yet again postpone a vote on the treaties in 
hopes of obtaining backing. The Opposition, too, was 
constrained from taking a totally partisan stance. This was 
both because there were elements of the CDU who also saw the 
benefits of Ostpolitik and, more significantly, because of the 
heavy international pressures from both East and West seeking 
CDU/CSU approval.
While this mixture of divisive and limited integrative 
politics enhanced the influence of the full House, it was not 
conducive to influence by the Foreign Affairs Committee. First 
of all, the critical nature of the decision for the survival of 
the Government shifted the focus of political activity to a 
level above the Foreign Affairs Committee - to the leaders of 
the parties themselves. Moreover, the heavy intrusion of 
divisive politics into the unfolding events created an 
atmosphere of tension, rhetoric and suspicion. This atmosphere
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was not suitable for the kind of substantive policy discussions 
backed by expertise which had been the hallmark of integrative 
politics within the Committee.
While the elements of integrative politics which did exist 
could come to the fore at various points in the drama on the 
floor of the House, these tentative elements lacked the 
stability required by the working methods of the Committee.
CONCLUSION
The Reality and Limits of Committee Influence
The first aim of this thesis was to demonstrate, in 
contrast to the assertions of various analysts, that 
parliamentary Committees can, under certain conditions, exert 
influence over the conduct of foreign policy. In the first six 
case studies, varying degrees of influence have been shown.
At an impressionistic level one can see greater or lesser 
degrees of influence in the various cases. Thus, the successful 
insistence of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee on a 
preamble to the Franco-German Treaty clearly reflected greater 
Committee influence than the Australian Joint Parliamentary 
Committee's Report on Aid, the recommendations of which became 
policy less because of the political strength of the Committee 
than because of similar views within the Whitlam Government.
In other cases, however, it is more difficult to say 
precisely where the greater influence was exerted. Thus, 
although in the case of the blockade of the Mundat Forest 
Treaty, the Committee exerted what is perhaps the ultimate 
degree of influence, this can be seen as a relatively 
insignificant issue.
In contrast, in the NATO decision the Committee was unable 
to secure the policies it desired but it nevertheless played a 
major role in forcing the Prime Minister to alter significantly 
his objectives in the most important foreign policy decision 
taken in post-war Canada.
In which case can the Committee's influence be said to 
be greater?
It is useful to make another comment concerning influence. 
Influence can be perceived as being either direct or indirect. 
Direct influence can be conceived as occurring in cases where 
the Committee's position is actually realised in the nation's 
foreign policy as a result of either the constitutional powers 
or political and/cr persuasive force of the Committee. The
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blockage of the Mundat Forest Treaty and the preamble to the 
Franco-German Treaty are both cases in which the Bundestag 
Committee used its constitutional power of acting on treaties 
to secure or enforce acceptance of its views.
In the case of the West Indian Sugar Agreement, however, 
the Canadian Senate Committee lacked such legislative powers. 
Instead, it relied on its expertise and persuasiveness to 
convince the relevant foreign policy decision-makers of the 
wisdom of its views.
Indirect influence can be seen in those cases where the 
Committee either did not secure all of its objectives or only 
set broad outlines for future Government policy. As indicated 
above, the NATO decision was a prime example of the first type 
of situation. The second set of circumstances can be seen in 
the case of the Jaksch-Report, where the Committee’s action 
served to indicate that a political climate existed in Germany 
upon which new policy initiatives could be taken.
It is important to re-emphasise that the first six case 
studies of this thesis were selected with a view to 
demonstrating the possibility of parliamentary Committee 
influence on foreign policy. Thus, these cases cannot 
necessarily be considered as representative of Committee 
performances in general. Indeed, the studies of the post-EDC 
period and Ostpolitik demonstrate that even in the German 
system, where the Committee was most powerful both in terms of 
legal rights and political tradition, the Committee could be 
essentially impotent if certain conditions existed. Thus, a 
major conclusion of this thesis is that in parliamentary 
systems Foreign Affairs Committees can exert influence - not 
that they invariably do exert influence.
In the following section we shall attempt to delineate the 
factors which enable Foreign Affairs Committees to exert 
influence. The question immediately arises, however, of the 
extent to which there are common factors transcending individual 
political systems which determine political influence. Clearly,
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the different legal norms of the German, Canadian and Australian 
systems determine to a significant degree the possibilities for 
influence.
Gordon Reid has suggested "... that if the legislative 
function is weak ... the ability of the Houses to control the 
bureaucracy is also weak ....".  ^ To this, I would add 'all 
other things being equal'. But in politics all other factors 
are rarely equal. While the above case studies generally 
support Reid's assertion, their larger contribution is to focus 
on the other political factors. It is in such political factors 
that commonalities across systems are revealed - commonalities 
in the types of political behaviour which are likely to lead or 
not to lead to political influence.
The Politics of Influence
W7hat then can be identified as possible key factors 
enhancing Committee influence? As already indicated legal 
powers have considerable bearing on the influence which 
Committees can exert.
The provision of the Bundestag standing orders that a 
treaty must be reviewed by the Committee before it can come 
before the full House for ratification has significantly 
contributed to the fact that the German Committee has been the 
most powerful of the three examples.
While the crucial importance of the Committee's legal 
powers was evident in the case of the Mundat Forest Treaty, 
these powers, while significant, are only a partial explanation 
of the Committee's success in obtaining a preamble to the 
Franco-German Treaty. The international pressures (see below) 
brought to bear in this case were, among other factors, needed 
to galvanise the Committee into making use of its legal powers.
G.S. Reid, 'Parliament and the Bureaucracy1 in John Wilkes 
(Ed.), Who Runs Australia?, Sydney, 1972, pp.3-4.
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The case of Ostpolitik demonstrated that the mere existence of 
such legal powers does not guarantee their conversion into
2political influence if the broader context is unfavourable.
Perhaps the best summation of the role of legal powers is 
to say that they provide the German Committee, but far less so 
the Canadian and least of all the Australian Committee, with 
tools which ski]led politicians can use to enhance Committee 
influence provided that wider political circumstances do not 
inhibit such action.
Another factor to be considered is the Committee1s 
relationship with the bureaucracy. It might be hypothesised 
that the influence of a Committee is enhanced when it develops 
close co-operative ties with the foreign policy bureaucrats. 
Indeed, in the case of the Jaksch-Report such co-operation was 
maintained and it facilitated the education of various 
political actors on the Committee which, in turn, aided the 
achievement of the political consensus upon which new 
initiatives to the East could be based. In other cases, the 
bureaucracy provided the Committee with information and opinions 
which contributed to the persuasiveness of the Committee’s 
position. In yet further cases, however, the bureaucracy's 
position vis-a-vis the Committee was not one of harmonious 
support. In the Mundat Forest Treaty, for example, the 
Committee flatly rejected the position of the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry. In the case of post-EDC foreign policy, the 
bureaucracy's actions served to support the Government's 
position and not to develop an independent Committee influence.
In the Australian Aid case, the bureaucracy was divided 
within itself with Foreign Affairs officials resisting the 
Committee's recommendations while the new Aid Agency co-operated 
closely with the Australian Government to supplement the 
policies which the Committee had recommended.
As indicated in Chapter Eight, legal powers of Parliament 
under the peculiar circumstances of Ostpolitik did secure some 
influence for Parliament as a whole, but not for the Committee.
301
Thus, no clear pattern emerges, but it is very apparent 
that bureaucratic support is not a necessary consideration for 
Committee influence.
In contrast, international factors were generally potent 
weapons in the hands of parliamentary Committees. In most cases 
examined in this thesis, the influence of the Committee was 
enhanced by its ability to draw support for its position from 
the international environment.
In some cases this took the form of palpable pressures 
from foreign actors. Thus, in the case of the Franco-German 
Treaty, concern expressed not only by the American and West 
European Governments, but also by leaders of various European 
political parties and representatives of European supranational 
organisations provided political muscle for the Committee in 
its dealings with Adenauer. Similarly, in Canada's Sugar 
decision the arguments of the Committee were backed up by the 
strong protests of the West Indian Governments. In a somewhat 
different fashion the opinions of West European Governments and 
party leaders profoundly influenced the Canadian Commons 
Committee which in turn was able to muster enough support to 
force a modification in Trudeau's plans for NATO. The 
international environment, moreover, can be conditioned by 
forces much less direct than pressures from foreign actors.
Hence, in the case of the Jaksch-Report, perceptions of a 
changed international environment as a result of the first moves 
towards detente aided those arguing for a more flexible foreign 
policy. Even the strongest international pressures, however, 
do not guarantee Committee influence. The Ostpolitik case 
demonstrated the ability of German politicians to resist massive 
pressures from both allies and potential foes. In this case, 
the Committee was unable to use such pressures to build support 
for a substantive compromise because of divisions within the 
wider context of German politics.
This brings us to the main analytic concept of this 
thesis - that Committee action can be characterised as either
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integrative or divisive politics. These contrasting approaches 
were introduced in general terms in the Introduction and have 
played prominent roles in the analysis of each case study.
It is now appropriate to look in more detail at the concept 
of integrative politics.
First, let us look at the aims of integrative politics.
The basic aim of integrative politics is to influence the 
substance of foreign policy. This can be either via actions 
within the Committee's own powers (e.g. the blockage of the 
Mundat Forest Treaty) or by influencing Government decisions 
(e.g. Canada's NATO policy). By focusing on the substance of 
policy, Committee members, consciously or unconsciously, 
sacrifice short-term partisan advantage. When divisive politics 
are pursued, the aim becomes less the substance of policy and 
more the adjustment of the balance of power between Government 
and Opposition, either by seeking defections of backbenchers or 
by enhancing the electoral position of the respective sides.
The concern is not with foreign policy per se but with the 
domestic power implications of alternative foreign policies.
Let us now turn to the environment of integrative politics. 
Integrative politics cannot function in an atmosphere of 
diametrically-opposed foreign policies between Government and 
Opposition (e.g. as at the time of EDC). There must be a degree 
of commitment to common objectives so that the major parties can 
compromise and so avoid being forced into a situation of 
permanent confrontation. Moreover, such an environment requires 
a sufficient parliamentary majority to guarantee the continued 
tenure in office of the Government.
When such a majority does not exist (e.g. in the case of 
the Ostpolitik), then the temptations for deriving a partisan 
advantage will probably favour the use of divisive politics.
A corollary to the above is that the environment for 
integrative politics is enhanced when the various actors are 
not bound by rigid conceptions of their roles. Thus Opposition 
politicians should not regard their function as solely one of
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opposing the Government, nor should Government backbenchers 
regard their jobs as defending the Government under all 
circumstances, if integrative politics are to have a chance 
to prevail.
If such flexible attitudes are held then fluid coalitions 
of Government and Opposition parliamentarians can form and have 
an impact on policy. The required atmosphere of substantive 
debate will be supported by the presence of adequate knowledge, 
interest and information on the part of the parliamentarians 
concerned.
Such knowledge and interest was clearly present in the 
Canadian NATO and Sugar cases, but was absent to a significant 
degree in the Australian Aid case. Indeed, it can be said that 
only pseudo-integrative politics existed in the Australian case. 
This in turn is related to the number of qualified 
parliamentarians available for foreign policy positions, which 
in turn is a function of the size of Parliament. On the 
Government's side in particular, in the case of a small 
Parliament such as Australia's, once the 'brain-drain' into 
Cabinet has taken place, very little talent is left for service 
on parliamentary Committees.
This leads us to the incentives favouring the use of 
integrative politics. The basic incentive for integrative 
politics is that all sides may gain from a compromise. An 
Opposition which is unable to force its views on the Government 
through divisive politics can through integrative politics both 
obtain some influence over the substance of politics and appear 
to the electorate as a constructive foreign policy actor (e.g. 
the shift of SPD foreign policy at the time of the Jaksch- 
Report). The Government can gain by using the Committee as a 
sounding board (e.g. the Jaksch-Report), and it can benefit 
from Committee expertise where its own bureaucracy has failed 
it (e.g. Canadian Sugar).
Other actors also gain from integrative politics. 
Backbenchers of all persuasions have a chance to influence
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policy, and, in the process, to demonstrate their abilities and 
enhance their future careers. The bureaucracy gains the 
advantage of having alternative means of influence, other than 
their ministers, for furthering their pet projects. Of course, 
in any given case there will be some losers (e.g. Committee- 
Chairman Wahn in the NATO case). Moreover, in any given case 
each actor must make a political assessment as to whether 
integrative politics is likely to further his interests - and 
it is always possible that some will opt for divisive politics 
(e.g. Strauss and Wehner in the Ostpolitik). Even more 
detrimental to the possibility of integrative politics is a 
structural situation, such as exists in Australia, where the 
lack of adequate talent on the Government's side of the 
Committee diminishes the Government's interest in utilising the 
Committee because it would be at a permanent disadvantage in 
that forum.
Finally, let us examine the levels of integrative politics.
Integrative politics can operate at both the Committee and full
Parliament level. While these levels are obviously interrelated,
an atmosphere of integrative politics can be maintained in the
Committee even when there are significant elements of divisive
politics on the floor of the House. This was demonstrated
repeatedly in our case studies - the Jaksch-Report, Franco-
German Treaty, NATO and West Indian Sugar cases. Indeed, a
study of a Canadian parliamentary Committee dealing with
domestic policy strongly supports the view that the Committee
forum is more conducive to integrative politics than the floor
of the House: "... this case study throws new light on the
differences between the behaviour of legislators on the floor
of the House as contrasted with the ‘small group' situation in
committees. It is argued that more flexible relationships among
the government, parliament and the bureaucracy are possible [in
Committees] than either past practice or a rigid theory of
3responsible government would suggest".
J.R. Mallory and B.A. Smith, 'The Legislative Role of 
Parliamentary Committees in Canada. The Case of the Joint 
Committee on the Public Service Bills' in Canadian Public 
Administration, Vol. 15, No. 1, p.l.
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Our case studies not only indicate the validity of this 
distinction in the field of foreign policy, but also they argue 
that the Committee is dependent upon integrative politics for 
its influence. In the six case studies where Committee influence 
was demonstrated, with qualifications in the Australian case, 
integrative politics played a central role. This was in cases 
of both direct and indirect influence. While one can conceive 
of hypothetical cases where the Committee could exert influence 
in the absence of integrative politics, and it is even more 
possible to imagine a Government successfully resisting the 
views of a Committee practising integrative politics, 
nevertheless, the cases examined in this thesis suggest a strong 
link between Committee influence and integrative politics.
Indeed, these cases provide sufficient empirical evidence for 
the proposition that integrative politics is a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition for Committee influence. This 
conclusion was particularly underlined by our last two case 
studies where, despite the existence of important legal powers, 
the Committee failed to exert influence as it was overwhelmed 
by divisive politics.
For those who adhere to the theory of responsible 
Government, the above conclusions could raise some concern. 
Committee influence, it is clear, can be at the expense of the 
Foreign Minister who is responsible theoretically for foreign 
policy. Of course, as we have seen in the NATO case, this 
responsibility can also be under challenge from the head of 
Government, the Prime Minister.
For those who perceive the danger of Government co-option 
of the Committee through the pursuit of integrative politics as 
a reason for restricting the Committee's role, the practical 
alternative, at least in the field of foreign policy, is free 
rein for the bureaucracy and the Government. Finally, 
integrative politics provides an ironic twist to Bernard Crick's
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classic definition4 of control: Control means influence, but
it also can mean direct power; advice, and sometimes command; 
criticism and upon occasion even obstruction; scrutiny, and 
sometimes policy initiative; and occasionally publicity but 
more often discretion.
'Control means influence, not direct power; advice, not 
command; criticism not obstruction; scrutiny, not initiation; 
and publicity, not secrecy5. Eernard Crick, The Reform of 
Parliament, London, 1968, pp.25-26.
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Office of the Prime Minister, Transcript of Speeches and 
Press Releases, April 1968 to November 1971.
House of Commons, Debates, Sept. 1968 to Dec. 1969.
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House of Commons, Standing Committee of External Affairs 
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Department of External Affairs, Secretary of State for 
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Senate of Canada, Report of the Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs on Canada-Caribbean Relations, Ottawa 1970.
West Germany
Bundestagsdrucksachen, January to December 1954; December 
1956 to August 1963; November 1971 to August 1972.
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und Informationszentrum des Deutschen Bundestages) April-May 1972.
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